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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines livelihoods in the wake of agricultural commercialization under the 
Revitalization of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS) Programme and similar 
revitalization initiatives within the Olifants River Basin in Limpopo Province. The focus is on 
contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships implemented within selected 
smallholder irrigation schemes. The thesis is based primarily on in-depth empirical studies 
conducted between October 2003 and March 2009 in three sites located in two Integrated 
Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) poverty nodes namely, Greater 
Sekhukhune and Vhembe Districts. To a lesser extent, the thesis draws on findings from 
rapid appraisals of five additional study sites in Greater Sekhukhune District. 
Research findings showed that the performance of joint ventures and strategic partnerships 
had so far largely fallen short of expectations. With the exception of a minority of 
smallholders involved in RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships, the promise of higher 
incomes and improved livelihoods had often remained elusive, while debts and potential 
losses of often meagre household assets loomed large, threatening to erode existing 
livelihoods and undermine government interventions. This was mainly because ‘viability’ in 
both the RESIS and RESIS-Recharge phases was narrowly seen in economic and technical 
terms, such that reduction of transaction costs often entailed the divesting of 
responsibilities to address issues of rural poverty and inequality. Subsistence production had 
largely given way to commercially-orientated farming, and weak monitoring of contract 
formulation and implementation meant that voices of marginalized poor and vulnerable 
people, particularly women and the elderly, were not being heard. 
Research findings further revealed that while RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships 
increased incomes for a minority of smallholders, such arrangements did not meaningfully 
improve the productive, managerial and marketing skills of smallholders to ensure their 
effective participation in agriculture. Rather, strategic partnerships were creating a small 
class of black ‘arm-chair’ farmers, who played little or no active role and obtained few or no 
skills in commercial farming but perpetually depended upon and drew incomes from agri-
business initiatives run by externally-based agents. Adjunct to questions of sustainability for 
these farmers’ ability to participate in commercial farming, the thesis raises the question: 
What is the rationale for joint ventures and strategic partnerships in the context of South 
Africa’s Agricultural Sector Strategy objectives for support to black farmers? 
Contracts lacked mechanisms for equitable distribution of costs and benefits between 
contracted private partners and targeted smallholders, on the one hand, and the rest of 
members of local communities, on the other hand. Contracts also lacked provisions for post-
project recapitalization of infrastructure and rehabilitation of degraded land. This raised 
questions about the longer term sustainability of productivity, natural resource base and 
livelihood security in smallholder irrigation schemes. The conclusion of this thesis is that the 
challenge of reducing rural poverty and inequality in smallholder irrigation schemes might 
not be resolved through existing institutional approaches to agricultural commercialization.   
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
November 2011 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that Livelihoods and Agricultural Commercialization in Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes in Limpopo Province, South Africa is my own work, that it has not been submitted 
before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have 
used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references. 
 
 
 
Barbara Nompumelelo Tapela      May 2011 
 
 
Signed:…………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Research towards this thesis was made possible through funding from several sources. 
Firstly, the Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the 
Western Cape and the Centre for International Environmental and Development Studies 
(NORAGRIC) at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences collaboratively provided the major 
source of funding, under auspices of the ‘Human Rights in South Africa’s Land Reform’ 
Project of the Norwergian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR). Secondly, a doctoral fellowship 
award by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) covered a significant 
portion of the research costs on RESIS case studies and, in particular, enabled the expansion 
of primary research into Makuleke rural community. PLAAS and IWMI collaboratively 
availed additional funding for research on RESIS-Recharge Strategic Partnerships under 
auspices of a CGIAR Challenge Programme project entitled ‘Water Rights in Informal 
Economies’ (CP66). Towards enhancing on-going research in Makuleke, the Transboundary 
Protected Areas Research Initiative (TPARI) provided a small grant to explore and develop, 
through community engagement, guidelines for best practice in social research in rural 
communities neighbouring the Kruger National Park. 
I am particularly indebted to Professor Ben Cousins for his guidance throughout the 
research. My thanks also go to colleagues at PLAAS for their generous support. Various 
other institutional actors gave generous assistance during the research. These include 
persons affiliated to NORAGRIC, IWMI, the Water Research Commission (WRC), Greater 
Sekhukhune District Council, Ephraim Mogale Local Municipality (formerly Greater Marble 
Hall LM), Elias Motswaledi Local Municipality (formerly Greater Groblersdal Local 
Municipality), Thulamela Local Municipality, Limpopo Provincial Department of Agriculture 
(LDA), Mpumalanga Provincial Department of Agriculture and Land Administration (DALA), 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), Department of Land Affairs (DLA) office 
in Witbank, Limpopo Provincial Department of Local Government and Housing, Independent 
Development Trust (IDT), Africare, Sekhukhune Farmers Development Trust (SFDT), 
Hereford Farmers Association, Hereford Irrigation Board, Upper Arabie Balemi Irrigation 
Scheme Trust, Phetwane Farmers Association, Noordelike Sentrale Katoen (NSK), Makuleke 
Farmers Association, Arthur Creighton, Temong cc, Ndzalo Consulting, WOMIWU 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Consultants, Tobacco Institute of South Africa (TISA), Tobacco RSA and Limpopo Tobacco 
Processors (ex-MKTV). Special thanks go to Mrs Pearl Moruasui (formerly) of Africare, Dr 
Barbara van Koppen of IWMI, Marna de Lange (formerly) of Ndzalo, Dr Massoud Shaker and 
Mr Rex Mtileni (both formerly) of LDA, Mr Tshikolomo of LDA and Mr Jan Venter of DALA. I 
am also grateful to Elma Molobela, Michael Marotla, Emmanuel Masemola, Metla Mabye, 
Elmon Chauke, Attorney Hlongwane and Edward Maluleke for their assistance with the 
fieldwork.  
To my husband Nigel and son Mbongeni, I thank you for holding the fort and for your 
unwavering support throughout the research and writing up of this thesis. Last but not least, 
I acknowledge the foundational struggles by my parents, Florence Phathekile (nee Ntaisi) 
and Maccabees Bailey Poyah; and my late grandparents namely, Diana Judith (nee 
Tshabangu) and James Poyah Jele, and Ellen (nee Ngwenya) and Jonathan Molopo Ntaisi. I 
also humbly dedicate this work to the many women in my extended families and elsewhere 
in Southern Africa, who were never able to fully realise their aspirations throughout their 
own lifetimes owing to the multiple constraints they faced as black women living in difficult 
moments of our history. Without the collective sacrifices of all the above and His support in 
holding the whole framework of our existence together, this work would not have been 
possible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AgriBEE Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Framework for Agriculture 
ANC  African National Congress 
ARC  Agricultural Research Council 
BAT  British American Tobacco 
BEE  Black Economic Empowerment 
BBBEE  Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy (of the European Union)  
CASP  Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme 
CBDM  Cross Border District Municipality 
CBOs  Community Based Organizations 
CBPWP Community Based Public Works Programme 
CCAWs Coordination Committees for Agricultural Water 
CLRA  Communal Land Rights Act 
CLRB  Communal Land Rights Bill 
CMAs  Catchment Management Agencies 
DALA  Department of Agriculture and Land Administration (Provincial) 
DBSA  Development Bank of Southern Africa 
DLA  Department of Land Affairs 
DPLG  Department of Provincial and Local Government 
DWAF  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry  
ESKOM Electricity Supply Commission  
GEAR  Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy 
HDIs  Human Development Indices 
HFA  Hereford Farmers Association  
HVGA  Hereford Vegetable Growers Association  
IDP  Integrated Development Plan 
IDT  Independent Development Trust 
IDTT  Inter-Departmental Task Teams 
IGR  Inter-Governmental Relations 
IMT  Irrigation Management Transfer 
IPCC  Inter-Provincial Coordination Committees 
ISRDP  Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme 
ISRDS  Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy 
IWRM  Integrated Water Resources Management 
JVs  Joint Ventures 
LED  Local Economic Development 
LDCs  Less Developed Countries 
LRAD  Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
MKTV  Magaliesberg Kooperatiewe Tabak Vereeneging 
MTEF  Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
MWID  Major Water Infrastructure Development 
NAFU  National African Farmers Union 
NDA  National Department of Agriculture 
NDPW  National Department of Public Works 
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organizations 
PDoA  Provincial Department of Agriculture 
PDW  Provincial Department of Public Works 
RDP  Reconstruction and Development Programme 
REAP  Rural Enterprise and Agribusiness Programme  
RESIS  Revitalization of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes 
SAGL  South Africa Gold Leaf 
SFDT  Sekhukhune Farmers Development Trust 
StatSA  Statistics South Africa 
TFA  Tafelkop Farmers Association 
TISA  Tobacco Institute of South Africa 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UP  University of Pretoria 
WAR  Water Allocation Reform 
WRC  Water Research Commission 
WSDP  Water Services Development Plan 
WUAs  Water User Associations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
KEY WORDS ................................................................................................................................ 2 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... 3 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................ 4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................................. 5 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................................. 9 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... 18 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... 20 
CHAPTER ONE .......................................................................................................................... 22 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 22 
1.1 BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 22 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM ...................................................................... 27 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ................................................. 28 
1.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................... 29 
1.4.1 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS CONCEPT ........................................... 29 
1.4.2 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS APPROACHES..................................... 30 
1.4.3 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS FRAMEWORK .................................... 34 
1.4.3.1 Contexts, Conditions and Trends ................................................................ 35 
1.4.3.2 Livelihood Assets ........................................................................................ 35 
1.4.3.3 Institutions .................................................................................................. 37 
1.4.3.4 Institutional Arrangements ........................................................................ 38 
1.4.3.5 Livelihood Strategies .................................................................................. 39 
1.4.3.7 Vulnerability to Shocks and Trends ............................................................ 39 
1.4.3.8  Livelihood System ....................................................................................... 42 
1.4.3.9 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 42 
1.4.4 POVERTY, POWER, AGENCY AND RIGHTS ...................................... 43 
1.4.5 CAPABILITY APPROACH................................................................... 44 
1.4.6 ENTITLEMENTS ANALYSIS ............................................................... 48 
1.4.7 INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNABILITY .......................... 49 
1.5 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................. 52 
1.5.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 52 
1.5.2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK ................................................................ 53 
1.5.3 DATA COLLECTION .......................................................................... 56 
1.5.4 ANALYTICAL METHODS ................................................................... 58 
1.5.4.1 Stakeholder Analysis and Participation ...................................................... 58 
1.5.4.2 Gender Analysis .......................................................................................... 60 
1.5.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED DURING RESEARCH ......................... 61 
1.5.5.1 Issue of Relevance ...................................................................................... 61 
1.5.5.2 Issue of Bureaucracy ................................................................................... 62 
1.5.5.3 Ethical Issues ............................................................................................... 63 
1.5.6 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES ................................................... 65 
1.5.6.1 Livelihood Outcomes .................................................................................. 66 
1.5.6.2 Community ................................................................................................. 66 
1.5.6.3 Livelihood Sustainability ............................................................................. 66 
1.5.6.4 Livelihood Impacts ...................................................................................... 67 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE ......................................................................... 70 
CHAPTER TWO ......................................................................................................................... 73 
INTEGRATING SMALL-SCALE FARMERS INTO MAINSTREAM COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE: 
THE CONTEXT ........................................................................................................................... 73 
2.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 73 
2.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS .............................................................. 73 
2.2.1 CONTRACT FARMING ...................................................................... 73 
2.2.2 CONTRACT FARMING MODELS ....................................................... 74 
2.2.3 THE CONCEPT OF ‘SMALLHOLDER’ ................................................. 76 
2.3   RESURGENCE OF CONTRACT FARMING: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL 
BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 78 
2.3.1  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT FARMING AND 
EMERGENCE OF NEW AGRI-FOOD SYSTEMS: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 79 
2.3.2 THE RESURGENCE OF CONTRACT FARMING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 
REGIONAL OVERVIEW ..................................................................... 81 
2.3.3  SMALL-SCALE FARMERS’ INTEGRATION INTO GLOBALIZED AGRI-
FOOD SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL DEBATES ................................... 84 
2.4  SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: OVERVIEW ............... 88 
2.5 INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ... 
  ........................................................................................................ 92 
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 92 
2.5.2 ISRDP VISION AND ARTICULATION ................................................. 92 
2.5.3 ISRDP OBJECTIVES ........................................................................... 93 
2.5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRDP: OVERVIEW ............................... 93 
2.5.5 HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE ISRDP: POST-1994 RECONSTRUCTION 
  ........................................................................................................ 96 
2.5.6 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ISRDP .................................. 97 
2.5.6.1  World Bank Approach: Economic Liberalization ....................................... 98 
2.5.6.2 Van Zyl's Vision for Agriculture and Management of the Transition: 
Liberalization ................................................................................ 101 
2.6  OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEBATES ON ENHANCING RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................. 104 
2.6.4  WATER SECTOR PERSPECTIVES ON PROSPECTS FOR  SMALLHOLDER 
IRRIGATION FARMERS .................................................................. 112 
2.6.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 115 
2.7  ISRDP IN THE CONTEXT OF SMALLHOLDER FARMER SUPPORT IN 
GREATER SEKHUKHUNE DISTRICT ................................................ 115 
2.7.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .......................................................... 116 
2.7.2 GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING .............................................................. 117 
2.7.3 ISRDP IMPLEMENTATION IN GREATER SEKHUKHUNE: CHALLENGES 
  ...................................................................................................... 121 
2.7.3.1 Overview ................................................................................................... 121 
2.7.3.2 Challenges of Smallholder Irrigation Farmer Support .............................. 123 
CHAPTER THREE ..................................................................................................................... 126 
REVITALIZATION OF SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES PROGRAMME (RESIS): 
LIMPOPO PROVINCE ............................................................................................................. 126 
3.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 126 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
3.2  PRECURSOR OF RESIS PROGRAMME: RESURGENCE OF CONTRACT 
FARMING IN SOUTH AFRICA ......................................................... 127 
3.3 RESIS PROGRAMME IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE: ORIGINS ............... 129 
3.4 PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK ......................... 133 
3.5 EARLIER PHASES OF RESIS IMPLEMENTATION ............................. 135 
3.5.1 ENABLING POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............. 135 
3.5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF INNOVATIVE BEST PRACTICE ....................... 136 
3.5.3 LEARNING OF LESSONS FROM THE PAST ..................................... 136 
3.6 SHIFT FROM RESIS TO RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE ........................... 137 
3.7 DEFINITION AND TARGETING OF IRRIGATION FARMER CATEGORIES
  ...................................................................................................... 138 
3.8 RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: IMPLEMENTATION OF PILOT PROJECT 143 
3.9  RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: OVERVIEW OF PROGRAME 
IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................ 144 
3.9.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ................................................ 144 
3.9.2 ANALYSIS OF RESIS-RECHARGE ‘EMPOWERMENT’ CONTRACTS . 146 
7.2.2.1 Statement of ‘Historical Background’ ....................................................... 147 
7.2.2.2 Objectives of Strategic Partnerships ........................................................ 147 
7.2.2.3 Main Agreement ....................................................................................... 148 
7.2.2.4 Parties to the Contract ............................................................................. 149 
7.2.2.5 Rights, Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................ 149 
3.10 SUMMARY OF ISSUES RAISED BY SMALLHOLDERS ...................... 153 
3.11 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 154 
CHAPTER FOUR ...................................................................................................................... 155 
HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME .......................................................................................... 155 
4.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 155 
4.2 LOCATION ..................................................................................... 156 
4.2.1 SITUATION .................................................................................... 156 
4.2.2 SITE AND BIOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS ................................... 156 
4.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .......................................................... 157 
4.3.1 ORIGINS OF HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: 1926 TO THE 1980s .. 
  ...................................................................................................... 157 
4.3.2 NON-VIOLENT OCCUPATION AND THE PROCESS TOWARDS 
 FORMALIZATION OF LAND RIGHTS: FROM 1997 TO 2000 ........... 158 
4.4 LAND ALLOCATION ....................................................................... 162 
4.5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE .......................................................... 165 
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 165 
4.5.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF HOUSEHOLDS ........................................ 166 
4.5.2.1 Language Composition ............................................................................. 166 
4.5.2.2 Gender Composition ................................................................................. 166 
4.5.2.3 Definition of ‘Community’ and ‘Household’: Challenges ......................... 166 
4.5.2.4 Crop Production ........................................................................................ 169 
4.5.2.5 Employment ............................................................................................. 169 
4.5.2.6 Income ...................................................................................................... 171 
4.5.2.7 Household Material Resources................................................................. 171 
4.5.3 SELECTED LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES ............... 174 
4.5.3.1 On-Farm Livelihood Diversification Strategies ......................................... 174 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
4.5.3.2 Debts  ...................................................................................................... 176 
4.5.3.3 Vulnerability.............................................................................................. 177 
4.5.3.4 Shortage of Irrigation Water .................................................................... 179 
4.5.4 SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 183 
4.6 FARMER ORGANIZATION .............................................................. 184 
4.7  REHABILITATION AND 'REVITALIZATION' OF THE HEREFORD 
IRRIGATION SCHEME: STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS AND RESOURCES .. 
 ...................................................................................................... 187 
4.8  HEREFORD TOBACCO PROJECT: PRIVATE INVESTOR-LED JOINT 
VENTURE, 2003/2004 ................................................................... 189 
4.8.1 ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT ................................................. 189 
4.8.2 JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: 2003/2004............................... 192 
4.8.3 SMALLHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: 
ORAL TESTIMONY ......................................................................... 195 
4.8.3.1 Refilwe Monageng*: Plot J ....................................................................... 195 
4.8.3.2 Pinkie Dube* - Plot R ................................................................................ 196 
4.8.3.3 Kabelo Mabalane*: Plot W ....................................................................... 197 
4.8.3.4 Phineas Sithole*: Plot L ............................................................................ 198 
4.8.3.5 Elsie Maphala, daughter of Kereng Maphala*: Plot P .............................. 198 
4.8.4 JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: PERSPECTIVES BY OTHER 
STAKEHOLDERS ............................................................................. 199 
4.8.4.1 DALA Projects Officer, Maloeskop Local Office ........................................ 199 
5.8.4.2 Stephanus Van Meulen*: Local commercial farmer and member of 
Hereford Irrigation Board management committee .................... 201 
5.8.4.3 Marie Van Niekerk*: Commercial farmer formerly resident in the Greater 
Groblersdal area ........................................................................... 201 
5.8.4.4 Gerhadus Booysens: Local respondent with links to the Hereford 
commercial farming sector ........................................................... 201 
4.8.5 PERSPECTIVES FROM SENIOR MANAGERS OF TOBACCO RSA AND 
TISA ............................................................................................... 202 
4.8.5.1 Issue of Joint Venture Losses .................................................................... 202 
4.8.5.2 Issue of Irregular Harvesting of Monageng's Prime Tobacco Crop .......... 202 
4.8.5.3 Issue of Debts ........................................................................................... 203 
4.8.5.4 Issue of Profile and Status of MKTV ......................................................... 203 
4.8.5.5 Envisaged Way Forward ........................................................................... 204 
4.8.7 SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 204 
4.9  OVERVIEW OF A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PROCESS TO PROMOTE 
SMALLHOLDER ENTRY INTO GLOBALIZED VEGETABLE AGRI-
BUSINESS ...................................................................................... 205 
4.9.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 205 
4.9.2 HEREFORD VEGETABLE PACK HOUSE: ORIGINS ........................... 206 
4.9.3 REAP PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: CONTESTATION OVER 
LOCATION OF PACK HOUSE .......................................................... 208 
4.9.3.1 Overview of the Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making Process and 
Contestation ................................................................................. 208 
4.9.3.2 Perspectives of Hereford Smallholders on the Multi-Stakeholder Process: 
Resource Capture ......................................................................... 211 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
4.9.3.3 Perspectives of other Key Stakeholders on the Multi-Stakeholder Process: 
Power Dynamics ........................................................................... 212 
4.9.4 AFTERMATH OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DECISION MAKING PROCESS
  ...................................................................................................... 213 
4.9.4.1 Failure and Despondency: 2003 to 2004 .................................................. 213 
4.9.4.2 Resurgence of Contract Farming: Hereford Packaging House and Farmer-
Led Vegetable Joint Venture ........................................................ 215 
4.10 DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES .......................................................... 217 
4.10.1 SMALLHOLDERS AND BIG BUSINESS: A QUESTION OF POWER ... 217 
4.10.2 GENDER ISSUES ............................................................................. 220 
4.10.3 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CAPITAL-INTENSIVE CROPS.................. 222 
4.10.4 JOINT VENTURE RISKS IN THE CONTEXT OF RURAL POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY......................................................................................... 
 ...................................................................................................... 224 
4.10.5 COST AND BENEFITS SHARING ISSUES IN JOINT VENTURES ........ 227 
4.10.6 INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION AND MONITORING .................. 228 
4.10.7 MONITORING ................................................................................ 229 
4.11 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 230 
CHAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................................. 234 
PHETWANE IRRIGATION SCHEME ......................................................................................... 234 
5.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 234 
5.2 LOCATION ..................................................................................... 235 
5.2.1 SITUATION .................................................................................... 235 
5.2.2 SITE AND BIOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS ................................... 237 
5.2.3 POPULATION ................................................................................. 237 
5.2.4 WATER SOURCES AND USES ......................................................... 238 
5.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .......................................................... 240 
5.4 LAND ALLOCATION AND TENURE RIGHTS .................................... 242 
5.5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF PHETWANE COMMUNITY .......... 248 
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 248 
5.5.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF HOUSEHOLDS ........................................ 248 
5.5.2.1 Language Composition ............................................................................. 248 
5.5.2.2 Gender Composition ................................................................................. 248 
5.5.2.3 Employment ............................................................................................. 249 
5.5.2.4 Income ...................................................................................................... 255 
5.5.2.5 Household Material Resources................................................................. 256 
5.5.2.6 Crop production ........................................................................................ 257 
5.5.2.7 Food Consumption ................................................................................... 258 
5.5.3 SELECTED LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES ............... 260 
5.5.3.1 Informal Fishing by the Unemployed and Landless ................................. 260 
5.5.3.2 Debts  ...................................................................................................... 262 
5.5.3.3 Livelihood Shocks...................................................................................... 262 
5.5.3.4 Coping Strategies ...................................................................................... 263 
5.5.3.5 Health Issues ............................................................................................. 265 
5.5.4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 266 
5.6  PRELIMINARY PHASE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALIZATION IN 
PHETWANE: 2001 TO 2004 ........................................................... 267 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
5.6.1 INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION ............................................. 267 
5.7 OVERVIEW OF RESIS IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: 2003 TO 2004 .... 
  ...................................................................................................... 271 
5.7.1 INSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ............................ 271 
5.7.2 INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION .................. 272 
5.7.3 ENGAGEMENT WITH SMALLHOLDERS ......................................... 273 
5.7.4 PRE-DEVELOPMENT SURVEY ........................................................ 274 
5.7.5 ORGANIZATION OF INSTITUTIONS ............................................... 275 
5.7.5.1 Project Management Structure and Organization ................................... 276 
5.7.6 CHALLENGES TO DEVOLUTION: WUA REGISTRATION FAILURE ... 281 
5.7.2 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 282 
5.8 RESIS: COTTON JOINT VENTURE, 2003 TO 2004 .......................... 284 
5.8.1 INCEPTION PHASE: SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER 2003 .................. 284 
5.8.2 COTTON GROWING PHASE: JANUARY TO MAY ............................ 287 
5.8.3 COTTON PICKING PHASE: JUNE TO AUGUST 2004 ....................... 291 
5.8.4 POST-PRODUCTION PHASE: SEPTEMBER 2004 TO JULY 2006 ..... 295 
5.9 RESIS-RECHARGE: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 2008 ..................... 299 
5.9.1 INCEPTION OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ..................................... 299 
5.9.2 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ................................................ 301 
5.9.3 CONTRACTUAL FLAWS .................................................................. 302 
5.9.4 DISSATISFACTION OVER POWER AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
ISSUES ........................................................................................... 303 
5.9.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTRACT................................................ 304 
5.10 SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 305 
CHAPTER 6 ............................................................................................................................. 307 
MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME ......................................................................................... 307 
6.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 307 
6.2 LOCATION ..................................................................................... 309 
6.2.1 SITUATION .................................................................................... 309 
6.2.2 SITE AND BIOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS ................................... 311 
6.3 COMMUNITY PROFILE .................................................................. 311 
6.3.1 POPULATION ................................................................................. 311 
6.3.1.1 Population Distribution .................................................................................. 311 
6.3.1.2 Population Growth ................................................................................... 312 
6.3.1.3 Migration .................................................................................................. 312 
6.3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .......................................................... 313 
6.3.3 DEFINING ‘COMMUNITY’ .............................................................. 315 
6.3.4 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION ...................................... 316 
6.3.5 POWER DYNAMICS ....................................................................... 319 
6.3.6 LAND USE AND TENURE ................................................................ 322 
6.3.7 SOCIAL SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE .................................... 323 
6.3.8 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALLHOLDER 
HOUSEHOLDS ................................................................................ 325 
6.3.8.1 Household Size ......................................................................................... 326 
6.3.8.2 Education .................................................................................................. 326 
6.3.8.3 Employment Status .................................................................................. 327 
6.3.8.4 Income ...................................................................................................... 330 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
6.3.8.5 Crop Production ........................................................................................ 332 
6.3.8.6 Household Material Asset Ownership ...................................................... 333 
6.4 MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ... 336 
6.5  PRELIMINARY PHASE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALIZATION IN 
MAKULEKE: 1999 TO 2002 ............................................................ 339 
6.5.1 PRE-DEVELOPMENT SURVEYS ...................................................... 339 
6.5.2 RESTRUCTURING OF LAND DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA ................... 339 
6.5.3 LAND RE-ALLOCATION AND USAGE .............................................. 340 
6.5.3.1 Overview ................................................................................................... 340 
6.4.3.1 Allocation of Food Plots ............................................................................ 341 
6.4.3.2 Allocation of Commercial Plots ................................................................ 341 
6.4.3.3 Allocation of Orchard Plots ....................................................................... 342 
6.4.3.4 Allocation of Smallholdings by Gender .................................................... 343 
6.5.4 INSTITUTIONAL RE-ORGANIZATION ............................................. 344 
6.5.5 CAPACITY BUILDING ..................................................................... 345 
6.5.6 RESUSCITATION OF DBSA LOAN ................................................... 346 
6.5.7 REHABILITATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE ....................................... 347 
6.6 EARLY PHASE ONE OF RESIS: JOINT VENTURE WITH NSK ............ 349 
6.6.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ................................................ 349 
6.6.2 JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE AND FARMER’S RESPONSES ..... 356 
6.6.3 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 362 
6.7 RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH AWC . 363 
6.7.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ................................................ 363 
6.7.1.1 Modification of Equity Labourer and Private Investor Relationship ........ 363 
6.7.1.2 Contributions by Parties ........................................................................... 364 
6.7.1.3 Organization of Equity Labourers ............................................................. 364 
6.7.1.4 Duration of Contract ................................................................................. 365 
6.7.1.5 Roles, Responsibilities and Obligations .................................................... 365 
6.7.1.6 The Issue of Power ................................................................................... 366 
6.7.1.7 Exit Strategy .............................................................................................. 367 
6.7.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENT: 
2007 to 2009 ................................................................................. 367 
6.7.2.1 Crop Production Approach ....................................................................... 367 
6.7.2.2 Roles in Crop Production .......................................................................... 368 
6.7.2.3  Performance:  Crop Production and Income for Emerging Commercial 
Farmers ......................................................................................... 368 
6.7.2.4 Exclusion of Subsistence Food Producers ................................................ 369 
6.7.2.5 Distribution of Compensatory Benefits .................................................... 371 
6.7.2.6 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 373 
6.8  LIVELIHOOD IMPACTS: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND 
CHALLENGES ................................................................................. 373 
6.9  CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS AND LIVELIHOODS OF 
SELECTED INDIVIDUAL FARMERS, 2008/2009 .............................. 378 
6.9.1  RENIAS CHAUKE: EQUITY LABOURER WITHIN IRRIGATION SCHEME 
AND MARKET-ORIENTATED RIVERSIDE GARDENER ..................... 378 
6.9.1.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 378 
6.9.1.2 Historical Background ............................................................................... 378 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
6.9.1.3 Interaction with RESIS and RESIS-Recharge Interventions: Livelihood 
Outcomes ...................................................................................... 380 
6.9.1.4 Water Use ................................................................................................. 383 
6.9.1.5 Discussion and Conclusion........................................................................ 385 
6.9.2 MR T. G. PHOSA: MARKET-ORIENTATED GARDENER WITH PRIVATE 
BOREHOLE IN RAIN-FED CROPPING AREA .................................... 387 
6.9.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 388 
6.9.2.2 Historical Background ............................................................................... 388 
6.9.2.3 Interaction with RESIS and RESIS-Recharge Interventions: Livelihood 
Outcomes ...................................................................................... 388 
6.9.2.4 Water Use ................................................................................................. 395 
6.9.2.5 Discussion ................................................................................................. 396 
6.9.3 FARMER F: EQUITY LABOURER WITHIN IRRIGATION SCHEME AND 
MARKET-ORIENTATED RIVERSIDE GARDENER ............................. 399 
6.9.4 TOBIAS HLONGWANE: EQUITY LABOURER WITHIN IRRIGATION 
SCHEME AND MARKET-ORIENTATED RIVERSIDE GARDENER ...... 401 
6.9.5 FARMER ‘G’: EQUITY LABOURER IN IRRIGATION SCHEME ........... 403 
6.9.6 MR WILBERT RENDANI HLONGWANE AND MR PHILLIP DUMAS 
MALULEKE: INFORMAL ‘STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP’ FOR 
SUBSISTENCE RIVERSIDE GARDENING .......................................... 405 
6.9.6.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 405 
6.9.6.2 Background to the Informal ‘Strategic Partnership’ ................................ 406 
6.9.6.3 Livelihoods Generation Process, Strategies and Outcomes ..................... 407 
6.9.6.4 Water Use: Quantity ................................................................................. 409 
6.10  OVERVIEW OF EFFECTS OF CONTRACT FARMING ON LIVELIHOODS 
IN MAKULEKE COMMUNITY ......................................................... 410 
6.10.1 EMPLOYMENT ............................................................................... 410 
6.10.2 INCOME ........................................................................................ 414 
6.10.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION .......................................... 415 
6.10.4 LAND TENURE INSECURITY ........................................................... 418 
6.10.5 PROBLEMS OF SHARING WATER .................................................. 424 
6.11 COPING STRATEGIES ..................................................................... 426 
6.11.1 RELIANCE ON SOCIAL NETWORKS ................................................ 427 
6.11.1.1 Social Networks among Equity Labourers ................................................ 427 
6.11.1.2 Social Networks among Displaced Subsistence Food Producers ............. 429 
6.11.2 LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION: OVERVIEW OF INFORMAL 
IRRIGATION FARMING .................................................................. 430 
6.11.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 430 
6.11.2.2 Informal Commercial Irrigation in Riverside Gardens .............................. 431 
6.11.2.3 Informal Subsistence Irrigation in Riverside Gardens .............................. 433 
6.11.2.4 Homestead Gardens ................................................................................. 434 
6.12 DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES .......................................................... 436 
6.12.1 REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATION: LEGITIMACY ISSUE ................ 436 
6.12.2 CAPACITY BUILDING ..................................................................... 439 
6.12.3  GENDER AND DECISION-MAKING ................................................. 440 
CHAPTER SEVEN .................................................................................................................... 441 
SYNTHESIS OF KEY FINDINGS AND ISSUES ........................................................................... 441 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 441 
7.2  EARLIER RESIS PHASES: DISCUSSION OF SELECTED KEY FINDINGS 
FROM JOINT VENTURES IN HEREFORD, PHETWANE AND 
MAKULEKE .................................................................................... 442 
7.2.1 LIVELIHOOD CONTEXTS: OVERVIEW............................................. 442 
7.2.2 OVERVIEW OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SMALLHOLDERS AND 
JOINT VENTURES ........................................................................... 448 
7.2.3 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CAPITAL INTENSIVE FARMING ............. 451 
7.2.4 DEBT .............................................................................................. 452 
7.2.5 FARM WORKER WAGES ................................................................ 454 
7.2.6 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT AND MARGINALIZATION ....... 455 
7.3  RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS FROM 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE .................... 457 
7.3.1 GENERAL APPROACH .................................................................... 457 
7.3.2 PROJECT INCEPTION ..................................................................... 458 
7.3.3 CROP PRODUCTION ...................................................................... 459 
7.3.4 INCOME AND ‘SUCCESS’ ............................................................... 460 
7.3.5 SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING ......................................... 461 
7.3.6 LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES ........................................ 462 
7.3.7 DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS CROP ....................................................... 462 
7.3.8 EXCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS ................................. 463 
7.3.9 GOVERNANCE ISSUES ................................................................... 463 
7.3.10 EMPOWERMENT FRAMEWORK.................................................... 465 
7.3.11 MONITORING ................................................................................ 467 
7.4  KEY ISSUES IN INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL 
COMMERCIALIZATION AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN SMALLHOLDER 
IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE: DISCUSSION ...... 468 
7.4.1 ISSUE OF POWER .......................................................................... 468 
7.4.3 ISSUE OF VIABILITY ....................................................................... 473 
7.4.4 DIVERSITY OF SMALLHOLDER INTERESTS ..................................... 474 
7.4.5 EMPOWERMENT ISSUES ............................................................... 475 
7.4.6 CHALLENGES OF CO-MANAGEMENT ............................................ 477 
7.4.7 ISSUE OF SUBSIDIZED PRIVATIZATION ......................................... 483 
CHAPTER EIGHT ..................................................................................................................... 485 
AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALIZATION AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN SMALLHOLDER 
IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN LIMPOPO: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ............................... 485 
8.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 485 
8.2  INSTITUTIONAL AND LIVELIHOOD CONTEXTS FOR RESURGENCE OF 
CONTRACT FARMING IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE: SUMMARY ......... 486 
8.3 CONTRACT FARMING AND RURAL LIVELIHOOD SECURITY .......... 489 
8.4 JOINT VENTURE AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS ..... 492 
8.5  NURTURING RURAL LIVELIHOOD SECURITY WITHIN A HYBRID NEO-
LIBERAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY CONTEXT: 
DISCUSSION .................................................................................. 495 
8.6  TOWARD ENHANCED DECISION MAKING IN SMALLHOLDER 
IRRIGATION SCHEME INTERVENTIONS: EXPLORATORY POLICY 
OPTIONS........................................................................................ 496 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
8.7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 500 
APPENDIX 1 MAP SHOWING MAKULEKE WATER SOURCES AND USES, 2009 .. 506 
CITED REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 507 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 SIZE CATEGORIES OF IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA .... 26 
FIGURE 2 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS FRAMEWORK .................................... 35 
FIGURE 3 INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNABILITY .......................... 51 
FIGURE 4 LOCATION OF STUDY AREAS ........................................................... 53 
FIGURE 5 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK ................................................................ 55 
FIGURE 6                             AMALGAMATED EXPENDITURE ENVELOPE FOR FUNDING THE 
ISRDP ............................................................................................... 94 
FIGURE 7  GREATER SEKHUKHUNE DISTRICT: DEMARCATION OF MUNICIPAL 
BOUNDARIES ................................................................................. 118 
FIGURE  8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESIS AND ISRDP ................................. 132 
FIGURE 9 PHASES OF RESIS PROGRAMME IN LIMPOPO .............................. 134 
FIGURE 10 LOCATION OF HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME .......................... 157 
FIGURE 11  HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY  
DISTRIBUTION OF SMALLHOLDINGS BY GENDER, 2004 ............... 164 
FIGURE 12                          HEREFORD: CROP PRODUCTION, 2004 ......................................... 169 
FIGURE 13  HEREFORD: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF ADULT MEMBERS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS ..................................... 170 
FIGURE 14  HEREFORD: ABSTRACTION POINT AND CANVAS-PROTECTED TANKS 
FOR TEMPORARY SUPPLY OF RAW WATER FOR DOMESTIC USE, 
2004 .............................................................................................. 178 
FIGURE 15  HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: WATER STORAGE DAM AND 
ABSTRACTION POINT ALONG LINED PORTION OF HEREFORD 
CANAL, 2004 ................................................................................. 181 
FIGURE 16 HEREFORD: UNLINED SECTION OF HEREFORD CANAL, 2004 ....... 181 
FIGURE 17  HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: STAKEHOLDER SUPPORT 
NETWORKS FOR SMALLHOLDER MARKET ENTRY ........................ 189 
FIGURE 18  LOCATION OF PHETWANE IN THE CONTEXT OF UPPER ARABIE 
BALEMI IRRIGATION SCHEME TRUST AREA, 2009 ........................ 236 
FIGURE 19  PHETWANE: ALLOCATION OF PLOTS THROUGH PTOs BY GENDER 
AND AGE, 2004 ............................................................................. 243 
FIGURE 20  EFFECT OF SHARING ARRANGEMENTS ON ACCESS TO PLOTS 
ALLOCATED THROUGH PTOs, BY AGE, 2004 ................................. 247 
FIGURE 21  PHETWANE COMMUNITY: ADULT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY 
GENDER AND AGE, 2004 ............................................................... 249 
FIGURE 22 PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT POPULATION, 2004
 250 
FIGURE 23 UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE GROUP, 2004 ...................................... 251 
FIGURE 24                          UNEMPLOYMENT OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION EDUCATION,      
2004 .............................................................................................. 252 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
FIGURE 25  PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT POPULATION BY 
GENDER, 2004 ............................................................................... 254 
FIGURE 26 PHETWANE: MATERIAL ASSET OWNERSHIP BY HOUSEHOLD, 2004
 256 
FIGURE 27  PHETWANE COMMUNITY: CONSUMPTION OF SELECTED FOOD, 
2004 .............................................................................................. 259 
FIGURE 28  PHETWANE: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF DISCLOSED ILLNESSES 
AND DISABILITY, 2004 ................................................................... 266 
FIGURE 29  GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PHETWANE IRRIGATION SCHEME 
RELATIVE TO SIMILAR SCHEMES IN RESIS CLUSTER 11, 2009 ...... 269 
FIGURE 30  PHETWANE IRRIGATION SCHEME: PROPOSED MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE, 2004 ......................................................................... 277 
FIGURE 31 LOCATION OF MAKULEKE COMMUNITY ...................................... 309 
FIGURE 32                          SITUATION OF MAKULEKE COMMUNITY, 2008 ............................ 310 
FIGURE 33  MAKULEKE: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF COMMERCIAL PLOT    
HOLDERS BY EDUCATION AND AGE, 2005.................................... 327 
FIGURE 34  MAKULEKE: COMPARISON OF EMERGING FARMER AND FOOD 
PLOTHOLDER HOUSEHOLDS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, 2005 .... 328 
FIGURE 35  MAKULEKE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF EMERGING COMMERCIAL 
FARMERS BY GENDER, 2005 ......................................................... 329 
FIGURE 36  MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF 
PRODUCTIVE POPULATION BY GENDER, 2000 ............................. 330 
FIGURE 37  MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED HEADS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS BY MEAN MONTHLY INCOME, 1997 ..................... 331 
FIGURE 38  MAKULEKE: DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL FARMING 
HOUSEHOLDS BY MEAN MONTHLY INCOME, 2005 ..................... 332 
FIGURE 39  MAKULEKE: MATERIAL ASSET OWNERSHIP BY COMMERCIAL 
FARMING HOUSEHOLDS, 2005 ..................................................... 335 
FIGURE 40 MAKULEKE LAND USE: 1970 TO 2009 .......................................... 337 
FIGURE 41 MAKULEKE: PERCENTAGE ALLOCATION OF PLOTS BY GENDER ... 343 
FIGURE 42  MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF 
ALLOCATION OF COMMERCIAL PLOTS BY AGE AND GENDER, 2005 . 
 ...................................................................................................... 344 
FIGURE 43  MAKULEKE: EXAMPLES OF MEAN MONTHLY INCOME FOR 
CATEGORIES OF SMALL-SCALE IRRIGATION FARMERS, 2008 ...... 417 
FIGURE 44  MAKULEKE: SOME OF THE WOMEN SUBSISTENCE FARMERS WHO 
LOST WITHOUT COMPENSATION ACCESS TO RAIN-FED CROP 
FIELDS DURING IRRIGATION SCHEME DEVELOPMENT IN THE LATE 
1980S ............................................................................................ 419 
FIGURE 45  SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION OF SMALLHOLDER 
IRRIGATION SCHEMES: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF OWNERSHIP 
OF MATERIAL ASSETS BY HOUSEHOLDS, 2004 TO 2005 .............. 446 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1 SIZE CATEGORIES OF IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA .... 26 
TABLE 2  TYPES OF LIVELIHOOD ASSETS ........................................................ 36 
TABLE 3 TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION ....................................................... 60 
TABLE 4 TYPOLOGY OF CONTRACT FARMING MODELS ............................... 75 
TABLE 5 VAN ZYL'S VISION FOR INCREASING LAND ACCESS FOR SMALL- TO 
MEDIUM-SIZED COMMERCIAL FARMERS, 1996 ........................... 102 
TABLE 6  GREATER SEKHUKHUNE: SUMARY OF SELECTED LIVING 
CONDITIONS, 2002 ....................................................................... 119 
TABLE 7  TYPOLOGY OF FARMERS IN SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES 
TARGETED BY RESIS PROGRAMME ............................................... 141 
TABLE 8  OVERVIEW OF RESIS-RECHARGE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
CONTRACTS, 2009 ......................................................................... 152 
TABLE 9  GENDER ALLOCATION OF SMALLHOLDINGS IN HEREFORD 
IRRIGATION SCHEME, 2004 .......................................................... 163 
TABLE 10  HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: DISTRIBUTION OF 
SMALLHOLDINGS BY GENDER, 2004 ............................................ 164 
TABLE 11  HEREFORD: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT MEMBERS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS RESIDENT IN THE IRRIGATION SCHEME, 2004 ...... 170 
TABLE 12  MATERIAL ASSET OWNERSHIP BY HOUSEHOLDS IN HEREFORD 
IRRIGATION SCHEME, 2004 .......................................................... 172 
TABLE 13  HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: FREQUENCY OF DISCLOSED 
ILLNESSES IN SMALLHOLDER HOUSEHOLDS, 2004 ....................... 179 
Table 14  HEREFORD: KEY FUNDING FOR REHABILITATION AND UPGRADING 
OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND REVITALIZATION OF FARMING, 2000 - 
2006 .............................................................................................. 187 
TABLE 15  HEREFORD: SMALLHOLDER FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS FOR TOBACCO 
PRODUCTION, 2003 - 2004 ........................................................... 194 
TABLE 16  SMALLHOLDER ACCOUNTS FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTION 
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN FOUR SMALLHOLDERS AND LOCAL 
COMMERCIAL FARMER JOPPIE GRAHAM, 1999 ........................... 200 
TABLE 17  PHETWANE IN THE CONTEXT OF UPPER ARABIE BALEMI 
IRRIGATION SCHEME TRUST AREA, 2009 ..................................... 237 
TABLE 18  PHETWANE: ALLOCATION OF PLOTS THROUGH PTOs BY GENDER 
AND AGE, 2004 ............................................................................. 243 
TABLE 19  EFFECT OF SHARING ARRANGEMENTS ON ACCESS TO PLOTS 
ALLOCATED THROUGH PTOs, BY AGE, 2004 ................................. 247 
TABLE 20  PHETWANE COMMUNITY: ADULT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY 
GENDER AND AGE, 2004 ............................................................... 249 
TABLE 21 PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT POPULATION, 2004 . 
  ...................................................................................................... 250 
TABLE 22 UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE GROUP, 2004 ...................................... 251 
TABLE 23                       UNEMPLOYMENT OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION EDUCATION,    
2004 ................................................................................................... 252 
TABLE 24  PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT POPULATION BY 
GENDER, 2004 ............................................................................... 254 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
TABLE 25  PHETWANE: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF CONSUMPTION OF 
SELECTED FOOD, 2004 .................................................................. 259 
TABLE 26  CONSOLIDATED FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION 
AND OVERHEAD COSTS ON THE UPPER ARABIE IRRIGATION 
SCHEME ........................................................................................ 268 
TABLE 27  PHETWANE COMMUNITY: PERCEPTIONS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS, NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS, 2003 ............................... 275 
TABLE 28  PHETWANE: EARNINGS PER FARMER FOR IRRIGATION-RELATED 
LABOUR, 2004 ............................................................................... 289 
TABLE 29  PHETWANE: EARNINGS FROM COTTON PICKING AT R0.40 PER 
KILOGRAM, 2004 .......................................................................... 293 
TABLE 30 CLUSTER FOUR OF RESIS PROGRAMME SCHEMES IN LIMPOPO .. 307 
TABLE 31  STRATEGIC PARTNERS IN MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME, 2002 
TO 2009. ........................................................................................ 308 
TABLE 32  MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY 
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS, 2008 ................................................ 311 
TABLE 33  MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: COMMUNAL AND INDIVIDUAL PIPED 
DOMESTIC WATER SUPPLIES, 2008 .............................................. 324 
TABLE 34  MAKULEKE: PAIRWISE RANKING BY GENDER OF COMMUNITY 
NEEDS PERCEIVED AS MOST IMPORTANT, 1998 .......................... 339 
TABLE 35  MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: DISTRIBUTION OF PLOTS BY TYPE 
OF USE AND AREA, 2008 ............................................................... 340 
TABLE 36  MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: TOTAL LOAN REQUESTED FROM 
DBSA, 2000 ................................................................................... 347 
TABLE 37  MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: REHABILITATION OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE, 2000 TO 2003 ................................................. 348 
TABLE 38 MAKULEKE: COTTON PICKING ALLOWANCES, 2005 .................... 359 
TABLE 39 CAPITAL INVESTMENTS BY MR T. G. PHOSA, 2003 ...................... 391 
TABLE 40 PART OF PHOSA’S FARM BUDGET, 2008 ...................................... 394 
TABLE 41  EXAMPLES OF JOB CREATION BY MAKULEKE COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, 2000 TO 2003 ................................. 412 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Small-scale irrigation farming is envisaged to play a progressively larger role in rural 
development and in reducing some of the inequalities inherent in South Africa's space 
economy (South Africa, 1998b). A prevailing view within South African government circles is 
that increased involvement in commercial agriculture by resource-poor black small-scale 
farmers, who are mostly located in the marginal former homeland areas, is a viable strategy 
towards redressing the poverty, inequality, food insecurity and unemployment that pervade 
these areas largely as a legacy of the country’s colonial and apartheid history. This fact is 
demonstrated by the targeting of agricultural investment towards providing support to 
livelihoods, infrastructure, irrigation, services and skills development in the country’s 
poverty nodes, which were identified by the erstwhile Integrated Sustainable Rural 
Development Programme (ISRDP) (South Africa, 2001b). Smallholder irrigation farmers are 
among the range of small-scale producers that have been targeted by government 
interventions. 
Since the late 1990s, the South African government has implemented a nationwide 
programme to ‘revitalise’ state-owned smallholder irrigation schemes, which fell into disuse 
following sudden withdrawal of government subsidies in 1994. Of the 302 smallholder 
irrigation schemes found in South Africa (Van Averbeke et al, 2011), most are located in 
Limpopo Province (Figure 1; Table 1). Within the province, many of the schemes are located 
in impoverished former homelands and a smaller proportion consists of former white 
farmer settlement schemes located in commercial farming areas.  
The RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province focuses on at least one hundred and twenty-six 
(126) existing smallholder irrigation schemes and aims at “re-building socially uplifting [and] 
profitable agribusiness” through “a comprehensive programme to structure, train and 
capacitate smallholder farmers to run their scheme profitably and sustainably” (De Lange, 
2004). Many of the irrigation schemes were developed after publication in 1955 of the 
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Tomlinson Commission report on ‘Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas within 
the Union of South Africa’ (Tomlinson Commission Report, 1955).  
The Tomlinson Commission was tasked “to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into and report on 
a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native areas with a view to developing 
within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Natives and based on 
effective socio-economic planning.” The commission sought to clarify the complexity of 
administration and civic life in the African reserves through detailed data about African 
people, their eroding “tribal past” and their adaptation to the market economy in the white 
areas. Of significance was the fact that the Tomlinson Commission report was concerned 
with three inter-dependent primary policies.  
The first was the separation of farmers from non-farmers, which was done by calculating 
the minimum income from agriculture that would be capable of sustaining a farming 
household. The second was a land rehabilitation policy, for which the Tomlinson report 
sought to provide, as required by a 1943 report of the Social and Economic Planning Council 
on the Native Reserves, the “fundamental scientific knowledge on which to base wise land 
use so as to ensure that the productivity of the land will be increased and maintained”. The 
third policy addressed by the Commission related to the industrialization of native reserves. 
The main recommendations of the Commission were that government should consolidate 
the native reserves into seven Bantustans; acquire the 6 million acres set aside in terms of 
the 1936 Land Act; spend £104 million in the first ten years on socio-economic 
development, with 50 000 jobs created each year. The Tomlinson report further stated that 
if the homelands policy was to be viable, there would have to be the necessary 
infrastructure, land and money to make it work. 
Furthermore, on the basis of a survey of 111 peasants, who subsisted from farming alone, 
the Tomlinson Commission concluded that “£56 p.a. is large enough to attract a Bantu to 
full-time farming in mixed farming and pastoral areas, and to bind him permanently to the 
land.” From this conclusion, the Commission advocated that £60 per annum would be the 
minimum gross income required by individual rural households in the entire black farming 
population. The Tomlinson Commission further commented that “the Bantu will have to 
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raise his income of £60 to higher levels—by his own efforts.” The report recommended, 
among other things, that irrigated holdings of between 1.3 and 1.7 ha could adequately 
“provide a family with a living that would satisfy them” (Ibid.).  
While the foregoing concerns were basic components of government plans for native 
reserves during the apartheid era, what distinguished the Tomlinson report from others was 
that it provided quantitative measurement of socio-economic classes, as well as detailed 
proposals that made increased agricultural productivity dependent on the large-scale 
removal of “inefficient” peasants from the land. The result of recommendations such as 
these was that a significant proportion of the black population in the native reserves was 
subsequently forcibly removed from their land (see Platzky & Walker, 1985) to 
accommodate selected minorities within the farming population, who the report termed 
“economic farming units” (EFUs). The nation-wide tide of forced removals was linked to the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (Act 46) of 1959 and the accelerated 
implementation of ‘Betterment’ schemes, which characterized many homeland areas and 
the so-called ‘independent states’. Following the Tomlinson report and the subsequent 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, efforts were made to industrialize the 
administrative centres of homeland areas and ‘independent states’ and to develop 
smallholder irrigation schemes, which contributed to bolstering the apartheid architecture 
in the native reserves. However, the apartheid government seems to have known, from the 
Tomlinson Commission report, that the economic viability of both the smallholder irrigation 
schemes and the ‘self-governing’ states was extremely unlikely. 
Former homeland-based smallholder irrigation schemes became dysfunctional following 
sudden withdrawal of state subsidies by the post-apartheid government after 1994. This 
seems to have led to a deepening of food and livelihood insecurity within rural local 
communities. Large schemes were particularly affected, since these were often centrally-
managed and therefore heavily dependent on government support (Van Averbeke & 
Mohamed, 2006). By contrast, the breakdown of former white farmer settlement schemes 
appears to have been tenuous, varied and context-specific. 
While the RESIS Programme might therefore be construed to be an attempt to reverse 
adverse consequences of subsidy withdrawals, it is also true that the RESIS Programme has 
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been a response to an international drive to reduce transaction costs of operating state-
sponsored irrigation schemes and enhance efficiency in agricultural water use, productivity 
and marketing. Prescriptions for achieving this include the development of infrastructure, 
technology and farmer skills, irrigation management transfer (IMT) to farmers and 
implementation of agricultural commercialization, often through various permutations of 
contract farming. Under the rubric of ‘black economic empowerment’ (BEE), the RESIS 
Programme and similar initiatives have spawned various joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships. Within such enterprises, ‘contracts’ are principal institutional mechanisms to 
coordinate linkages between smallholders and agri-business firms and to facilitate entry by 
smallholders into commercial agriculture. 
The adoption of contract farming as a mechanism to govern linkages between small-scale 
farmers and agri-business firms or promote small-scale farmers’ entry into mainstream 
commercial agriculture is not new in developing countries (Glover & Kusterer, 1990:1; 
Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002a) and South Africa (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002b). What is new is the 
unprecedented level of complexity in the globalization and integration of industrial agri-
food systems, and the large number of actors and institutions that farmers have to interact 
and transact with. Such development is associated with the emergence since the 1980s of 
“new agricultures” that are geared towards high-value crops (Little & Watts, 1994), an 
increasing involvement of small-scale farmers in contract farming in developing countries 
and a reduction of state roles in farmer support as private sector roles increase (Da Silva, 
2005:4). The net effect has been a strengthening and expansion of market penetration into 
rural areas that have hitherto been characterized by subsistence forms of production.  
Beyond global and regional influences, the RESIS Programme in South Africa has emerged 
against a backdrop of national macro-economic policy shifts away from the focused anti-
poverty strategies of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) towards a dual 
emphasis on both poverty reduction and national economic goals espoused by the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy. The RESIS Programme has also emerged in 
tandem with the erstwhile government-led Integrated Sustainable Rural Development 
Programme (ISRDP), which was a key national framework for rural development from 2001 
to 2009 before it was replaced by the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme 
(CRDP) (see Section 2.5). Support to emerging farmers by various sectors, in particular, 
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derives from the core objectives of the Agricultural Sector Strategy (South Africa, 2001b) 
namely, to: 
 Enhance equitable access and participation in the agricultural sector; 
 Improve global competitiveness and profitability; 
 Ensure sustainable resource management; and 
 Ensure food security. 
 
FIGURE 1 SIZE CATEGORIES OF IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
TABLE 1 SIZE CATEGORIES OF IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Size in 
Ha Limpopo 
Eastern 
Cape 
KwaZulu-
Natal Mpumalanga 
Western 
Cape 
North 
West 
Free 
State 
>1500 
 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 
50 to 
1500 9 3 3 0 0 0 0 
151 to 
500 27 4 3 0 1 0 0 
51 to 
150 70 7 2 3 0 0 0 
5 to 50 
 46 41 4 5 7 2 3 
<5 
 0 16 17 0 0 0 0 
Total n 
 153 73 30 8 8 2 3 
 
Source: Shaker, 2005 
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The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Framework for Agriculture (Agri-BEE) 
addresses the first two objectives, and joint ventures and strategic partenrships are 
considered a key strategy for promoting entry by emerging irrigation farmers into the 
commercial sector. Strategic initiatives that complement Agri-BEE include Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT), Water Allocation Reform (WAR), DWA Policy on the Financial 
Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers, Land Reform Policy, the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) and municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) 
and Local Economic Development (LED) frameworks, among others. 
Within Limpopo Province, revitalization objectives articulate the aforementioned national 
institutional frameworks as well as the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS) 
(Limpopo Provincial Government, 2004). The PGDS is premised upon a view that resolving 
challenges of poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and rural development in the 
province will depend largely on investment and growth in the agricultural sector.  
While objectives of the RESIS Programme have resonated with national macro-economic 
policy objectives, implementation of revitalization initiatives in Limpopo Province has 
tended to promote agricultural commercialization rather than subsistence production by 
smallholders. Increasingly, since 2005, the RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province has 
become focused on black economic empowerment, ‘strategic partnerships’ and irrigation 
infrastructure development. A pertinent question for the study was whether or not success 
or failure of the ISRDP, as a key institutional framework for rural development from 2001 to 
2009, would ultimately be reckoned by the extent to which global rather than local 
imperatives and economic rather than livelihood interests had influenced conceptualization 
of the interventions such as the RESIS Programme.  
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The research problem for the study was captured in the following overarching question: 
 Does agricultural commercialization of smallholder irrigation schemes in South 
Africa, as articulated mainly through contractual joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships, provide an adequate construct for achieving rural livelihood security 
within selected impoverished local communities in Limpopo Province? 
Subsumed within this overarching question were four broad sets of questions relating to: 
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 Institutional contexts  
 Institutional arrangements; 
 Livelihood assets, strategies, impact factors, outcomes and vulnerability to shocks 
and trends; and 
 Policy and institutional issues. 
Specific research questions were:  
 In what institutional and livelihood context has the resurgence of contract farming 
occurred in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province? 
 How have contracts for joint ventures and strategic partnerships been formulated 
and implemented in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province?  
 How have agricultural commercialization initiatives affected livelihoods of petty 
commodity producers, subsistence farmers and other people in smallholder 
irrigation scheme communities? 
 What are the key policy and institutional issues for government interventions in 
smallholder irrigation schemes? 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 The research aim was to determine whether or not agricultural commercialization of 
smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa, as articulated mainly through 
contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships, provided an adequate 
construct for achieving rural livelihood security in selected impoverished local 
communities within Limpopo Province. In pursuing this aim, a key concern was 
whether or not institutional arrangements reflected interests of the poor and 
vulnerable in such communities. Such examination was predicated on detailed 
analyses of livelihood portfolios and strategies in selected case study sites. 
Research objectives were to: 
 Characterize the institutional and livelihood context for the resurgence of contract 
farming in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province; 
 Examine the institutional arrangements for joint ventures and strategic partnerships 
in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province;  
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 Examine the effects of agricultural commercialization initiatives on livelihoods of 
petty commodity producers, subsistence farmers and other people in local 
communities associated with selected small-scale irrigation schemes; and 
 Identify key policy and institutional issues for government interventions in 
smallholder irrigation schemes. 
1.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This section presents the conceptual framework for the study. Firstly, the background to 
sustainable livelihoods approaches is presented. This is followed by an outline of the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), which is a key conceptual framework for the 
study. Towards overcoming the observed shortcomings of the SLF (Scoones, 2009), the 
section proceeds to present a brief outline of other relevant analytical concepts and 
conceptual and methodological frameworks. Concepts of poverty, power, agency and rights 
are briefly outlined before the presentation of overviews of the Capabity Approach and 
Entitlement Analysis (e.g. Amartya Sen) and the Integrated Framework for Governability 
(Kooiman, 2008). This blended conceptual framework enables a more rigorous examination 
and synthesis of complex institutional aspects of agricultural commercialization and their 
impacts on livelihoods associated with smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province.  
1.4.1 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS CONCEPT 
‘Livelihoods’ have been defined in terms of the capabilities, assets and activities required for 
a means of living (Chambers & Conway, 1992: 7). ‘Sustainable livelihoods’ are those that can 
cope with, recover from and adapt to stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance their 
capabilities and assets and provide net benefits to other livelihoods locally and more widely, 
both at present and in the future, without undermining the natural resource base (Ibid.).  
In his earlier work, Scoones (1998) observed that the term ‘sustainable livelihoods’ often 
embraced “uneasy compromises” that were embedded within the same definition, and 
existing literature often gave little clarity about how contradictions are addressed and trade-
offs assessed. Scoones (Ibid.) linked this ambiguity of definition and methodological 
vagueness to difficulties with ‘sustainable development’. Sustainable development, as 
defined in the Bruntland Commission’s 1987 Report Our Common Future (WCED, 1987:43), 
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has been subject to robust debate over the meanings and articulation of sustainable 
development (Hall, 2000; Hoff, 1998:5; O’Riordan, 1998; Chatterjee & Finger, 1994; Seidman 
& Anang 1992; MacNeill et al, 1991). Criticism that the concept of sustainable development 
fails to specify how sustainability should be achieved (Dietz, 1996; Cole, 1994; Chatterjee & 
Finger, 1994) and embodies ideological and conceptual inconsistencies (Chatterjee & Finger, 
1994; Vivian, 1995; Blaikie, 1985) echoes Scoones’ (1998) point about the contradictions 
and ambiguity of the sustainable livelihoods concept.  
In his latter work, Scoones (2009: 172) comments that the term livelihoods is mobile and 
flexible, and “can be attached to all sorts of other words to construct whole fields of 
development enquiry and practice”. These relate to ‘locales’ (rural or urban livehoods), 
occupations (crop farming, pastoral or fishing livelihoods), social difference (gendered, age-
defined livelihoods), directions (livelihood pathways and trajectories), dynamic patterns 
(sustainable or resilient livelihoods) and many more (Ibid.).   
1.4.2 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS APPROACHES 
Since the 1990s sustainable livelihoods approaches have become increasingly central to 
debates around rural development, poverty reduction and environmental management 
(Scoones, 1998; Farrington et al, 1999). The sustainable livelihoods approach has been used 
by donor organizations, such as the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID), United Nations (UN) Development Programme (UNDP), Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme, Oxfam, CARE International Khanya 
and others (Knutsson, 2006; Hussein, 2002; Farrington et al, 1999).  
While the proliferation of rural development initiatives guided by the approach appears to 
have followed the late 1990s burgeoning of theoretical work on sustainable livelihoods by 
various scholars (Carswell, 1997; McDowell & De Haan, 1997; Carney, 1998; Hussein & 
Nelson, 1998; Scoones, 1998), some scholars (Ellis, 2002 in Hussein, 2002; Clark, 2005) 
assert that the late 1990s explosion of interest in sustainable livelihoods did not constitute a 
significant innovation in development practice. Ellis & Biggs (2001) trace origins of the 
sustainable livelihoods approach to strands of ideas developed through the 1980s and 1990s 
by scholars such as Chambers (1983), Chambers & Conway (1992) and Bernstein et al (1992) 
and from famine analysis of the 1980s (Sen, 1981; Swift, 1989). Concepts that prefigured 
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sustainable livelihoods have been used since the 1980s to address issues of famines and 
food insecurity (Ellis 2002 in Hussein, 2002). Clark (2005) states that sustainable livelihoods 
approaches build upon ‘basic needs’ approaches, which were pioneered by Paul Streeten et 
al (1981) and Frances Stewart (1985).  
Basic needs approaches came to the fore following failure by many African countries to 
achieve industrial development and economic growth during the Industrial Development 
era (Friedmann, 1992). At that time, development approaches were premised upon the 
notion of regional convergence and tended to assume similar paths of development for 
both developed and Third World countries (Daly, 1996 in Hoff, 1998). At independence 
many Less Developed Countries (LDCs) therefore entered the world economy with the goal 
of achieving industrial development and economic growth, but their export-based 
economies and the heavy financial debts soon militated against this aim (Chatterjee & 
Finger, 1994). Centrally planned, capital-intensive aid projects and integrated rural 
development (IRD) projects failed to alleviate poverty and resulted in environmental 
degradation and further erosions of rural livelihoods, food security and incomes (Darkoh, 
1996). Such failure constituted a crisis that forced a re-examination of the mainstream 
development models in the 1970s and adoption of basic needs approaches (Friedmann, 
1992). 
Scoones (2009) refutes claims by some genealogies of livelihoods thinking that associate the 
emergence of such perspectives with an influential paper by Chambers & Conway (1992). By 
asserting that the history of a cross-disciplinary livelihoods perspective has influenced rural 
development thinking for the past 50 or more years, Scoones (Ibid.) also implicitly questions 
the claims by some scholars (e.g. Ellis & Biggs, 2001; Ellis 2002 in Hussein, 2002; Clark, 2005, 
among others) that origins of livelihoods approaches can be traced to the 1980s and 1990s. 
He cites Fardon’s (1990 in Scoones, 2009) work, which documented a cross-disciplinary 
collaboration involving ecologists, anthropologists, agriculturalists and economists who 
since the 1950s sought to change rural systems and their development challenges in the 
Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Zambia. Scoones comments that although such work was 
not labeled as such, it was quintessentially livelihoods analysis.  
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Scoones asserts that the reason why such work did not come to dominate development 
thinking in the decades following the Second World War was that policy advice was 
increasingly influenced by professional economists. This was linked to the emergence of 
post-war institutions for development namely, the World Bank, the UN system, bilateral 
development agencies and national governments of newly-independent countries across 
the world. The hegemonic framing of development discourses by economists and associated 
specialists from technical disciplines from the natural, medical and engineering sciences 
pushed social science expertise and cross-disciplinary livelihoods perspectives, in particular, 
to the periphery. Scoones surmises that while alternative radical Marxist perspectives 
engaged at the macro-level on the political and economic relations of capitalism, they rarely 
delved into the particular, micro-level contextual realities on the ground. There were 
exceptions, however, such as works by economists and Marxists in the fields of agricultural 
economics and geography. These offered a more nuanced view through, for example, 
empirically-based village studies that were alternative to economic analyses of rural 
situations (Lipton & Moore, 1972 in Scoones, 2009), studies of diverse impacts of the Green 
Revolution in India (e.g. Farmer 1977 in Scoones, 2009; Walker & Ryan 1990 in Scoones, 
2009) and Norman Long’s (1984 in Scoones, 2009) actor-orientated approach, which 
referred to livelihood strategies in Zambia. 
The resurgence of interest in sustainable livelihoods in the late 1990s is attributed to rising 
concerns over the persistence of poverty despite interventions by governments, donors and 
non-governmental organizations (Farrington et al, 1999; Ellis, 2002 in Hussein, 2002). There 
was a shift in development theory in the mid-1990s, which gave rise to the emergence of 
the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ (Béné et al, 2010:6; Baulch, 1996; Lipton & Ahmed, 1997; 
Gore, 2000). This shift led to a renewed interest in interventions aimed at people centered 
poverty reduction, for example, through the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy 
initiative, through debt cancellation and through recognition of the importance of ‘voices of 
the poor’ (Narayan et al 2000 in Béné et al, 2010:6). Concepts such as self-esteem, 
vulnerability and social exclusion began to gain attention (Beck, 1994 Béné et al, 2010:7; 
Atkinson 1998 in Béné et al, 2010:7) along with issues related to well-being, human and 
gender rights, civil society and social movements (Béné et al, 2010:7; Friedman, 1996; 
Chambers, 1997; Sen, 1999). Renewed focus on poverty appears to have influenced the 
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renewed interest in livelihoods in rural contexts, such as smallholder irrigation schemes. 
Farrington et al (1999) further ascribes such interest to increasing donor commitment to 
tackling poverty, which made the search for answers on how to best address poverty more 
urgent.  
Application of the sustainable livelihoods approach has tended to be varied and flexible, but 
permutations of the approach share certain core principles (Farrington et al, 1999). Such 
principles include: 
 Putting people at the centre of development; 
 Shifting away from the traditional focus on income and consumption criteria for 
assessing poverty towards more comprehensive criteria that capture the diversity of 
poverty aspects; and  
 Recognizing relationships between micro-level and macro-level characteristics and 
processes.  
Carswell et al (1997 in Scoones, 1998) observed that despite the widespread adoption of 
sustainable livelihoods approaches, “definitions of sustainable livelihoods were often 
unclear, inconsistent and relatively narrow” and without clarification there was a risk of 
simply adding to the conceptual muddle. While trade-offs between productivity, equity and 
sustainability were critical to the achievement of sustainable livelihoods (Carswell, 1997: 3), 
practical difficulties remained in understanding how, in practice, to handle trade-offs 
(Farrington et al, 1999).  
While the sustainable livelihoods approach has been hailed as enabling a comprehensive 
understanding of poverty and synthesis of many issues into a single framework (Ashley & 
Carney, 1999), scholars have also pointed to a number of fundamental flaws. Criticism has 
been that the approach and framework overall can “convey a somewhat cleansed and 
neutral approach to power issues”, which starkly contrasts with the fundamental role that 
power imbalances play in causing poverty (Ibid.). Related criticism has been that the 
sustainable liveliihods approach and framework do not give attention to rights (Carney, 
2003) and implicitly accept the status quo of poverty and inequality (Budlender & Dube, 
1998).  
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1.4.3 SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS FRAMEWORK  
The study’s conceptual framework was based on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
(SLF) (Figure 2), which was developed by various scholars (Scoones, 1998; Farrington et al, 
1999; Carswell, 1997; McDowell & De Haan, 1997; Carney, 1998; Hussein & Nelson, 1998; 
Chambers & Conway, 1992). The SLF shows how, in different contexts, sustainable 
livelihoods are achieved through access to a range of livelihood assets, which are combined 
in the pursuit of different livelihood strategies (Scoones, 1998). A central tenet within the 
framework is the analysis of the range of formal and informal organizational and 
institutional factors that influence sustainable livelihood outcomes (Ibid.). The study was 
mainly concerned about the policies and institutions that mediate livelihood opportunities, 
and examined whether or not policies and institutions reflected interests of the poor. Such 
examination was predicated on detailed analyses of livelihood portfolios and strategies, and 
their linkages to institutions and institutional arrangements.   
In using the SLF, however, the study was mindful of the challenges and limitations 
associated with the framework, particularly with regard to issues of power (Ashley & 
Carney, 1999), rights (Carney, 2003; Norton & Moser, 2001 in Carney, 2003; Ashley & 
Carney, 1999), social capital (Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2001), agency 
(Giddens, 1979) and governance and governability (Kooiman, 2008; Kooiman & Jentoft, 
2009). Chambers & Scoones (2009) state that key issues that livelihoods approaches have 
failed to address include processes of economic globalisation; power, politics and links 
between livelihoods and governance; long-term environmental change; long-term shifts in 
rural economies; and wider questions about agrarian change. Hence, the SLF was 
complemented by elements of methodologies such as Entitlement Analysis and the 
Capability Approach (Sen, 1981, 1984, 1999; Gasper, 2006; Nussbaum, 2003) and the 
Integrated Framework for Governability (Kooiman, 2008) and Stakeholder Analysis 
(Overseas Development Administration (Bryson, 2004), among others. This thesis does not 
delve into a detailed review of such frameworks and approaches, but draws from them to 
strengthen the SLF used by the study. 
Based on the SLF, key concepts for the study’s conceptual framework included ‘contexts’, 
‘livelihood assets’, ‘institutions’, ‘institutional arrangements’, ‘power’, ‘rights’, ‘agency’, 
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‘livelihood strategies’, ‘livelihood outcomes’, ‘vulnerability to shocks and trends’ and 
‘livelihood system’ (UNDP, 1999).     
 
 
 
1.4.3.1 Contexts, Conditions and Trends 
‘Context’ referred to the historical, political, policy, legislative, programmatic, macro-
economic, environmental, demographic, economic and social backdrop against which RESIS 
Programme era contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships have emerged in 
smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province. Since these contractual arrangements 
intersected with livelihoods of people living in irrigation scheme communities, institutional 
context encompassed ‘livelihood contexts’, which is the totality of people’s surroundings. 
The study analysed institutional and livelihood contexts, conditions and trends.   
1.4.3.2 Livelihood Assets 
Livelihood assets are also synonymously termed ‘resources’ or ‘capitals’. In explaining the 
meaning of ‘resource’, Zimmermann (1971 in Mitchell, 1979) states that resources “are not, 
VULNERABILITY TO SHOCKS AND TRENDS 
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they become; they are not static but expand and contract in response to human wants and 
human action”. According to Omara-Ojungu (1992), Zimmermann’s philosophical view is 
that objects or attributes become resources when they are considered to be capable of 
satisfying human needs and objectives. Amenability to human use rather than mere physical 
presence therefore appears to be a key underlying criterion guiding definitions of livelihood 
resources or assets. The study considered therefore that livelihoods assets broadly refer to 
the endowments, entitlements and capabilities available to individuals, households and 
communities. 
Livelihood assets are often classified into five main types namely, natural, physical, human, 
social and economic or financial assets (Table 2). ‘Natural’ assets refer to natural ‘stocks’, 
such as land, water, soils and genetic resources, and environmental ‘services’, such as the 
hydrological cycle, nutrient cycling and pollution sinks (Scoones, 1998). ‘Physical’ assets 
include irrigation infrastructure, housing, electricity, roads and fences, among others. 
‘Financial’ assets include, for example, incomes, savings and access to credit. ‘Human’ assets 
refer to knowledge, information, skills, labour, culture, sound health and similar attributes. 
‘Social’ capital or assets include extent of social organization, social cohesion and social 
relations such as kinship, friendship, membership of interest groups and, in particular, 
access to networks and platforms for socio-political engagement and collective action, 
among others. 
TABLE 2  TYPES OF LIVELIHOOD ASSETS 
Type of Resource Description 
Natural Natural stocks, such as soil, water, air and genetic resources, and 
environmental services, such as the hydrological cycle and pollution 
sinks.  
Physical Physical infrastructure, such as irrigation, housing, roads, 
communications, power supplies. 
Human Skills, knowledge, ability to labour, good health and physical capability.  
Social Social cohesion, conflict resolution, customs, social networks. 
Economic or Financial Cash, credit or debt, savings, borrowing; Input and labour costs, 
demand; Credit and financial management; Market prices, stability and 
transaction costs  
Source: Adapted from Scoones (1998) and Lankford (2003) 
The study considered that all five types of assets were critical components of rural people’s 
‘baskets’ of diverse livelihood strategies. However, for rural individuals, households, 
communities and smallholders among these, social capital was particularly important. Social 
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capital included social organization, social cohesion, conflict resolution, customs and social 
networks. Combined with other livelihood assets, social capital contributed to the 
effectiveness of engagements with diverse stakeholder interests and power dynamics, and 
the ability of people to claim their rights, access their entitlements, enhance their 
capabilities, exercise freedoms of choice, obtain desired outcomes and reduce their 
vulnerability to shocks and trends. Through access to platforms for socio-political 
engagement and collective action, social capital potentially strengthened the reckoning 
position of the rural poor against domination by the more powerful local elites and external 
agents, who might collude to capture access to bases of productive wealth and social 
power. In each case study site, individual, household and community profiles were 
constructed and analysis was made of livelihood assets, trade-offs, combinations, sequences 
and trends. Such analysis took into account the background contexts, conditions and trends 
as well as institutions and institutional arrangements pertaining to adopted agricultural 
commercialization approaches.  
1.4.3.3 Institutions 
Institutional theory defines institutions as the rules, regulations and conventions that 
impose constraints to human behavior to facilitate collective action (North, 1990). 
Institutions “provide stability and meaning to social behavior”, operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdictions and are transported by various carriers, such as cultures, structures and 
routines (Scott, 1995). By providing structure and stability to social relations and access to 
bases of social power and productive wealth, institutions determine the endowments, 
entitlements and capabilities of local communities and households. Institutions operate at 
multiple levels of jurisdictions and are transported by various carriers, such as cultures, 
structures and routines (Scott, 1995).  
The term ‘institution’ in the study broadly referred to formal and informal frameworks, 
structures and networks. Institutional frameworks included policies, legislation, guidelines, 
regulations, rules, norms and standards, which range from local, provincial, national and 
regional to global level. Institutional structures included relevant government departments, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), municipalities, private investors, civic society 
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organizations (CSOs), traditional leadership structures and community based organizations 
(CBOs) and farmers’ associations.  
At smallholder irrigation scheme level, informal institutions also included unwritten and/or 
uncodified rules, norms and standards, such as de facto rules and practices regarding access 
to resources, which fall outside the ambit of formal legislation and customary rules but are 
widely recognized as legitimate by members of local communities. While some of these 
were rooted in long-standing traditional governance systems and cultural rules and norms, 
others were routinely crafted by people as they grappled with day-to-day social challenges 
and uncertainty.  
The study recognized that while institutions are intended to provide stability and structure, 
power dynamics could result in institutions positively or negatively affecting livelihood 
assets, strategies, outcomes and vulnerability to shocks and trends, particularly for people 
at the local level. Conversely, affected people could use their assets and agency to influence 
institutions, provided they possess sufficient assets and, in particular secure rights.   
The study also recognized that the multiple levels of institutional jurisdictions and the 
diversity of stakeholders implied that, within smallholder irrigation scheme contexts, there 
could be coexistence of plural formal and formal institutions. Such pluralism could lead to 
convergence or disjuncture between local and externally-driven institutional arrangements.  
1.4.3.4 Institutional Arrangements  
‘Institutional arrangements’ refer to organizational systems, processes, procedures and 
mechanisms. The study was particularly interested in institutional arrangements pertaining 
to agricultural commercialization and, in particular, contractual joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships. Specific attention was given to the analysis of contracts governing 
relationships between petty commodity producers and private investors. Beyond these 
agents, the study also examined the ways in which such contracts affected subsistence 
farmers and others within local communities. This latter analysis was informed by insights 
about linkages between farm-based and non-farm incomes (Reardon et al, 2001; Ellis, 1998) 
and that “…extremely poor people live in rural areas and have livelihoods which are bound 
closely to smallholder agriculture as farmers, labourers, transporters, marketers and 
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processors of produce and as suppliers of non-agricultural services to households whose 
income is principally agriculture-derived” (Kydd, 2002:1). Effectively, therefore, the effect of 
contracts extended beyond the contracting agents. 
1.4.3.5 Livelihood Strategies 
Livelihood strategies refer to the tactics that people use to safeguard themselves against 
vulnerability to risks (Ellis, 1998). In agrarian contexts, such strategies include agricultural 
intensification or extensification, livelihood diversification and migration (Scoones, 1998). 
The efficacy of risk-averse strategies depends on livelihood assets and institutions that they 
interact with (Chapman & Tripp, 2004). 
The notion of diversification helped the study to conceptualize how rural people behaved in 
response to perceived risks associated with contractual joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships. Diversification, according to Bryceson’s (2000 in Chapman & Tripp, 2004) 
typology, is characterized by three main types of activities. These are, firstly, ‘local services’ 
that are commonly provided in remote areas, such as beer brewing and brick making; 
secondly, ‘trade’ of both agricultural and manufactured products that occurs between rural 
and urban areas; and thirdly, ‘transfer payments’, which in areas with mobile populations 
working in both rural and urban areas includes remittances and pensions from absent family 
members.  
1.4.3.7 Vulnerability to Shocks and Trends 
Although various attempts have been made to define and capture the meaning of 
‘vulnerability’, there is no universally accepted single definition (Du Toit & Ziervogel, 2004). 
However, it is possible to distinguish between two broad categories of definitions namely, 
those that are depoliticised and technicist, on the one hand, and those that are grounded in 
political economy and/or political ecology. It is important to highlight this distinction so as 
to avert the possible pitfall of viewing vulnerability of the rural poor as ‘something that is 
only perpetuated by the processes and dynamics that can be grasped at the micro-level of 
individual or household level resources or strategies’ (Du Toit & Ziervogel, 2005). Such 
processes are themselves sustained and perpetuated by the broader and thoroughly 
historical systems of social relations in which they are embedded (Ibid.). In light of this, the 
assertion by this thesis is that definitions of vulnerability in the context of historically 
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marginalized South African communities, such as those associated with smallholder 
irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province, necessarily have to take cognizance of the historical 
and contemporary political economy and political ecology underpinning much of the 
evident vulnerability within livelihood systems in impoverished contexts. Such an approach 
enables a clearer articulation of the linkage and interactions between the micro-level of 
individual or household level resources or strategies and meso- and macro-levels of policy, 
planning and resource allocation. 
At a very basic level, Chambers (1989) provides a simplified definition that “Vulnerability 
refers to exposure to contingencies and stress and difficulty in coping with them…” 
Chambers distinguishes between two facets of vulnerability namely, an ‘external side of 
risks, shocks and stress to which an individual or household is subject’ and an ‘internal side 
which is defenselessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss’. External 
vulnerability refers to the structural elements that determine sensitivity and risk to 
exposure (Moser, 1998 in Hart, 2009), whereas internal vulnerability concerns the ability of 
households to respond and cope with stressors and the actions required to overcome, or at 
least reduce, the undesirable effects of exposure to processes of environmental, economic, 
political and social change (Bohle, 2001 in Hart, 2009).  
From the perspective of vulnerability to global climatic change, Liverman (1990) 
distinguishes between two broad strands of definitions, wherein vulnerability is defined 
as a biophysical condition and as an aspect of political economy. The former class of 
definitions considers the most vulnerable people to be those who live in the most 
precarious physical environments. In Malthusianist fashion, such definitions link the 
problem to demographic drivers, such as population growth and attendant resource 
demands, which exceed the ‘carrying capacity’ of given landscapes. The latter class of 
definitions provide a strong critique of both physical and demographic determinism. 
Liverman states that this political economy or neo-Marxist framework defines 
vulnerability in terms of the political, social and economic conditions. From this 
perspective, Susman et al (1984 in Ibid.) define vulnerability as “the degree to which 
different classes in society are differentially at risk”. Proponents of the political economy 
definition employ the theory of social marginalization to demonstrate how 
underdevelopment (i.e. flows of resources out of a region, land expropriations, 
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exploitative labour conditions, political oppression, and other processes associated with 
colonialism and capitalism has made people, especially the poor, to more vulnerable and 
forced them to degrade their environments (p. 30). As Liverman points out, such critique 
resonates with similar views expressed with respect to vulnerability to the 1972 Sahel 
drought (e.g. Darkoh, 1996). 
 
Du Toit & Ziervogel (2005) assert that vulnerability cannot simply be understood, as 
econometric studies sometimes do (e.g. Bhorat et al 2001 in ibid.), in terms of poverty-
sensitive segmentation of the labour market in order to identify who is ‘vulnerable to 
poverty’. Such an approach is highly non-dynamic and misses the longitudinal and 
temporal aspects of vulnerability, reducing it simply to the likelihood of someone being in 
a particular income segment at a particular moment. Du Toit & Ziervogel (Ibid.) assert 
that a much more rigorous approach comes from the literature on natural hazards and 
epidemiology, within which scholars argue that vulnerability needs to be understood as a 
condition of exposure and sensitivity to shocks and stresses - it characterises those who 
are ‘at the tipping point,’ where a small push can cause an irreversible or hard-to-
recover-from decline in welfare (Devereux 2002 in Ibid.; Alwang et al 2001 in Ibid.). 
Furthermore, the scholars argue that vulnerability is best conceptualised as a property of 
systems or networks, not individuals, and hence reference to vulnerable groups 
effectively says something about the systems upon which they depend. Ultimately, such 
an approach to defining vulnerability is a complex judgement about the sensitivity of 
those networks to particular impacts and their resilience or the ability to recover (Du Toit 
& Ziervogel, 2004).   
The study considered that the vulnerability of livelihood systems to possible negative effects 
of neo-liberal agricultural interventions can result in shocks and risks that test the resilience 
of affected livelihoods and possibly exacerbate the antecedent impacts of historical 
resource alienation and social marginalization. Risks and hazards were associated with the 
negative effects of exogenous agricultural commercialization policies, unequal power 
relations within contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships, as well as the 
vulnerability profile of socially-differentiated individuals, households and communities. 
Vulnerability was conceptualized in terms of ‘livelihood systems’ within which petty 
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commodity producers, subsistence farmers and ordinary members of selected irrigation 
scheme communities lived, and particular attention was given to the poorest and most 
vulnerable individuals and groups.   
1.4.3.8 Livelihood System  
The UNDP (1999: 3) defines a livelihood system as a dynamic realm that integrates both the 
opportunities and assets available to a group of people for achieving their goals and 
aspirations as well as interactions with and exposure to a large range of beneficial or 
harmful ecological, social, economic and political influences that may help or hinder the 
group’s capacity to make a living.  
1.4.3.9 Conclusion 
In outlining the foregoing Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, the study took cognizance of 
Scoones (2009) more recent critique of the application of the SLF and sustainable livelihoods 
approaches. Scoones decries the focus on ‘capitals’ and the ‘asset pentagon’ as an 
“unfortunate diversion” that kept the discussion firmly in the territory of economic analysis. 
He concedes that there were merits in the discussion about how assets could be combined, 
substituted and switched, with diverse portfolios emerging over time for different people in 
different places. Scoones also concedes that the discussion on how changes in natural 
capital could be linked to social and economic dimension was an important step forward 
and, similarly, advocation of a broader view of assets. However, a problem was that it was 
the more instrumental economic focus that remained at the centre of the discussion and 
defined much of the subsequent interventions on the ground. Consequently, other critical 
work on sustainable livelihoods was sidelined. Such work stressed features such as the 
notion of institutions and organizations as mediating livelihood strategies and pathways, 
socio-cultural and political processes which explained how and why diverse asset inputs 
linked to strategies and outcomes. Such features were subject to power and politics and 
were the locus of questions of rights, access and governance. Implicit within Scoones’s 
critique is a view that the elevation of economic perspectives detracted from contributions 
by an alternative explanatory angle that “emphasized complex processes requiring in-depth 
qualitative understandings of power, politics and institutions, and so a very different type of 
field research” (p. 178).  The study made a conscious effort to adopt such dimension of the 
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SLF to examine agricultural commercialization and livelihoods in impoverished rural 
contexts.  
1.4.4 POVERTY, POWER, AGENCY AND RIGHTS 
Carney (2003) states that while poverty has many dimensions and causes, many of the 
world’s poor lack power and influence. This can be a cause of poverty, since the voice of the 
poor is rarely heard in allocation decisions. Lack of power and influence can also be an 
aspect of poverty, since lack of voice is a condition of being poor (Ibid.). It can also be an 
effect of poverty, whereby low levels of human capital, in particular, can result in limited 
ability to exert influence (Ibid.). Carney’s conception of power resonates with Bourdieu’s 
(1992) concept of ‘capital’ and Gidden’s (1979) concept of ‘agency’.  
According to Bourdieu (1992), economic, social, political and cultural forms of capital 
combine to confer power over instruments of production or reproduction. Giddens (1979) 
views power as agency or the capacity of an agent to make a difference. Contrary to views 
that power vests with dominant groups, subordinates possess counter-hegemonic power 
that they exercise through ‘hidden transcripts’ of offstage resistance (Scott, 1990). 
Subordinates can also exercise power by collectively mobilizing social capital to publicly 
engage with institutions on the need for change or claim socio-political power, entitlements 
and ‘rights’ of access to bases of social power and productive wealth (Tapela et al, 2011a). 
Rights can be understood as “claims that have been legitimized through social structures 
and norms” (Norton & Moser 2001 in Carney, 2003). Rights approaches emphasize ‘equity’ 
(of treatment and opportunities, rather than of outcomes), inclusiveness, accountability and 
governance (Carney, 2003). Rights can strengthen local people’s claim-making power and 
capacities (Dalal-Clayton, 1997). This thesis acknowledges the usefulness of rights-based 
approaches and concepts of capital and agency, but considers that these do not sufficiently 
resolve the problematic elevation of economic perspectives (Scoones, 2009). Such 
perspectives often interpret class differences in monetary terms under economic rationality, 
with wealth-based approaches emphasizing self-interested utility maximization through 
rent-seeking behaviour while welfarist approaches revolve around numerical metrices such 
as income. Since the income approach to well-being does not account for the diversity in 
human beings and for the heterogeneities of contingent circumstances (Grasso, 2002), there 
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is a need to further broaden the SLF to take into account other important dimensions to the 
flourishing of human well-being that income doesn’t account for. These include health, 
education, social relationships, longevity, employment, environmental conditions, housing 
conditions (Grasso, 2002), as well as the governability of such dimensions. 
Du Toit & Ziervogel (2005) provide a particularly useful analysis of meanings and 
understandings of poverty. The scholars allude to ongoing debates about the nature of 
poverty and the relation between monetary and ‘capability’ poverty. Their research on 
‘chronic poverty’ highlights some of the key features of the local political economies and 
social power relations within which livelihoods are pursued. The scholars assert that 
understanding why poor people stay poor for long periods of time requires a close look at 
the underlying structural dimensions that may undermine people’s attempts to escape 
poverty. Du Toit & Ziervogel assert that poor people have agency, but their agency is 
undermined through processes of poverty and vulnerability. These create a corrosive and 
dispiriting context that saps people’s ability to make a lasting escape from poverty and 
undermines their ability to make use of whatever resources they do possess and also 
radically diminishes the circle of their impact on the world around them. Access to resources 
and capitals clearly also play a key role in shaping what kind of agency is open to poor 
people (Carter & May 2001 in Ibid.; Adato, Carter & May 2004 in Ibid.), but there also seems 
to be a crucial element contributed by the experience of poverty and the ways in which 
people understand, make sense of, and take on their lived conditions. 
This section proceeds to complement the SLF with an overview of selected alternative 
explanatory viewpoints and frameworks namely, the Capability Approach, Entitlement 
Analysis and the Integrated Framework for Governability. These take cognizance of issues of 
poverty, power, agency and rights, as well as emphasize the complexity of institutional and 
livelihood structures, contexts and processes as well as require in-depth qualitative 
understandings of power, politics and institutions.  
1.4.5 CAPABILITY APPROACH  
Beginning with the 1979 Tanner Lecture on ‘Equality of What?’ delivered at Stanford 
University and, subsequently, in many articles and several books that tackle a range of 
economic, social and ethical questions, Professor Sen (1980; 1984; 1985; 1987; 1992; 1999) 
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has developed, refined and defended a framework that is directly concerned with human 
capability and freedom (Clark, 2005). Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach (CA) has emerged 
as the leading alternative to standard economic frameworks for thinking about poverty, 
inequality and human development generally (Ibid.) and a critique of the largely utilitarian 
strand of thinking in welfare economics and welfarist approaches more generally (Ibid.; 
Mehta, 2006). 
 According to (Clark, 2005), the theoretical roots of the CA can be traced back to Aristotle, 
Classical Political Economy and Karl Marx, as well as more recent theoretical works, such as 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971) and his emphasis on ‘self-respect’ and access to primary 
goods (Sen 1992:8). From the start Sen acknowledged strong connections with Adam 
Smith’s (1776) analysis of ‘necessities’ and living conditions and Karl Marx’s (1844) concern 
with human freedom and emancipation. Later on Sen (1993:46) recognised that ‘the most 
powerful conceptual connections’ relate to Aristotle’s theory of ‘political distribution’ and 
his analysis of eudaimonia, which is ‘human flourishing’ (Nussbaum, 1988; 1990). 
Conceptual foundations of the CA can be found in Sen’s critiques of traditional welfare 
economics, which typically conflate well-being with either opulence (income, commodity 
command) or utility (happiness, desire fulfilment) (Mehta, 2006; Clark, 2005; Grasso, 2002).  
Sen’s approach clearly requires “a broader informational base, which focuses particularly on 
people’s capability to choose the life they have reason to value” (Sen 1999:63 in Grasso, 
2002), to highlight the social and economic factors which give them the opportunity to do, 
and to be what they consider valuable for their fulfilment (Grasso, 2002). As such, the CA 
focuses directly on the substantive ‘freedoms’ of the individuals involved. In this sense, 
therefore, Sen suggests that well-being (or the standard of living) should be considered in 
terms of human ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ (Ibid.; Clark, 2005).  
Clark explains that Sen begins by considering income or commodity command. Like Adam 
Smith, Sen (1983) emphasises that economic growth and the expansion of goods and 
services are necessary for human development. However, like Aristotle, he reiterates the 
familiar argument that ‘wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely 
useful and for the sake of something else’ (Sen, 1990, p.44). Sen therefore argues that in 
judging the quality of life we should consider what people are able to achieve. He then 
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observes that different people and societies typically differ in their capacity to convert 
income and commodities into valuable achievements. In comparing the well-being of 
different people, therefore, not enough information is provided by looking only at the 
commodities each can successfully command. Hence it is necessary to consider how well 
people are able to function with the goods and services at their disposal (Clark, 2005). 
Functioning is an achievement of a person, in other words, what she or he manages to do or 
be (Clark, 2005). It reflects, as it were, a part of the ‘state’ of that person (Sen, 1985:10 in 
Ibid.). Functionings relate to what a person may value doing or being, they are the living 
conditions achieved by an individual and represent a set of interrelated activities and states 
(“doings” and “beings”) that form her life (Grasso, 2002). Achieving a functioning with a 
given bundle of commodities depends on a range of personal and social factors (Clark, 
2005). A functioning therefore refers to the use a person makes of the commodities at his or 
her command. Capability reflects a person’s ability to achieve a given functioning (Saith, 
2001:8 in Ibid.). In Marco Grasso’s analysis, capabilities concern the ability of an individual 
to achieve different combinations of functionings, and define the freedom to choose the life 
that she prefers. Although these two concepts are complementary they are distinctly 
different in that a functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to 
achieve. While functionings are more directly related to living conditions, capabilities are 
notions of freedom, in the positive sense, about “what real opportunities you have 
regarding the life you may lead” (Sen, 1987:36 in Grasso, 2002). 
Given that capabilities refer to substantive ‘freedoms’ or the ability to choose the life one 
has reasons to value, the CA allows focus to go beyond the primary goods that an individual 
holds (after Rawls) and thereby embrace the characteristics that govern the conversion of 
commodities “into the person’s ability to promote her ends” (Sen 1999:75 in Mehta, 2006). 
From such perspective, therefore, Sen’s CA suggests that in order to overcome poverty and 
inequality, it is not sufficient for people to possess livelihood assets, endowments and 
capacities. What is critical is their ability to exercise substantive freedoms to turn such 
resources or commodities into functionings and capabilities (Grasso, 2002; Clark, 2005).  
Capabilities also accommodate the diversity of human experiences and situations, as well as 
multidimensional understandings of poverty, inequality, wellbeing, development and 
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freedom (Mehta, 2006). For this thesis, the value of Sen’s CA lies in its amenability to the 
development of a rigorous methodological approach to operationalize the study aim and 
objectives within the context of complexity in interactions between institutions and 
livelihoods. Indeed, a distinctive characteristic of Sen’s CA is that it does not provide a 
formula or “path” to carry out welfare measurements and comparisons, and such 
‘incompleteness’ approximates the ambiguity and complexity of human life and values 
(Grasso, 2002) and thereby allows for flexibility in the handling of diverse contexts. This is 
consistent with the widespread acceptance by economists nowadays that the traditional 
utilitarian notion of welfare can render only a partial picture of human well-being (Grasso, 
2002) and that human development is interested not only in economic growth, but also in 
expanding human capabilities and in human choice (Anand & Sen 2000 in Mehta, 2006). 
Despite this, there persists a dominance of economic growth based approaches and rent-
seeking behaviour in agricultural sector interventions within impoverished contexts (Bene et 
al, 2010). Meanwhile, welfarist approaches seem to continue to grapple with identifying 
effective ways of achieving alignment between institutional interventions and with local 
people’s livelihood needs. 
Clark’s view (2005) is that the CA probably has the most in common with the Basic Needs 
Approach to development, which was pioneered by Paul Streeten et al (1981) and Frances 
Stewart (1985) among others. However, Sen argues that basic needs approaches tend to 
lapse into ‘commodity fetishism’. While such argument is considered a valid criticism of the 
original formulation of basic needs, proponents of the latter generation of basic needs 
approaches have refuted the contention on the basis that the concept of basic needs was 
not centred on the possession of commodities. Despite this criticism, it is now widely 
recognised that the CA manages to bring together many of the concerns of basic needs 
theorists (originally expressed in a rather ad-hoc manner) into a single coherent 
philosophical framework (Clark, 2005). Furthermore, unlike the basic needs approaches, the 
CA extends beyond the analysis of poverty and deprivation and largely concerns itself with 
well-being generally. Alkire (2002:170 in Ibid.) observes that ‘the single most important 
function of the CA is to make explicit some implicit assumptions in the basic needs 
approaches about the value of choice and participation (and the disvalue of coercion)’. In 
this regards, Sen’s conceptualization of freedom is particularly useful.  
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Sen’s concept of freedom involves “both the processes that allow freedom of action and 
decisions, and the actual opportunities that people have, given their personal and social 
circumstances” (Sen, 1999:17 in Boykoff, 2003). Sen devotes much attention to various 
interconnected elements of instrumental freedoms, concerned with “the way different 
kinds of rights, opportunities, and ‘entitlements’ contribute to the expansion of human 
freedom in general, and thus to promoting development” (Sen, 1999:37 in Ibid.).  
1.4.6 ENTITLEMENTS ANALYSIS 
 
According to Boykoff (2003), Amartya Sen first framed the concept of entitlements in his 
1981 seminal work on Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. This 
was written as an effort to expand upon and improve the narrow economic conceptions of 
hunger, famine and deprivation that dominated western development model perspectives. 
Sen challenged the ‘conventional’ conceptions of poverty (as food per capita) in his 
statement that “…starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food to 
eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat. While the latter can be 
cause of the former, it is but one of many possible causes…” (Sen, 1981:1). Sen further 
defined the exchange of entitlements as the trading for collections of commodities, or 
producing them, and the function that specifies the set of alternative commodity bundles 
that the person can command respectively for each ‘endowment’ bundle. Endowments 
referred to the ownership bundle. Such bundles were considered to be mediated and 
determined by many factors, including employment opportunities, race, caste, gender, and 
power inequality. At the time of Sen’s postulation of the Entitlement Analysis, this was a 
significant departure from orthodox and hegemonic thinking regarding poverty. By placing 
activities such as food production within a network of relationships, Sen ‘offered a new 
approach to poverty and deprivation analyses’, which was effectively an entitlement and 
endowment approach (Boykoff, 2003).  
From Sen’s work, “entitlement” of an individual can be defined as the set of alternative 
commodity bundles that such person can acquire through legal means available in society. 
The entitlement approach considers that a person will go hungry if he or she fails to 
establish command over a commodity bundle with enough food. While the ways through 
which people establish command over a bundle of commodities vary in each society, 
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depending on the prevailing legal, political, social and economic environment, within a 
market economy a person’s entitlements characteristically depend on two factors. Firstly, 
entitlements are governed by his endowment or initial ownership of resources, such as 
labor power or land. Secondly, they are determined by his ‘exchange entitlement mapping’, 
which is defined as the relation that specifies what he can acquire through exchange, be it in 
the form of trade (exchange with others) or production (exchange with nature), for each 
given endowment. Factors influencing a person’s exchange entitlement mapping include, 
among others, employment opportunities, wage rate, the cost of productive resources, the 
value of what he can sell, the price of what he may wish to buy, social security and taxation 
provisions, among other things. 
Boykoff (2003) observes that when Sen produced his seminal work of 1981, the scholar 
reflected on some of the limitations to his entitlement approach. He admitted that there 
were ambiguities in the specification of entitlements. These included, for example, the 
concentration on rights within the given legal structure in a society whereas some activities 
were illegal and the assumption that perfect information dictated people’s food choices. 
Such limitations elicited much criticism, notably by scholars like Gore, who promoted a 
‘broadened extended entitlements analysis’. According to Boykoff, Gore contended that 
while Sen’s philosophical arguments were sound, key shortcomings of his analysis made it 
incapable of adequately analyzing hunger and famine. Drawing from a range of literary 
works, Gore brought moral, ethical, and legal issues to the fore, along with gender issues 
and questions of access, in both theory and in practice. Among the eleven points of critiques 
and improvements that Gore suggested were the needs to pay more attention to illegal 
practice in entitlement analyses, to further analyze contestation and communication of 
meaning, to further explore the notion and practice of negotiation, and to adopt a more 
detailed disaggregated look at local level processes. 
1.4.7 INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNABILITY 
Du Toit (2005) observes that the landless unemployed, the marginal working class, workers 
and employers do not encounter each other as abstract homo economicus but as individuals 
and groups drawing in all their decision-making on cultural repertoires, political and 
ideological resources, frameworks of identity and assumptions thoroughly structured by 
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more than 300 years of violent, racist, exploitative and brutalising history. Such context 
necessarily has to be taken into account (e.g. Terreblanche, 1998; Makgetla 2004 in Du Toit, 
2005; May, Carter & Padayachee 2004 in Du Toit, 2005). In light of observations such as this, 
the study considered that the complexity of South African institutional and livelihood 
contexts, structures, processes and interactions requires a thorough examination of issues 
of governance and ‘governability’ (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009; Chuenpagdee & Jentoft, 2009; 
Kooiman, 2008). The governability of any societal system or entity is the propensity for its 
successful governance (Kooiman, 2008). The concept of governability can also be used as a 
methodological framework operationalizing governance efforts, deepening the systemic 
awareness of impact chains and designing analytical tools for assessing the impacts or 
effects of governance chains (Kooiman, 2008). An integrated focus on these two integrated 
and inter-linked concepts was seen as potentially able to strengthen the SLF’s examination 
of the contexts of and interactions between institutions and livelihoods, thus yielding more 
useful results for policy and research.  
The Integrated Framework for Governability (Figure 3) derives from lessons learnt in 
international contexts elsewhere about the failure of great policy and management efforts 
by public authorities to slow down the rate of resource depletion in ‘common property 
resources’ (CPR) contexts (Kooiman, 2008). Such lessons suggest that institutional failure is 
not only due to inadequate policies but also to the facts that the institutions formulating 
and implementing these policies are weak or lack capacity, and value bases of the various 
governance efforts are often contradictory (Ibid.). The governability framework is also 
informed by a growing realization that social, economic, ecological and cultural attributes of 
‘Systems-to-be-Governed’ (SG) have become increasingly diverse, complex and dynamic, 
while ‘Governance Systems’ (GS) have become dispersed away from the traditional state 
centre and nested within hierarchical systems, resulting in a complex array of elements, 
orders and modes of State, Markets and Civil Society, as well as hybrid forms of these. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The GS perspective acknowledges that societies are governed by a combination of governing 
efforts from all kinds of actors and entities both public and non-public (Kooiman, 2003; 
Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009). It calls for the joint and interactive responsibilities of state, 
market and civil society and proposes a shift from problem-solving approach to approaches 
that emphasize opportunity creation and the effective handling of the tensions that arise 
within the natural resource systems (Kooiman & Bavinck, 2005). The governance 
perspective also acknowledges that natural resource systems are characterized by 
‘diversity’, ‘complexity’ and ‘dynamics’ (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009; Kooiman & Bavinck, 
2005). The Governance System (GS) approach is commonly seen as conducive to addressing 
these challenges and concerns in order achieve positive outcomes in terms of healthy 
ecosystems, improved justice, improved livelihoods, and better food security. 
Interactions Pressures Impacts 
Participation 
Policies 
Civil Society 
State 
Market 
Ecological 
Economic 
Social 
Cultural 
Governance System Governing Interactions System-to-be-Governed 
Attributes: 
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Orders 
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Properties: 
Diversity 
Complexity 
Dynamics 
Resilience 
FIGURE 3 INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR GOVENABILITY 
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Adapted from Kooiman, 2008 
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Furthermore, lessons show that Interactions between SG and GS are a basic element of 
Governance (GI) (Kooiman, 2008). Modalities of GI include participation, collaborations (e.g. 
partnerships), and policy and management interactions. The manner in which these 
arrangements are formulated and implemented determines governance outcomes, in terms 
of Pressures and Impacts on sub-systems of the System-to-be-Governed (i.e. social, 
economic, ecological and cultural sub-systems) and sub-systems of the Governance System 
(i.e. the State, Markets and Civil Society) (Ibid.). Governability is therefore the sum of all 
three aspects namely, GS, SG and GI, whose contributions vary. Although the study 
examined all three aspects of governability, particular attention was given to GI with 
agricultural commercialization interventions in smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo 
Province.  
Critically for the study was the observation that power relationships and socio-political 
cultural traditions find their expression in Governance Interactions (Kooiman & Jentoft, 
2009; Chuenpagdee & Jentoft, 2009; Kooiman, 2008). From such perspective, it was 
therefore important to develop understandings about three key modalities, among others, 
which relate to institutions and livelihoods. Firstly, how socio-political entities (often termed 
‘stakeholders’) participate in governing interactions. Secondly, why collaborative forms of 
governance are growing, wherein socio-political entities are willing to do things together 
instead of doing them alone, including cases where shared motives are evident (e.g. 
interdependence) and where motives differ (e.g. partnerships between companies and 
farmers’ organizations). Thirdly, it was important to develop clear understandings that 
policies and ‘management’ are key collective variables for all hierarchical interactions; 
policies being the frameworks that public authorities at all levels use to bring about 
politically preferred change; while management is a means of organizing interactions 
according to criteria of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ (e.g. through interventionist tools like 
‘Stakeholder Identification’).  
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
1.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study adopted an empirical approach to examine the interaction between livelihoods 
and agricultural commercialization, as articulated mainly through contractual joint ventures 
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and strategic partnerships, in smallholder irrigation schemes. Particular attention was given 
to contract farming arrangements under the RESIS Programme and similar initiatives in two 
poverty nodes identified by the ISRDP. Case study sites for in-depth research included 
Hereford and Phetwane Irrigation Schemes in Greater Sekhukhune District and Makuleke 
Irrigation Scheme in Vhembe District (Figure 4).  
 
FIGURE 4 LOCATION OF STUDY AREAS 
1.5.2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Towards operationalizing research objectives, the research framework (Figure 5) was 
centred on two axes of enquiry namely: institutional arrangements and livelihoods. The 
research examined the institutional and livelihood context for the resurgence of contract 
farming; institutional arrangements for joint ventures and strategic partnerships; and 
effects of agricultural commercialization initiatives on livelihoods of petty commodity 
producers, subsistence farmers and other people in local communities. The study also 
identified key policy and institutional issues. Such examination was predicated on a review 
of pertinent literature as well as detailed analyses and rapid appraisals of livelihood 
portfolios and strategies in selected case study sites. Site selection criteria included 
targeting of site for revitalization and agricultural commercialization, existence of joint 
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ventures and/or strategic partnerships, representativity and geographic location within an 
identified ISRDP poverty node, whether or not such site was gazetted. 
The study adopted a two-tier approach to empirically examine smallholder irrigation 
schemes in two poverty nodes identified by the erstwhile ISRDP in Limpopo Province, 
specifically, Greater Sekhukhune and Vhembe Districts. From October 2003 to March 2009, 
in-depth research revolved around three case studies namely, Hereford and Phetwane 
Irrigation Schemes in Greater Sekhukhune District and Makuleke Irrigation Scheme in 
Vhembe District. These sites were purposively selected on the basis of literature review 
findings, feasibility survey and consultations with actors in key stakeholder institutions. 
From May 2008 to April 2009, in-depth research was complemented by rapid appraisals of 
an additional five similar cases within Greater Sekhukhune District. These were Elandskraal-
Balemi/EBIS, Elandskraal-Kgotlelelo, Tswelelopele, Strydkraal A and Krokodilheuwel. Such 
longitudinal and ‘dispersed intensive’ method of micro-level investigation enabled the 
livelihoods research to transcend, to a certain extent, the boundaries of time and space 
(according to Murray, 2002). The research method was combined with deliberate efforts to 
link the terms of reference of the study to prevailing policy processes and political contexts, 
in a bid to offer evidence-based recommendations for appropriate strategies of state 
intervention. However, the extent to which the research could influence policy depended on 
a much more complex set of factors that were largely beyond the scope of the study. 
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The rationale for the two-tier research approach was that, while rapid appraisals of a 
relatively large number of cases afforded the broad overview needed to make generalized 
inferences, the likelihood that such appraisals might miss critical nuances and thereby fall 
short of providing clear understandings of issues necessitated in-depth research on a 
narrower selection of case studies.   
1.5.3 DATA COLLECTION 
A principle that guided the research was that data collection should result in clearer 
understandings of the intersection between agricultural commercialization, contract 
farming arrangements and rural livelihoods. This required investments in time and other 
resources for in-depth data collection, analysis and triangulation. The researcher developed 
a common framework for the collection and handling of data in ways that enabled 
comparisons across different case study contexts. The framework was flexible enough to 
allow the research to effectively respond to context-specific requirements and peculiarities. 
Since effects of externally-induced interventions, such as agricultural commercialization, 
often traverse a broader range of livelihoods than those pertaining to petty commodity 
producers within joint venture and strategic partnership entities, data collection was 
extended to subsistence food producers and other members of irrigation scheme 
communities. 
Primary and secondary methods were used to collect qualitative and quantitative data. 
Secondary data sources included maps, historical records, community records, published 
and unpublished scientific and popular papers, research reports, statistical survey reports, 
municipal integrated development plans (IDPs) and documents compiled by government 
institutions, private investors, NGOs, project implementing agents (PIAs), professional 
service providers (PSPs) and other identified stakeholders. For joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships, secondary data sources included official records, business plans, project 
reports, constitutions of smallholder organizations, joint venture and strategic partnership 
contracts and, where available, financial records. Primary data sources generally included 
direct observation, questionnaire surveys, in-depth and semi-structured interviews with key 
resource persons and respondents, informal conversations, workshops and focus group 
discussions. At local community and interest group levels, primary research relied on 
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Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques, such as oral testimony, geographical 
mapping, issues mapping, time lines, trend lines, field surveys, focus group discussions and 
community workshops.   
For in-depth primary research, data collection was staggered into two phases. The initial 
phase involved collection of baseline data on livelihood profiles using questionnaire surveys. 
The second phase entailed in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and workshops with 
a limited number of purposively selected key resource persons and respondents from the 
entire community spectrum. This strategy enabled views and voices of women, the youth 
and the poorest and most vulnerable people to be heard, alongside views of petty 
commodity producers and the more vocal and powerful members of the community.   
An adapted version of the PLAAS Chronic Poverty Questionnaire (see Appendix 1) was used 
to collect data at the household unit of analysis. The questionnaire enabled compilation of 
individual and collective livelihood profiles, and disaggregation of data according to gender, 
age, literacy, employment and income. However, the scale at which questionnaire data was 
collected meant that livelihood profiles could only be generalized overviews. Data collection 
in the second phase therefore sought to elicit, through in-depth interviews and primary 
observation, in-depth understandings and greater nuances on livelihoods. The second phase 
also attempted to triangulate information gathered within the three irrigation schemes with 
data possessed by externally-based institutions. Such triangulation entailed surveys of 
secondary data sources, such as official records, reports and municipal integrated 
development plans (IDPs), as well as interviews with key resource persons from formal 
institutional structures. 
A challenge was that the questionnaire survey often could not pick up discrepancies in 
income data. For example, there were instances of discrepancy between income sources 
and disclosed livelihood strategies. There were also discrepancies between disclosed 
incomes and actual expenditure, particularly in cases where the latter significantly exceeded 
the former. Although probing questions were asked during questionnaire administration, 
respondents sometimes did not provide sufficient explanation. Clarity was often obtained 
much later on, when sufficient trust had been established between respondents and the 
researcher.  
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A second challenge related to inevitable deviations from questionnaire survey plans, 
particularly the intention to survey entire (100 per cent) populations of Hereford and 
Phetwane Irrigation Schemes. This level was achieved only in Hereford, which had a 
relatively small population (32) of households that ‘straddled’ the irrigation scheme and 
villages elsewhere in the rural hinterland. In Phetwane, 72 per cent of all households and 98 
per cent of smallholder households were surveyed. Constraints were largely due to absence 
of prospective respondents, owing to labour migration, commuting and other reasons. In 
Makuleke, the survey covered all (100 per cent) of petty commodity producers (locally 
termed “commercial plotholders”), 16 per cent of subsistence food producers and a 
consortium (100 per cent) of four commercial vegetable producers. Except for the 
consortium, which was initially invisible or hidden at research planning stage, the Makuleke 
survey met the planned objectives of 100 per cent of petty commodity producers and 
between 15 per cent and 20 per cent of subsistence food producers. The rationale here was 
that the study should not exacerbate the observed research fatigue in the community, 
which was due to the plethora of studies and research tourism that followed the settlement 
of a land restitution claim against the South African National Parks Board (SANParks) in 
1998.   
1.5.4 ANALYTICAL METHODS 
Various methods were used to analyse qualitative and quantitative data. Among these, this 
thesis highlights Stakeholder Analysis.  
1.5.4.1 Stakeholder Analysis and Participation 
Stakeholder Analysis (ODA, 1995; Bryson, 2003; World Bank, 1996) was found particularly 
useful for identifying, characterizing and engaging with various categories of stakeholders. 
The methodology helped to develop clearer understandings of stakeholder interests, 
capacities, resources, roles, responsibilities, relationships, priority, power and influence, 
issues and modes of ‘participation’ (see Table 2 for typology). Stakeholder Analysis clarified 
the dynamics around ‘power’ and ‘influence’, which determine decisions around adopted 
interventions, institutional arrangements and who gets included, excluded and/or adversely 
included in what benefit stream or decision making platform. Stakeholder Analysis also 
assisted the researcher to structure and adapt the study on an on-on-going basis, depending 
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on emerging issues, insights, needs and other circumstances.For enhanced rigour, 
Stakeholder Analysis was closely interwoven with elements of the Capability Approach and 
Entitlements Analysis framework (Sen, 1981, 1984, 1999; Gasper, 1984; Nussbaum, 2003).  
 
A ‘stakeholder’ was defined as an interested individual, group or institution that may or may 
not be affected by decisions or actions pertaining to interventions and contractual 
arrangements within selected smallholder irrigation schemes, and may or may not be part 
of decision-making about such interventions arrangements. ‘Primary stakeholders’ were 
those ultimately affected, either positively (i.e. beneficiaries) or negatively (i.e. losers) by 
decisions or actions pertaining to agricultural commercialization and contractual 
arrangements. ‘Secondary stakeholders’ were the intermediaries in the project design and 
implementation processes. ‘Key stakeholders’ were those who could significantly influence, 
or were important to the success of a project. These definitions included winners and losers, 
as well as those involved or excluded from decision making processes.  
‘Participation’ has been variously defined. For the study, useful definitions included, firstly, 
Cernea’s (1985) definition that participation is “Empowering people to mobilize their own 
capacities, be social actors rather than passive subjects, manage resources, make decisions, 
and control decisions that affect their lives…”  A second definition was the World Bank’s 
(1998) definition that participation is “a process through which stakeholders influence and 
share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect 
them…”A third useful definition was the Southern African Sustainable Use Study Group’s 
(SASUSG, 1997) definition that participation is “The process whereby all valid stakeholders 
are able to pursue their interests with a minimum of mutually subtractive influences…” It 
was noted that while these definitions emanated from varying ideological perspectives and 
institutional objectives, the rhetoric was broadly resonant.  
The diversity of stakeholders required clear understandings of modes of participation with 
respect both to contract farming arrangements and the study’s research process. For such 
insights, the study drew from Pimbert & Pretty’s (1994 in IIED, 1994:19) Typology of 
Participation (Table 3). The typology provides clear definitions of various modes of 
participation. Combined with Stakeholder Analysis and elements of the Capability Approach, 
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Entitlements Analysis and the Integrated Framework for Governability (Figure 3), the 
typology strengthened the analysis of observed phenomena as well as the research process.  
TABLE 3 TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION 
Typology Components of each Type 
Passive  
Participation 
People participate by being told what is going to happen or has happened. It is a 
unilateral announcement by an administration or project management without any 
listening to peoples' responses. The information being shared belongs only to external 
professionals. 
Participation in  
information giving  
People participate by giving answers to questions posed by extractive researchers and 
project managers using questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. People do not have 
the opportunity to influence proceedings, as the findings of the research or project 
design are neither shared nor checked for accuracy. 
Participation by  
Consultation 
People participate by being consulted, and external agents listen to views. These external 
agents define both problems and solutions, and may modify these in the light of people’s 
responses. Such a consultative process does not concede any share of decision-making 
and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people’s views. 
Participation for  
material incentives 
People participate by providing resources, for example labour, in return for food, cash, or 
other material incentives. Much in situ research falls in this category, as rural people 
provide the fields but are not involved in the experimentation or process of learning. It is 
very common to see this called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging 
activities when the incentives end. 
Functional  
Participation 
People participate by forming groups to meet pre-determined objectives related to the 
project, which can involve the development or promotion of externally initiated social 
organisation. Such involvement does not tend to be at early stages of project cycles or 
planning, but rather after major decisions have been made. These institutions tend to be 
dependent on external structures, but may become independent in time.  
Interactive  
participation 
People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the formation of new 
local groups or the strengthening of existing ones. It tends to involve interdisciplinary 
methods that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systematic and structured 
learning processes. These groups take control over local decisions, so that people have a 
stake in maintaining structures or practices. 
Self-mobilisation/ 
active participation 
People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change 
systems. Such self-initiated mobilisation and collective action may or may not challenge 
existing distributions of power and wealth. 
Source: Pimbert and Pretty (1994 in IIED, 1994:19) 
1.5.4.2 Gender Analysis 
Gender Analysis related to similarities and differences between women and men at the 
community level in terms of access to decision-making, land rights, benefits and costs 
deriving from agricultural commercialization and capacity building within joint ventures and 
strategic partnerships. Gender Analysis went beyond issues of equity by attempting to make 
explicit the opportunities and constraints that affected the ability of women and men to 
respond to joint ventures and strategic partnetships. The analysis also examined the ways in 
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which women and men perceived the usefulness of agricultural commercialization 
initiatives. 
1.5.5 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED DURING RESEARCH 
1.5.5.1 Issue of Relevance 
An important underlying principle for the study was that the research should be relevant to 
policy. A difficulty was that the study emerged independent of formal institutional processes 
for agricultural commercialization. Despite this, the researcher made a conscious effort to 
secure support from selected key stakeholders. Stakeholder Analysis was a useful tool for 
this. Individual consultations were held with a number of institutional actors prior to site 
selection. Although the researcher assumed ultimate responsibility for the selection of 
specific sites for in-depth study, there was broad consensus on the selected sites. By 
contrast, site selection for the rapid appraisals relied largely on collective decision making 
and expediency. The reason was that, owing to the study’s logistical constraints, appraisals 
necessarily had to “piggy back” on external funding and processes by institutional 
stakeholders within the researcher’s informal ‘core support group’. This concession did not 
pose any difficulty though, since site selection criteria closely approximated the criteria 
earlier used by the researcher to select sites for in-depth research.       
Another difficulty was that significant financial resources were required to fund a study that 
was deep and broad enough to be of relevance to policy and practice. The study began with 
funding to examine two in-depth case studies namely, Hereford and Phetwane. However, 
these two cases were too limited to be representative of the nationwide RESIS Programme, 
which in Limpopo encompassed more than 126 smallholder irrigation schemes. Towards 
enhanced rigour, therefore, the researcher sought and obtained additional funding to cover 
in-depth research on a third case study namely, Makuleke. In-depth case studies provided 
the desired richness of data, owing to time spent and trust relationships built over relatively 
longer time. However, contestations in Makuleke, Phetwane and Hereford posed threats 
and required adaptation of the research design in order to secure the requisite research 
space. Furthermore, results of these studies could not be sufficiently extrapolated to a 
broader scale. For greater representativity and relevance, there was a need to complement 
in-depth research with a rapid appraisal of a number of similar cases.   
 
 
 
 
62 
 
PLAAS provided valuable assistance in availing a large proportion of funding, mostly from 
the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and strengthening links with the 
International Water Management Institution (IWMI). The researcher obtained further 
support from key stakeholders within a ‘core support group’ composed of intermediary 
institutions namely, the Water Research Commission (WRC), IWMI and, for the special case 
of Makuleke1, the Transboundary Protected Areas Research Initiative (TPARI). Through 
these organizations, the researcher mobilized additional research funding, convened 
workshops and actively engaged with stakeholders, particularly smallholders and rural 
communities. Such strategy accelerated the process of data collection, particularly for rapid 
appraisals, and enabled the researcher to meaningfully engage with stakeholders who 
would otherwise have been difficult to access. For example, where study sites were 
characterized by contestations, such as in Makuleke, the research became subject to the 
danger of being cast into particular ‘camps’ merely on the basis of the researcher having 
communicated with certain persons belonging to those camps. TPARI-funded community 
engagement workshops enabled the researcher to bring all key local stakeholders to one 
platform, facilitate discussions about relational issues between researchers and researched 
communities, reach a consensus on acceptable protocols of engagement and thereby obtain 
collective commitment of support.      
1.5.5.2 Issue of Bureaucracy 
A challenge was that bureaucratic red tape often encumbered communication and 
information flow between the researcher and stakeholders identified for the core support 
group. Officials often required the researcher to submit prior formal requests for 
information and superiors from above to give authorisation for them to provide it. Despite 
measures to formally inform key decision makers about the research and to request 
support, responses varied according to specific circumstances during programme processes 
and personal disposition of individual officials. Consequently, certain key documents were 
either delayed or inaccessible to research for reasons that were sometimes unclear. 
Furthermore, while some of the government officials were helpful others did not feel 
obliged to support the research. A few of the latter cited the government’s Performance 
                                                     
1
 Makuleke case was special in the sense that the community was considered and considered itself to have 
been ‘over-researched’ owing to the precedent-setting 1998 Settlement Agreement with the South African 
National Parks (SANParks) Board, following their restitution claim for land within the Kruger National Park.   
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Management System (PMS) as a hindrance to time spent attending to research issues, which 
were not part of their Key Performance Areas (KPAs) and therefore not recognized by 
accounting systems. The net effect of such constraints was that the research process often 
became bogged down by insufficient information. 
1.5.5.3 Ethical Issues 
The study was underpinned by an awareness of the ethical imperative for research to avoid 
entrenching the legacy of historical injustices in rural communities. These included the 
undermining of rural people’s rights and freedoms, silencing of local voices, extractive 
research practice and lack of accountability. The following principles therefore guided the 
research: 
 Principle of respect 
 Principle of historical awareness 
 Principle of reciprocity, mutual benefit and equitable sharing 
 Principle of process 
 Principle of full disclosure 
 Principle of differential needs and objectives 
 Principle of communication and due acknowledgement 
 Principle of acknowledgement of different types of knowledge 
During the course of research, the researcher found it necessary to strengthen the proposed 
ethics of the study. This was due to observations that power dynamics, contestations and a 
general sense of disillusionment about prospects for amelioration of deprivation were 
increasing in most of the study sites. The last phenomenon seemed to be related to the 
broader national wave of violent social protests that gripped mostly urban informal 
localities and were highly publicized in the media (Tapela et al, 2011a). Although the 
likelihood of violent rural protests was low, there was a real danger that research could 
inadvertently be caught up in or contribute to local challenges.   
Towards developing common understandings, local legitimacy and equitable best practice 
for the study, the researcher combined efforts with similarly concerned researchers in 
TPARI, linked up with an international discourse around the social and human dimensions of 
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conservation and protected area management2 and, through participative community 
engagement, developed guidelines to help social researchers and local people to develop 
workable and ethical agreements for social research (Tapela et al, 2007; 2009b). Such 
investment was invaluable to enabling the researcher to proceed through what increasingly 
became difficult terrain, particularly with the emergence and exponential increase in social 
protests in South Africa since 2004. 
In engagements with members of rural communities, the researcher faithfully complied with 
ethical guidelines for social research (see Tapela et al, 2009b). For example, the purpose of 
the research was explained prior to commencement of research, local protocols for 
community entry were respected and respondents were alerted to their freedom not to 
disclose information they were not comfortable with providing and/or disclosing. Benefits of 
research were explained as a means towards managing expectations. Feedback was 
provided to key resource persons in rural communities and assistance given towards 
ensuring that communities generated longer term benefits from research. The last was 
achieved through workshops on policy engagement and stakeholder networking. By 
opening up such space for voices of smallholders to be heard, the researcher broke out of 
the usual mould of preserving ‘sacred’ platforms of discourse for elitist access by 
professionals and academicians.  
Similar ethical principles were applied to engagements with institutional stakeholders. A 
particular challenge regarding this group, however, was tension between the study’s ethical 
requirement to avoid public exposure of information deemed detrimental to respondent 
officials (although in the public interest) and expectations by PLAAS and funding institutions, 
such as the NCHR, for the researcher to publicly engage with policy. The researcher found 
herself caught within such tension and often compelled to tread the fine line between 
protecting information sources and being accountable to PLAAS, funders and the South 
African public at large.  
For both rural communities and government officials, the researcher devised a strategy to 
assess and distil critical policy issues, which were then handled through structured and 
                                                     
2 This discourse emanated from the World Parks Congress held in Durban in September 2003, and culminated 
in an international conference or Indaba on Social Research and Protected Areas: Towards Equitable Best 
Practice and Community Empowerment, held at Skukuza in April 2005. 
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targeted engagements, such as issue-focused workshops and discourses. In such workshops 
identities of respondents were not disclosed, except where respondents expressed a desire 
for their names to be published and/or exercised their freedom to actively participate in 
open discussions. Other problematic issues were assigned to scientific papers and popular 
publications.  
For rural communities, problematic issues included findings on rural livelihood strategies 
that were brazenly outside the ambit of formal legislation (i.e. criminal) as well as strategies 
that were criminalized by virtue of absence of institutional measures to redress past 
discrimination. The latter types of strategies were widely perceived to be legitimate and 
accepted within local communities, contrary to commonly-held views about the former. 
Policy engagement on such issues sought to create awareness among institutional actors 
and a ‘safe-space’ for constructive responses to the plight of the rural poor and vulnerable. 
By contrast, findings on observed and alleged irregular practices by institutional actors were 
more difficult to deal with. The researcher’s handling of such findings was guided by two 
practical principles. Firstly, if the need for in-depth investigation of alleged irregularities 
went beyond the purpose and focus of the study, then such work was deemed to be beyond 
the scope of the study. The second principle was that, where observed irregularities were 
deemed significant enough, the researcher would seek advice from relevant actors within 
the researcher’s ‘core support group’ of institutional stakeholders. As far as possible, 
identities of information sources were protected and diligence exercised in the handling of 
sensitive information. Such strategies helped the researcher to manage the more difficult 
terrains while retaining compliance with ethical guidelines.    
1.5.6 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES  
At its initiation, the study began with the goal to identify livelihood ‘impacts’ of agricultural 
commercialization and, in particular, joint ventures within smallholder irrigation schemes. A 
focus on impacts implicitly meant that the study would have to assess whether or not 
livelihood outcomes had been sustainable. This raised three related methodological 
challenges. 
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1.5.6.1 Livelihood Outcomes 
In determining livelihood outcomes (or results), the study moved beyond metric variables, 
such as income, to include also the less tangible outcomes relating to well-being, such as 
power, influence, identity, affirmation, respect and dignity. However, an assessment of 
sustainability of outcomes would have been premature, since the RESIS Programme was at 
an early stage. Furthermore, although “enhanced income” was considered a success 
indicator among most of the petty commodity producers, such indicator was not shared by 
the broader group of subsistence producers and other members of local communities.  
1.5.6.2 Community 
Subsumed to livelihood outcomes, the concept of ‘community’ was not easy to define 
(Tapela et al, 2007; Warburton, 1998; Chambers, 1997; Welbourn 1991 in Chambers, 1997), 
owing to factors such as diversity of interests, power dynamics and porosity of boundaries. 
Conscious effort was made to avoid imposing technicist views of what community means, 
and, as far as possible, respondents were asked to define what they understood their 
communities to be. Consideration was given to linkages between rural local communities 
and other spheres of livelihood generation, for example rural hinterlands and urban centres. 
For practical reasons, the study mostly engaged with people found within the study sites at 
the time of research, although in-depth research also included a number of migrant 
workers.  
1.5.6.3 Livelihood Sustainability 
The second challenge related to lack of conceptual clarity about what constitutes 
‘sustainable livelihoods’ (Carswell et al 1997 in Scoones, 1998) and specifications of how 
sustainability should be achieved (Dietz, 1996; Cole, 1994; Chatterjee & Finger, 1994). This 
difficulty was compounded by differences in interpretations of the meaning of sustainable 
livelihoods and perceptions about how trade-offs between productivity, equity and 
sustainability (Carney, 1997) should be handled in the context of government-led 
interventions and contract farming arrangements. It seemed unlikely that stakeholders 
would reach a consensus within the time horizon of the study. Effectively, therefore, it 
would have been futile for the researcher to pursue a goal to assess impacts of agricultural 
commercialization and joint ventures on the sustainability of livelihoods in smallholder 
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schemes. The study therefore sought to limit the study to an examination of institutional 
influences on livelihood assets, strategies, outcomes and, in particular, vulnerability. Where 
the consideration of sustainability factors was deemed necessary, this was limited to 
preemptive qualitative assessments of existing institutional provisions for longer term, post-
project outcomes.  
1.5.6.4 Livelihood Impacts 
The third challenge methodological challenge related to the complex nature of rural 
livelihoods and livelihood systems. Scholars (Ellis, 2000, 1998; Kepe, 1997; Ntshona, 2002; 
Tapela, 2005; 2008; 2009) clearly indicate that rural people’s livelihoods often straddle 
divides between ‘subsistence’ and ‘commercial’ in ways that are complex, dynamic and 
nested. The diversity, dynamism and inter-connectedness of livelihoods and livelihood 
systems, and the porosity of household and community boundaries multi-causality of 
livelihood outcomes, it soon became apparent that the researcher would have to grapple 
with a major methodological challenge to assess livelihood impacts. A pertinent question 
was how to determine with confidence the extent to which a given agricultural 
commercialization and/or joint venture factor affected rural people’s livelihoods, ‘baskets’ 
of livelihood strategies and livelihood systems, as opposed to the effects of a multiplicity of 
other possible causal factors. For example, early observations were that while given joint 
ventures exposed all smallholders within a group to the same risk and hazard factors, 
households of smallholders showed markedly different degrees of vulnerability to attendant 
hardships.   
Although economists have devised econometric methods that enable disaggregation of 
effects of different factors that cause specific outcomes, such methods were found not to 
be sufficiently helpful to gauging qualitative impacts of agricultural commercialization on 
observed livelihoods. It became clear therefore that a critical part of the study would be to 
devise a methodology that would provide both a valid assessment and useful insights on 
how interventions towards agricultural commercialization affected people living within or 
adjacent to small-scale irrigation scheme in poverty nodes in Limpopo Province.  
Owing to methodological difficulties pertaining to determining ‘livelihood impacts’ (Ahmed 
& Lipton, 1997), therefore, the study refrained from assessing whether or not livelihood 
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outcomes are sustainable or not but rather focused on the ways in which contractual joint 
ventures and strategic partnerships have affected ‘livelihoods’ within selected smallholder 
irrigation schemes. Consequently the study examined how rural people’s livelihoods were 
enhanced or adversely affected by agricultural commercialization and contract farming 
arrangements in selected smallholder irrigation schemes. 
The researcher modified the proposed research aim by shifting focus away from assessing 
livelihood impacts to examining ways in which formulation and implementation of 
agricultural commercialization through contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships 
affected ‘livelihoods’ within selected smallholder irrigation schemes. This allowed a greater 
degree of freedom to make causal, though cautious, statements about agricultural 
commercialization and livelihoods. However, it did not completely eliminate the need to 
isolate, where possible, the effects of agricultural commercialization from other factors and 
to distinguish between direct and indirect effects and short-term and long-term impacts.  
A pertinent counterfactual question remained: What would have happened without 
agricultural commercialization and joint venture contracts in the selected small-scale 
irrigation schemes? In a study by Ahmed & Lipton (1997:5) on the ‘Impact of Structural 
Adjustment on Sustainable Rural Livelihoods”, authors observe that the “before and after 
approach”, which is often used to assess the impact of reforms, traces economic 
performance before and after adjustment and attributes differences to the adjustment. A 
major problem with the approach, however, is that it is difficult to control for exogenous 
shocks (Ibid.). The authors further state that such an approach can neither show that any 
element of adjustment or the whole package has succeeded or failed in changing some 
policy variable, nor account for changes that would have occurred without adjustment. The 
above observations can be transposed to the methodological problem for the study.  
Both structural adjustment and agricultural commercialization, through contract farming, 
are premised on transaction cost economics approaches. However, the point of departure 
for the study was its emphasis on interactions between institutional arrangements and 
livelihoods, from perspectives of rural poverty and inequality. Drawing from unresolved 
debates on merits and demerits of agricultural commercialization and contract farming 
(Section 1.2.4), a hypothetical view by the study was that neo-liberal approaches to 
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commercial agriculture-driven rural development might not be appropriate constructs for 
resolving rural challenges of smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province. As such, 
the ‘before and after’ approach was not very useful since it omitted a whole range of 
quantitative and qualitative effects occurring between joint venture project inception and 
conclusion. It was important to gain insights into these effects, since they embodied 
people’s real experiences and perceptions rather than concerns by other stakeholders about 
the economic viability of projects.  
Instead of the ‘before and after’ approach, therefore, this study opted to trace livelihood 
trends and trajectories throughout the course of agricultural commercialization processes. 
The rationale was not to simply use comparisons of livelihood characteristics prior to and 
after contractual joint ventures to determine livelihood impacts. Rather the objective was to 
obtain insights into how commercialization processes intersected with people’s livelihoods, 
what coping strategies people adopted and what combination of factors predisposed 
households towards increasing vulnerability or resilience over a period of approximately 
three years. During this time, joint venture and strategic partnership projects came and 
went, but primary data collection continued to track livelihood trends and trajectories, both 
in direct response to agricultural commercialization and to a combination of this and other 
effects.    
Variables that were endogenous and exogenous to agricultural commercialization often co-
existed in many of the affected households, such that it was not easy to isolate effects of 
agricultural commercialization from other effects. For example, there was antecedent socio-
economic differentiation. There were also variations in livelihood generation strategies, 
shocks experienced and coping strategies prior to, during and after the course of joint 
venture projects. Some of the shocks emanated from outside of joint venture projects, while 
strategies for coping with shocks induced by joint ventures involved reliance on other 
resources within the broader ‘baskets’ of livelihoods. It was possible though to make useful 
qualitative causal descriptions and analyses of observed phenomena. It also appeared that 
disaggregating the individual facets of household characteristics and effects of 
commercialization was not as critical as acknowledging the reality that rural livelihoods are 
inherently complex and their various facets are closely inter-connected, often inextricably. 
Thus, rigor in isolating facets and effects was perhaps not as important as capturing the 
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‘untidy’ reality and qualitatively analysing, as faithfully as possible, the intersection between 
livelihoods and agricultural commercialization.      
In attempting to overcome some of the methodological difficulties, the sampling frame for 
two of the study sites included households who had and who had not been directly involved 
in contractual joint ventures, for the sake of comparison. Owing to antecedent differences 
in household natural resource endowments, tenure rights, material asset ownership, 
literacy, attained education levels, employment, financial resources, indebtedness, social 
networks and political influence, this ‘control group’ approach did not sufficiently account 
for observed differences during agricultural commercialization processes. The approach was 
therefore of limited use in assessing the degree to which changes in livelihoods could be 
ascribed to agricultural commercialization. Despite this limitation, the control group 
approach was useful in highlighting differences in shocks experienced and coping strategies 
adopted at specific points during commercialization processes.   
Towards addressing the aforementioned methodological challenges, attention was also 
given also to literature on similar studies in order to draw lessons on possible ways of 
overcoming the methodological difficulties. What emerged was that other researchers 
(Farrington et al, 1999; Ahmed & Lipton, 1997; Gibbon 1996 in Ahmed & Lipton, 1997) had 
encountered similar problems in livelihood impact studies and concluded that despite 
limitations, the sustainable livelihoods approach to assessing impacts of interventions 
remains a useful tool. Farrington et al (1999) for example, concludes that the sustainable 
livelihoods approach provides a useful tool for “putting people and issues of most concern 
to them at the centre of analysis” and reduces the prospect that any one discipline or sector 
will dominate. The study surmised therefore that the sustainable livelihoods approach, 
when used in conjunction with complementary analytical frameworks, is useful in analysing 
the highly complex interactions between people, institutions and interventions. As such, 
methodological challenges should not rule out the validity of findings obtained using the 
approach. 
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter Two reviews the context within which efforts to integrate small-scale farmers into 
mainstream commercial agriculture have emerged in Limpopo Province. The review begins 
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by defining selected key concepts, followed by a synoptic background to the resurgence of 
contract farming in global, regional and South African national contexts. A review of debates 
on the merits and demerits of contract farming for smallholders is juxtaposed with South 
African debates about post-1994 rural development and agrarian reform. Special 
consideration is given to the ISRDP context, which emerged in tandem with the RESIS 
Programme nationally and in Limpopo Province.  
Chapter Three presents research findings on the RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province. The 
chapter begins with an overview of the RESIS Programme framework in Limpopo Province. 
Finally, an outline of the common implementation framework and approach of RESIS-
Recharge Phase is presented. The RESIS-Recharge Phase merits particular attention since it 
represents a major shift away from the original RESIS Programme objectives. Emphasis is on 
the generic contract structure used by LDA, contract implementation and key issues raised 
by smallholders in all targeted sites. Such examination synthesizes findings from rapid 
appraisals of various case studies, namely, Elandskraal-Balemi/EBIS, Elandskraal-Kgotlelelo, 
Tswelelopele, Strydkraal A, Krokodilheuwel, as well as Makuleke and Phetwane.  
Chapter Four presents findings on institutional arrangements and processes relating to 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme in Greater Sekhukhune District. Revitalization initiatives 
emerged in Hereford during the pilot phase of the broader national RESIS Programme, but 
outside of the LDA-led programme in Limpopo Province. Owing to the cross-border 
configuration and ISRDP designation of Greater Sekhukhune District, and earlier 
classification of Hereford under Mpumalanga Province, Hereford contract farming 
arrangements were driven by a multiplicity of institutions at local, provincial and national 
levels. These included government departments, municipalities, NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, 
traditional leadership, faith based organizations, political structures and the private sector. 
After abolition of cross-border municipalities, the location of Hereford was re-classified as 
Limpopo Province, and the irrigation scheme was incorporated into the LDA-led provincial 
RESIS Programme. While such background might be construed to indicate a divergence from 
the RESIS Programme described in this chapter, such difference is cosmetic rather than 
substantive. Ultimately, context-specific permutations of RESIS were articulation of the 
same overarching national programme to revitalize small-holder irrigation schemes.  
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Chapter Five examines interactions between agricultural commercialization, livelihoods and 
contract farming arrangements in Phetwane Irrigation Scheme associated with the earlier 
implementation stage of RESIS. Particular attention is given to a joint cotton production 
venture. To a lesser extent, allusion is made to subsequent shifts towards RESIS-Recharge 
interventions and strategic partnerships. 
Chapter Six presents findings from in-depth research on a strategic partnership arrangement 
associated with RESIS-Recharge in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. Makuleke provides 
particularly useful insights since the case study was directly associated with three of the four 
phases of the RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province namely, the Watercare Programme 
(Phase 1), RESIS (earlier Phase 2) and RESIS-Recharge (latter Phase 2). A more detailed 
examination of livelihoods during and after successive RESIS and RESIS-Recharge 
interventions and arrangements is made. 
Chapter Seven presents a synthesis and discussion of findings. Emphasis is on key issues 
emerging from the study.  
The thesis concludes in Chapter Eight with a summary of key issues and recommendations 
for policy.    
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CHAPTER TWO  
INTEGRATING SMALL-SCALE FARMERS INTO MAINSTREAM 
COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE: THE CONTEXT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two reviews the context within which efforts to integrate small-scale farmers into 
mainstream commercial agriculture have emerged in Limpopo Province. The review begins 
by defining selected key concepts, followed by a synoptic background to the resurgence of 
contract farming in global, regional and South African national contexts. A review of debates 
on the merits and demerits of contract farming for smallholders is juxtaposed with South 
African debates about post-1994 rural development and agrarian reform. Special 
consideration is given to the ISRDP context, which emerged in tandem with the RESIS 
Programme nationally and in Limpopo Province.  
2.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
 
The notion of contract is central to any understanding of the social integration of peasants 
into corporate relations of production (Watts, 1994:25). The section begins by defining the 
concept of ‘contract farming’ and then proceeds to outline a typology of contract farming 
models. 
2.2.1 CONTRACT FARMING 
Glover & Kusterer (1990:4) state that the concept of ‘contract farming’ is complex and 
therefore not easy to define. Complexities include the diversity of institutional 
arrangements (Da Silva, 2005; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002), differences in historical and 
political economy contexts (Little & Watts, 1994) and the multiplicity of objectives, which 
include welfare, political, social and economic criteria (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). According 
to Glover and Kusterer (1990:4), contract farming or production can be simply defined as 
arrangements between a grower and firm(s), for example exporters, processors, retail 
outlets, or shippers, in which non-transferrable contracts specify one or more conditions of 
marketing and production.  Eaton & Shepherd (2001:2) state that “contract farming can be 
defined as an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the 
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production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements, frequently at 
predetermined prices”.  
A common view is that contract farming is a form of ‘vertical coordination’ of linkages 
between small-scale farmers and agri-business firms (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Glover & 
Kusterer, 1990; Little & Watts, 1994; Minot, 1986; Wilson, 1986; Dolan, 2005; Singh, 2005, 
2002). In their study of contract farming in Sub-Saharan Africa, Little & Watts (1994:9) 
define the concept, for working purposes, as “forms of vertical coordination between 
growers and buyers-processors that directly shape production decisions through 
contractually specifying market obligations (by volume, value, quality, and, at times, 
advanced price determination); provide specific inputs; and exercise some control at the 
point of production (i.e. a division of management functions between contractor and 
contractee)”.  
As a form of agricultural commercialization, contract farming can be seen from the 
perspective of New Institutional Economics (NIE), whereby contracts are a means to reduce 
‘transaction costs’. Transaction costs are the costs incurred when a firm engages in an 
exchange process (Da Silva, 2005:12). They include the costs occurring prior to a transaction, 
such as obtaining information and negotiating the exchange conditions, as well as post-
transaction costs, such as monitoring and enforcing terms of the contract (Ibid.). Reduction 
of transaction costs has often meant a reduction of government support to farmers. 
2.2.2 CONTRACT FARMING MODELS 
Eaton & Shepherd (2001:44) put forward a typology of various forms of contractual linkages 
between small-scale farmers and agri-business firms (Table 4). The typology identifies five 
broad models, depending on the product, resources of the sponsor and intensity of the 
relationship needed between the farmer and the sponsor. These include the centralised 
model, nucleus estate model, multipartite model, informal model and intermediary model.  
 The Centralized Model involves a centralised processor and/or packer buying from a large 
number of small farmers. The model is used for tree crops, annual crops, poultry and dairy 
products, which often require a high degree of processing. The Centralized Model is 
vertically coordinated, with quota allocation and tight quality control. The involvement of 
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sponsors in production varies from minimal input provision to the opposite extreme where 
the sponsor takes control of most production aspects. 
The Nucleus Estate Model is a variation of the Centralised Model, wherein the sponsor also 
manages a central estate or plantation. The central estate is usually used to guarantee 
throughput for the processing plant but is sometimes used only for research or breeding 
purposes. The Nucleus Estate Model is often used with resettlement or transmigration 
schemes and involves a significant input of material and management inputs. 
 
TABLE 4 TYPOLOGY OF CONTRACT FARMING MODELS 
TYPE OF MODEL CHARACTERISTICS 
Centralised Model Involves a centralised processor and/or packer buying from a large number of 
small farmers;  
Is used for tree crops, annual crops, poultry and dairy. These products often 
require a high degree of processing, such as tea and vegetables and fruit for 
canning of freezing; 
Is vertically coordinated, with quota allocation and tight quality control; 
Sponsors’ involvement in production varies from minimal input provision to 
the opposite extreme where the sponsor takes control of most production 
aspects. 
Nucleus Estate Model Is a variation of the centralised model where the sponsor also manages a 
central estate or plantation; 
The central estate is usually used to guarantee throughput for the processing 
plant but is sometimes used only for research or breeding purposes; 
Is often used with resettlement or transmigration schemes; 
Involves a significant input of material and management inputs. 
Multipartite Model May involve a variety of organisations, frequently including statutory bodies; 
Can develop from the centralised or nucleus estate models, e.g. through the 
organisation of farmers into cooperatives or the involvement of a financial 
institution. 
Informal Model Is characterised by individual entrepreneurs or small companies; 
Involves informal contracts, usually on a seasonal basis; 
Often requires government support services such as research and extension 
services; 
Involves greater risk of extra contractual marketing. 
Intermediary Model Involves sponsor in sub-contracting linkages with farmers to intermediaries; 
There is a danger that the sponsor loses control of production and quality as 
well as prices received by farmers. 
Source: Eaton & Shepherd, 2001 
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The Multipartite Model may involve a variety of organisations, and frequently includes 
statutory bodies. This model can develop from the centralised or nucleus estate models, for 
example through the organization of farmers into cooperatives or the involvement of a 
financial institution. 
The Informal Model is characterised by individual entrepreneurs or small companies and 
involves informal contracts, usually on a seasonal basis. The model often requires 
government support services, such as research and extension services. The Informal Model 
involves greater risk of extra-contractual marketing, wherein producers surreptitiously sell 
portions of produce to buyers outside the ambit of the informal contract. 
In the Intermediary Model, the sponsor sub-contracts linkages with farmers to 
intermediaries. The danger is that the sponsor may lose control of production and quality as 
well as prices received by farmers. 
The above typology provides a useful tool for this study’s characterization of the joint 
ventures and strategic partnerships that have emerged under the RESIS Programme and 
similar initiatives in Limpopo Province. In applying the typology, however, this thesis is 
mindful of the possibility that the permutations obtaining within the case study sites may 
vary in structure and content from the five models outlined in Eaton & Shepherd’s (2001) 
typology. As such, the typology is used with a degree of flexibility. 
2.2.3 THE CONCEPT OF ‘SMALLHOLDER’ 
According to Cousins (2010), the term ‘smallholder’ is often defined and used in an 
inconsistent manner to refer to, among other things, producers who occasionally sell 
produce for cash as a supplement to other sources of income; those who regularly market a 
surplus after their consumption needs have been met and those who are small-scale, 
market-orientated commercial farmers. While the two main criteria that distinguish 
between these types of smallholder are, firstly, size of landholding and, secondly, extent of 
production for the market, other criteria include use of different types of labour (e.g. 
household or family labour, hired workers or cooperative labour) and/or source of faring 
capital.    
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The smallholder model, which has been adopted by many international development 
institutions (e.g. IFAD) and regional development organizations (e.g. NEPAD), positions 
small-scale farmers as a potential engine for growth for rural areas, particularly in Africa 
(Béné et al, 2010:7; Valdes & Foster, 2005; Hazell et al, 2007). The ‘success-story’ of the 
Eastern Africa export-oriented high-value horticulture sector (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; 
Minot & Ngigi 2004 in Béné et al, 2010:7) is viewed as additional evidence that the 
smallholder model might be a solution, and that trade with developed-country markets is of 
particular importance in this process (DFID 2005 in Béné et al, 2010:7). Consequently, an 
increasing number of donor agencies and governments of developing countries have been 
encouraged by their academic and policy advisors to push their national agri-food sectors 
(i.e. crops, livestock, forests and fisheries) along this high-value, export-oriented avenue. 
Proponents of such approach claim that the exportation of agri-foods (in particular high 
value agri-food products) to developed countries’ markets could be a powerful engine for 
poverty reduction and economic development (Béné et al, 2010:8; Cunningham, 2000; 
Valdimarsson & James, 2001; FAO, 2007). However, the debate about whether such trade 
actually benefits small-scale producers, such as smallholders and fishers, as well as local 
populations or possibly the wider national economy remains unresolved (Béné et al, 2010:8; 
Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002; Hersoug, 2004). 
International experience suggests that a major problem with smallholder-oriented 
agricultural commercialization in many rural contexts relates to predication of interventions 
upon the wealth-based model. According to Béné et al (2010), this model conceives the 
solution to problems of poverty and resources degradation as revolving around making 
smallholders more ‘economically efficient’ while enhancing the productive capacity of the 
resource base. A central objective of the wealth-based approach is to ‘unlock’ the inherent 
wealth or resource rent value (i.e. the ‘economic rent’) from high value produce and then 
add value throughout the agri-food chain (Sumaila 2008 in Béné et al, 2010:9). The wealth-
based model espouses and reproduces the logic of the conventional Malthusian narrative, 
which argues that since poverty is the result of too many people depending directly on too 
limited resources, the solution is to restrict resource access to a limited number of users 
through an efficient rights allocation system and to maintain and maximize the overall 
productivity of the resource base (Cunningham et al 2009 in Béné et al, 2010:9). Such an 
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approach is presumed to lead to maximization of wealth or economic rent for the 
smallholder sector, improve the profits of smallholders who remain included in productive 
enterprises and possibly redistribute resultant benefits to the rest of local rural communities 
and the broader public. Mechanisms for achieving this include diverting part of the tax and 
license fees (i.e. ‘resource rent’) levied on the productive sector towards social expenditure 
(Béné et al, 2010:9; Cunningham & Neiland, 2005).   
The theory and the reasoning of rent extraction has been an alluring option for those 
seeking to create wealth from smallholder irrigation schemes and thereby contribute to 
local, regional and national economic growth and development as well as poverty reduction. 
Such reasoning resonates with arguments put forward by South African agricultural 
economics scholars in support of an integrated rural development approach that predicates 
upon high growth rate within the core or mainstream economy, which spreads favourable 
trickle-down effects to the impoverished rural periphery (Terreblanche, 1998:49). Such 
argument resonates, to an extent, with ISRDP and RESIS Programme formulations (see 
Section 2.5 and Chapter Three, respectively).  
2.3  RESURGENCE OF CONTRACT FARMING: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL 
BACKGROUND  
According to Watts (1994), contract farming represents one fundamental way in which the 
twin processes of internationalisation of agriculture and agro-industrialisation are taking 
place on a global scale. From such perspective, contracting signifies profound changes in the 
“old” international division of labour, the structure of international food regimes and in 
North-South relations. The spread of contract farming also denotes a watershed in the 
transformation of rural life and agrarian systems in the Third World in general (Ibid., 
1994:24). Contract farming is not new, however, and observed developments represent a 
resurgence of interest in contract farming, which since the 1980s has been influenced by 
broader changes in world agri-food systems.  
This section reviews the global and regional background to South Africa’s renewed interest 
in contract farming. The review presents, firstly, an overview of the historical development 
of contract farming and changes associated with the emergence of prevailing agri-food 
systems. Secondly, the review gives an outline of international debates about the 
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integration of small-scale farmers into globalized agri-food systems. Such background, 
however, is fraught with complexities due to, among other factors, the wide array of 
agricultural products, contractual arrangements, agricultural development policies and 
processes, and intersection of these with shifts in the global political economy. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to delve into a detailed account of how contract farming developed 
in different sectors and regions of the globe. This section therefore restricts itself to 
overviews of selected key features and milestones.  
2.3.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT FARMING AND EMERGENCE OF 
NEW AGRI-FOOD SYSTEMS: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
Contract farming has been widely practised for many years in many countries, including 
developing countries (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Glover and 
Kusterer, 1990:1). Eaton & Shepherd (2001) assert that the contracting of crops has existed 
from ‘time immemorial”. The practice has ranged from the specifications of percentages of 
crops as means of payment of tithes, rents and debts in ancient Greece, through the various 
forms of sharecropping during the first century in China and the late nineteenth century in 
the United States, to the establishment of formal farmer-corporate agreements in European 
colonies in the early twentieth century (Ibid.).  
Other scholars trace the principles of contract farming practice back to the nineteenth 
century, when contract farming was used in the United States for processing crops, such as 
sugar, beets and peaches, and in Taiwan for sugar production under Japanese colonial rule 
(Da Silva 2005:11). From its historical origins, contract farming has spread globally into many 
developing countries, accompanied by an expansion into a broader array of food and fibre 
sectors (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). From a radical political economy stance, Wilson (1986) 
describes this spread as the “capitalist penetration of agriculture”. The crystallization of 
contract farming into its industrial form of organization, however, appears to have begun in 
the aftermath of the Second World War.  
The restructuring of global economy following the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 and 
the revolutionary transformation of international political economy since 1945 exerted 
widespread influence on the organisation of world commercial agriculture. Drawing from 
Watts’ (1994: 23) analysis of the genesis and spread of the seed industry, for example, this 
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restructuring had three distinct facets. Firstly, the 1970s to early 1980s was a period of 
corporate merger and consolidation by multi-national companies (MNCs). Secondly, the 
geography of agricultural production changed with the shifting of production sites around 
the globe. Thirdly, the globalization of certain sectors was accompanied by the spread and 
deepening of contractual relations in commercial agriculture.  
Interest in agri-business increased noticeably during the 1970s and 1980s due to a number 
of factors, including African famines of 1974 and 1985, which focused world attention on 
the continent’s continuing crisis in food production (Glover & Kusterer, 1996:11). The 1980s 
and early 1990s witnessed a steep decline in the continent’s export earnings, a depletion of 
foreign-exchange reserves and a looming prospect of bankruptcy for many countries (Little 
& Watts, 1994). In recommendations to avert economic crises, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank prescribed economic structural adjustment programmes as 
part of a “new order” of development, in which contract farming assumed a prominent 
position (Ibid.).  
Transformation of world agri-food systems resulted in the ‘industrialisation’ of world 
agriculture (Da Silva, 2005; Glover & Kusterer, 1996; Little & Watts, 1994). Since the 1980s, 
such industrialisation has been evident in all segments of production-distribution chains (Da 
Silva, 2005:4; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Little & Watts, 1994; Glover & Kusterer, 1990). Agri-
food systems have become globally dispersed and increasingly vertically-integrated along 
“value chains” (Little & Watts, 1994). The spread of these contract-based systems has been 
accompanied by a reduction of the role of spot markets as a mechanism to harmonise 
transactions (Da Silva, 2005).  “New agricultures” have emerged that are geared towards 
high-value crops (Little & Watts, 1994), an increasing involvement of small-scale resource-
poor farmers in contract farming in developing countries and a reduction of state roles in 
farmer support as private sector roles increase (Da Silva, 2005:4).  
Drivers of this change have included technological developments, demographic changes, 
changing consumer preferences, trade liberalisation, financial capital mobility (Da Silva, 
2005). Drivers have also included innovations in biotechnology, transportation and 
processing (Little & Watts, 1994) and, more recently, and climatic change. The contract is 
considered a critical institutional mechanism for minimising the costs of market exchange 
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and ensuring compliance, thus reducing supply-side uncertainty that is detrimental to the 
workings of industrialised agricultural market chains. Contract farming has therefore 
emerged as a means to reduce transaction costs, coordinate links between farmers and 
agribusiness firms and integrate small-scale farmers into mainstream agricultural market 
chains (Kheralla & Kirsten, 2002). Concomitant to these changes has been a massive shift 
towards the commoditization of agricultural resources, such as land and water, which is 
similarly driven by transaction cost economics. It is perhaps worth noting that, with neo-
liberal reforms having resulted in state disengagement from rural areas of developing 
countries, contract farming was proposed as a means for private firms to assume roles 
previously performed by the state (World Bank, 2001).  
Since the 1980s, contract farming has come to represent a fast-growing and much-
advertised form of agro-industrialisation for Third World countries (Watts, 1994:23). This 
development has taken place against the background of the internationalisation of world 
agriculture as well as drastic changes in technology and improved capacity for natural 
resources extraction (Little & Watts, 1994). While contract farming has assisted farmers to 
improve their lot through providing more reliable incomes, generating employment 
especially for women, providing new skills in farming and doing away with the patron-client 
relationship between large and small producers, in many cases the practice has been 
accompanied by poor extension services, low prices to farmers due to haphazard pricing of 
produce and higher risk to producers (Glover & Kusterer, 1990; Singh, 2002).  
2.3.2 THE RESURGENCE OF CONTRACT FARMING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: REGIONAL 
OVERVIEW 
Contract farming re-surfaced in Southern Africa and Africa in general in the 1980s as a 
strategy for rural transformation. In these countries, the “new agricultures” have been 
geared towards high-value crops (Little & Watts, 1994), an increasing involvement of small-
scale resource-poor farmers in contract-based commercial agriculture and a reduction of 
state roles in farmer support as private sector roles increase (Da Silva, 2005:4). Southern 
African frameworks and developments have been part of broader international and African 
institutional frameworks and trends.  
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African states are signatories to the Maputo Declaration of 2003 (IDASA, 2009). Under the 
Maputo Declaration, heads of state of the African Union (AU) recognize that Africa has the 
responsibility to invigorate its agricultural sector, increase food production and ensure 
economic prosperity and the welfare of its people by guaranteeing sustainable food 
security. The heads of state also acknowledge that 30 per cent of the continent’s population 
is chronically and severely undernourished. They also recognize that the continent is a net 
importer of food and the largest recipient of food aid in the world (Ibid.). With specific 
regard to the Southern African region, the SADC Declaration on Agriculture and Food 
Security (SADC, 2004) provides a key institutional framework for linking small-scale farmers 
into mainstream commercial agriculture. International institutions that have supported the 
integration of Southern African small-scale farmers into mainstream commercial agriculture 
include, among others, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Finance 
Corporation (IFC)3, Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and 
Food Agriculture and Natural Resource Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN).  
Under auspices of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the 
FAO has provided overarching advisory support to the reform of regional agricultural sector 
frameworks (FAO, 2006). Regarding issues of food security and vulnerability, for example, 
UNDAF’s Common Country Assessment (CCA) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
have been linked to the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems 
(FIVIMS) in an effort to redress failure by past interventions to reduce poverty and food 
security (Ibid.).  
The IFC, which is part of the World Bank Group, has provided financial investment and 
advisory support to commercial ventures by small-scale farmers. CGIAR has provided 
support to research organizations based in Southern Africa, mainly through the Challenge 
Program on Water and Food (CPWF). FANRPAN has co-ordinated, influenced and facilitated 
policy research, analysis and dialogue at the national, regional and global levels, through 
networking, capacity building and generation of information for the benefit of all 
stakeholders in the SADC region (FANRPAN, 2006).  
                                                     
3 IFC Agri-Business Sector Brochure on ‘The Private Sector and Global Food Security’. Internet 
[http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/agribusiness.nsf/Content/Features_Food_Security] 29/10/2011. 
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Furthermore, donor funding has been disbursed through various bi-lateral arrangements. 
For example, the Danish Association for International Cooperation supports trade and 
market linkages for Zambian small-scale producers4. Such support is provided in terms of 
‘favourable’ trade agreements and arrangements under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and African 
Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), through which the United States (US) opened its 
market for over 6000 products from Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), through its Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), provides an important institutional 
framework for promoting African small-scale farmers’ entry into mainstream commercial 
agriculture (NEPAD, 2005; South Africa, 2012). NEPAD has declared that the vision for 
economic development in Africa must be based on raising and sustaining higher rates of 
economic growth. African Heads of State and Government have recognised that agriculture 
is crucial to the continent’s economy and overall development and, specifically, to achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
Within the CAADP framework, contract farming is considered to be a useful institutional 
mechanism for governing linkages between small-scale farmers and agri-business firms and 
promoting small-scale farmers’ entry into mainstream agricultural market chains. CAADP is 
predicated on four pillars, which have been prioritized for investment. These are: 
sustainable land and water management; improvement of rural infrastructure and 
enhanced market access; increasing food availability and nutrition; and improving 
agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption. Anticipated socio-economic 
development benefits include increased productivity, on-farm and off-farm employment 
opportunities, improved incomes, livelihoods and the quality of life in rural areas.   
Against the background of concerted efforts to promote the integration of small-scale 
farmers into mainstream commercial agriculture, the recent past has seen many African 
small-scale becoming increasingly drawn into industrialised and globalised agri-food 
                                                     
4 Report on proceedings of the Advocacy and Lobby Workshop on Market linkages for Small Scale Farmers and 
Producers in Luapula Province, held from 20 to 21 November 2006 in Mansa, Zambia.  
Internet [http://www.cuts-international.org/pdf/Report_MarketLinkages.pdf] 29/10/2011. 
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systems. A few examples include Zambia and Malawi (Kirsten et al, 2005; Chizarura, 2007), 
Gambia (Carney, 1994), sugar, tea and cotton production in Zimbabwe (Jackson & Cheater, 
1994; Chizarura, 2007), horticulture in Kenya (Dolan, 2005; Jaffe, 1994), palm oil in Côte d’ 
Ivoire (Daddieh, 1994) and sugar in South Africa (Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1998). Such 
ventures are characterized by permutations of contract farming arrangements, and this 
mode of agricultural commercialisation is seen by its proponents as contributing, through 
multiplier effects, to economic growth (Kirsten et al, 2005; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Eaton 
& Shepherd, 2001; Von Braun, 1995) and rural development (Glover & Kusterer, 1990).  
Amid the optimism about prospects for entry by Southern African smallholders into the free 
market economy and about their establishing of viable niches within commodity sectors, 
there has been an on-going debate about the extent to which contract farming benefits 
small-scale farmers or leads to their exploitation by firms (Da Silva, 2005). This debate 
resonates with the broader international debates on implications of neo-liberal approaches 
to rural development and poverty in developing countries.  
2.3.3 SMALL-SCALE FARMERS’ INTEGRATION INTO GLOBALIZED AGRI-FOOD 
SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 
Proponents of agricultural commercialisation argue that it contributes, through multiplier 
effects, to economic growth (Kirsten et al, 2005; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Eaton & 
Shepherd, 2001; Von Braun, 1995) and rural development (Glover & Kusterer, 1990). A 
further argument is that agricultural commercialisation has “a significant potential to 
enhance rural development, reduce poverty and increase productivity, employment and 
incomes of small-scale farmers” (Norton 2004). Contract farming, in particular, is said to 
have a “considerable potential to integrate small-scale farmers in developing countries into 
export and processing markets and into the modern economy” (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). 
Such optimism is evident in the heraldic descriptions of contract farming as “partnerships 
for growth” (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001) and “a tool for empowering smallholder farmers in 
Southern Africa” (Kirsten et al, 2005).  
Experience shows that while contract farming has assisted African farmers to improve their 
lot through providing more reliable incomes, generating employment especially for women, 
providing new skills in farming and doing away with the patron-client relationship between 
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large and small producers (Glover & Kusterer, 1990). However, in many cases the practice 
has been accompanied by poor extension services, low prices to farmers due to haphazard 
pricing of produce and higher risk to producers (Ibid.). Disadvantages have also included the 
poor bargaining power of farmers and their dependence on firms for inputs and credit 
(Fulton & Clark, 1996), as well as environmental degradation due to over-exploitation of 
land and water resources (Siddique, 1998).  
Observations have also been that small-scale farmers, who wield less power and control 
within contract farming arrangements, are often more vulnerable to risks associated with 
highly competitive commercial agriculture (Jacobs, 2001: 28; Mayson, 2003; Cousins, 2003; 
Da Silva, 2005; FAO, 2006). Some critics have argued that producers' control of the 
production process is reduced, and cash crops are produced at the expense of local food 
production and food security (Jacobs, 2001: 28). Others have argued that contractual joint 
ventures are a new form of exploitation and a mechanism through which private investors 
spread the risk of engaging in an increasingly complex and capital-intensive sector, while 
gaining market and political credibility in the process (Mayson, 2003). The cited merits of 
contract farming have therefore been juxtaposed with a broad consesus that 
commercialization of agriculture has mainly negative effects on the welfare of the poor (Von 
Braun, 1995:187). 
Eaton & Shepherd (2001:3) argue that “the decision to use the contract farming modality 
must be a commercial one. It is not a developmental model to be tried by aid donors, 
governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because other rural development 
approaches have failed. Projects that are motivated primarily by political and social 
concerns rather than economic and technical realities will inevitably fail.”  
Constraints to effective participation by small-scale farmers partly emanate from world 
market conditionalities. The requirements, quality standards and food safety rules of 
consumers and corporations in developed countries can act as effective barriers to 
participation in high-value chains by small producers (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). Sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary measures and regulatory instruments, such as Provisions of the 
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), are used as non-trade barriers to 
protect producers in the north thereby making it difficult for producers in developing 
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countries to compete (Madonsela 2001 in Jacobs, 2001). There is a danger therefore that 
the requirements, quality standards and food safety rules of consumers and corporations in 
developed countries can act as effective barriers to participation in high-value chains by 
small producers (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). 
Constraints are also due to trade liberalization policies, such as the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture, which compel developing countries to phase out 
subsidies, exchange controls and trade barriers without imposing the same conditions in 
countries in the north (Jacobs, 2001). An issue that has been raised in policy debates and 
international trade negotiations, such as the FAO-facilitated Doha and Uruguay Rounds, is 
the ‘uneven playing field’ that has emerged in world agriculture subsequent to the various 
General Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATTs) since the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Agreement.  
According to an FAO report (FAO, 2006:2), the uneven playing field resulted from the 
“difficult history” that agriculture has had in the sequence of rounds of multi-lateral trade 
negotiations. The problem was belatedly addressed and brought under GATT disciplines 
after conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994. Prior to that “agriculture had been subject 
to a number of exceptions from GATT rules and GATT members, notably those who had the 
financial resources to do so, used these exceptions to grant export subsidies and impose 
quantitative import restrictions as adjuncts to their domestic agricultural support policies”. 
This created distortions and “disarray” in world food markets, which multi-lateral trade 
negotiations have since sought to redress (Ibid.).  
Measures to resolve structural problems, however, have not fully resolved the market 
inequalities. On the one hand, GATT negotiations continue to explore ways of mitigating 
negative impacts of liberalisation using, for example, mechanisms such as ‘special and 
differential treatment’ (SDT), which applies only to developing and least-developed 
countries (LDCs) (FAO, 2006). On the other hand, trade liberalisation policies, such as the 
World Trade Organization's Agreement on Agriculture, continue to coerce developing 
countries to phase out subsidies, exchange controls and trade barriers without imposing the 
same conditions in the north (Mayson, 2003:28). The FAO Report (FAO, 2006) concludes 
that “the debate over SDT continues, with developing countries and less developed 
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countries (LDCs) remaining dissatisfied with developed country responses to assist them in 
increasing their capacity to trade and to implement trade regulations”.  
Political economy scholars (Wilson et al, 2001:4; Tarrow, 1996 cited in Harris, 2001:1; 
Cousins, 2003; Drummond & Marsden, 1999) consider structural factors, such as outlined 
above, to be the most fundamental of constraints. These scholars argue that the persistence 
of poverty in developing countries, irrespective of more recent formulations for 
development, is largely the direct result of the broader structural factors inherent in the 
global political economy. Such factors perpetuated the divergence between core and 
marginal economies.  
According to Bessant (2007:443), debates within discourses about agricultural 
commercialization and market integration of small-scale farmers tend to invoke the terms 
‘farm crisis’, ‘agricultural crisis’ and ‘rural crisis’ to characterize significant disruptions of or 
threats to rural livelihoods. Bernstein et al (2006), for example, describes the great 
processes of agrarian transformation, which have fundamentally altered rural livelihoods in 
developing countries, and identifies some of the dilemmas for public action, which arise 
from agrarian transformation and the crises of rural livelihoods. Although such perceptions 
of crisis lack clear and concise meaning and shared conceptual understanding, much of the 
debate revolves around four themes (Bessant, 2007:443). The first relates to farm financial 
difficulties, which include low or unsustainable incomes, indebtedness and increasing 
reliance on non-farm revenue. The second theme relates to structural changes in 
agriculture, involving increasing scale, concentration and consolidation. The third is about 
rural livelihoods, while the fourth theme relates to international dimensions namely, market 
fluctuations, trade regulations and disputes (Ibid.).  
Given the significant constraints to prospects of small-scale producers effectively 
participating in mainstream commercial sectors, debates have more recently become 
focused on identifying requisite conditions for ensuring that value chains become effective 
tools for pro-poor development. According to Seville et al (2011), key questions revolve 
around whether or not resource-poor producers can participate and capture the value in 
such supply chains.  Other questions centre on whether or not small-scale producers really 
benefit, given the additional costs and risks in such markets, and under what conditions 
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such benefits accrue. While it is critical for interventions to be predicated on clear 
understandings of small-scale producer contexts (or “rural worlds”, according to Vorley 
2002 in Seville et al, 2011), a constraint, however, is that there is as yet a limited number of 
quantitative studies to demonstrate the impact of interventions in value chains on the poor 
(Humphrey & Navas-Aleman 2010 in Seville et al, 2011). Despite that there are also few 
interventions and theoretical approaches that successfully integrate analyses of stand alone 
value chains, livelihoods and environmental factors (Bolwig et al (2008 in Seville et al, 2011), 
emerging findings seem to suggest that ‘lead firm’ interventions, which funnel assistance by 
partnering with lead firms in the value chains, have less impact than ‘market linkage 
projects’, which work with chains without a lead firm (Humphrey & Navas-Aleman 2010 in 
Seville et al, 2011). A weakness of the former means of participation is that lead firm 
interventions primarily focus on business development with poverty impacts being a 
secondary outcome (Seville et al, 2011).  
In spite of the above constraints, Seville et al (Ibid.) affirms the usefulness of livelihoods-
based approaches to developing clearer understandings of rural contexts. The scholars 
further propose that strategies for increasing development impact include co-investments in 
the upgrading of livelihoods, producer skills, producer organizations and intermediaries to 
meet the requirements of the markets, as well as in utilizing existing assets and committing 
additional requisite investments towards ensuring that the poor are able to participate in 
ways that enhance their benefits while their reducing exposure to risks. Other suggested 
strategies include adapting trade relations, supply chain coordination, development of 
effective market linkages, fairness and transparent governance, sharing of costs and risks, 
equitable access to services, adaptation of product proposition and procurement practices, 
and co-investments in livelihoods beyond the value chain (Ibid.).    
2.4 SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: OVERVIEW  
Since the late 1990s, there has been an increasing convergence of reforms in various sectors 
in South Africa. This development seems to have provided a semblance of the required 
policy, statutory and governance framework within which the challenges of poverty and 
inequality can be resolved, rural development achieved and livelihoods secured. However, 
while the convergence of sector reforms might appear to have bolstered the prospects of 
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black small-scale farmers’ entry by into commercial agriculture, a problem is that these 
reforms have been concomitant with the government’s macro-economic policy shifts away 
from the anti-poverty strategies of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
towards the national economic goals espoused by the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy. Amid such policy shifts, government has retained a 
commitment to both economic growth and social development.  
Government's interest in "playing a significant role in the economy while fighting poverty" is 
evident in the Finance Minister's 2005 budget speech, in which expenditure on an 
expanding social security programme to cater for the poorest 40 per cent of the population 
would increase by 25 per cent in the following five years (Friedman, 2005). The National 
Growth and Development Strategy (NGDS) envisages that economic investment and growth 
will contribute to resolving challenges of poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and socio-
economic development. Despite government interventions, however, poverty and 
unemployment persist. The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa 
(AsgiSA), which was launched by Deputy President Ngcuka in 2006, states that towards 
meeting targets for reducing unemployment and poverty, the challenge is “to use strong 
demand for South Africa’s natural resources to build foundations for sustainable growth and 
bring the economically marginalised third of the population in mainstream economy” (South 
Africa, 2006).  
Within the agricultural sector, support to emerging farmers by the various sectors derives 
from the core objectives of the Agricultural Sector Strategy (South Africa, 2001) namely, to: 
 Enhance equitable access and participation in the agricultural sector; 
 Improve global competitiveness and profitability; 
 Ensure sustainable resource management; and 
 Ensure food security. 
The food security objective seems to address interests of both the rural poor as well as the 
broader public in South Africa. The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Framework 
for Agriculture (Agri-BEE) addresses the first two objectives, and joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships are considered to be key strategies for promoting entry by emerging black 
commercial farmers and petty commodity producers into mainstream agri-food systems. 
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Strategic initiatives that complement Agri-BEE include Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT), Water Allocation Reform (WAR), Policy on the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor 
Irrigation Farmers, Land Reform, Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP), 
municipal Local Economic Development (LED) frameworks and the ISRDP. 
The ISRDP, which was the key rural development framework from 2001 to 2009, is further 
demonstration of the hybrid nature of the government's macro-economic policy (see 
Section 2.5). The ISRDP emerged concomitant to the RESIS Programme, which is a 
nationwide programme to revitalize production and promote agricultural commercialization 
in smallholder irrigation schemes. Stated objectives of the RESIS Programme address both 
economic and poverty concerns, but articulation of the programme has progressively 
shifted towards economic interests, with key drivers including infrastructure and technology 
development (see Section 2.7).     
With specific regard to Limpopo Province, the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy 
(PGDS) provides the main institutional framework for interventions by government and 
partners in civil society, private sector and donor agencies. The PGDS is premised upon a 
view that resolving challenges of poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and rural 
development in the province will depend largely on investment and growth in the 
agricultural sector.  
While government seeks to balance conditions for economic growth with social security 
concerns, in many rural and urban contexts, various factors continue to militate against 
poverty reduction and livelihoods and food security, while BEE-focused interventions favour 
the creation of black elites without meaningfully reducing inequalities (Cousins, 2003; 
Tapela, 2008). Since 2004, discontent over perceived relative deprivation has increased, 
particularly among the poor and marginalized, become conflated with poor service delivery 
and other factors, and nationwide tides of violent social protests have erupted mostly in 
urban informal settlements (Nleya, 2011; Nleya et al, 2011; Atkinson 2007, Johnston & 
Bernstein 2007, Botes et al 2007a,b; Bond & Dugard, 2008; Allen & Heese, 2009; Heese & 
Allen, 2009) and exponentially increased in frequency in 2009 (Tapela et al, 2011a; Allen & 
Heese, 2009; Gouws et al, 2009; Sinwell et al, 2009; Nleya, 2011; Nleya et al, 2011). 
Although most rural communities have not been actively involved in such protests, there is 
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evidence of heightened discontent in various bucolic localities across South Africa (Tapela et 
al, 2011a; Tapela, 2009).  
With specific regard to land and agricultural policy, Greenberg’s (2010) Status Report shows 
that liberalization and deregulation have removed the state from direct interventions in 
nearly all operational activites in South Africa. Under such conditions, there has been a 
significant growth in concentration on food manufacturing, storage and retailing. 
Smallholders have suffered shortages of essential services, such as extension services, which 
were formerly provided by agricultural boards and cooperatives. Deregulation has 
established an expectation that farmers, regardless of resource endowments and scale of 
enterprise or operation, should be able to procure privatized extension services at a 
relatively high cost and to raise both capital and production loans at market-related interest 
rates and be able to pay them back. Greenberg alludes to recognition by the ANC’s 2007 
Polokwane Conference resolutions, which recognized that concentration and vertical 
integration in the value chain limit the space for smallholders to participate in the market. In 
light of this, the ANC proposition was ‘to integrate smallholders into formal value chains and 
link them with markets’, with cooperatives as a key organizational structure to 
operationalize such integration. Greenberg comments that the resolutions provided no 
clarity on the extent to which cooperatives might be orientated towards transforming the 
inherited market economy as opposed to merely enabling access to it. 
The burgeoning of social protests seems to have contributed, alongside a range of other 
factors, to pressurizing government to re-orient rural development interventions towards 
poverty and inequality concerns. Following an abrupt change of the South African 
presidency in 2009, whereby Deputy President Jacob Zuma replaced President Thabo Mbeki, 
various ministries were restructured and the Comprehensive Rural Development 
Programme (CRDP) replaced the ISRDP as the key institutional framework for rural 
development. 
President Jacob Zuma officially launched the CRDP on Monday 17 August 2009, at Muyexe 
Village in Greater Giyani Local Municipality of Limpopo Province. The CRDP was driven by 
the newly-constituted Department for Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). CRDP 
objectives were to facilitate processes that address specific and prioritized needs of 
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communities in rural areas.  Such needs included access to clean water, decent shelter, 
adequate sanitation and enterprises development support. The programme was based on 
the three strategic pillars namely, Agrarian Transformation, Rural Development and Land 
Reform. Community participation was stated as a central approach to CRDP 
implementation, particularly with regard to needs identification, programme development 
and service delivery monitoring. Since the CRDP emerged after the study, an extensive 
examination of the CRDP is largely beyond the scope of this thesis, although some reference 
is made to the programme insofar as it relates to the RESIS Programme (Chapter Three).  
2.5 INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME  
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The South African government launched the ISRDP in July 2000 after consultation with a 
wide range of key stakeholders and as a renewed attempt to improve opportunities and the 
well-being for the rural poor (IDT, 2000: iv). Prior to this, the Office of the Presidency of 
South Africa directed the formulation process for the ISRD Strategy (ISRDS). President Thabo 
Mbeki formally announced the ISRDS on June 25 1999. The ISRDP ended in 2009, following 
government’s expressed recommitment to addressing poverty, restructuring of ministries 
and emergence of CRDP. This section gives attention to the ISRDP, which was the main 
institutional framework for rural development during the course of the study.  
2.5.2 ISRDP VISION AND ARTICULATION  
The vision of the ISRDP was to "attain socially cohesive and stable rural economies with 
viable institutions, sustainable economies and universal access to social amenities, able to 
attract and retain skilled and knowledgeable people who are equipped to contribute to 
growth and development" (IDT, 2000:19).  
Articulation of this vision involved an incremental approach wherein the initial focus on 
thirteen identified pilot nodal areas was to be broadened to embrace all impoverished rural 
areas in the country by the year 2010. A further seventeen nodes were identified in 
September 2003 but were never gazetted.  
Articulation of the ISRDP vision also involved the integration and coordination of rural 
development interventions by various sectors and spheres of government in South Africa. In 
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this regard, the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) process provided the principal 
instrument for integration and coordination, as required by the Municipal Systems Act 23 of 
2000. This act gave municipalities the legal responsibility to undertake IDP processes to 
guide and inform all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making in municipal 
areas, and therefore places municipalities in a key position to coordinate the ISRDP 
programme. The central positioning of municipalities in the implementation of the ISRDP 
reflected the government's objectives to decentralize political and administrative decision 
making to local authorities.  
2.5.3 ISRDP OBJECTIVES 
As a support strategy for government decentralization objectives, the ISRDP subscribed to 
policy objectives pertaining to rural development, which included: 
 The promotion of macroeconomic stability to create favourable conditions for 
investment and trade;  
 Agricultural policy reform to remove distortions and enhance competitiveness in the 
agricultural sector;  
 Investment in infrastructure and service delivery to strengthen links between rural areas 
and the economy as a whole, to reduce the costs of production in rural localities and to 
make rural areas more desirable places to live in;  
 Investment in human capital to enhance the skills and health of rural people; and 
 Broadly-based ownership of land and productive assets to address the historical 
inequalities in access to land and housing (Goldman et al, 2002).  
2.5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISRDP: OVERVIEW  
Implementation of the ISRDP involved the use of existing institutional, planning, 
management and funding mechanisms to focus the expenditure of the three spheres of 
government in order to more effectively and efficiently respond to needs and opportunities 
(See Figure 6). It is perhaps worth noting that the implementation approach was not based 
on additional funding from government, but on increasing efficiency in the application of 
public funds to create appropriate outputs in the rural areas where they are required. 
Towards this end, the structures and procedures of the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) provided the mechanism for rationalizing national and provincial budget 
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structures into an 'amalgamated expenditure envelope' to meet ISRDP objectives. 
Mobilization of funds took place through various delivery structures and relationships, 
including the economic, social and infrastructure 'clusters' and 'partnerships' of various 
state organs, the private sector, public-private partnerships and the donor sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IDT 2000: 28) 
 
 
Implementation of the ISRDP also included the establishment of political and technical 
institutions to drive, manage and implement the programme across the three spheres of 
government (See Box 1).  
It is evident that the ISRDP was basically an institutional rationalization strategy for aligning 
the activities of all three spheres of government with local development priorities. Although 
the ISRDP had no tangible development outputs, the implementation framework for the 
programme included the identification of 'anchor projects' around which the various 
development initiatives were envisaged to revolve. Smallholder irrigation schemes were 
among a list of seventeen anchor projects in the Greater Sekhukhune District. 
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FIGURE 6 AMALGAMATED EXPENDITURE ENVELOPE FOR FUNDING THE ISRDP 
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BOX 1 SOME KEY OUTPUTS OF THE ISRDP 
 An Inter-Governmental Relations (IGR) Organalysis that outlines the key roles and responsibilities of 
critical entities across all spheres of government;  
 Assignation of a core group of 14 national ministers to act in pairs as political "champions" for individual 
provinces and rural nodes; 
 Identification of political and technical champions at the provincial and nodal municipal levels;   
 Establishment of a national Inter-Departmental Task Team (IDTT) structure to manage and coordinate the 
ISRDP nationally; 
 Initiation of a process to establish provincial and nodal municipality Technical Coordinating Committees to 
manage and coordinate the ISRDP at the operational level;  
 Initiation of process to establish nodal delivery teams in all the nodal district municipalities (IDT, 2002); 
and 
 Identification of "anchor" projects for each of the thirteen pilot nodal areas, and the incorporation of 
these into the relevant IDPs. 
(Source: IDT, 2002) 
Despite achievements in the setting up a variety of institutional arrangements to implement 
the ISRDP and the identification of nodal anchor projects, a common view was that the 
implementation of the programme had been beset with a number of difficulties. Prior to the 
launch of the ISRDP in 2001, the national Inter-Departmental Task Team (IDTT) identified 
the following challenges: insufficient alignment across the three spheres of government, 
lack of adequate funding and technical inputs for projects, slow response by institutional 
systems and actors to the demands for new protocols of organizational behaviour, and poor 
visibility and support of political champions.  
A 2004 evaluation of the ISRDP, on behalf of the Independent Development Trust (IDT), 
showed that there had been limited improvements over the previous four years and the 
programme was still beset with insufficient capacity and inadequate coordination with and 
participation by provincial and national departments (Everatt et al, 2004). Although a great 
deal of money had been made available for capacity building initiatives in the nodes, such 
funding was not guided by clear planning. Institutional arrangements at the nodal level had 
yet to be sufficiently refined. Although relations between district and local municipalities 
seemed to be generally adequate, there were problematic undercurrents that needed to be 
dealt with. IDP process required greater participation by the national sphere and better 
coordination of planning, budgeting and delivery between all the spheres of government. 
Such challenges were compounded by the fact that the ISRDP emerged within a context in 
which there was "very little concentration on spatial planning in rural areas to succeed the 
former apartheid planning strategies" (Swartz et al, 2003: 3). 
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2.5.5 HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE ISRDP: POST-1994 RECONSTRUCTION 
The ISRDP was the product of a concerted effort by the South African government, acting in 
conjunction with local, national and international structures and networks (IDT, 2000). The 
programme drew from a diversity of development approaches and interests. Indeed, 
international frameworks such as Agenda 21 and the Millennium Development Goals appear 
to have had significant influence on the drafting of the ISRDP. While this enriched the 
discourses that informed the ISRDP design process, the same diversity also created 
difficulties in the conceptualisation of the rural challenge in South Africa and the requisite 
interventions. These difficulties were reflected in debates regarding whether or not the 
ISRDP provided an adequate construct for the resolution of the rural challenge. 
The ISRDP emerged during the African National Congress' (ANC's) second term in 
government. Everatt (2004: 3) asserts that between 1999 and 2004, there was a shift away 
from the 1994 - 1999 emphasis on policy formulation and releasing resources to benefit the 
majority of citizens towards a focus on implementation and service delivery, including 
better organization of government through mechanisms such as the Cabinet Cluster system. 
The beginnings of this shift, however, were rooted in the ANC's first term in government. 
This was the design phase of the Cabinet Cluster system and systems and structures such as 
the Poverty Relief Fund, the annual Cabinet Lekgotlas and the Medium Term Strategic 
Framework. There seem to be varying views, however, on the contributions by the policy 
and legal frameworks developed in the ANC government's first term of office.  
One view (Everatt, 2004: 4) is that the ISRDP was a response to the failure by the Rural 
Development Strategy and the Rural Development Framework to articulate a clear 
methodology for achieving the RDP requirements and standards, due to a lack of experience 
with the complexities of governance. Everatt’s view is therefore that the RDP provided the 
key macro-economic policy that set out the delivery requirements and standards for the 
ISRDP. Other scholars (Van Rooyen et al, 2001: 42) recognize the role of both the RDP and 
GEAR in providing the policy grounding of the ISRDP, the latter being seen as providing the 
requisite stable macro-economic framework. The contrasting views reflect divergence in the 
conceptual bases for the ISRDP and contradictory perspectives on the broader rural 
development approach adopted by government. The contrasting views also reflect the 
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interests and tensions inherent in the broader national and provincial institutional context 
outlined in Section 2.1 above.  
Apart from diversity of international influences on the framing of the ISRDP, there seem to 
have also been some practical national and local imperatives for the government 
intervention. Practitioners within various sector departments appear to have recognised the 
weaknesses inherent in the uncoordinated delivery of assets and services. This seems 
evident from adoption by the ISRDP of the 'cluster' delivery model developed by the 
National Public Works Department for implementation of the Community Based Public 
Works Programme (CBPWP). The cluster delivery model became the 'nodal' model for the 
ISRDP (Everatt, 2004).  
Scholars such as Cousins (2003) have argued that the South African challenge is not about 
‘rural development’ but ‘agrarian reform’. Cousins’s notion of agrarian reform encompasses 
a broader set of issues than envisaged by neo-liberal economists, such as Van Zyl (1996). It 
embraces the character, strength and distribution of land rights; the class character of the 
relations of production and distribution in farming and related enterprises; how these 
connect to the wider class structure; and therefore economic and political power and the 
relations between them. By contrast, ‘integrated rural development’, as conceived by neo-
liberal economists, emphasizes the inclusion of petty commodity producers into the 
mainstream capitalist economy as a means of achieving ‘equity’ and ‘empowerment’ of the 
historically disadvantaged5.   
2.5.6 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ISRDP  
Conceptual foundations of the ISRDP can be traced to the early 1990s, when academic 
debates about the challenge of rural poverty and inequality occupied a central position in 
numerous conferences, workshops and seminars that were held both in South Africa and 
abroad. Such debates largely focused on the land question. An important landmark among 
these was the Land Options Conference, which the Land and Agricultural Policy Centre 
(LAPC) convened in Johannesburg from 12 to 15 October 1993 (Van Zyl, 1996). Major 
                                                     
5
 See Section 2.3 for a more detailed review of this debate. 
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initiatives also included a plethora of popular discussions that were held at the grassroots 
level (Ibid.).  
With progression through the decade, however, there was a broadening of focus to include 
issues of disempowerment, poverty and empowerment of historically disadvantaged 
individuals (HDIs) and communities in various sectors of the economy, particularly 
agriculture. The focus of debates shifted to restructuring of the economy to “create equal 
opportunities and level the playing field” (Kirsten et al, 1998:1). Concepts such as ‘black 
advancement’, ‘black empowerment’ and ‘affirmative action’ came to the fore (Ibid.). Black 
economic empowerment (BEE) broadly meant the redress of the legacy of past 
discrimination and elimination of inequalities, but this was qualified by recognition of the 
need for “economically optimal allocation of scarce production factors in order to produce 
sustainable levels of welfare” (p.3). The assumption was that the market, as an institution 
that links demand and supply, provided an effective mechanism for allocating scarce 
resources according to need and utility (Brand et al 1992 in Kirsten et al, 1998; Eckert 1991 
in Kirsten et al, 1998).  
Global liberalisation policies were influential in shifting focus to include economic questions, 
alongside the land question. The World Bank, in particular, played a key role in setting the 
tone for post-1994 discourses on the challenge of rural poverty and inequality and, by 
extension, conceptualization of the ISRDP and related interventions in the land, agriculture, 
water and other productive sectors. 
2.5.6.1  World Bank Approach: Economic Liberalization 
In 1994, the World Bank asserted that a successful strategy for growth and development of 
the rural economy would require at least three components, including: 
 Firstly, the removal of prevailing distortions in white commercial agriculture to 
increase competition and induce a shift towards more employment-intensive forms 
of production, processing and marketing; 
 Secondly, the development of a new type of commercial, small-scale agriculture 
centred on the family farm to further increase employment intensity and efficiency 
in agriculture; and 
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 Thirdly, a fundamental institutional restructuring in order to support the new 
vision: on the one hand, a down-sized and employment-intensive white farming 
sub-sector and, on the other hand, an emerging commercial small-scale farming 
sub-sector (Kirsten et al, 1998:5).  
The second component pertained specifically to historically disadvantaged people in former 
homeland areas, for whom the proposed development strategy would entail an upgrading 
of agricultural support services and investments in improved physical and social 
infrastructure. Such strategy was said to be consistent with the process of policy 
liberalization and focusing public sector resources on “some of the most obvious victims of 
apartheid”. By contrast, the second element of the World Bank’s assertion involved a 
restructuring of the public, private and private voluntary institutions that define 
entitlements of farmers and provide support services to farmers as well as “a restructuring 
of the entitlements and services themselves” (Ibid.). 
Although the World Bank’s proposition was closely attuned to global liberalization policies 
emanating from the Bretton Woods Agreement, it was largely silent on outstanding socio-
economic and political issues, such as disempowerment and alienation of productive 
resources, principally land, which affected the majority of historically disadvantaged black 
people of South Africa. It was left to South African stakeholders to qualify the content of 
‘appropriate’ strategies for redress and restructuring.   
2.5.5.3 Emergence of Neo-liberal Dominance of South African Rural Development and 
Agrarian Reform Discourses 
Lipton (2007) suggests that South African debates have been subject to conflicting 
interpretations of South Africa’s history of disempowerment. Lipton identifies three broad 
categories of scholarship that shaped perceptions about South Africa’s past, socio-economic 
challenges and requisite reforms. These are the neo-liberals, neo-Marxists and (African and 
Afrikaner) nationalists.  
From among a diversity of stakeholders who engaged with the 1990s discourses about post-
apartheid South Africa’s rural challenge, a ‘think-tank’ of neo-liberal scholars rose to 
prominence in the late 1990s and influenced the formulation of the ISRDP and related 
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reforms in land, agriculture, water and other productive sectors. This grouping, as well as 
some Marxist scholars, social scientists and political economists,  emanated from the LAPC 
‘Options Conference’ of 1993 (Van Zyl et al, 1996), and the think-tank was formally 
convened by the Africa Institute for Policy Analysis and Economic Integration (AIPA) towards 
publication of a book entitled ‘The Agricultural Democratisation of South Africa’ (Kirsten et 
al, 1998).  Contributors mostly included agricultural economists notably, Johan Van Zyl, 
Johan Kirsten, Hans Binswanger, Nick Vink, Klaus Deininger, Johan Van Rooyen, Michael 
Aliber, Rob Townsend, Sampie Terreblanche and Diana Carney, among others. The AIPA 
publication became the conceptual basis for the ISRDP and, by extension, the RESIS 
Programme.   
The ascendance of neo-liberal scholarship was counter to compelling evidence and 
arguments put forward by South African political economics scholars (e.g. Levin & Weiner, 
1996; Delius, 1996; May et al, 1998; May, 2000:7). These argued that the challenge of rural 
poverty and inequality might not be resolved through neo-liberal approaches but required a 
comprehensive poverty relief programme. South African neo-liberal scholarship also rose 
despite international evidence that a few decisive strokes of policy to roll back states and 
liberate markets was not enough to achieve accelerated economic growth and reduce 
poverty6.  
Terreblanche (1998:49) ascribes the hegemonic influence of neo-liberals to fiscal constraints 
and lack of organizational capacity, which prohibited the new ANC-led government from 
implementing a comprehensive poverty relief programme. Terreblanche concludes that, in 
the absence of practicable poverty-focused options, the argument of the “wealthy middle 
class” that the only way to solve the poverty problem was to maintain a high economic 
growth rate prevailed.   
By contrast, Lipton (2007:148) alludes to tensions within the Tripartite Alliance of the 
African National Congress (ANC), Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the 
South African Communist party (SACP). While the main divisions have been between African 
nationalists/Africanists, the Left and various less effectively mobilized liberals and 
                                                     
6 Bernstein, H. 2004. Development Studies and the Marxists. Draft eScholarship Repository. Internet 
[http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgirs/CGIRS-2004-8] 01 April 2008. 
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pragmatists, “pace-setters” have been Africanists and the Left within the ANC. According to 
Lipton, many among Africanists are former Black Consciousness activists, who have been co-
opted into influential positions within the ANC and are among those who decry the lack of 
change and incomplete power transition. Most are not averse to capitalism and are indeed 
the driving force behind the ANC’s BEE policy.  
It would seem therefore that emergence of the ISRDP in the ANC’s second term of office 
reflected, in addition to lack of fiscal and organizational capacity (Terreblanche, 1998:49), 
the convergence between Africanist and neo-liberal perspectives. Such convergence has 
also been evident in the heraldic economic ‘growth and development’ mantra that 
characterizes overarching institutional frameworks, such as the National Growth and 
Development Strategy (NGDS) and its provincial permutations, as well as sector-specific 
slogans like ‘water for growth and development’. The mantra is also echoed in regional 
institutional frameworks for agriculture, such as the NEPAD CAADP (see Section 1.2.3), and 
similar provincial frameworks, such as RESIS-Recharge Programme of Limpopo Province (see 
Section 2.3.2). 
2.5.6.2 Van Zyl's Vision for Agriculture and Management of the Transition: Liberalization 
The World Bank’s proposition of 1994 (see Section 2.2.3.2) appears to have been taken up 
by South African neo-liberal scholars, such as Van Zyl (1996), who put forward ‘a new vision 
for agriculture and management of the transition’. Van Zyl’s vision was predicated upon 
three pillars namely: accelerating rural development; increasing access to land for the poor; 
and increasing access to land for small- to medium-sized commercial farmers (Ibid.). 
Regarding the last pillar, Van Zyl advocated that this strategic option represents the missing 
link in the required strategy for successful agricultural and rural transformation in South 
Africa (Kirsten et al, 1998:7). To promote market-assisted land redistribution, Van Zyl 
proposed that support should concentrate on the following four categories of individual 
and/or community owner-operators (Table 5): 
 Land rental markets (including sharecropping); 
 Joint ventures of workers and owners; 
 Contract farming between a processing or marketing firm and owner-operators; and  
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 Market-assisted land redistribution to individual, small- to medium scale owner-
operators (Van Zyl 1996:605; Kirsten et al, 1998:7). 
 
TABLE 5 VAN ZYL'S VISION FOR INCREASING LAND ACCESS FOR SMALL- TO MEDIUM-
SIZED COMMERCIAL FARMERS, 1996 
Owner-Operator Category Rationale and Requirements 
Land rental markets  
(including sharecropping) 
A more flexible rental market would improve the opportunity for 
households with some farm resources to engage in agriculture. 
However, land rental should not become the main aspect of farm 
structure, given the intrinsic problems such as under-investment, 
environmental costs and collateral constraints to credit. 
Joint ventures of workers and owners Joint ventures, such as equity-sharing schemes, will contribute to 
broadening the ownership base in agriculture. However, successful 
replication of this approach will be constrained by high transaction 
costs and special conditions for success, such as high value products. 
Contract farming between a 
processing or marketing firm and 
owner-operators  
Contract farming is especially appropriate for commodity production 
that involves a central processing plant or packing house, which 
requires large capital outlays and benefits from economies of scale 
(e.g. cotton and sugar cane production). 
Market-assisted land redistribution to 
individual, small- to medium scale 
owner-operators 
This approach will facilitate access to land for small- to medium-scale 
farmers. However, it will also require coordinated support by 
Departments of Agriculture, Land Affairs and Finance  as well as the 
private sector regarding: grants, a viable credit system, substantial 
private sector involvement and selective government funded, 
financed and/or provided support services.   
Source: Adapted from Van Zyl (1996:605) and Kirsten et al (1998:7). 
Van Zyl’s vision set the tone for neo-liberal scholars within AIPA’s think-tank. Their 
perspectives on economic growth and development in AIPA publication entitled ‘The 
Agricultural Democratisation of South Africa’ became key points of reference for ISRDP 
formulation. The hegemony of neo-liberalism, however, remains contested. Various Marxist, 
social science and political economy scholars have continued to engage with policy on the 
requisite framing of the land and agrarian question, as well as institutional arrangements for 
empowerment and poverty alleviation. Such scholars include, among others, Levin (2002), 
Kepe & Cousins (2002), Cousins (2003), Borras (2003), Andrew et al (2003), De Swart (2004), 
Du Toit & Ziervogel, 2005; Du Toit (2004), Mayson (2004), Cousins (2005a), Cousins (2005b), 
Cousins et al (2005a), Cousins et al (2005b), Lahiff & Cousins (2005), Cousins & Hall (2005), 
Cousins & Claassens (2005), Cousins (2010) and Cousins & Scoones (2010). Drawing largely 
from radical political economy perspectives, some of these scholars (e.g. Cousins, 2005a; Du 
Toit & Ziervogel, 2005; Du Toit & Ziervogel, 2004; Du Toit, 2004; Cousins, 2003; Borras, 
2003; Levin, 2002; May, 2000: 7; Levin & Weiner, 1996) identify structural factors as being 
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the fundamental constraints and argue that constraints to effective participation by small-
scale farmers partly emanate from world market conditionalities. Similar views are 
expressed by Wilson et al (2001:4), Tarrow (1996 in Harris, 2001:1) and Drummond & 
Marsden (1999), who consider structural factors to be the most fundamental of constraints 
to poverty reduction in developing countries. Within this thesis, the institutional dimension 
of relationships within contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships provides a lens 
for examining whether or not structural factors constitute constraints to rural livelihoods in 
impoverished smallholder irrigation scheme contexts in Limpopo Province.  
According to Lipton (1993 in Cousins & Scoones 2010:40), institutions assume a significantly 
central role in New Institutional Economics, which informs much of the thinking 
underpinning contractual arrangements between farmers and private firms. New 
Institutional Economics sees both peasants and large land owners as rational decision-
makers and real markets to be absent or ‘thin’ because of inadequate information or high 
transaction costs. This paradigm therefore propounds the adoption of exogenous 
institutions, such as rural money markets or share-cropping, and endogenous institutions, 
such as rural property rights, as means towards reducing transaction costs. Proponents of 
New Institutional Economics approaches also advocate the accommodation of ‘interlocked 
markets’, which are explicable as an endogenous response to market imperfections. They 
also recognise power relations and structures as important, since groups and coalitions seek 
to use or alter their property rights to their advantage (Ibid.). Endogenous power structures 
are seen as potentially leading to sub-optimal outcomes for society, particularly when large 
land owners prevent land markets from optimizing farm size and allowing the economic 
strengths of labour-intensive small-scale agriculture to be realized. New institutional 
economists therefore gauge viability in terms of productive efficiency, higher levels of 
equity and contributions to broader economic growth and poverty reduction (Ibid.). 
Hart (2008) asserts that adequate understanding is not just a matter of combining different 
dimensions into a more encompassing model of “neo-liberalism in general” but rather the 
challenge is to come to grips with how “identifiably neo-liberal projects and practices 
operate on terrains that always exceed them”. Hart’s rationale is that the fissures within 
South African society form part of greater struggles over the definition and meaning of 
liberation and freedom on the one hand and simultaneously reflect the “expressions of 
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betrayal—intensified and sharpened by obscene and escalating material inequalities, and 
the crisis of livelihood confronting many in South Africa today”. This implies therefore the 
need to examine, in nuanced ways, the class dimensions of decision making, formulation 
and implementation of interventions and their impacts. 
The next section presents, by way of context, an overview of South African debates on 
requisite approaches to enhancing rural development and addressing challenges of poverty 
and inequality. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into a comprehensive review of 
counter-arguments to the neo-liberal perspectives. The thesis therefore limits such 
examination primarily to works by several selected social scientists, Marxists and other 
political economy scholars, who, among other scholars, have developed thorough analyses 
of South Africa’s rural challenge and critiques of adopted approaches. The logistical 
limitations to capturing the entire diversity of views and volume of such debates within this 
thesis, which foregrounds empirical research findings, are acknowledged.  
2.6 OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEBATES ON ENHANCING RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT  
A number of South African political economy and social science scholars, and notably the 
Marxists, have questioned the neo-liberal argument for integrated rural development, 
agricultural commercialization and, in particular, the merits of contractual market linkage 
for smallholders and other members of impoverished rural communities. Such dispute 
revolves around various linked axes of argument. One of these relates to the neo-liberal 
assumption that a high growth rate within the core or mainstream economy will spread 
favourable trickle-down effects to the impoverished rural periphery, resulting in greater 
socio-economic integration and stability. Another is linked to the practical difficulties of 
ensuring successful entry by black small-scale farmers into mainstream commercial 
agriculture and a significant role for smallholder irrigators within the economy. A third 
pertains to the divergence of understandings about ‘marginalization’ and therefore the 
requisite interventions for addressing challenges of poverty and inequality.  
In his critique of the ‘redistribution-through-growth’ perspective, Terreblanche (1998:46) 
asserts that the economic problem for South Africa is mainly a systemic one. The scholar 
argues that for South Africa to be aligned with “today’s world”, the country has no choice 
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but to develop an “appropriate and sustainable system of democratic capitalism” to replace 
the previous system of racial capitalism. The scholar identifies the most serious problem 
facing South Africa today as the ‘absence of a proper social structure’. He states that South 
African population does not presently constitute a society since it lacks the shared values, 
the common ideological connections, the cross-cutting cleavages and the common history 
necessary to “cement the population into some kind of community” (p.47). Terreblanche 
further argues that South African transformation will not be complete until a new 
“symbiosis” has been forged between the black controlled state and white owned capital. 
Drawing from the perspectives of an “incomplete power shift” and an “on-going power 
struggle” across post-1994 racial cleavages of political and economic power, Terreblanche 
identifies five ‘problem areas’ as probable impediments to the transformation process: 
 Lack of socio-economic stability and a unifying ideology, manifest in high levels of 
violence, crime and general lawlessness;  
 Lack of equity, manifest in inequalities in the distributions of incomes, property, 
opportunities and in abject poverty;  
 Relatively low economic growth and poor job creating ability of the economy; 
 Inability of both the private and public sectors to create socio-economic and 
ideological conditions conducive for a fuller re-integration of the South African 
economy into global economy; and 
 Inability of the new government to govern efficiently and effectively as well as the 
inability of government to facilitate the systemic transformation towards a 
sustainable system of democratic capitalism (Ibid.).    
Terreblanche surmises that although racial capitalism cannot be blamed for all inequalities 
in the distribution of income, property and opportunities, a large part of these inequalities 
can and should be blamed on the social, economic and political structures created during 
the period of white supremacy. This view resonates with views by other scholars (e.g. 
Leibbrandt et al 2001:205 in Du Toit, 2005; Makgetla 2004 in Du Toit, 2005; May, Carter & 
Padayachee 2004 in Du Toit, 2005) that the role of the structure of the Apartheid economy 
and the extreme nature of South African inequality in impeding growth should be 
recognised, and that the neo-liberal argument about rigidity and inefficiency seems rather 
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decontextualised in the light of the deeply racialised and authoritarian history of South 
African capitalism, state formation and modernisation.  
With regard to the practical difficulties of ensuring successful market entry by black small-
scale farmers, Cousins (2003) casts his argument in terms of the ‘agrarian question of the 
dispossessed’ perspective, which revolves around the constituting of a new class of 
emergent petty commodity producers from the ranks of the desperately poor, a class which 
“must insert itself aggressively into the mainstream capitalist economy”. Cousins raises 
questions about prospects for effective participation by small-scale farmers in highly 
competitive and globalised agricultural commodity sectors. On the basis that black small-
scale farmers lack the financial resources, technology, technical and managerial skills and 
access to markets, Cousins asserts that it is debatable whether a new class of petty 
commodity producers can establish a viable niche within global commodity chains, given the 
significant constraints to their effective participation. Collier & Dercon (2009) argue that in 
the longer term, strategies to increase agricultural contributions to economic growth might 
render smallholder farming untenable, since labour productivity requires “successful” 
migration out of agriculture and rural areas. 
At face-value, such perspectives seem to echo Kirsten & Sartorius’ (2002) observation that, 
among farmers, it is often only the well-endowed and skilled who have the ability to be part 
of the coordinated chains and alliances. However, there is a fundamental difference in 
assumptions underpinning Kirsten & Sartorius’ observation and Cousin’s (2003) perspective. 
Cousins’s ‘agrarian question of the dispossessed’ view is predicated upon a class-analytic 
assumption that prospects of effective participation by these farmers are untenable under 
prevailing structural constraints. Kirstens & Sartorius’ view resonates, rather, with Eaton & 
Shepherd’s (2001:3) argument that successful entry by small-scale farmers into mainstream 
commodity sectors becomes possible when the decision to use the contract farming 
modality is commercial rather than developmental, and motivated primarily by economic 
and technical realities rather than political and social concerns. The latter view implicitly 
assumes that the ‘inclusion’ of the more capable among black farmers can enhance these 
farmers’ equitable access to and participation in coordinated global value chains and 
alliances. 
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Cousins (2003) argues that contrary to conventional notions of poverty as ‘residual’ in 
character, the vast majority of rural dwellers are not so much excluded as included on highly 
adverse terms. Reiterating this view, Du Toit (2005) asserts that often the problem is not 
that poor people have simply been excluded from particular institutions, resources or larger 
processes, but that they have been included on inequitable or invidious terms (Apthorpe 
1999 in Ibid.; Bracking 2003 in Ibid.; Murray 2001 in Ibid.). The counter-argument by some 
among Marxist scholars, including Cousins (2003) and Du Toit (2005), is that the complex 
and dynamic processes of marginalization form such an important dimension of chronic 
poverty and require us to go beyond the simplistic dichotomy between inclusion and 
exclusion and the assumption that inclusion is necessarily beneficial. 
The above debates have direct implications for what has become known in South Africa as 
the “two economies” debate, which revolves around the argument advanced by President 
Mbeki in August 2003 that the persistence of poverty in South Africa is due to the 
“structural disconnection” between the “first world economy” and a “third world” economy 
(Mbeki 2003 in Du Toit, 2005). According to Du Toit, the significance of Mbeki’s argument is 
that it represents government’s recognition of the limitations of trickle-down approaches. 
Such recognition presents opportunity to advance the re-examination and enhancement of 
approaches to poverty (Ibid.). In his ‘two economies’ analysis, Cousins (Ibid.) dismisses the 
assumption that economic growth in the ‘first economy’ will automatically benefit those in 
the ‘second economy’, arguing that the apparently successful policies pursued within the 
‘first economy’ are the same policies that create structural disadvantage in the ‘second’, and 
thus need to be questioned. Webster (2004 in Du Toit, 2005) points out that powerful and 
suggestive as the metaphor of a separate “third world economy” is, it is not a helpful way to 
understand the very complex actual relationships that persist between the highly developed 
‘core’ of the South African economy and its underdeveloped and impoverished periphery.  
Furthermore, Cousins (2005a) expresses reservations about former President Thabo Mbeki’s 
suggestion that the ‘first’ (i.e. formal and mainstream) and ‘second’ (i.e. informal and 
marginalized) economies are ‘structurally disconnected’. In disputing such suggestion, the 
scholar invokes suggestions by analysts, such as Magketla (2004 in Cousins, 2005a) and 
Terreblanche (2002 in Cousins, 2005a), that poverty is caused by structures of inequality 
within one economy that is already integrated, but in ways that disadvantage the majority. 
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The scholar surmises that if the construct envisaged by Makgetla and Terreblanche is a more 
appropriate model, then the solution lies not in “building ladders between the lower and 
the upper storeys of the two-tiered house, but rather in rebuilding the house, according to a 
new set of architectural plans”, according to an often cited analogy by Mbeki. In essence, 
these scholars call for a radical change of the capitalist structure rather than a 
reconstruction of the same construct that has proved detrimental to real transformation of 
South African society. Cousins therefore rejects the neo-liberal assumption that integration 
of the first and second economy will require ‘sustained government intervention’, including 
resource transfers and the infusion of capital (Ibid: 11). 
Du Toit (2004:11 in Cousins, 2005a) observe that it may well be that many of the obstacles 
to accumulation from below among poor people are linked very closely to the depth of 
corporate penetration of the economy as a whole…”. Drawing from perspectives on global 
value chains, Cousins & Scoones (2010) contest the neo-liberal paradigms of ‘viability’ and 
observe that the notion of viability is often narrowly seen in technical and economic terms, 
with success being judged on the basis of farm productivity and economic returns and 
technical recommendations around ‘minimum farm sizes’, ‘economic units’ and ‘carrying 
capacity’. Smallholders are therefore thrust into standard farm management approaches 
and business plans developed for large scale commercial farms. The result is that the role of 
other farming systems that do not fit into the narrow commercial model, such as as small-
scale household-based production systems, are marginalized from the ambit of 
programmatic support. Cousins & Scoones view such normative model and practice as 
legacies from settler colonialism in Southern Africa, which has given rise to the highly 
dualistic and racially divided agrarian structure.  
Acknowledging this historical context, Denison & Manona (2007) call for a re-formulation of 
interventions to take into account the diversity of smallholder needs and interests, and 
factoring in of needs of the resource-poor while responding to changes in global agri-food 
systems. From a radical Marxist perspective, Cousins (2003) asserts that although the deep 
poverty in rural areas requires radical measures, not least a redistribution of resources 
including land, a sustainable livelihoods approach that builds on the land-based livelihoods 
that rural people currently practice and enhances their economic value might be more 
appropriate than attempting to replace these livelihoods with fully market-orientated or 
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commercialised approaches. Towards this end, Friedman's (2005) observation that attempts 
to deal with poverty are ineffective because they do not reflect what the poor want also 
suggests, perhaps, the need for more active participation by the rural poor in shaping the 
agrarian agenda. 
Cousins & Scoones (2010) point out that many livelihoods analyses reveal an inherent 
tension between emphases on poverty alleviation, on the one hand, and promoting 
economic growth and increased market access, on the other hand. Effectively therefore, 
two strands of livelihoods approaches can be identified namely, the developmentalist and 
welfarist approaches. The former underscores economic growth and development while the 
latter approach emphasizes poverty alleviation and strongly focuses on food security. 
Wegner & Zwart (2011), for example, cast the contemporary production challenge in terms 
of food security for the poor. These scholars state that achieving the objectives of increased 
food production, food availability and environmental sustainability requires adoption of a 
blend of policies that address a four-pronged approach that includes supporting subsistence 
farmers to cope with risk and vulnerability; empowering small investor farmers with 
capacity to increase their productivity, production and competitiveness and thereby 
contribution to food security; making large investments pro-poor by setting appropriate 
frameworks; and building complementarities between small and large farms where possible 
(Ibid.). Viability, from the welfarist approach, is defined in protectionist terms as the ability 
to shelter poorer people from shocks and stress, alleviate poverty and reduce vulnerability 
of those most at risk. 
By comparison, radical political economy has relatively more diverse strands of thinking 
(Cousins & Scoones, Ibid.). One view, for example, attempts to theorise contemporary forms 
of radical agrarian populism. Radical populists perceive rural poverty to be a result of 
unequal agrarian structure and therefore underscore the oppression and exploitation of 
workers and peasants by the more powerful land-owning classes and corporate interests. 
While such perception resonates with the Marxist focus on class relations, class structure 
and dynamics of class accumulation in agriculture, radical populists differ in that they place 
less emphasis on class and other forms of differentiation amongst the rural poor while 
instead lumping together the collective interests of groups of marginalized people. Such 
radical political economy perspective rejects the conventional assessment of viability in 
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terms of efficiency and productivity, drawn from “an economic logic that fetishes growth in 
quantitative terms” (McMichael 2008 in Cousins & Scoones, 2010). The rationale is that such 
logic externalizes ecological effects, such as chemical pollution, discounts energy costs and 
subsidy structures for agribusiness and undervalues the economic costs of agro-
industrialization (Ibid.). 
Marxist analyses, like radical political economy perspectives, are diverse and fraught with 
contradictions over nuance and interpretation (Cousins & Scoones, 2010). Key Marxist 
concepts include social relations of production, the unequal distribution of property righs 
between classes and class power, in both economic and political terms. A core concern for 
Marxists is the contribution of agriculture to capitalist accumulation and industrialization 
(Akram-Lodhi & Kay 2009 in Cousins & Scoones, 2010:46). While such concern is rooted in 
late nineteenth century classical framings of the ‘agrarian question’, the contemporary 
concern is debated under a markedly different context of neo-liberal globalisation (Cousins 
& Scoones, 2010). Whereas pre-capitalist societies were characterized by rent-based 
appropriations of surplus labour of peasant producers by the landed gentry, the logic of 
capitalist social property relations in contemporary contexts establishes the conditions of 
market dependence and drives the growth of agricultural productivity through technical 
innovation (Bernstein 2004 in Cousins & Scoones, 2010).  From such perspective, Bernstein 
(Ibid.) postulates that peasants are best understood as petty commodity producers, who are 
subject to processes of class differentiation. Some succeed in becoming rural capitalist 
farmers while others are compelled to engage in wage labour and other forms of activity to 
secure their livelihoods. Cousins & Scoones surmise that this implies therefore that viability 
from a Marxist perspective is primarily a function of class relations and dynamics. Viability 
can also refer to an accumulation from below or above by emerging classes of agrarian 
capital. Similarly, viability can be considered to be the reproduction of peasant farmers as 
petty-commodity producers, or improved prospects for the livelihood security of 
differentiated classes of labour. In light of the extension of neo-liberal globalization into the 
commodification of rural economies, assessments of viability also go beyond localized 
contexts and might include the ability of agriculture to contribute to national economic 
growth for the benefit of the broader society.   
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From among the five contested paradigms of viability outlined above, it would seem that 
Cousins, draws largely from the Marxist perspective to further develop a class-analytic 
perspective on small-scale farming and agrarian reform (Cousins, 2010). The latter 
perspective is centred on the key concepts of ‘petty commodity production’ and 
‘accumulation from below’, which the scholar asserts are essential for understanding the 
differentiated character and diverse trajectories of small-scale agriculture in capitalist 
economies. Cousins’s perspective also revolves around the notion of ‘smallholder’, which 
embodies class differentiation although much of its common usage suggests that 
smallholders form a relatively homogenous group. The downplaying of inequalities and 
differences between rural households is associated with the greater importance ascribed to 
‘racialized class relations’ in Southern Africa.  
Cousins (Ibid.) postulates that an alternative approach to analysing rural social formation in 
the region is to view both proletarianization and the emergence of petty commodity 
production as class trajectories within a capitalist economy. Such trajectories can also be 
seen in complex and contradictory combinations with each other. The scholar therefore 
proposes a class-analytic typology that identifies six categories of small-scale producers in 
South Africa. These include, firstly, ‘supplementary food producers’, who work small plots or 
gardens, do not have access to wage income and rely on additional forms of income such as 
social grants, craftwork or petty trading for their simple reproduction. Secondly, ‘allotment 
holding wage workers, who work small gardens but are primarily dependent on wages for 
their simple reproduction. Thirdly, ‘worker peasants’, who farm on a substantial scale but 
are also engaged in wage labour and combine these in their simple reproduction. The fourth 
type consists of ‘petty commodity producers’, who are able to reproduce themselves from 
farming alone, or with minor additional forms of income. The fifth type includes ‘small-scale 
capitalist farmers’, who rely substantially on hired labour and can begin to engage in 
expanded reproduction and capital accumulation. Lastly, the sixth type of small-scale 
producer includes ‘capitalists whose main income is not from farming’, and who farm on a 
small-scale but their main source of income is another business. This typology seems 
particularly useful in helping to unpack the key variables relating to who engages in what 
agricultural activity, the degree to which agriculture contributes to social reproduction or 
expanded reproduction and the degree to which hired labour is used in the agricultural 
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production process. According to Cousins, such variables are key indicators of class relations 
in agriculture.  
2.6.4 WATER SECTOR PERSPECTIVES ON PROSPECTS FOR SMALLHOLDER 
IRRIGATION FARMERS  
Perret (2001) argues that the vision of a significant role for black petty-commodity 
producers in smallholder irrigation schemes seems rather ambitious when viewed against 
the fact that the majority of black arable farmers in South Africa practise rain-fed cropping 
rather than irrigation, and subsistence rather than commercial farming. This view seems to 
be supported by observations by Backeberg & Sanewe (2010) that among the approximately 
1.3 million households in the category of small-scale agriculture, who participate in some 
type and varying intensity of food production activity, the majority (82.8%) have plots of 
land whose size ranges from less than 0.5 ha to 1 ha. For an additional 10.7% of households 
the plot sizes are between 1 and 5 ha. About 56.5% of households are headed by women. 
According to a study by Hart (2009: 17 in Ibid.), 4.5 million black people in South Africa 
participate or are in some way dependent on agriculture. For many this is a low-input, low-
output activity and includes livestock production. Land access is therefore a major 
constraint. 
The proportion of black small-scale farmers who can benefit from agricultural 
commercialization in Limpopo province is constrained by environmentally and structurally 
induced ‘water scarcity’ (Tapela et al, 2011a; Tapela, 2009). Most (11) of the 19 Water 
Management Areas (WMAs) experience problems associated with physical water scarcity 
(Tapela et al, 2011). Water-stressed WMAs include the Olifants River Basin in Limpopo 
Province, within which all study sites for this thesis are located. While the relatively dry and 
drought-prone climate of Limpopo Province is widely acknowledged to be responsible for 
environmental water scarcity, it is the structurally induced water scarcity that has 
preoccupied debates around water and livelihoods, agrarian reform and rural poverty 
eradication (Derman et al, 2011; Van Koppen et al, 2010; Schreiner et al, 2010; Van Koppen 
et al, 2009).  
With respect to productive water use, such as irrigation farming, observations are that 
white commercial farmers have continued to command a significantly larger share of 
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irrigation water and infrastructure in the ‘water-stressed’ Olifants River Basin (Tren & Schur, 
2000; Ligthelm, 2001). While the South African government’s Policy on the Financial 
Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers is a welcome move to improve access to 
water by black smallholders, the gradualist approach adopted by the government’s Water 
Allocation Reform (WAR) Programme limits prospects for redistribution of water at a critical 
phase of entry by black farmers into mainstream commercial agriculture (Tapela, 2008). 
Given WAR provisions that a review and possible reallocation of registered water use should 
take place after a period of five years, and that reallocations detracting from existing lawful 
use have to be justified, the process of redistributing water is likely to be “technically 
demanding and contentious” (DWAF, 2005).    
Neo-liberal interpretations of emphases on 'efficiency' in water use, the 'user pays' principle 
and the payment for water resource management services at their 'economic value' further 
narrow the prospects for resource-poor emerging black farmers securing equitable access to 
water. An illustration of the small-scale farmers’ dilemma relates to the inter-sectoral 
competition for water between the mining sector and the emerging smallholders occupying 
irrigation schemes in the Olifants Basin (Farolfi & Perret, 2002). Until Flag Boshielo Dam wall 
was upgraded in 2005, this competition seems to have compelled the small-scale farmers, 
whose profit margins were relatively low (Tren & Schur, 2000), to trade away a greater 
share of their water allocation to the mines, who could afford to off-set water prices. 
Commoditization of water resources therefore possibly poses a threat to the sustainability 
of livelihoods of subsistence producers among smallholders.  
The possible negative effects of water commoditization resonate with the effects of market-
based land reform, which particularly seems to restrict possibilities of extrapolating small-
scale farmer support to areas outside of smaholder irrigation schemes. Studies (Jacobs et al, 
2003: 25) suggest that reliance on the market to acquire land has resulted in a strong and 
increasing emphasis on commercial agriculture. Applications for land reform grants are 
required to adhere to stringent commercial criteria to qualify for land purchase grants and 
loans, and applicants are required to procure support services, such as business planning, 
extension and finance, from the private sector. Small-scale production particularly for 
household consumption “hardly features in official redistribution thinking”, and state 
agricultural support services are unavailable in many parts of the country (ibid.).  In light of 
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these factors, Jacobs et al (2005: 25) concludes that the prospects of the very poor accessing 
LRAD funding are increasingly in doubt. From the foregoing, it is difficult to see how a 
commercialized approach to the allocation of land and water resources and to agricultural 
production can contribute to sustainable livelihoods in contexts where poverty is rampant, 
such as in smallholder irrigation schemes in Greater Sekhukhune. 
Beyond redistributive reforms for productive land and water use, arguments have been put 
forward that, although water is an integral part of people’s multi-faceted livelihoods, the 
single-use design of formal public water schemes continues to be at variance with multiple-
use practices of local communities and households and is therefore key factor determining 
insecurity at local community and household levels, particularly among the rural poor (Van 
Koppen et al, 2006, 2010; Cousins et al, 2007; Maluleke et al, 2005; AWARD, 2005; 
Mendiguren & Mabelane, 2001). Such arguments draw from empirical evidence that rural 
people simultaneously use multiple natural and man-made sources, such as surface water 
bodies, irrigation canals, wetlands, soil moisture or rooftop water, individual or communal 
storage facilities, groundwater wells and boreholes irrespective of whether or not they have 
household connections or public taps (Tapela et al, 2011a; Tapela, 2009; Van Koppen, 2010, 
2006; Maluleke et al, 2005; AWARD, 2005; Mendiguren & Mabelane, 2001). Such water is 
used for multiple livelihood requirements, including subsistence irrigation of food crops 
(Ibid.).  
Evidence that the single-use design of formal public water schemes continues to be at 
variance with multiple-use practices of local communities and households needs to be 
juxtaposed with evidence from experiences in implementation of contract farming. The 
latter shows that while contract farming has assisted some African farmers to improve their 
lot, in many cases such institutional arrangements have been accompanied by a range of 
practical disadvantages. Disadvantages have included poor extension services, low prices to 
farmers due to haphazard pricing of produce and higher risk to producers (Glover & 
Kusterer, 1990) (Ibid.). Disadvantages have also included the poor bargaining power of 
farmers and their dependence on firms for inputs and credit (Fulton & Clark, 1996) and 
environmental degradation due to over-exploitation of land and water resources (Siddique, 
1998). Small-scale farmers, who wield less power and control within contract farming 
arrangements, have often been more vulnerable to risks associated with highly competitive 
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commercial agriculture (Jacobs, 2001: 28; Mayson, 2003; Cousins, 2003; Da Silva, 2005; FAO, 
2006). Producers' control of the production process has been reduced, and cash crops 
produced at the expense of local food production and food security (Jacobs, 2001: 28). In 
light of such disadvantages, contractual joint ventures are viewed to be a new form of 
exploitation and a mechanism through which private investors spread the risk of engaging in 
an increasingly complex and capital-intensive sector, while gaining market and political 
credibility in the process (Mayson, 2003).  
2.6.5 CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing debates and issues, the study sought to examine, through empirical 
research, whether or not agricultural commercialization, as articulated mainly through 
contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships, provides an adequate construct for 
achieving rural livelihood sustainability within impoverished smallholder irrigation scheme 
communities in Limpopo Province. The following chapter (Chapter Three) presents a review 
and research findings on the RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province, the latter of which are 
based on rapid appraisals of various case studies, including Makuleke and Phetwane. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six respectively present in-depth research findings from Hereford, 
Phetwane and Makuleke Irrigation Schemes.  
2.7 ISRDP IN THE CONTEXT OF SMALLHOLDER FARMER SUPPORT IN 
GREATER SEKHUKHUNE DISTRICT 
This section examines, by way of example, the institutional context for ISRDP support to 
smallholder irrigation farmers in Greater Sekhukhune District, which is home to seven out of 
eight study sites empirically examined by the study. These were Hereford, Phetwane, 
Elandskraal-Balemi/EBIS, Elandskraal-Kgotlelelo, Tswelelopele, Strydkraal A and 
Krokodilheuwel. No similar contextual examination is made of Vhembe District, where 
Makuleke Irrigation Scheme is located. Although the latter poverty node was identified in 
September 2003, it was never gazetted and therefore the ISRDP was therefore not formally 
implemented in the district. Nonetheless, municipal IDPs recognize localized rural poverty 
nodes, such as Makuleke, and target them for development interventions. The singular 
focus of examination on the ISRDP context in Greater Sekhukhune should not significantly 
detract, however, from the usefulness of insights yielded by this poverty node to this thesis, 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
since there are broad similarities in the geographical, historical and institutional contexts of 
both districts. 
2.7.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Peter Delius (1996) succinctly summarizes the history of Greater Sekhukhune District as 
follows: 
Sekhukhuneland was the heartland of the formidable Pedi Kingdom which long 
held the Swazi, the British and the Boers at bay. In the twentieth century it was 
transformed into an impoverished and overcrowded "reserve" but remained a 
byword for rural resistance; in the 1980s it achieved national notoriety as the 
epicentre of witch burnings. 
 
It is worth noting that black people of Greater Sekhukhune District have historically played a 
significant role in rural resistance to both colonialism and apartheid, within a context where 
much of the resistance in post-Second World War South Africa was urban proletariat based. 
People like the late Flag Boshielo, after whom the water supply dam above the Phetwane 
Irrigation Scheme (the research site not included in this report) is named, are documented 
as having actively pioneered the initial armed resistance against apartheid. The historical 
onslaught on the local political power structure, dispossession of land and related resources 
and erosion of livelihoods appear to have provided a strong impetus to the early phases of 
resistance to colonialism by the Pedi of Sekhukhuneland. After this, the rural-urban linkages 
between Sekhukhuneland and urban-industrial centres also fostered the rural resistance to 
colonialism, and later to apartheid. This was articulated mainly through the migrant labour 
system. Sekhukhuneland became a major source of cheap labour for the colonial political 
economy following the defeat of Sekhukhune by the combined British, Boer and Swazi 
onslaught. The term “Nebo”, which today refers to a densely populated region within 
Makhuduthaga local municipality in Greater Sekhukhune District, originated as an acronym 
for “Native Employment Bureau Office”. Following the re-alignment of municipal boundaries 
in terms of the Municipal Demarcation Act of 2000, the contemporary configuration of 
Greater Sekhukhune district has brought together rural people with a diversity of 
backgrounds and cultures, mainly the Pedi, Ndebele, Ntwane (Tswana) and the Swazi, 
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among others. Although these have historically experienced varying degrees of conflict over 
time, conditions of poverty and inequality have been an enduring common factor.  
2.7.2 GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING 
Greater Sekhukhune District one of six district municipalities that comprise Limpopo 
Province. Prior to the government’s abolition of cross-border municipalities in 2005, Greater 
Sekhukhune was a cross-border district municipality straddling the boundary between the 
Limpopo and Mpumalanga Provinces. The district is also one of the thirteen rural poverty 
nodes identified in 2001 for accelerated rural development through the erstwhile ISRDP. 
The active role played by the rural people of Greater Sekhukhune in the struggle against 
colonialism and apartheid, and the prevailing impoverishment and inequality seem to have 
been strong compelling factors for the government to prioritize the district for the ISRDP. 
The question though, was whether or not such prioritization would translate into tangible 
improvement of livelihoods for rural people living within or close to smallholder irrigation 
schemes. 
The spatial extent of the district is approximately 1 326 437 hectares (Greater Sekhukhune 
Cross Border District Municipality (CBDM), 2005; Greater Sekhukhune CBDM, 2002). 
Significant proportions of the district (and Limpopo Province) fall within the Olifants/Lepelle 
River Basin, which is a constituent of the transboundary Limpopo watercourse system 
shared by South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The district is located 
close to larger urban centres such as Pretoria, Polokwane and Nelspruit. The five local 
municipalities constituting Greater Sekhukhune District are Makhuduthamaga, Fetakgomo, 
Greater Tubatse, Elias Motswaledi (formerly Greater Groblersdal) and Ephraim Mogale 
(formerly Greater Marble Hall) (Figure 7). Until 2005, Greater Groblersdal, Greater Marble 
Hall and Greater Tubatse were cross-border local municipalities. The study gave attention to 
sites located within Elias Motswaledi (formerly Greater Groblersdal) and Ephraim Mogale 
(formerly Greater Marble Hall) Local Municipalities. 
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FIGURE 7 GREATER SEKHUKHUNE DISTRICT: DEMARCATION OF MUNICIPAL 
BOUNDARIES 
Greater Sekhukhune District has a dualistic socio-economic structure of the kind found in 
many of South Africa's rural municipalities demarcated since the promulgation of the 
Municipal Demarcation Act of 2000. The settlement pattern indicates the social and physical 
segregation of communities. The relative affluence of the formerly designated 'white' 
commercial areas contrasts with the high levels of poverty and unemployment in the non-
commercial former 'black' areas. The latter have lower Human Development Indices (HDIs), 
with large backlogs in services and infrastructure, and very small or non-existent economic 
bases. There have been recent moves to promote economic integration and equity through 
various ‘black economic empowerment’ initiatives, including the commercialization of small-
scale irrigation schemes. However, the underlying dualism largely endures in many sectors 
and areas within the district.  
Commercial agriculture provides the bulk of the employment opportunities in the district, 
but more than half of the population (64.8 per cent) is unemployed (StatSA, 2002), 
particularly the youth (age group 15 to 35 years). While the government service sector in 
the past provided a significant number of the jobs in the district, this sector has since 
become smaller and therefore less able to absorb prospective labour (Greater Sekhukhune 
IDP, 2002). Lack of employment opportunities has reinforced the migration of significant 
proportions of the rural population to various urban centres, including those in the Gauteng 
Province. Table 6 summarizes selected socio-economic characteristics of the district around 
the time of inception of the ISRDP. Data shows that salaries and wages, remittances, 
pensions, grants and access to agricultural land made significant contributions to livelihoods 
in the district. There were relatively low proportions of households with access to land for 
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agriculture (30.4 per cent) and engaged in crop farming (30 per cent). There were very low 
proportions of households engaged in livestock farming (1.2 per cent) and horticulture (0.3 
per cent), as well as households which depended on the sale of farm produce as the main 
source of income (1.2 per cent). Early 2000s discourses around IDPs and local economic 
development (LED) in the district indicate that land redistribution and greater involvement 
of black people in the commercial farming sector were priority issues in Greater Sekhukhune 
(Tapela, 2002; Greater Sekhukhune IDP, 2002; Greater Sekhukhune District Status Report, 
January to July 2003).  
TABLE 6 GREATER SEKHUKHUNE: SUMARY OF SELECTED LIVING CONDITIONS, 2002 
Characteristic Measure (as a 
percentage: %) 
Unemployment rate (in terms of the expanded definition) 64.8 
Proportion of households living below minimum living level (R1 100 p.a.)  [Source: 
Sekhukhune IDP Document, 2002: 20] 
77.4 
Proportion of female-headed households  
[Source: Sekhukhune IDP Document, 2002: 20] 
58.6 
Proportion of households with access to land for agriculture 30.4 
Proportion of households engaged in field crop farming 30.0 
Proportion of households engaged in livestock farming 1.2 
Proportion of households engaged in horticulture 0.3 
Proportion of households which never had a problem in satisfying their food needs 28.9 
Proportion of households which depend on sale of farm produce as main source of 
income 
1.2 
Proportion of households which depend on remittances as the main source of 
income 
29.1 
Proportion of households which depend on pensions and grants as their main 
source of income 
37.8 
Proportion of households which depend on salaries and/or wages 21.6 
Proportion of households which depend on other sources of income 6.9 
Proportion of households with NO income 3.3 
Source: StatSA, 2002 
Delius (1996) observes that contemporary conditions in the Sekhukhune region exemplify 
the daunting task of reconstruction demanded of South Africa's democratically-elected 
government. According to the District Status Report for January to July 2003, key challenges 
for development in Greater Sekhukhune District Greater were poor social and economic 
infrastructure in all areas of the municipality, poor social and physical integration of the 
communities of the district, high poverty levels, gender inequality, inaccessibility of basic 
services such as health and education, lack of economic opportunities and wealth creation 
for the majority of the population, landlessness, environmentally unsustainable utilisation of 
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resources in the area, under-utilisation of the tourism potential within the nodal area and 
under-utilisation of agricultural potential in both production and agri-processing. 
Identified challenges excluded water scarcity, which has been identified as a major 
challenge within the district (Tren & Schur, 2000; Ligthelm, 2001). Not only is the Limpopo 
Basin drought-prone, but all the available water appears to have already been allocated, 
mostly to commercial irrigation, tourism, industrial and domestic uses. While discrepancies 
in various data sets regarding water availability and usage in the Limpopo Basin make it 
difficult to determine the precise nature of the water scarcity problem, there is agreement 
that the established commercial farming sector accounts for the bulk of water usage while 
black farmers had insufficient water (Tren & Schur, 2000). During the course of the study, a 
number of interventions were underway to improve water access for this sector. One of 
these was the DWAF Policy on the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers, 
which was launched in 2005. 
From around 2002 the development of platinum mining in the eastern rim of the district 
appears to have led to heightened concerns over water scarcity. This pitted mining sector’s 
water demands against increasing demands for irrigation water by the RESIS Programme, 
thereby compelling institutional actors to take clearer positions on which water uses would 
be prioritized. Competition due to envisaged increases in water demand by smallholder 
irrigation and mining sectors gave rise to intense inter-sectoral competition over water 
(Farrolfi & Perret, 2002). The competition prompted some government officials and scholars 
to argue that productive water should be re-allocated primarily on the basis of ‘efficiency’ of 
use (Ibid.). The study found that institutional actors conceived efficiency from neo-liberal 
and New Institutional Economics perspectives, using principles such as ‘user pays’, ‘crop-
per-drop’ and transaction costs. In the smallholder irrigation sector, this potentially elevated 
agricultural commercialization above food security objectives. In light of such shifts, a key 
concern by the study was whether or not policies and institutions of the RESIS Programme 
and related initiatives reflected livelihood interests of the poor.  
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2.7.3 ISRDP IMPLEMENTATION IN GREATER SEKHUKHUNE: CHALLENGES 
2.7.3.1 Overview   
Research findings were that implementation of the ISRDP in Greater Sekhukhune was beset 
by obstacles relating to local government reform. Institutional capacity was lacking or not 
robust enough. There were insufficient administrative skills, inadequate office 
infrastructure, high staff turn-over, lack of coordination between the technical and the 
political champions of the ISRDP and difficulties in mobilizing funding for anchor projects. 
Residual differences in the budgeting cycles of the district municipality and national and 
provincial departments also posed a difficulty to the financing of projects prioritized in the 
IDPs. The District Municipality faced problems in coordinating projects across local 
municipal jurisdictions. To some extent, this problem appears to have been due to the 
failure by the District Municipality to overcome the negative effects of competition among 
the various local municipalities.  
Coordination problems were compounded by the persistence of a sectoral approach, 
wherein many government officials continued to work within the ambit of their line 
departments irrespective of the requirements for integration. Municipal actors expressed 
frustration about apparent disregard by many senior government officials of the 
municipalities’ legal mandate to coordinate development within local authority jurisdictions. 
Such disregard involved the generally inconsistent attendance of municipal meetings by 
senior government officials, who often sent junior officials despite such meetings requiring 
input from officials with decision-making authority.  
Interviews conducted during 2003 with senior government officials revealed a perception 
that the governance process prescribed by the Municipal Systems Act was too cumbersome 
and time-consuming for effective delivery. Given the requirements of the Performance 
Management System introduced by government, many officials therefore tended to 
prioritize activities within their key performance areas (KPAs), to the detriment of the 
development coordination activities of municipalities. Members of staff in institutions 
providing support to the Greater Sekhukhune municipality expressed the view that there 
was a need for government to make active participation in development coordination 
activities mandatory for all relevant senior officials. It was also acknowledged that the 
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municipality needed to be proactive in ensuring that it had the capacity to play the 
coordination function effectively.   
The problem of institutional participation appears to have been associated with the early 
phase of the local governance framework that emerged in 2001 following the passing of the 
Municipal Systems Act of 2000. The problem might be interpreted as having been one of 
institutional inertia, in which government officials continued with procedures and practices 
that had become out-dated by governance policy and legal reforms. Since 2004, however, 
there was a reported shift towards more active participation by government officials in 
various development coordination committees, within and outside municipal structures in 
Greater Sekhukhune. The general view by people working in government departments, 
NGOs and the private sector remained that development coordination by municipalities 
needed to be improved.  
The aforementioned challenges were exacerbated by the cross-border administration that 
characterized Greater Sekhukhune District until 2007. Integration challenges related to the 
fact that the district and some of the local municipalities straddled the boundary between 
Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces. Cross-border local municipalities included the then 
Greater Groblersdal (now Elias Motswaledi), where Hereford Irrigation Scheme is located, 
and Great Marble Hall (now Ephraim Mogale), where Phetwane Irrigation Scheme is 
located. Local respondents expressed concerns over possible capture of resources by people 
belonging either to “Mpumalanga” or to “Limpopo” Provinces. Such concerns were mostly 
associated with the then Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality, whose delineation brought 
together not only the formerly white commercial areas, black township areas around 
Dennilton and Lebowa homeland, but also people of different ethnic identities.  
Beyond perceptions of resource capture, there were practical governance issues around 
coordinating the enforcement of differing by-laws of two provinces within the same cross-
border municipality. Funding of projects in the cross-border municipality by provincial 
departments tended to be split along provincial lines. Where one province allocated more 
funding than the other, this has created the public impression that the municipality 
favoured areas in that province over areas in the other. In an attempt to resolve the cross-
border coordination problems, an Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee (IPCC) was 
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established in 2003. The study could not establish how effective this structure was. The 
existence of this provincial level structure did not, however, change public perceptions of 
differential treatment. The cross-border problem was ultimately resolved when government 
abolished cross-border municipalities in 2007.   
2.7.3.2 Challenges of Smallholder Irrigation Farmer Support 
At the inception of the RESIS Programme in 2001, smallholder irrigation schemes were 
among the seventeen listed ISRDP anchor projects for the Greater Sekhukhune District. 
ISRDP documents made particular reference to irrigation schemes in the Mid-Arabie Olifants 
(i.e. Middle Olifants/Lepelle) and Lepellane (i.e. Lower Olifants/Lepelle) sections of the 
Olifants/Lepelle River Basin below Flag Boshielo (formerly Arabie) Dam. Four of the five case 
studies that were rapidly appraised for this thesis are located in these two sections, while a 
fifth as well as Phetwane Irrigation Schemes are located upstream in the Upper 
Olifants/Lepelle section. Smallholder irrigation schemes in all three sections constitute 
Cluster 11 of the RESIS Programme. 
The ISRDP and its key institutional mechanism, the IDP, sought to promote the entry by 
black farmers into commercial agriculture. Smallholders in irrigation schemes were among 
the targeted group. There were basically two types of small-scale irrigation schemes 
associated with black economic empowerment through joint ventures. The first type 
comprised schemes located in the formerly white commercial farming areas, such as 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme. This type of scheme, often associated with DLA’s LRAD 
Programme, the National Department of Agriculture (NDA) 7 Farmer Settlement Programme 
and DLA’s erstwhile Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), was not very common. 
The second type of irrigation scheme included government-owned schemes located in 
communal lands of the former Lebowa homeland, such as the Upper Arabie, the Mid-Arabie 
Olifants and the Lepellane Irrigation Schemes. Both types of schemes involved a shift 
towards transferring of land rights, water allocations and responsibility for irrigation 
management to black smallholders, with financial, material, technical and other support 
from government departments, civil society and the private sector.  
                                                     
7 During government restructuring in 2009, the NDA was reconstituted to be the Department of Agriculture 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). 
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It is worth noting that joint ventures in small-scale irrigation schemes were not a new 
phenomenon in the Sekhukhune region. In both commercial and communal farming areas, 
smallholders had experienced involvement in joint ventures prior to 1994 (De Lange, 2004). 
A common refrain in their accounts is dissatisfaction with the manner in which joint 
ventures were implemented. Problems include private investors’ lack of transparency and 
accountability, a sense of disempowerment among irrigation farmers and the ultimate 
failure of the joint ventures, resulting in losses of livelihoods and assets (Ibid.). 
Prior to the abolition of cross-border municipalities, moves to promote the entry by black 
farmers into commercial agriculture were commonly termed ‘revitalization’ in Greater 
Sekhukhune. However, the 'Revitalization of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes' (RESIS) 
Programme formally focused specifically on government-owned smallholder irrigation 
schemes located in former homeland areas, such as those in the Middle and Lower 
Olifants/Lepelle River Basin. By contrast, the term 'revitalization' was informally used to 
refer to on-going projects in small-scale irrigation farmers in formerly white settlement 
schemes located in commercial farming areas, such as Hereford. This distinction was largely 
due to challenges relating to cross-border administration (see Section 2.2.5.1). On the one 
hand, the RESIS Programme was driven by the Limpopo Provincial Department of 
Agriculture (LDA), which consequently focused funding to smallholder irrigation schemes 
located in its respective portions of the cross-border district municipality. Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme, on the other hand, is located in an area that fell under Mpumalanga 
Province and therefore could only receive revitalization support from its respective 
Department of Agriculture and Land Administration (DALA). Since abolition of cross-border 
municipalities and inclusion of the entire Elias Motswaledi (formerly Greater Groblersdal) 
Local Municipality into Limpopo Province, Hereford has become part of the RESIS 
Programme. 
Under the rubric of ISRDP, the promotion of entry by black farmers into commercial 
agriculture prior to 2007 was articulated through collaborative efforts involving clusters of 
institutional stakeholders. For areas under Mpumalanga Province, Coordination Committees 
for Agricultural Water (CCAWs) provided revitalization support to smallholders in irrigation 
schemes, such as Hereford, among other irrigation farmers. For areas under Limpopo 
Province, the Economic Cluster of the Limpopo PGDS provided support to the RESIS 
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Programme. Such collaborations involved provincial departments of agriculture, DLA, the 
NDA, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)8 and the national and provincial 
departments of Public Works (NPWD and PDWs). A number of institutions actors from NGOs 
and the private sector were also actively involved, the latter through implementation of 
infrastructure rehabilitation, skills development, project facilitation and direct contracting 
within joint ventures.  Greater Sekhukhune District IDP documents captured details of such 
collaborative efforts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8
 At Ministerial level, DWAF was reconstituted in 2009 to be the Department of Water and Environmental 
Affairs (DWEA), while at departmental level the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) continued to function 
distinctly from the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 REVITALIZATION OF SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES 
PROGRAMME (RESIS): LIMPOPO PROVINCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Revitalization of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS) Programme defines 
‘revitalization’ as “a holistic approach to re-building socially uplifting, profitable agribusiness 
on existing schemes” (De Lange, 2004: 107) and “a comprehensive programme to structure, 
train and capacitate the smallholder farmers to run their scheme profitably and sustainably” 
(De Lange, 2004: 107; Shaker, 2005: 19). According to Van Averbeke & Mohamed (2006), 
the RESIS Programme can be construed as the fourth era (or ‘Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT) and Revitalization Era) in the history of smallholder irrigation development in 
South Africa since the beginning of and and after the colonial era. It was preceded by the 
first era or ‘Peasant and Mission Diversion Scheme Era, which occurred during the 19th 
century and coincided with the early part of the individual diversion scheme era identified 
by Backeberg & Groenewald 1995 in Ibid.). The second era lasted from 1930 until about 
1960 and can be referred to as the ‘Smallholder Canal Scheme Era’ (Ibid.). It coincided with 
the era of public storage schemes in the history of national irrigation development 
described by Backeberg & Groenewald (1995 in Ibid.), and more specifically the second 
phase of this era, referred to as the Great Depression and the Second World War by Bruwer 
& Van Heerden (1995 in Van Averbeke & Mohamed, 2006). The third era third period of 
smallholder irrigation development lasted from about 1970 until 1990 and was an integral 
part of the economic development of the homelands (Ibid.). Specifically, the establishment 
of these new irrigation schemes with funding from South Africa formed part of the 
economic development strategy of the homelands (Van Rooyen & Nene, 1996 in Ibid.; 
Lahiff, 2000), which were - without exception - islands of underdevelopment and poverty 
(Beinart, 2001 in Van Averbeke & Mohamed, 2006).  
During the course of the study, the regulatory framework governing the RESIS Programme 
was at the national level, while implementation was done at provincial level. Within 
Limpopo Province, the programme began in 1998 with a pilot phase that ended in 2000. 
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This was followed by RESIS Phase 1, which extended from 2000 to 2002 and was termed the 
‘Watercare Programme’. The third phase was the earlier RESIS Phase 2, which ran from 
2001 to 2004 and was commonly termed ‘RESIS’. The latter part of RESIS Phase 2 began in 
2005 and was named ‘RESIS-Recharge’. The study was concluded during the course of the 
RESIS-Recharge phase.   
Land and water-related challenges to commercialized small-scale irrigation farming in 
Greater Sekhukhune and Vhembe Districts raise questions on the extent to which RESIS can 
contribute to enhancing the livelihoods of the majority of rural people in Limpopo Province. 
In addition to providing secure land tenure, water access rights, technical skills and 
managerial support, there seemed to be a need for small-scale irrigation farmer 
development to take into account the multiple realities, needs and aspirations of black 
farmers, and to give particular attention to the poorest and most vulnerable people within 
the schemes. 
This chapter begins by presenting a synopsis of the historical background to the resurgence, 
under the RESIS Programme, of contract farming in South Africa. This is followed by an 
overview of the RESIS Programme framework in Limpopo Province. Finally, an outline of the 
common implementation framework and approach of RESIS-Recharge Phase is presented. 
The RESIS-Recharge Phase merits particular attention since it represents a major shift away 
from the original RESIS Programme objectives. Emphasis is on the generic contract structure 
used by LDA, contract implementation and key issues raised by smallholders in all targeted 
sites. Such examination synthesizes findings from rapid appraisals of various case studies, 
which also include Makuleke and Phetwane (Chapters Five and Six respectively).  
3.2 PRECURSOR OF RESIS PROGRAMME: RESURGENCE OF CONTRACT 
FARMING IN SOUTH AFRICA  
In the run-up to RESIS Programme implementation, many small-scale farmers in South 
Africa and Limpopo Province, in particular, were increasingly drawn into industrialised and 
globalised commercial agriculture. Such developments were largely influenced by broader 
changes in world agri-food systems (see Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). There was a burgeoning 
of government-supported contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships between 
black smallholders and private firms. Contract farming, however, was not a new 
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phenomenon in South Africa, as various studies attest (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Porter & 
Phillips-Howard, 1998; Bembridge, 1988; Fairall 1988 in Kirsten et al, 1998).  
Kirsten & Sartorius (2002) state that South Africa has a long history of farming under 
contract, which embraces a wide range of sharecropping arrangements dating back to the 
early twentieth century. Outgrower schemes were the contract farming model most 
commonly used in contractual arrangements involving black small-scale producers prior to 
1994. According to Kirsten et al (1998:133), the concept of an outgrower scheme was 
pioneered by the sugar industry in Kwazulu-Natal, when sugar companies contracted large 
scale commercial farmers and small-holders on communal land to supply sugar mills. Since 
inception of these schemes in 1972, approximately 19,000 small-scale sugar cane growers 
have benefited from outgrower schemes in Kwazulu-Natal (Fairall 1988 in Kirsten et al, 
1998). Similar outgrower schemes were initiated between the 1970s and 1980s in the 
Transkei homeland, where small-scale farmers were mainly involved in tea production in 
Magwa and Majola Tea Estates in Lusikisiki area (Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1998; 
Bembridge, 1988). Sugar schemes have generally been successful in generating employment 
and incomes for farmers (Kirsten et al - van Rooyen & Ngqangweni, 1998:133). 
While changes in world agri-food systems have influenced the resurgence of South African 
interest in contract farming, in rural contexts like smallholder irrigation schemes, such 
interest has been conflated with the need to address Millennium Developent Goals (MDGs). 
In 2003, the Pan-African Implementation and Partnership Conference on Water, which was 
convened by the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) and the UN-Water/Africa in 
Addis Ababa from 08 to 13 December, underscored the urgent need for strategic 
interventions and synergies to enhance prospects of achieving MDGs targets for food and 
water security (UNEP, 2003; IISD, 2003). For smallholder irrigation scheme contexts, 
identified challenges included: 
 Malnutrition, food insecurity, poverty and environmental threats; 
 Lack of improvement on per capita food production and climatic variability impacts; 
 Declining investments in agriculture and in irrigation, as well as the poor reputation 
of investments in irrigation; 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
 The need for policy recognition of the clear linkage between water and reduced 
poverty, which is seen to contribute to positive economic growth; and 
 The need to promote greater investment in water for agriculture. 
In light of such challenges, the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) asserted that 
an annual increase of agricultural production of 6 per cent was needed to achieve food 
security by 2015 (Shaker, 2005). The FAO stated that, of the 6 per cent growth, 75 per cent 
should come from agricultural intensification and 25 per cent from agricultural expansion. 
Based on these targets, NEPAD recognized the importance of investment in agricultural 
water and, in particular, the important role of ‘water control’ in increasing productivity and 
reducing hunger (Ibid.). NEPAD set specific targets for 2015 as follows: 
 Small-scale water control: 14.2 million ha of agricultural land to be developed at a 
cost of USD14.4 billion); 
 Rehabilitation of irrigation schemes: 3.6 million ha of agricultural land to be 
rehabilitated at a cost of USD8.9 billion; and 
 Development of irrigation schemes: 1.9 million ha of agricultural land to be 
developed at a cost of USD13.6 billion). 
3.3 RESIS PROGRAMME IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE: ORIGINS 
According to Shaker (2005), the “roots” of the RESIS Programme are in the Water Law 
Review process of 1997. During this process, a total of 63 workshops were conducted with 
smallholders and commercial farmers in all South African provinces. The workshops 
sensitized farmers to envisaged shifts towards Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) and its emphasis on fair and equitable access to water, efficiency in water use and 
sustainability of the resource, ecosystem and socio-economic activities and livelihoods. 
Following the Water Law Review process of 1997, Limpopo Provincial Department of 
Agriculture (LDA) initiated the RESIS Programme in 1998 under auspices of the Netherlands-
funded “Planning and Implementation of Irrigation Schemes” Programme. The programme 
involved the ‘revitalization’ of 126 irrigation schemes in the province, with direct benefits to 
approximately 12 432 farmers and indirect benefits to a wider rural population living on or 
near the 19 730ha of land comprising the schemes. The targeted farmers collectively held 
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agricultural infrastructure to the replacement value of R4 billion. Objectives of RESIS were to 
transform: 
 Rural society through substantially raising incomes of households on irrigation 
schemes and in surrounding villages within the programme duration from 2004 to 
2010; and  
 Government service delivery through staff training, capacity building and 
streamlining of government systems.  
The first objective closely linked RESIS to the ISRDP goal to improve opportunities and well-
being for the rural poor within nodal districts such as Greater Sekhukhune (Figure 8). The 
second objective was linked to the broader Integrated Provincial Support Programme (IPSP), 
which was initiated in 2000 by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) 
through funding by DFID and support from GTZ (Figure 8). The IPSP provided a significant 
portion of funding for RESIS. Both of the overarching objectives of RESIS articulated the 
Limpopo Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS). 
The PGDS for Limpopo was based on three pillars namely, mining, tourism and agriculture. 
While investment and growth in Limpopo’s mining and tourism from 2000 to 2005 had been 
remarkable within the national context, such achievements were described as “jobless 
growth” (DPSA, 2005: 20). The rationale was that the mining sector in the province, for 
example, created 8 jobs with every R1 million invested, whereas agriculture created up to 
50 jobs with the same investment. Consequently, a prevailing view was that the resolution 
of challenges of poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and development in Limpopo 
depended largely on investment and growth in the agricultural sector. With specific regard 
to smallholder irrigation schemes located in the former Venda Bantustan and homeland 
areas of Lebowa, Gazankulu and KwaNdebele, such investment was envisaged to build upon 
existing infrastructure and farming skills within the 126 schemes. 
Many of these schemes were developed after publication in 1955 of the Tomlinson 
Commission Report on Socio-economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of 
South Africa (Perret, 2001). Despite that in proposing the development of labour reserves 
(or Bantu areas), the Tomlinson report emphasised the creation of a class of small property 
owning farmers, most of the recommendations of this commission were rejected by the 
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government (Vink & Kirsten, 2000: 5). Vink & Kirsten (Ibid.) comment that the government 
“…subsequently created the vision and practice of ethnically based homelands. This in turn 
was the ideological precursor of forced removals, Trust land purchase and consolidation of 
homelands…” The absence of commercial farming in homelands was subsequently ascribed 
to a lack of managerial and entrepreneurial ability among black farmers, despite a long 
history to the contrary (Bundy, 1979; Keegan, 1981; Matsetela, 1981; Beinart et al, 1986). 
This served to justify the use of public institutions and expatriate management to ‘develop’ 
agriculture, resulting in large scale centrally managed projects with little or no community 
participation. In a latter adaptation, some of the schemes appear to have been adjusted to 
settle selected labourers as ‘project farmers’ under the control of central management.  
Despite the apartheid government’s rejection of most recommendations of the Tomlinson 
Commission, some recommendations pertaining to subsistence farming were implemented, 
with significant effects on settlements, land use patterns and irrigation development in 
black rural areas (Perret, 2001:2). Examples of such recommendations included the 
Commission’s suggestion, which was based on information on existing schemes that 
irrigated holdings of between 1.3 and 1.7 ha could adequately “provide a family with a living 
that would satisfy them, whereby the whole family would work on the holding”. Such 
recommendations also included a proposal that “All schemes should be placed under proper 
control and supervision, with uniform regulations as regards water rates, credit facilities and 
conditions of settlement” (Perret (Ibid.).  
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FIGURE  8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESIS AND ISRDP 
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This approach, which sought to achieve subsistence for an estimated 36 000 black ‘families’ 
farming on 56 000ha of irrigated land (Perret, Ibid.), was initially propped up by subsidies from 
the apartheid government. Following the political and administrative “independence” of labour 
reserves, central government withdrew subsidies and Bantustan and homeland area authorities 
assumed responsibility for providing the subsidies.  
After 1994, owing to perceptions that the schemes were under-productive and inefficiently run, 
and due to budgetary constraints of provincial governments and the government’s intention to 
dismantle apartheid machinery in Bantustans and former homelands, the post-apartheid 
government abruptly withdrew state subsidies upon which the schemes depended (Perret, 
2001; Bembridge, 2000). Subsequently, many schemes ceased to function and became 
dilapidated. The withdrawal of state subsidies was also linked to the government’s macro-
economic policy shift from the RDP to GEAR around 1999, and the adoption of neo-liberal 
elements inherent in the latter (Perret, 2001). Although post-1994 reforms have sought to 
address challenges of poverty and inequality, the immediate result of the sudden withdrawal of 
subsidies was a deepening of food and livelihood insecurity for resource-poor small-scale 
farmers and rural communities living in the neighbourhoods of irrigation schemes. In light of 
this, the longer term plan became to eventually transfer irrigation management to farmers, in 
accordance to similar developments in many countries globally.  
3.4 PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK   
During the course of the study, four distinct phases of the RESIS Programme could be 
distinguished in Limpopo Province (Figure 9). Firstly, the Pilot Phase of the RESIS Programme, 
which lasted from 1998 to 2000. Secondly, RESIS Phase 1, which was termed the ‘Watercare 
Programme’ and which extended from 2000 to 2002. The third phase was the earlier RESIS 
Phase 2, which was termed ‘RESIS’ and ran from 2001 and to 2004. The fourth phase was the 
latter part of RESIS Phase 2, which was named ‘RESIS-Recharge’ and occurred from 2005 to 
2007.  
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FIGURE 9 PHASES OF RESIS PROGRAMME IN LIMPOPO 
Following the Pilot Phase of 1998 to 2000, the RESIS Programme began as a ‘Watercare 
Programme’ that extended from 2000 to 2002. Between 2003 and 2004, the Watercare 
Programme was re-constituted as the “RESIS Programme”. The RESIS Programme had two 
successive phases namely, ‘RESIS’ Phase and ‘RESIS-Recharge’ Phase, respectively. The RESIS 
Phase occurred between 2001 and 2004 and the subsequent RESIS-Recharge Phase ran from 
2005 to 2007. Each of the successive phases was preceded by a pilot stage. The pilot stage of 
the RESIS Phase was from 1998 to 2000 while that of the RESIS-Recharge Phase ran from 2002 
to 2004.  
The four phases of the RESIS Programme ran concurrent with irrigation infrastructure 
rehabilitation and upgrading projects. During the Pilot Phase and Phase 1 of RESIS, there was a 
general tendency to confuse revitalization initiatives, which were driven by LDA, with 
infrastructure rehabilitation and upgrading projects, which were led by LDA9 in collaboration 
with the provincial Department of Public Works. De Lange (2004) makes clear distinction that 
revitalization approaches represented an outgrowth from the more common practice of 
‘rehabilitation’, which involved “the engineering centred re-construction of dilapidated 
infrastructure”. Ultimately, however, revitalization and rehabilitation were both essentially 
components of the RESIS Programme implementation framework. 
                                                     
9
 In 1998, LDA was named the Northern Province Department of Agriculture, Land and Environment. 
Joint Ventures 
Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Development  
Agri-BEE Strategic Partnerships 
Partnerships 
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Towards programme implementation, smallholder irrigation schemes were grouped into 
clusters and prioritized according to requirements of each respective phase of the RESIS 
Programme. Cluster delineation was mainly based on geographical proximity. There were 
variations in the number of smallholder irrigation schemes in each cluster.  
3.5 EARLIER PHASES OF RESIS IMPLEMENTATION  
The earlier phases of RESIS Programme implementation were underpinned by the need to 
achieve NEPAD targets for 2012 (see Section 3.2), which considered pre-requisite factors to 
include an enabling policy and institutional environment, identification of innovative best 
practice and learning of lessons from the past (Shaker, 2005). This section presents an outline 
of the RESIS Pilot Phase from 1998 to 2000, Phase 1 or ‘Watercare Programme’ from 2000 to 
2002, and the earlier ‘RESIS’ stage of Phase 2 from 2003 to 2004.  
3.5.1 ENABLING POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
In the case of South Africa, the semblance of a conducive policy and institutional environment 
was created by various post-1994 policy shifts and institutional reforms. These included 
adoption by government of the IWRM approach in 1997, formulation of various national 
institutional frameworks to support historically disadvantaged black small-scale farmers and the 
emergence of ISRDP as an institutional rationalization framework for rural poverty nodes in 
1999. The World Summit on Sustainable Development, which was held in Johannesburg in 
2002, brought international focus to bear upon the manner in which ‘developmental’ 
municipalities exercised governance within ISRDP poverty nodes, such as Greater Sekhukhune 
(Tapela, 2002a). Such scrutiny created an additional imperative for government interventions to 
be seen to be effective in addressing issues of poverty and inequality and, in particular, 
redressing historical injustices and empowering black farmers. Hence, contrary to expectations 
in 1999 that macro-economic policy shifts away from RDP to GEAR would lead to an emphasis 
on economic objectives at the expense of poverty concerns, the ISRDP and Limpopo PGDS 
embraced, at least in rhetoric, both sets of macro-economic policy objectives. Similarly, early 
RESIS Programme interventions were characterized by a dual emphasis on commercialization 
and food security objectives.  
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3.5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF INNOVATIVE BEST PRACTICE 
Around the time when LDA initiated the RESIS Programme in 1998, programme design actively 
drew insights from international best practice in Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), through 
support from organizations such as the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and 
the Water Research Commission (WRC). Furthermore, extensive empirical research was 
conducted on smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province. Such studies focused on 
land tenure issues (Claassens, 2001; Piontek, 2000; Lahiff, 2000; 1999), water issues (Farolfi & 
Perret, 2002; Shah et al, 2002; Perret, 2001; Tren & Schur, 2000), income, food security and 
productivity (Mphahlele et al, 2000) economic viability (Kamara et al, 2002) and extension and 
support services (Machethe & Mollel, 2000).  
On the basis of insights from international best practice and local research, RESIS Programme 
management identified what constituted innovative best practice within smallholder irrigation 
scheme contexts in Limpopo Province. What remained to be seen was how programme 
implementation would grapple with the diversity of such contexts at the local level. When the 
design and implementation of the pilot phase and Phases 1 and 2 of RESIS commenced, a key 
feature of programme structure was the adoption of contractual joint ventures between 
smallholders and private investors. Such institutional arrangements were facilitated by LDA, 
through delegated responsibility to consultancy organizations or ‘professional service providers’ 
(PSPs). 
3.5.3 LEARNING OF LESSONS FROM THE PAST 
The RESIS Programme as a whole drew from past experiences with LDA programmes, such as 
Limpopo Agricultural Development Programme (LADEP) and “Participatory Extension 
Approach” (PEA) (De Lange, 2004). By contrast, Phase 2 of RESIS was largely a product of 
lessons learnt during the RESIS Pilot Phase and Phase 1 or Watercare Programme (Shaker, 
2005). Shaker (2005: 20) states that from the Pilot Phase emphasis on infrastructure 
rehabilitation in irrigation schemes, such as Thabina, there was an attempt in the subsequent 
Phase 2 of RESIS to shift towards a more balanced emphasis on preparatory planning, farmer 
training, organizational development and the establishment of institutions. However, 
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observations were that the RESIS Phase (i.e. Phase 2 from 2001 to 2004) did not assimilate as 
much of the critical lessons as intended by implementing agencies (De Lange, 2006: 21, 22). 
Observations were also that RESIS joint ventures often exposed smallholders to risks associated 
with capital intensive farming without imparting requisite skills or generating anticipated 
incomes.  
Chapters Four, Five and Six of this thesis respectively provide detailed insights into 
implementation of earlier phases of the RESIS Programme in Hereford, Phetwane and Makuleke 
Irrigation Schemes. Earlier phases could be construed to have been ‘lessons learning’ and ‘best 
practice innovation’ phases, which effectively contributed to adjustments of the programme 
during the subsequent RESIS-Recharge Phase.  
3.6 SHIFT FROM RESIS TO RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE 
With progression from earlier RESIS Phases to the latter RESIS-Recharge Phase from 2005 to 
2007, LDA made adjustments to the RESIS Programme structure. Such adjustments related to 
the formulation of contract farming arrangements and capital expenditure. These adjustments 
were made in accordance with a new BEE Framework instituted by LDA in 2005.  The sourcing 
of service providers, private investor partners and targeting of farmers were all re-orientated 
towards the empowerment framework. What was not clear was to what extent RESIS 
Programme adjustments took into account prior lessons learnt about other interests than the 
narrow economic viability, technological efficiency and commercial orientation of crop 
production. While programme adjustments were purportedly based on identified innovative 
best practice, the manner in which RESIS-Recharge implementation grappled with the diversity 
of farmers in smallholder irrigation schemes had yet to unfold. 
In both the RESIS and RESIS-Recharge phases, significant financial expenditure was directed 
towards rehabilitation and development of irrigation infrastructure and promotion of crop 
production. Between 2001 and 2004, LDA set aside a total of R224 million to fund the earlier 
RESIS phase of the programme. A further R248 million was allocated towards funding the latter 
or “RESIS-Recharge” phase, of which R84 million was budgeted for 2005 to 2006 and R164 
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million for 2006 to 2007. While some of the funding went towards installation of centre pivots 
in a few irrigation schemes, a larger proportion of RESIS-Recharge funding went towards 
development of floppy sprinkler irrigation systems in a greater number of smallholder irrigation 
schemes. With progression from RESIS to RESIS-Recharge, however, there was a shift in the 
focus of government interventions.  
Whereas emphasis during the earlier RESIS phase was on infrastructure rehabilitation and ‘joint 
ventures’ as means to “re-building socially uplifting [and] profitable agribusiness” through “a 
comprehensive programme to structure, train and capacitate smallholder farmers to run their 
scheme profitably and sustainably” (De Lange, 2004), RESIS-Recharge phase objectives shifted 
towards infrastructure development and strategic partnerships. Infractructure technology 
development and market incentives increasingly became the drivers for RESIS Programme 
interventions in Limpopo Province, rather than rural poverty reduction and, thereby, livelihood 
and food security.  
It was not clear whether or not the shift in RESIS Programme interventions was predicated on a 
clearly articulated and formalized provincial and/or national policy. However, it seemed likely 
that changes in world agri-food systems as well as national initiatives, such as AsgiSA, and 
regional responses, such as NEPAD’s CAADP, contributed to shaping LDA’s approaches to 
agricultural commercialization in the RESIS-Recharge phase. A consistent feature within the 
progression from RESIS to RESIS-Recharge phases, however, was the adoption of ‘contracts’ as 
institutional arrangements for regulating relations between smallholders and private 
commercial agricultural enterprises, reducing transaction costs and integrating small-scale 
farmers into mainstream agricultural market chains. The RESIS-Recharge phase also saw the 
emergence of a more focused approach to targeting smallholders.  
3.7 DEFINITION AND TARGETING OF IRRIGATION FARMER CATEGORIES 
This thesis uses the term ‘smallholder’, for practical purposes, to refer to all farmers with plots 
of land in state-sponsored irrigation schemes. The terms ‘emerging commercial farmer’ and 
‘subsistence food producer’ are extensively used as short-hand to distinguish between 
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commercially-orientated and subsistence-orientated farmers. Prior to and during the RESIS 
Programme, both groups of farmers were beneficiaries of state support through infrastructure 
development, contract farming arrangements and other means. With shifts towards the RESIS-
Recharge Phase, programme adjustments produced clearer definition and targeting of different 
categories of farmers.  
Denison & Manona’s (2007) attempt to characterize RESIS farmer categories (Table 7) seems to 
have contributed to improving the definition and targeting of irrigation farmer categories. 
However, the implementation of RESIS-Recharge seems to have dispensed with the traditional 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in favour of narrowly targeting one category of smallholders, the 
equity labourer, to the exclusion of all others. Despite the need for further refinement of 
Denison & Manona’s typology, this study found these scholars’ work to be particularly useful. 
According to Denison & Manona (Ibid.), the development of strategies for irrigation 
revitalization was predicated on four groups of farming styles. These were ‘The Business 
Farmer’, ‘The Equity Labourer’, ‘The Smallholder’ and ‘The Food Producer’ (Table 7).  
The Business Farmer type was typically an individual or group of individual farmers with greater 
commercial interest, skills, market capability and financial resources. Such farmers were 
entrepreneurs and were close perhaps to the stereotypical ‘emerging commercial farmer’. They 
would generally need large farm sizes of between 5 and 40 ha depending on crops grown (Table 
7). By contrast, the Equity Labourer was characteritically a member of collective of plot holders 
on large, complex or expensive irrigation schemes, where the reality of scheme running costs 
and operational management called for commercial partners to invest in or run the farming 
enterprise. Although details of partnership contracts were diverse, the equity labourer type 
applied to those cases where there was in effect a wholesale handover of the soils, water and 
infrastructure assets in return for some dividend and a guarantee of jobs at the minimum wage 
(Table 7). Denison & Manona (Ibid) observe that many partnerships, including contract farming 
and outgrower schemes, will apply to both the business farmer and equity labourer types. 
While there are overlaps in characteristics of the two types of farmer, distinction can be based 
on the locus of decision making authority. While the business farmer maintains a degree of 
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autonomy in decision making, the equity labourer is basically a worker, with very little influence 
on decision making. 
The Smallholder was typally a plot holder with a more diversified range of livelihood strategies, 
within which farming plays a smaller role in the overall mix of livelihoods and income (Table 7). 
Smallholder farmers were often poorly-resourced and they typically preferred to engage in 
lower risk farming styles. According to the RESIS Programme framework, such an approach was 
unlikely to be a financially feasible proposition in many of the irrigation schemes with high 
running costs, where operational costs reduced cash returns, or with pumped hydraulic 
systems, which had a higher risk of failure. The smallholder type of farmer, however, could 
survive in schemes with lower running costs, typically gravity flood schemes. Denison & 
Manona (Ibid.) further state that the argument for recognition of this type of farmer was that 
successful small-scale farming was not necessarily a scaled down version of mainstream 
commercial farming systems. Rather, the relatively low levels of inputs and dependence on 
markets for outcomes, which characterized the smallholder type of farmer, had real advantages 
for the survival of many resource-poor farmers. As such, some of the objectives of support to 
these farmers necessarily had to be risk reduction and lower reliance on external cash exchange 
(Table 7).   
According to Denison & Manona, the Food Producer was typically a plot holder who was “at the 
baseline of poverty”. This type of smallholder therefore had limited access to labour and 
financial resources and generally did not often engage in irrigated field cropping because of 
investment costs, risks and aptitude. Given start-up support, however, the food producer was 
more likely to engage in food production in a home garden, which characteristically might be a 
few hundred square metres in area. There were cases though in which food producers were 
found in irrigation schemes. Such instances usually occurred in gravity schemes with low 
running costs, where food producers either ‘gardened’ in allotted plots or obtained informal 
permission to use dormant plots. Irrespective of whether they were located in home gardens or 
irrigation schemes, food producers tended to exhibit risk aversion behaviour, often manifest in 
small sizes of gardens, mixed cash sale and home food production motives. Due to inability or 
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disinterest, the food producer effectively had too few immediate options to move beyond their 
current state and engage in field cropping at any scale. Food producers therefore fell outside 
the broader category of ‘emerging commercial farmers’. 
TABLE 7 TYPOLOGY OF FARMERS IN SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES TARGETED 
BY RESIS PROGRAMME 
The Business Farmer: This is an individual or group of individual farmers with greater commercial interest, skills, market 
capability and financial resources. They are entrepreneurs, the more powerful in the community, possibly in leadership, 
and are close perhaps to the stereotypical ‘emerging commercial farmer’. They would generally need large farm sizes of 
between 5 and 40 ha depending on crops grown. Such crops would usually be those with more robust market opportunity, 
defined as a mix of commodity and medium value. An exception is where higher value crops are grown on smaller holdings 
of around 1 to 2 ha, in which case a contract arrangement is probably essential to provide the management and marketing 
outlets that high value crops demand. Since a commercial orientation is likely to call for higher yields and accept higher 
risks associated with adopted farming styles, land consolidation is clearly a key intervention, as well as farm systems and 
marketing support initiatives. Such initiatives include mentorships, NGO partnerships, academic partnerships and/or joint 
venture arrangements (i.e. strategic partnerships). 
The Equity Labourer: The equity labourer is defined as typically a member of collective of plot holders on large, complex or 
expensive irrigation schemes, where the reality of scheme running costs and operational management call for commercial 
partners to invest in or run the farming enterprise. While this type of farmer is suited to large and complex schemes, it can 
also apply to any scheme. Although details of partnership contracts are diverse, the equity labourer type applies to those 
cases where there is in effect a wholesale handover of the soils, water and infrastructure assets in return for some dividend 
and a guarantee of jobs at the minimum wage. Many partnerships, including contract farming and outgrower schemes, will 
apply to both the business farmer and equity labourer types. While there are overlaps in characteristics of the two types of 
farmer, distinction can be based on the locus of decision making authority. While the business farmer maintains a degree 
of autonomy in decision making, the equity labourer is basically a worker, with very little influence on decision making. 
The Smallholder: This type of farmer is typically a plot holder with a more diversified range of livelihood strategies, within 
which farming plays a smaller role in the overall mix of livelihoods and income. Smallholder farmers are often poorly-
resourced and they typically prefer to engage in lower risk farming styles. According to the RESIS framework, such an 
approach is unlikely to be a financially feasible proposition in many of the irrigation schemes with high running costs, 
where operational costs reduce cash returns, or with pumped hydraulic systems, which have a higher risk of failure. The 
smallholder type of farmer, however, can survive in schemes with lower running costs, typically gravity flood schemes. The 
smallholder category would apply to many existing farmers in irrigation schemes, who typically engage in crop production 
for multiple purposes namely, home consumption, cash sale and animal fodder. Argument for the recognition of this type 
of farmer is that successful small-scale farming is not necessarily a scaled down version of mainstream commercial farming 
systems. Rather, the relatively low levels of inputs and dependence on markets for outcomes that characterize the 
smallholder type of farmer have real advantages for the survival of many resource-poor farmers. As such, some of the 
objectives of support to these farmers should be risk reduction and lower reliance on external cash exchange.   
The Food Producer: This type of farmer is typically a plot holder who is “at the baseline of poverty”. The smallholder has 
therefore limited access to labour and financial resources and generally does not often engage in irrigated field cropping 
because of investment costs, risks and aptitude. Given start-up support, the food producer is more likely to engage in food 
production in a home garden, which characteristically might be a few hundred square metres in area. However, there are 
cases in which food producers are found in irrigation schemes. Such instances usually occur in gravity schemes with low 
running costs, where food producers either ‘garden’ in allotted plots or obtain informal permission to use dormant plots. 
Irrespective of whether they are located in home gardens or irrigation schemes, food producers tend to exhibit risk 
aversion behaviour, often manifest in small sizes of gardens and mixed cash sale and home food production motives. Due 
to inability or disinterest, the food producer effectively has too few immediate options to move beyond their current state 
and engage in field cropping at any scale. Food producers therefore fall outside the broader category of ‘emerging 
commercial farmers’. 
Source: Adapted from Denison & Manona (2007) 
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The scholars, however, identified food producers as posing a challenge to implementation of 
the RESIS Programme. This was because these farmers, by virtue of their poverty and 
vulnerability, tended to hold onto their irrigated plot rather than lease it out in an informal 
arrangement. They feared to lose the plot since it represented “one of the last few resources” 
that they had. From such perspective, therefore, the scholars surmised that the food producer 
was “important because he or she is one of the reasons for unutilized plots on schemes”. 
Towards making such land available for those who can or want to use it, Denison & Manona put 
forward two propositions. The first was that there should be a land registration and leasing 
initiative to allow the food producer type of farmer to hold onto the land while gaining a small 
income from leasing it out. The second proposition is that there should be an alternative home 
gardening initiative to motivate the food producer type of farmer to vacate the irrigated plot 
but still be able to produce food and safeguard against vulnerability.     
While Denison and Manona’s typology provides useful insights into the differentiation of 
smallholders, it falls short of capturing the broader diversity of farmers as well as their class 
relations. It seems necessary therefore to draw from both this typology and Cousins’ (2010) 
class-analytic typology, which identifies six categories of small-scale producers in South Africa. 
These include, ‘supplementary food producers’, who work on small plots or gardens, do not 
have access to wage income and rely on additional forms of income such as social grants, 
craftwork or petty trading for their simple reproduction; ‘allotment holding wage workers’, who 
work on small gardens but are primarily dependent on wages for their simple reproduction; 
‘worker peasants’, who farm on a substantial scale but are also engaged in wage labour and 
combine these in their simple reproduction; ‘petty commodity producers’, who are able to 
reproduce themselves from farming alone, or with minor additional forms of income; ‘small-
scale capitalist farmers’, who rely substantially on hired labour and can begin to engage in 
expanded reproduction and capital accumulation; ‘capitalists whose main income is not from 
farming’, and who farm on a small-scale but their main source of income in another business.  
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3.8 RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: IMPLEMENTATION OF PILOT PROJECT 
From 2002 to 2004, the pilot phase of the RESIS-Recharge Phase was implemented in 
Elandskraal Irrigation Scheme, which is located on the opposite bank of Olifants/Lepelle River, a 
few kilometres downstream of Phetwane. During that time, ten out of thirty-eight members of 
Elandskraal Balemi Irrigation Scheme (EBIS) Trust, who had relatively larger 5 ha plots, 
participated in a trial partnership with AWC. EBIS Trust and AWC developed a mutual 
relationship with support from LDA. The pilot project was a partnership to produce and market 
potatoes and maize. AWC provided practical skills development in crop production, harvesting, 
grading and packaging of harvested potatoes, among other skills. The LDA brought groups of 
smallholders from other similar schemes, such as Makuleke and Phetwane, to observe the 
model of partnership that was used in the pilot project.  
At the end of the pilot phase, LDA convened a meeting with various key stakeholders, primarily 
including members of EBIS Trust and AWC. The objective was to discuss future options and, in 
particular, an envisaged ‘empowerment’ model for RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships. The 
proposed empowerment framework required strategic partners, such as AWC, to subscribe to 
criteria set out in the Broad-Based Economic Empowerment Framework for Agriculture 
(AgriBEE). This entailed the formation of a strategic partnership between Elandskraal farmers, 
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a newly-formed private entity called Temong cc, 
which was to be jointly owned by a black former agricultural extension officer turned 
entrepreneur, Mr Lazarus Mosena, and Mr Arthur William Creighton, an established white agri-
business farmer. Responses to proposals by government officials showed a split among 
smallholders. While twenty (20) of the thirty-eight (38) members of EBIS Trust accepted the 
proposed empowerment model, eighteen (18) rejected it and instead opted for a modified 
version of the pilot phase contract, which was silent on the empowerment objective but gave 
smallholders more decision-making power.  
The difference was mainly due to an antecedent conflict within EBIS Trust. This was due to 
perceptions that, at the end of the pilot phase, the more affluent among smallholders had 
significantly benefited from the disposal of centre pivots while many others, including the 
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resource-poor, had been excluded from such benefits. The conflict undermined consensus on 
commonly-perceived problems with the proposed contract model.  
One such problem was that the proposed model was seen to be taking away significant degrees 
of power away from smallholders and inordinately vesting such power within government 
officials and strategic partners, with strategic partners accounting to the department and not to 
EBIS Trust. This contrasted with the greater degrees of power and autonomy exercised by 
smallholders in the pilot phase contract.  
A second problem pertained to perceived inequalities in the proposed empowerment 
framework. Some members of EBIS Trust questioned LDA’s basis for empowering a historically 
disadvantaged individual (HDI) from outside the ranks of smallholders namely, Mr Lazarus 
Mosena, while within such ranks there were HDIs with ambition and potential to become fully-
fledged commercial farmers. There were also suspicions of corruption with regard to 
preference by senior LDA officials of this specific empowerment partner, who formerly worked 
for the department as a locally-based extension officer. Contestations over inequitable sharing 
of pilot phase benefits contributed to smallholders’ failure to act collectively with respect to 
commonly perceived problems. Those smallholders who chose to accept the new model broke 
away from EBIS Trust, established themselves as a splinter group named ‘Kgotlelelo’ and 
cooperated with the department in its efforts to implement the empowerment model of 
strategic partnerships. The rest remained within the parent organization and retained its name. 
3.9 RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: OVERVIEW OF PROGRAME IMPLEMENTATION 
3.9.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
Institutional arrangements for agricultural commercialization in the RESIS-Recharge phase 
involved contract-based strategic ‘partnerships’. Partnerships were commonly defined as 
formal or informal relationships between various state and non-state parties, in which all 
participants agree to work together towards achieving a common objective or performing a 
specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits (Malena, 
2004). RESIS Programme strategic partnerships have entailed formal contracts primarily 
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between commercial agricultural enterprises and smallholders, but also involving the provincial 
department of agriculture as a third party. Overviews of strategic partnerships that have 
emerged during the RESIS Recharge era show that most of the contracts have followed a 
particular generic model. This model is a modified version of an approach that was developed 
during the pilot phase of RESIS-Recharge and subsequently extrapolated to various smallholder 
irrigation schemes within the province. Dynamics surrounding the pilot phase provide a useful 
background for examining contracts that have emerged in the RESIS-Recharge era. 
In January 2005, while EBIS Trust and AWC entered into a ten-year modified version of the pilot 
phase contract, preparations got underway to roll out the new strategic partnership approach 
in Elandskraal and in the broader province. During 2005, LDA formulated an ‘Empowerment 
Framework’ for strategic partnerships, which required strategic partners, such as AWC, to 
subscribe to enterprise ownership criteria set out in the Broad-Based Economic Empowerment 
Framework for Agriculture (AgriBEE). Within the same year, AWC and the former agricultural 
extension officer established Temong cc as an empowerment company of AWC in which each 
had a 50 per cent share. Around the same time, a process began to formally constitute 
Kgotlelelo as a legal entity. In March 2008 Kgotlelelo, constituted as Elandskraal Kgotlelelo 
Balemi Irrigation Cooperative, entered into a three-year contract with Temong cc. 
Against a backdrop of failure by many joint ventures of the earlier RESIS era (Tapela, 2008; 
Denison & Manona, 2006; Veldwisch, 2004), LDA took a decision to replicate modified versions 
of the pilot AWC - EBIS Trust partnership in other smallholder irrigation schemes in the 
province. While the replicated model adopted the same established private agricultural 
enterprise as strategic partner, LDA insisted that AWC should comply with the department’s 
Empowerment Framework by forming an ‘empowerment’ company that would partner with 
smallholders. Towards curbing financial losses and possible exposure of smallholders to risks 
associated with debts and production of high value crops, the department placed obligations 
upon the strategic partner to ensure the profitability of farming enterprises and to avoid undue 
exposure to debts. Prior to such roll-out, the department took smallholders from irrigation 
schemes, such as Makuleke and Tswelelopele, to Elandskraal where they were exposed to an 
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example of a ‘successful’ partnership. Although the post-pilot empowerment approach was 
subsequently extrapolated to a number of smallholder irrigation schemes within the province, 
concerns raised by Elandskraal smallholders do not seem to have been taken into account. In 
particular, concerns raised over issues of power remained unresolved. 
3.9.2 ANALYSIS OF RESIS-RECHARGE ‘EMPOWERMENT’ CONTRACTS 
While the earliest post-pilot phase contract between AWC and EBIS Trust was silent on the 
empowerment objective, all the other contracts included this objective as a means to 
addressing AgriBEE requirements. With the exception of EBIS Trust, whose post-pilot phase 
partnership with AWC had a ten-year long tenure from to 2016, all other RESIS-Recharge 
strategic partnerships commenced as from 2006 onwards and were of three-year durations 
(Table 8). Also excepting the AWC - EBIS Trust partnership, all other contracts were similar in 
content, with variations in the identities of signing parties, percentage shares of profits and 
dates of commencement and end of agreement. While all other strategic partnerships were 
facilitated by LDA since on-set of the RESIS-Recharge phase, the partnership between AWC and 
EBIS Trust evolved from a pilot phase trial partnership between AWC and some of the members 
of EBIS Trust. The relatively high degree of uniformity among RESIS-Recharge strategic 
partnership contracts was due to the approach adopted by the LDA after the Elandskraal pilot 
project.  
The term, ‘empowerment contracts’, is used herein to refer to those RESIS-Recharge 
institutional arrangements that subscribed to the LDA Empowerment Framework. The term 
therefore excludes the AWC – EBIS Trust contract, which commenced before the adoption by 
LDA of the Empowerment Framework in 2005. Inclusion of the anomalous AWC - EBIS Trust 
partnership among case studies for this thesis is mainly because there is direct link between 
this and the newer RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships, whereby the former was used as a 
pilot for latter institutional arrangements.  
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7.2.2.1 Statement of ‘Historical Background’  
Clause 1.1 of all the ‘empowerment’ contracts examined was entitled ‘history’. However, the 
term ‘history’ was technically a misnomer since contents of the section were not about the 
historical background to the contract. Rather, Clause 1.1 provided information on the location 
and areal extent of the particular irrigation scheme and stated that the scheme formed part of 
the “project” of the Limpopo Department of Agriculture. Further to that, Clause 1.1.1 of each 
contract specified the number of hectares (ha), type of irrigation infrastructure, number of 
farmers and types of crops under consideration. Given that the pre- and post-1994 history of 
many of smallholder irrigation schemes is characterized by varied and often negative 
experiences with equity labour arrangements (Vink et al, 1998:77), silence on such precedence 
left out an important benchmark for RESIS-Recharge empowerment contracts.  
By contrast, the contract between AWC and EBIS Trust made a clear statement about 
weaknesses of the preceding pilot phase institutional arrangement and how the new contract 
would improve upon past shortcomings. For example, Clause 2 of the AWC – EBIS Trust contract 
stated, “Mr Creighton was allowed to relinquish and sell one centre [pivot] every three years to 
a group of ten (10) farmers. This model was found to significantly benefit few farmers creating 
animosity amongst farmers. On the other hand the majority of farmers were struggling to get 
proper, reliable and timely mechanization services to prepare their land on time. The farmers 
took a decision to investigate a new arrangement whereby all farmers could benefit”. The AWC 
- EBIS trust contract therefore clearly articulated a key basis for the new arrangement. This 
provided a useful benchmark for assessing whether or not the contract constituted a better 
construct than the preceding arrangement.  
7.2.2.2 Objectives of Strategic Partnerships 
Clause 1.2 of all empowerment contracts stated that objectives of smallholders’ cooperatives 
with respect to the appointment of AWC to operate the irrigation schemes were that AWC 
shall: 
 Operate the irrigation scheme, as part of the project of the Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture, to its optimum potential capacity, on a profitable commercial basis; 
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 Train the farmers and transfer the required skills to empower them to be able to operate 
the irrigation scheme themselves, in the long term, which includes training in the areas 
of finance, quality control, marketing, management, operational, technical and business 
administration; 
 Stimulate the production of potatoes and other cash crops; 
 Create for farmers a carefully managed sales outlet for potatoes and other cash crops, 
thereby optimizing profits for both potatoes and cash crop sales and for processing and 
sales of value added products; 
 Utilize the experience and expertise of an established role player in the farming industry, 
to the benefit of farmers; 
 Ensure that a Profit Sharing Formula Arrangement is implemented among the two 
parties namely, Strategic Partner and the Farmers during the three year period under the 
agreement; and 
 Comply with the implementation of the Empowerment Framework of the Limpopo 
Department of Agriculture.      
7.2.2.3 Main Agreement  
Smallholders agreed that AWC would use the land, water and infrastructure on irrigation 
schemes for durations of three (3) years, according to varying profit sharing arrangements 
(Table 42). In some cases, such as Makuleke, Kgotlelelo and Tswelelopele, the strategic partner 
would get 60 per cent in the first year while smallholders’ cooperatives got 40 per cent; and 
thereafter each party would get an equal share (50 per cent). In other cases, such as Phetwane, 
Strydkraal and Krokodilheuwel, strategic partners and smallholders’ cooperatives would get 
equal shares (50 per cent) throughout the three-year duration of contracts. The exit strategy for 
the private investor, according to Clause 13 of contracts, envisaged that upon expiry of the 
strategic partnership agreement, AWC would relinquish his shares in the partnership, at no 
cost, in favour of smallholders’ cooperatives or such shareholders that may be nominated for 
this purpose by LDA. 
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7.2.2.4 Parties to the Contract     
RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership contracts were in effect ‘multi-partite’ institutional 
arrangements.  Contracts were agreements principally between commercial agricultural 
enterprises, as strategic partners, and smallholders’ cooperatives, as equity labourers. 
Contracts were co-signed by chairpersons of cooperatives or trusts, on behalf of smallholders, 
and Mr Arthur William Creighton, on behalf of either AWC or Temong cc. The signing was 
witnessed by four other persons. Although LDA was not a signatory to the contract, indications 
were that the department was in effect a third party to all empowerment contracts. Firstly, 
Clause 10 of empowerment contracts stated that “the relationship between smallholders’ 
cooperatives, Limpopo Department of Agriculture and AWC will be governed by the terms of 
this agreement”. Secondly, contracts specified responsibilities and obligations of AWC to the 
Limpopo Department of Agriculture. Thirdly, Clause 3 stated that the department remained 
involved in the management of the contract at board level to ensure that objectives of strategic 
partnership transactions are achieved. Smallholders alluded to “the middle man”, who played a 
key intermediary role but was not mentioned in strategic partnership contracts. Contracts 
therefore often involved intermediary actors, who were responsible for certain aspects of 
project implementation and accountable to the strategic partner.  
7.2.2.5 Rights, Roles and Responsibilities 
All strategic partnership contracts specified: 
 Appointment of Arthur William Creighton (AWC) or Temong cc, duly represented by 
Arthur William Creighton, as strategic partner (Clause 8);  
 AWC’s rights, duties and obligations as strategic partner operating in a given 
smallholder irrigation scheme (Clause 9); 
 AWC’s rights, duties and obligations as shareholder of the partnership (Clause 10); 
 AWC’s rights, duties and obligations in respect of a given group of smallholders (Clause 
11); and 
 AWC’s rights, duties and obligations with regard to the Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture (Clause 12). 
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An interpretation of terms of the contract suggests that some of the key roles, responsibilities 
and obligations of the private investor were that AWC shall: 
 Play a lead role in decision-making, management and implementation of the whole 
enterprise from production, technical support, marketing to financial accounting;  
 Provide smallholders with technical advice and training in the operation of the business 
enterprise of the irrigation scheme and ensure a transfer of skills in this regard (Clause 
11.1);  
 Ensure that the enterprise is profitable and does not get bogged down by debt; and 
 Comply with terms of the Limpopo Department of Agriculture Empowerment 
Framework. 
While contracts clearly spelt out the rights, roles and obligations of the strategic partner, they 
were not explicit on the rights, roles and obligations of smallholders. Clause 2.2 of the some of 
the contracts stated that these rights, roles and obligations were set out in Clause 6. However, 
Clause 6 did not make any mention of these but stated, “All references to the singular shall 
include the plural, and vice versa; all references to natural persons shall include legal persona, 
and vice versa; and all references to the masculine shall include references to the other 
genders.” In the Makuleke contract, although Clause 2.2 was missing, Clause 6 was worded 
exactly as Clause 6 in the other contracts.  
In the absence of explicit statements regarding smallholders’ rights, roles and responsibilities, 
such information was deduced from other clauses of contracts and cross-referenced with 
information given by smallholders, AWC and officials of LDA. It emerged that smallholders were 
required to contribute to strategic partnerships their allocated plots of land, water, irrigation 
infrastructure and, when required, their labour. It also appeared that delegated responsibilities 
of smallholders’ management committees were to engage directly with local communities 
regarding issues of labour, communication, theft and the distribution of benefits, such as casual 
employment and surplus produce. 
A critical difference between empowerment contracts and the AWC – EBIS Trust agreement 
was that, the latter contract was silent on compliance with the Empowerment Framework of 
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the Limpopo Department of Agriculture, which involved Historically Disadvantaged Individuals 
(HDIs) from outside the ranks of smallholders. A second difference was that the AWC – EBIS 
Trust contract did not explicitly hand over all responsibility for operating the irrigation scheme 
to the strategic partner but required AWC to act in consultation with smallholders. A third 
difference was that, while the AWC – EBIS Trust contract was underpinned by clearly stated 
principles of striving towards “good and mutual relationship”, equity, poverty reduction and 
improvement of livelihoods, such principles were lacking in empowerment contracts. Within 
the latter contracts, the responsibility for managing relations between smallholders and 
strategic partners was vested upon LDA, while emphasis was on principles of optimizing profits 
and avoiding debts. In spite of the above differences, both types of contract privatized the 
sourcing of extension services. While the empowerment contracts vested the strategic partner 
with the responsibility to train farmers, the AWC – EBIS Trust contract required the strategic 
partner to facilitate smallholders’ access to commercial technical services and not necessarily to 
actively train smallholders. Both partnership models also had the same end point, which was to 
achieve agricultural commercialization through contract-based strategic partnerships. 
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TABLE 8 OVERVIEW OF RESIS-RECHARGE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS, 2009 
Name of 
Scheme 
Area (Ha) Number 
of 
Farmers 
Average 
Plot Size 
(Ha) 
Irrigation 
Infrastructure 
Partners Duration of Contract Profit Sharing Arrangement 
Makuleke 232 43 5 Centre pivots Makuleke Farmers 
Cooperative and Mr Arthur 
William Creighton 
01 Mar 2007 - 28 Feb 2010 
(3 years) 
Year 1: 60% to AWC and 40% to 
plot holders. 
Years 2 and 3: 50% each 
Phetwane 52 48 1 Floppy Sprinkler Phetoane Irrigation Farmers 
Cooperative Ltd and Temong 
cc  
01 Nov 2008 – 01 Nov 
2011 
(3 years) 
Year 1, 2 and 3: 50% to AWC and 
50% to plot holders. 
Elandskraal 1: 
EBIS 
150 196 0.8 Centre pivots Elandskraal Balemi Irrigation 
Scheme Trust and Mr Arthur 
Creighton 
Jan 2005 to Jan 2016  
(10 years) 
NB: Verbal agreement not stated 
in contract: 
Year 1: 70% to AWC and 30% to 
plot holders. 
Year 2: 60% to AWC and 40% to 
plot holders. 
Year 3 to Year 10: 50% each. 
Elandskraal 2: 
Kgotlelelo 
197 28 7 Centre pivots Kgotlelelo Balemi Irrigation 
Cooperative Ltd and Temong 
cc 
01 Mar 2008 – 01 Mar 
2011 
(3 years) 
Year 1: 60% to AWC and 40% to 
plot holders. 
Years 2 and 3: 50% each 
Tswelelopele 
 
440  -   
but only    
403 used 
77 5 Floppy Sprinkler Tswelelopele Irrigation 
Farmers Cooperative Ltd and 
Temong cc 
2007 – 2010 
(3 years) 
Year 1: 60% to AWC and 40% to 
plot holders. 
Years 2 and 3: 50% each 
Strydkraal A 5 10 0.5 Floppy Sprinkler Strydkraal Irrigation Farmers 
Cooperative Ltd and Temong 
cc 
2007 – 2010 
(3 years) 
Year 1, 2 and 3: 50% to AWC and 
50% to plot holders. 
Krokodilheuwel    Floppy Sprinkler Krokodilheuwel Irrigation 
Farmers Cooperative Ltd and 
Temong cc 
2008 - 2011 
(3 years) 
Year 1, 2 and 3: 50% to AWC and 
50% to plot holders. 
Source: Fieldwork
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3.10 SUMMARY OF ISSUES RAISED BY SMALLHOLDERS 
During this study’s fieldwork, smallholders raised a number of issues relating to 
implementation of strategic partnership contracts. Although they were generally 
appreciative of incomes from farming, many voiced dissatisfaction with the content and 
implementation of signed contracts. Problematic issues included: 
  Lack of smallholders’ involvement in decision making; 
 Lack of active roles in crop production and meaningful skills development, 
particularly for those smallholders with an interest in becoming fully-fledged 
commercial producers; 
 Total dependency on the strategic partner, with inadequate provisions for 
smallholders’ capacity development, a high risk of total collapse of the enterprise at 
the end of the contract and ‘exit strategies’ that implied continued dependency on 
external partners, whether or not these are HDIs;  
 Lack of transparency regarding financial accounts, in particular, non-disclosure about 
management of funds within smallholders’ trust accounts and non-sharing of records 
relating to production costs and income, which had led to suspicions by some 
smallholders about the validity of dividends paid out; 
 Inadequate effort by department officials to ensure that smallholders fully 
understand content and implications of contracts before they sign the agreements; 
 Privatization of production, management, marketing and extension services; 
 Transparency of processes of land consolidation into trusts and selection of BEE 
partners; 
 Private partner’s upward accountability to LDA and lack of downward accountability 
to smallholders;  
 Poor governance of smallholders’ groups, for example poor accountability by 
smallholders’ committees to cooperative groups and lack of skills in organizational 
management; and 
 Poor accountability by smallholders’ committees to local communities.   
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3.11 CONCLUSION 
The convergence of international, regional, national, provincial and local institutional 
reforms in the late 1990s appears to have contributed to the dilution of RESIS Programme 
objectives for agricultural commercialization with food and livelihood security objectives. 
Within this dilution was a conflation of interests to integrate smallholders to globalized agri-
food systems and requirements for governments to ensure the achievement of MDGs, 
particularly for the rural poor. In principle and practice, therefore, the RESIS Programme 
framework seems to have been predicated upon an assumption that contract farming 
constituted an adequate construct for addressing both sets of macro-economic policy 
objectives.   
In light of such assumption, the aim of the study was to determine whether or not 
agricultural commercialization, as articulated mainly through contractual joint ventures and 
strategic partnerships, provided an adequate construct for addressing rural livelihood 
interests within selected smallholder irrigation scheme communities in Limpopo Province. In 
pursuing this aim, a key concern was whether or not policies and institutions reflected the 
interests of the poor. Such examination was predicated on detailed analyses of livelihood 
portfolios and strategies in selected case study sites. Research objectives were to: 
 Characterize the institutional and livelihood context for the resurgence of contract 
farming in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province; 
 Examine the institutional arrangements for joint ventures and strategic partnerships 
in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province;  
 Examine the effects of agricultural commercialization initiatives on livelihoods of 
petty commodity producers, subsistence farmers and other people in local 
communities associated with selected small-scale irrigation schemes; and 
 Identify key policy and institutional issues for government interventions in 
smallholder irrigation schemes. 
The next three chapters present empirical research findings on RESIS Programme 
implementation in selected study sites in Limpopo Province. Specific attention is given to 
interactions between contract farming arrangements and rural livelihoods in various 
smallholder irrigation scheme contexts.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme provides an interesting study of the dynamics that have 
emerged in the historically white commercial farming areas following the implementation of 
agricultural commercialization and AgriBEE in Greater Sekhukhune District. Hereford’s joint 
ventures provide a lens through which contracts, as institutional mechanisms for 
coordinating linkages between smallholders and private investors, have interacted with the 
livelihoods of resource poor irrigation farmers. This chapter presents findings from in-depth 
research that was carried out from November 2003 to July 2007.  
At the time of the study, the irrigation scheme consisted of a cluster of thirty-three small-
holdings, whose most obvious defining features were numerous tobacco curing barns that 
towered over squat cottages in varying states of repair and disrepair. A patchwork quilt of 
ploughed fields, flourishing gardens and fallow land spread out among the cottages and 
barns. Closer scrutiny revealed that the scheme was a hub of activity, with sprinklers quietly 
humming away and people labouring and gradually embroidering changes to the mosaic of 
the landscape. Such features bore testimony to self-mobilization efforts by black farmers to 
revive the scheme in 1997. What the idyllic vista could not reveal, however, were the 
historical and on-going contestations over land and water resources, as well as the changing 
milieu of partnerships between smallholders and the private sector.  
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This chapter begins by describing the location, historical background, land allocation, socio-
economic profile and livelihood strategies and challenges of Hereford Irrigation Scheme. 
This is followed by a close examination of two initiatives to promote entry by Hereford 
smallholders into globalized agri-food systems. The first relates to a private investor-led 
joint venture project that sought to utilize existing tobacco production infrastructure as a 
means to promote BEE and market entry for the historically disadvantaged farmers. The 
second relates to a multi-stakeholder process to promote makert entry by Hereford 
smallholders through commercial vegetable production and marketing. While both 
initiatives subscribed to government objectives relating to rural development, land reform 
and emerging farmer support or AgriBEE, the latter initiative was more firmly grounded in 
the newly-emerged ISRDP framework. For that reason, an empirical examination of both 
initiatives provides a comprehensive portrayal of both institutional processes and 
arrangements pertaining to this case study.     
4.2 LOCATION 
4.2.1 SITUATION 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme nests within a gap between the Olifants River and the Hereford 
Canal on the eastern margins of the small town of Groblersdal in Elias Motswaledi (formerly 
Greater Groblersdal) Local Municipality of Greater Sekhukhune District (Figure 10). The 
irrigation scheme is situated south of the R33 road to Stoffberg, on portions 236, 237, 238 
and 239 of 53JS Loskop South Farm along the Olifants/Lepelle River and the Hereford canal.  
4.2.2 SITE AND BIOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The scheme is sited at an altitude of approximately 1000 metres, approximately 44km 
downstream of the Loskop Dam, which is sited at altitude 1300m. The scheme is located 
within the commercial farming area administered by the Hereford Irrigation Board, in the 
Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality of Greater Sekhukhune District. The total land area 
of the irrigation scheme is 192.19 hectares (ha). Hereford Irrigation Scheme is part of a 
larger area of approximately 2 140 ha that is managed by Hereford Irrigation Board.  
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FIGURE 10 LOCATION OF HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME 
 
4.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
4.3.1 ORIGINS OF HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: 1926 TO THE 1980s 
The commercial farming area along the Hereford canal, which is presently managed by the 
Hereford Irrigation Board, was proclaimed in 1926 in terms of the Irrigation and 
Conservation of Water Act 12 of 1912 (Tren & Schur, 2000). Private landowners established 
irrigation farming following the construction of a small weir and a canal by two farmers, 
Meissner and Beukes. After the Second Word War, following the accession of the National 
Party government in 1948, the Hereford area was developed as a welfare settlement 
scheme for white workers who were pensioned early from mines and other industrial 
sectors (Butler, 1994). These workers were among the National Party’s key constituencies 
(Kruger, 2001: 2).  
Portions 236 to 239 of 53JS Loskop South farm, in which the Hereford Irrigation Scheme is 
located, were developed by the government specifically as a white settlement scheme for 
soldiers returning from the war. These war veterans-cum-tenant farmers abandoned the 
land in the 1980s for a number of reasons, including the failure of a tobacco joint venture 
and insecurity due to anti-apartheid activism. Deprived of gainful employment, the 
scheme’s black farm workers were compelled to relocate to Tafelkop and Motetema 
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settlements, between 10 and 15 km to the north-east of Groblersdal. For ten years, the land 
lay fallow and infrastructure was vandalized and became dilapidated.  
4.3.2 NON-VIOLENT OCCUPATION AND THE PROCESS TOWARDS FORMALIZATION 
OF LAND RIGHTS: FROM 1997 TO 2000  
 
On the 1st of February 1997, a group of 32 black farmers invaded and occupied the unused 
state land within portions 236 to 239 of 53JS Loskop South Farm. The farmers were 
members of the Tafelkop Farmers’ Association (TFA), then composed of more than 800 
members. Most of the 32 farmers who invaded Hereford had spent their childhoods 
working on the Hereford smallholdings alongside their parents.  
The black small-scale farmers’ interests in the four portions of 53JS Loskop South farm 
related primarily to the availability of water for irrigation, the possibility of secure tenure on 
arable land as well as access to funds to buy tractors and other agricultural inputs. The 
opportunities to generate livelihoods through farming in the impoverished communal lands 
around Tafelkop and Motetema had been very limited and poverty and food insecurity rife. 
These constraints and hardships, however, were not the principal motivation for invading 
the land. 
The main reason for invading the four portions of 53JS Loskop South Farm was that in 1993, 
a group of black small-scale farmers from Tafelkop had been given agricultural training and 
promised settlement on the vacant farm, as part of a pilot project of the Mpumalanga 
Provincial Department of Agriculture. No further feedback was given for four years, until the 
caretaker put up a sign indicating that the farm had been sold. This prompted the farmers to 
invade and forcibly occupy the land.  
After the invasion, there was heated debate over the legitimacy of the occupation. All the 
relevant stakeholders, including the National Department of Agriculture, the Department of 
Land Affairs (DLA), the National Department of Public Works, the Groblersdal Resettlement 
Committee, the Groblersdal Civic Association, the ANC Youth League, the Groblersdal Taxi 
Association and local Traditional Leaders (diKgoshi), agreed at a meeting that the invasion 
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was justified10. The Hereford Irrigation Scheme was then established, the farmers initially 
referring to themselves as the TFA, but later changing their name to "Hereford Farmers 
Association" (HFA) to distinguish the particular group of farmers from the larger parent 
organization. The DLA then began a process to lease the land for a renewable three-year 
term to the small-scale farmers, with the provision that land ownership would eventually be 
transferred from the state to the farmers11.  
The DLA prioritized this project under the name "Hereford Irrigation Scheme". Since the 
land was not under the control of the Department of Land Affairs (DLA), the DLA had to 
motivate for a transfer of title from the responsible department, then the National 
Department of Public Works (NDPW), to the farmers. The NDPW was to transfer the four 
portions of land to the National Department of Agriculture (NDA), who would then transfer 
the land to the Mpumalanga Provincial Department of Agriculture12. The provincial 
Department of Agriculture would then transfer the land to the DLA, for lease and eventual 
transfer to the small-scale farmers. The transfer process, however, was complicated by a 
number of factors.  
Firstly, there was a stand-off between the farmers and the provincial and regional 
department officials, with the farmers refusing to speak to these officials13. Consequently, 
the DLA resorted to involving national departments and not the provincial or regional offices 
in the land transfer process, motivating the transfer of land from the National Department 
of Public Works to the National Department of Agriculture. The DLA also proceeded to 
provide support to the farmers through a contracted consultancy, the 'Mpumalanga-West 
Consortium'. The National Department of Agriculture prepared to enter into three-year 
lease agreements with the 32 identified farmers, with an option for the farmers to purchase 
                                                     
10 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the DLA and the Hereford small-scale farmers ("Tafelkop 
Farmers Association (TFA)") on Farmer Settlement on the state-owned Portions 236 to 239 of 53JS Loskop 
South Farm, dated 14 February, 1997; Memorandum from the DLA office in Mpumalanga Province to the 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, dated 11 May 1997; Farmer’s Weekly, October 17 1997. 
11
 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the DLA and the Hereford small-scale farmers ("Tafelkop 
Farmers Association (TFA)") on Farmer Settlement on the state-owned Portions 236 to 239 of 53JS 
Loskop South Farm, dated 14 February, 1997 
12
 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the DLA and the Hereford small-scale farmers (TFA) on 
Farmer Settlement on the state-owned Portions 236 to 239 of 53JS Loskop South Farm, dated 14 February, 
1997. 
 
13 Minutes of a Meeting held on 25 September 1997. 
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the land. The farmers then applied for assistance from the National Department of 
Agriculture's Farmer Settlement Support Fund and received approval from the Minister of 
Land Affairs and Agriculture. This would have effectively been a duplication of government 
assistance. The then Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture, Dereck Hanekom, was called 
upon to intervene in the resolution of the complexities that emanated from the process 
surrounding the LRAD project at the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. 
The Minister responded firstly by cautioning against further similar land occupation. 
Secondly, the Minister decided that the settlement of the farmers should be facilitated 
through three-year lease agreements, with the option to buy14. He also wrote: 
The National Department of Agriculture should not in any way be directly involved in 
the settlement of farmers, the leasing or administration of land. It just confuses 
matters. Agency agreements should be entered into with provincial departments or 
local government to administer leases or manage certain farmer settlement 
programmes. The two DGs should please meet to discuss the rationalization necessary 
to locate the leasing function which is done by NDA in DLA. (In the face of substantial 
demand for land, 5 hectares of irrigated land is a lot – the conditions of lease 
extensions should include performance assessment)15 
The farmers accepted the minister’s decision, and gave assurance that the precedent set by 
the Hereford case would not be repeated, but that the other members of the TFA would 
follow the normal procedure of applying for land acquisition through the DLA District Office. 
A business plan outlining the proposed use of the land was then drawn up with the help of 
Africare, an NGO operating under a bilateral development aid agreement between the 
governments of South Africa and the United States. The farmers were to be granted the 
land on the basis of the anticipated lease agreements from the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture and Land Administration and the farmers' business plan.  
The land transfer process, however, encountered further problems. Following the Minister's 
decision, title was transferred from the National Department of Public Works to the 
                                                     
14
 Minutes of a Meeting held on 25 September 1997 
15
 Response by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs to Memorandum from the DLA office in 
Mpumalanga Province, dated 12 July 1997. 
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Agricultural Research Council (ARC)16. This created tension among the small-scale farmers17, 
who were reported as being threatened by outside parties claiming that the small-scale 
farmers had no right to the land18. The small-scale farmers were also reported as alleging 
that a third force from the past was preventing progress, and various political parties were 
reported as actively following the progress made on the Hereford project19. Some key 
respondents describe transfer of land to the ARC as a "suspicious" manoeuvre by certain 
government officials to forestall the allocation of land to black small-scale farmers. Some of 
the respondents link this transfer to the sign-post that prompted the invasion and 
occupation of the scheme.  
It is worth noting that the rest of the portions of 53JS Loskop South farm - excluding 
portions 236 to 239 - then belonged to the Mpumalanga Provincial Department of 
Agriculture. This department motivated for a transfer of its portions of the farm to the ARC 
around the time that portions 236 to 239 were to be transferred from the National Public 
Works Department, through the National Department of Agriculture, to DLA and then 
leased to the small-scale farmers. For some reason, the land transfer from the Provincial 
Department of Agriculture to the ARC included the land earmarked for the small-scale 
farmers20. There had to be a reversal of the transfer of land to the ARC back to the 
Department of Public Works before the process of transferring land to the small-scale 
irrigation farmers could begin. There was a delay of three years before the lease agreements 
could be effected (Kruger, 2001). The inception of the LRAD Programme in 2001 provided a 
mechanism with which the land transfer could be effected21. 
At the time of the study, the lease agreements entered into on 16 August 2000 had lapsed 
and had since been renewed on an annual basis with the Department of Public Works22. The 
four lots of land, portions 236 to 239, of 53JS Loskop South farm had been surveyed, 
                                                     
16
 Letter from the Deputy Director of the DLA Northern Highveld Regional Office in Mpumalanga Province to 
the DLA National Office, dated 18 March 1999. 
17
 Letter from the TFA to the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, dated 13 May 1999.  
18
 Letter from the Deputy Director of the DLA Northern Highveld Regional Office in Mpumalanga Province to 
the DLA National Office, dated 18 March 1999. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Interview with the Projects Officer at the Maloeskop Office (Groblersdal) of the Provincial Department of 
Agriculture and Land Administration, 14 October 2004. 
22
 Memorandum from the Mpumalanga Department of Agriculture and Land Administration to the National 
Department of Public Works, 25 August 2004. 
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subdivided into 33 plots and the title deeds registered at the Deeds Office in Pretoria23. The 
land had yet to be transferred from the Department of Public Works to the Provincial 
Department of Agriculture and Land Administration, and the farmers had yet to be formally 
granted ownership rights.  
The first few years following the occupation of the Hereford Irrigation Scheme by black 
farmers appear to have been marked by ongoing tension between the occupiers and 
established white farmers in the Hereford commercial farming area. In in-depth interviews 
with the black farmers, respondents alluded to conflicts, mistrust, low levels of cooperation 
and exclusion from water governance by the Hereford Irrigation Board during the early 
phase of settlement. Piontek (2000) documents small-scale farmers' experiences during this 
phase. Respondents linked their earlier problematic relations with the established white 
farmers to their lack of ownership rights to the land. The respondents also pointed out that 
the support from a few white commercial farmers in the immediate aftermath of the 
occupation had gradually evolved into a broader and more cooperative relationship with the 
farmers. 
4.4 LAND ALLOCATION  
The exact land area of the Hereford Irrigation Scheme was 192.19ha. This land was 
subdivided into 34 plots. Initially, 33 plots were surveyed and allocated to members of 
Hereford Farmers Association, which was one farmer more than the number of farmers 
identified during the land invasion, occupation and rights formalization process. A 34th plot 
was subsequently surveyed, which members of the association reserved for collective use.  
At the time of the study, some of the farmers who were in the original list of beneficiaries 
submitted to the DLA in 1997 had since fallen out of the group. Other farmers had since 
replaced three of the farmers who occupied the scheme, attempted commercial farming 
and then exited (Table 9). According to the chairman of the Hereford Farmers' Association, 
changes in the composition of the farmers' group were mainly due to failure by those 
replaced to "demonstrate a commitment to the collective goal of becoming commercial 
farmers". A number of criteria were apparently used to determine the degree of such 
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commitment, including diligence in production activities and subscribing to the governance 
practices of the group. 
Plot sizes ranged from 0.70 ha to 13.79ha, with a mean of 5.4 ha (See Table 9 below). The 
gender distribution of the allocated plots was 81.8 per cent male and 18.2 per cent female, 
and farmers aged 60 years and above commanded the largest share (39.4 per cent) of 
allocated plots (Table 10; Figure 11). Of this age group, 92.3 per cent were male. Plot size 
allocation did not seem to be strongly linked to income, gender or membership of the 
governance structure, though the largest five plots were allocated to male farmers.  
TABLE 9 GENDER ALLOCATION OF SMALLHOLDINGS IN HEREFORD IRRIGATION 
SCHEME, 200424 
Plot 
Number 
Emerging Farmers prior to 2004 Emerging Farmers in 2004 Plot Size 
(in ha) Name Gender Name Gender 
F Matthew Mokolobetsi M Richard Kenosi M 5.15 
N Spencer Mahlatini M Moscow Masuku M 6.02 
L Phineas Sithole M Phineas Sithole M 5.37 
T Johnson Mathake M Johnson Mathake M 3.78 
V Timothy Mambazo M Timothy Mambazo M 4.9 
M Goitsemang Pelotona F Goitsemang Pelotona F 7.31 
A Kgositsile Boikhutso M Kgositsile Boikhutso M 9.01 
B Bohutsanyana Modimo M Bohutsanyana Modimo M 5.53 
J Refilwe Monageng M Refilwe Monageng M 4.88 
K Thabang Raperekisi M Thabang Raperekisi M 7.25 
SO Kleinbooi Sibanda M Kleinbooi Sibanda M 6.16 
Y Kedibonye Motsamai M Kedibonye Motsamai M 3.79 
Z Jorosi Mdluli M Jorosi Mdluli M 5.05 
P Kereng Maphala M Kereng Maphala M 8.53 
Q Jabulani Stimela M Jabulani Stimela M 9.09 
RN Mosimane Phuti M Mosimane Phuti M 3.06 
D Themba Shabangu M Themba Shabangu M 5.43 
C John Dlamini M John Dlamini M 7.42 
IH Freddy Molapisi M Freddy Molapisi M 1.94 
H Tirelo Sontaga M Tirelo Sontaga M 7.05 
CG Maria Thulare F Maria Thulare F 2.99 
AW Nakedi Sebolelo F Nakedi Sebolelo F 0.71 
UQ Paul Basimane M Paul Basimane M 0.70 
I Mqeda Nkathazo M Mqeda Nkathazo M 6.38 
W Kabelo Mabalane F Kabelo Mabalane F 2.79 
TP Rapelang Ramushu M Rapelang Ramushu M 4.87 
X Nkele Simelane M Nkele Simelane M 6.95 
U Mmegi Ntoane M Reneilwe Mofokeng M 4.59 
O Lethlohonolo Thupane F Lethlohonolo Thupane F 6.49 
R Pinkie Dube F Pinkie Dube F 5.57 
S Serobe Molapo M Serobe Molapo M 6.06 
E Petros Mphuchane M Petros Mphuchane M 13.7 
G Kgabo Letsatsi M Kgabo Letsatsi M 2.70 
MI Hereford Farmers Association N/a Hereford Farmers Association N/a 2.79 
                                                     
24 The names and plot numbers have been changed to protect the identity of persons 
referred herein. 
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Several factors seem to have determined the pattern of allocation that had emerged. 
Variations in plot size were inherited from the demarcations that were made originally for 
tenants of the welfare settlement scheme. One respondent explained that the pattern of 
occupation of plots had largely been determined by events of the morning of 01 February 
1997. Prior to occupation, the group had agreed that as soon as each farmer occupied a 
plot, he or she would hang some 'laundry' on a line outside to indicate that the plot had 
been claimed. Among plot holders who occupied the plots from 2004 to 2007, however, 
were farmers who were recorded as having been too afraid to invade, although they had 
been part of an original group that had signed up to invade Hereford (Piontek, 2000). Also 
among plot holders were farmers who replaced original occupants who either subsequently 
"left" their plots or were removed due to “failure to demonstrate commitment to the 
collective goal”.  
TABLE 10 HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: DISTRIBUTION OF SMALLHOLDINGS BY 
GENDER, 2004 
Age group Male % Female % Total % 
40 - 49 8 24.2 2 6.1 10 30.3 
50 - 59 7 21.2 3 9.1 10 30.3 
60 and above 12 36.4 1 3 13 39.4 
Total 27 81.8 6 18.2 33 100 
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Although smallhoders initially obtained formally recognised usufruct rights to the land, 
through three-year lease agreements signed in 1997 with the National Department of 
Agriculture (NDA25), such leases lapsed in 2000 and became renewable on an annual basis 
with the Department of Public Works. Many of the smallholders were not clear on the exact 
status of their land tenure rights. Responsed to questions about smallholders’ perceptions 
about the nature of their tenure ranged from “partial ownership”, “almost mine”, “not yet 
mine” to “leased from government” (12 per cent). It was also evident that smallholders 
were confused about who assumed responsibility for receiving land rentals. While 
smallholders generally maintained a façade of optimism that they would be granted 
ownership rights, uncertainty and distress was evident in statements such as: 
We do not know what is going on. The leases lapsed and have not been 
extended. No one is talking to us about where we stand. We have a 
problem26. 
4.5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE  
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Emerging black small-scale farmers such as those in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme are 
often described as 'resource poor farmers'. From a sustainable livelihoods perspective, this 
terminology can be interpreted as relating to a deficit in all or some of the five livelihood 
capitals. Such capitals include the physical, natural, economic and/or financial, social and 
human resources required for a means of living (Chambers & Conway, 1992: 7). Livelihoods 
are considered sustainable when they can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, 
maintain or enhance their capabilities and assets, and provide net benefits to other 
livelihoods locally and more widely both at present and in the future, without undermining 
the natural resource base (Carswell, 1997; Hussein & Nelson, 1998). From such perspective, 
a deficit or poverty in all or some of the livelihood capitals therefore would be assumed to 
restrict a farmer's capacity to optimize available opportunities and resilience against 
vulnerability-inducing factors. Resource-poor farmers would therefore be assumed to be 
those for whom a deficit or poverty in livelihood capitals detracts from the sustainability of 
their livelihoods.  
                                                     
25
 NDA was restructured in 2009 and re-named ‘Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). 
26
 Interview with the Chairman of the HFA, 14 February 2005 
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This section outlines the characteristics of the farmers' households in terms of household 
composition, livelihood capitals and strategies. Although by no means unique, notable 
findings were that Hereford smallholders were characteristically defined by firstly, 
combination of farm-based and off-farm livelihood strategies, secondly, straddling between 
the irrigation scheme and rural communities elsewhere and, thirdly, diversification of 
farming to include crops and livestock.   
4.5.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF HOUSEHOLDS  
4.5.2.1 Language Composition 
Hereford smallholders' households consisted of people who spoke various languages, 
primarily Pedi (73 per cent), Zulu (15 per cent), Tswana (6 per cent), Swazi (3 per cent) and 
Ndebele (3 per cent). Despite such diversity of languages, there seemed to be a degree of 
social coherence amongst the smallholders. While the observed coherence seemed to 
indicate that these households had gradually developed into a community, there were 
problems with attempting to delimit the boundaries of the group and establish the precise 
population comprising this community.  
4.5.2.2 Gender Composition 
The gender composition of the adult (over 18 years) population surveyed was 55 per cent 
male and 45 per cent female. This excluded farm workers, many of who were casually or 
seasonally employed. Despite the higher male population, and in spite of the tendency by 
many women to divide their time between Hereford and Tafelkop or Motetema, women 
were more visible than men in the day-to-day work in the fields and gardens. This visibility 
of women was in contrast to the predominance of men in the allocation of smallholdings.  
4.5.2.3 Definition of ‘Community’ and ‘Household’: Challenges 
Attempts to profile the population of the Hereford Irrigation Scheme challenged by 
complexities associated with concepts of 'community' and 'household'. Firstly, there was the 
phenomenon of 'straddling', whereby smallholder’s households had retained the use of 
homestead sites in either Tafelkop or Motetema after occupying the small-holdings within 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme (Box 2). The reason for the dual occupation of homesteads 
was to optimize access to livelihood generation opportunities available in Hereford 
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Irrigation Scheme while simultaneously retaining access to social services in Tafelkop and 
Motetema. Such services were absent within the irrigation scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The general trend was that many of the married women divided their time between working 
on the scheme and caring for children and elderly relatives in Tafelkop and Motetema. The 
more consistent presence of women on the scheme was often associated with polygamous 
Box 2 Responses on 'straddling' by smallholders’ households, 2004 
 
 Kabelo Mabalane (Plot W): A widowed female pensioner farmer aged 63.  
"My children, five adult unmarried girls and one adult son, and nine grandchildren 
remained in the Tafelkop home. I support them as they are all unemployed. They do 
get child support grants of R140 per child, but this can only buy soap and a few 
other things. The bulk of the support is from me."  
  
 Pinkie Dube (Plot R): A married female farmer aged 60.  
"My nine children, four boys and five girls, remained in Tafelkop. Two are married 
and two are working. The five younger children are still staying at home in Tafelkop 
and attending school.  
 
 Phineas Sithole (Plot L): A 67-year old male farmer with two wives, Maina (47) and 
Mercy (63). 
Phineas: "I have five children, three of who live at home in Tafelkop. The first born is 
married and the second born passed away recently, as did my second wife. Maina 
was the third wife. Maina manages the farming and works on the crops on a day-to-
day basis, with the help of two hired hands. My first wife, Mercy, lives at home in 
Tafelkop and looks after my elderly mother and the children…. Hereford is where we 
work, Tafelkop is home." 
Maina: "I do most of the work on the plot. With the income and food we produce 
here, we support the family in Tafelkop…. I have no children of my own."   
 
 Tryphine Masuku (Plot N): Aged 52, farmer and wife of Moscow Masuku, who is fully 
employed at a furniture store in Groblersdal. 
"We have one girl child aged 23 who lives in Pretoria, looking for a job. No-one is 
staying at home in Motetema. On weekends, when my husband is available to 
supervise work on the plot, I go to Motetema to check if everything is alright. The 
problem with having two homesteads is the cost of commuting. One cannot 
commute daily due to financial constraints. Commuting takes money away from 
investment in crop production. There is also the constant worry over the safety of 
goods in the Motetema homestead that is unoccupied during the week." 
 
 Freddy Molapisi (Plot IH): Male pensioner farmer aged 75. 
"We all move up and down…My wife and I have three children and three 
grandchildren. She mostly lives with them in Motetema. They are not working, so we 
support the whole household with both our pensions and the income from this 
plot…" 
 
 Refilwe Monageng (Plot J): Male farmer aged 62. 
"Having two homesteads is not easy. We virtually live in Hereford, while two of our 
children live in Tafelkop, mostly with my wife (Johanna), and attend school there." 
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households (6.1 per cent), in which one of the wives - often the younger - resided and 
worked in the scheme while the other - often the older - resided in Tafelkop or Motetema 
caring for younger children and elderly relatives. The more consistent presence of women in 
the scheme was also associated with elderly women with grown up children (42.4 per cent) 
and with women who either held land rights in their own capacity or who were the main 
breadwinners in their households (18.2 per cent). Owing to the observed straddling, 
therefore, definition of a household as 'a group of people who share the same cooking pot', 
which is often used by StatSA, was not easily applicable.  
Secondly, the complexity of social relationships as well as interwoven links between 
Hereford smallholders and the broader Tafelkop Farmers Association compounded the 
difficulties of defining ‘community’. Furthermore, the lack of clear-cut distinctions between 
the nuclear and extended families living both within and outside of smallholders’ 
homesteads made it difficult to define ‘household’. Some household members moved in 
and out of the homesteads for various reasons at different times, while continuing to view 
themselves as belonging both to given smallholders’ households and to other non-
smallholder households elsewhere. Others appeared to be more consistently present within 
the household, although dividing their time between the homestead on the scheme and 
that in Motetema or Tafelkop.  
In a number of instances, farm workers were virtually part of smallholders’ households, 
sharing food from the same pot and, in some cases, also sharing the same house. However, 
the transient nature of employment for many of the farm workers posed difficulties 
regarding whether or not to include such workers in definitions of households.  
Consequently, the study adopted whichever definitions respondent smallholders deemed to 
be applicable to their specific contexts. In other words, smallholders defined what they 
understood to be their households, and the researcher deliberately avoided imposing 
technicist definitions that could be at variance with smallholders’ diverse contexts. Mostly, 
smallholders’ definitions excluded farm workers but included nuclear and extended family 
members, whose primary base was largely the particularsmallholders’ kinship group, 
whether or not such relatives resided in the scheme, Tafelkop, Motetema or elsewhere. 
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Married children were not considered to be part of smallholders’ households, but 
unmarried adult children often were.  
4.5.2.4 Crop Production 
The main commercial crops grown in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme were tobacco and 
vegetables (Figure 12). These were grown within joint ventures between the farmers and 
private investors. Two of the farmers also grew cotton. Subsistence crops included maize 
and wheat. Most of the farmers (94 per cent) grew crops primarily for commercial use and 
set aside a small proportion of their produce, particularly vegetables, for subsistence. At the 
time of the questionnaire survey in May 2004, lack of irrigation infrastructure limited access 
to water by four smallholders (12.5 per cent) on plots 30, 31, 32 and 33. Thse smallholders 
were therefore compelled to produce a limited quantity of crops primarily for subsistence, 
although small quantities of surplus produce were sold. These farmers later obtained access 
to water after a canal was constructed to link them to a rehabilitated storage dam on the 
scheme. After that, the four smallholders commenced crop production primarily for 
commercial purposes.     
 
 
FIGURE 12 HEREFORD: CROP PRODUCTION, 2004 
4.5.2.5 Employment 
Most of the respondents (66.25 per cent) - and slightly more women (33.75 per cent) than 
men (32.5 per cent) - considered themselves self-employed, mostly within the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme (Table 11; Figure 13). More men than women had full-time, paid 
employment outside the scheme. This partly explained the observed greater visibility of 
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women engaged in day-to-day work on the scheme. Some (12.5 per cent) of the resident 
adult household population were unemployed, while a small number (1.25 per cent) was 
casually employed.  
TABLE 11 HEREFORD: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT27 MEMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS 
RESIDENT IN THE IRRIGATION SCHEME, 2004  
Employment Status Male Female Total 
n % n % n % 
Unemployed (no paid employment) 5 6.25 5 6.25 10 12.5 
Self-employed 26 32.5 27 33.75 53 66.25 
Fully employed, with wage/salary 7 8.75 2 2.5 9 11.25 
Casually employed 1 1.25 0 0 1 1.25 
Other (e.g. students) 5 6.25 2 2.5 7 8.75 
Total 44 55 36 45 80 100 
 
 
The presence of unemployed members of households within the scheme indicated that the 
decision to engage in farming activities was not universally shared within smallholders' 
households. For some of the adult household members, residing at Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme was advantageous in terms of proximity to employment opportunities in the town 
of Groblersdal (Box 3), which was located between 0.5 and 2km from the scheme (see 
Figure 10 in Section 4.2). The scheme was therefore seen by some as a vantage-point for 
accessing employment in the urban centre. 
                                                     
27 Aged 18 years and above. 
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4.5.2.6 Income 
The questionnaire survey revealed that mean monthly household incomes ranged from zero 
to R4000. Follow-up in-depth interviews, however, showed that respondents were either 
afraid or reluctant to disclose their incomes, and consequently tended to exclude certain 
social grants, payments in kind and remittances. Respondents also excluded consumed 
subsistence produce from their calculations of income, partly because they do not keep 
records of such consumption and, in part, because they perceived ‘income’ in monetary 
rather than non-monetary terms. It was interesting to note, however, that households that 
were involved in a tobacco joint venture in 2004 displayed greater anxiety over incomes 
those that were not.  
4.5.2.7 Household Material Resources 
Household material resources included all identified assets in both Hereford and Tafelkop or 
Motetema. The rationale was that livelihoods in both locations were inter-linked, with 
farming activities in Hereford being an extension of opportunities in Tafelkop, Motetema 
and elsewhere. Table 12 shows quantitative data on household ownership of selected 
material assets. Listed assets do not include dwelling structures and other buildings owned 
or occupied by households, although qualitative assessment of such data revealed socio-
economic differentiation.   
 
Box 3 Example of linkage between on-farm and off-farm livelihood strategies  
 
Elsie Maphala was a 30 year old unmarried woman who resides on Plot P. The plot was 
allocated to her father, Kereng Maphala, who was 76 years old. Elsie was the eldest 
daughter of the family and had two children aged 7 and 2, who lived in the Tafelkop home 
with her mother. Elsie worked in the informal sector in the nearby town of Groblersdal. She 
explained her own livelihood strategy as follows: 
 
"I work for a woman who sells pap and meat at the 'bus rank' [bus station] in 
Groblersdal. She does not pay me any money, but whenever I need food and soap for 
my two children, she helps me. Selling food at the bus rank is not easy. We make 
between R100 and R200 per day at the month-end. On a good day during the month, 
we make between R40 and R50. However, in the middle of the month, we sometimes 
get only R14 per day, which is the price of one plate of pap and meat. We then have 
to carry the rest of the food back home to eat." 
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While smallholders were commonly considered to be resource-poor, ownership of 
productive assets varied among households, with some households having greater 
concentrations of material resources than others. While a significant proportion (57 per 
cent) of households did not own any gas, electric, coal or primus stoves and relied on wood 
fuel for cooking, others (15.2 per cent) owned two types of stove. The latter households also 
owned a range of other productive assets, including sewing machines (60 per cent) and 
tractors (60 per cent), for example. Many (60 per cent) of such households were also found 
to be involved in a tobacco joint venture and most (80 per cent) of these had debts that 
mostly ranged from R5000 to R10 000. Household communication resources mainly 
included cellphones (54.5 per cent) and radios (54.5 per cent). One household owned a 
television set, and none had a telephone connection. A significant proportion of households 
(61 per cent) owned vehicles, mostly small trucks ("bakkies") that were used to transport 
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produce to markets. A number of households (30.3 per cent) owned tractors, many of which 
were purchased with loans from the Land Bank. Such households regularly hired out the 
tractors to smallholders without the requisite means.  
One household owned a tractor that was independently purchased by the smallholder and 
his wife. The couple considered, however, that their tractor was too small to plough at 
depths required for commercial crop production. Consequently, the couple was often 
compelled to hire the larger tractors from Hereford Farmers’ Association members, who 
had bought trucks with loans secured through the tobacco joint venture. The hired tractors 
were mostly used on portions that the smallholder independently decided to allocate to 
commercial farming. Portions of the plot that were under subsistence production were 
mostly ploughed using the small self-financed tractor.   
None of the households owned donkeys or horses for draught power. About a third (30.3 
per cent owned cattle, but these were used for milk rather than draught power. A few of 
such cattle had been bought by individual farmers. Many were provided through a 
government-facilitated joint venture involving Hereford International, who objective was to 
enhance food security within the scheme and neighbouring rural localities, such as Tafelkop 
and Motetema.    
One household owned 51.9 per cent of the total of 27 head of cattle in Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme. Two households owned the 25 goats in the irrigation scheme, one household of 
which owned 80 per cent of the goats. Most (83.3 per cent) of the 48 sheep belonged to one 
household. The 27 pigs were owned by five households, two of which almost equally shared 
77 per cent of the total pig population. The total chicken population was 97. Chickens were 
by far the most widely distributed livestock, with one third (33.3 per cent) of Hereford 
households owning several chickens. One of the chicken-owning households owned a 
significant share (20.6 per cent) of all chickens counted. Ownership of livestock tended to be 
concentrated within particular households. One household, in particular, owned relatively 
large numbers of more than one type of livestock.  
There did not seem to be a significant difference in material asset ownership between 
Hereford smallholder households and other farm-based or non-farming rural households in 
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Greater Sekhukhune District. However, compared to smallholders in similar irrigation 
schemes elsewhere in Limpopo Province, Hereford smallholders had made greater 
investments in agricultural assets. Hereford farmers also appeared to enjoy greater food 
security and access to opportunities for generating livelihoods through farm-based and off-
farm employment. Debts associated with contractual joint ventures and the attendant risks 
of producing capital intensive crops were a major threat to Hereford smallholders’ material 
asset ownership, livelihood security and sense of well-being.  
4.5.3 SELECTED LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES  
4.5.3.1 On-Farm Livelihood Diversification Strategies   
Although Hereford Irrigation Scheme was often associated with crop production, findings by 
the study were that there was a growing trend towards diversification of farming to include 
livestock. While levels of livestock ownership were relatively low, livestock contributed to 
food security and income for livestock-owning households. In one of the households, a 
single dairy cow provided milk for self-sustenance and for sale to other households within 
the scheme. The income generated from milk sales contributed towards purchase of a 
miscellaneous range of day-to-day requirements for the household.  
For another household, which occupied one of the smallest plots (1.94ha) on the scheme, 
livestock farming took precedence over crop farming (Box 4). This particular smallholder 
concentrated on sheep, pig and poultry farming, and supplemented the limited grazing on 
his plot with stock-feed. The elderly (76 years old) smallholder and his wife both owned 40 
sheep, 10 pigs and 8 chickens. They also practiced intensive vegetable production on a 
portion of land just under 1 ha in extent, which was approximately half of the relatively 
small plot. The total household income derived from the couple's combined monthly 
pension of R1480 and sale and consumption of surplus livestock and vegetables. On average 
Molapisi sold between three and four sheep per month at R500 to R550 each, thus earning 
a monthly income of between R1500 and R2200 from sheep sales. In some months, he sold 
4 pigs at R2000 each, thus earning R8000.  
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Although the couple shared all farming responsibilities, there were clear gender divisions of 
labour and decision-making pertaining to specific assets. For example, chickens were for 
household consumption and were slaughtered whenever Molapisi's wife, who controls their 
use, decided to do so. Molapisi controlled decisions over the larger livestock, which brought 
in monetary income, although the couple shared responsibility for tending all livestock. The 
Molapisis employed two male workers at a salary of R550 per month, plus a month’s supply 
of mealie-meal, a share of food crops and additional bonus payments after the sale of 
produce. Given that the smallholder and his wife eked out livelihoods from a relatively small 
plot, the diversification strategy, combined with intensification of production, had made 
significant contributions to household income and food security. The strategy also 
contributed to enhancing incomes and food security for farm workers employed by 
Molapisi.  
To a large extent, it appeared that the smallholder’s control of the entire production 
enterprise gave him a high degree of freedom to adopt strategies that he deemed 
appropriate for his particular context. For example, when he realized that his plot size was 
Box 4 An example of diversified farming and livestock contributions to household income, 2004 
 
Freddy Molapisi is a 75-year old male, married plot-holder residing on Plot IH. He was born in 
Bushbuckridge. He worked as a religious minister in Lydenburg, Burgersfort, Groblersdal and 
Hammanskraal before retiring and settling in Motetema in 1994. Both his wife and he support three 
unemployed adult children and three grand children. Molapisi rears 40 sheep, 10 pigs and 8 chickens on 
his 1.94ha plot. He also grows vegetables mainly for household consumption in a garden of less than 1ha. 
The household income derives from the couple's combined monthly pension of R1480 and the sale and 
consumption of livestock and surplus vegetables. Molapisi sells between 3 and 4 sheep per month at 
R500 to R550 each, earning a monthly income of between R1500 and R2200. In one month, he sold 4 pigs 
at R2000 each, thus earning R8000. Chickens are for household consumption and are slaughtered 
whenever Molapisi's wife, who controls their use, decides to do so. Molapisi controls the larger livestock, 
which bring in monetary income, and the couple shares the tending of all livestock. The Molapisis employ 
2 male workers at a salary of R550 per month, mealie-meal, a share of food crops and additional money 
after the sale of produce. Livestock therefore makes a significant contribution to household income and 
food security. Livestock also contribute to the incomes and food security of the farm workers employed 
by Molapisi. 
 
From an initial flock of 5 sheep in 1998, Molapisi now has an average of 40 sheep at any given time. For 
him, the Hereford Irrigation Scheme is ideal for intensive livestock rearing in that water and fodder, in 
the form of scrap vegetables from local commercial farmers, are abundant. In 2001, he obtained a loan of 
R10 000 from the land bank to grow vegetables. He has since settled this loan and decided to scale down 
vegetable production in favour livestock rearing. A realization that his plot size is too small, the water too 
limited and the risks too great to sustain commercial vegetable production has informed his decision.  
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too small, the water too limited and risks too great to sustain commercial vegetable 
production using borrowed funds, he settled his bank loan and took a decision to scale 
down vegetable production in favour livestock rearing.  
Examples such as described above seem to have encouraged Hereford Farmers Association 
and individual smallholders to review their singular focus on crop farming. The leadership of 
Hereford Farmers Association began to proactively solicit assistance from external agencies 
regarding initiation of a livestock rearing project that would be compatible with commercial 
crop irrigation.   
4.5.3.2 Debts 
At the time of the survey, the majority (71 per cent) of households had debts ranging from 
R120 to between R10 000 and R50 000, with a third (33.3 per cent) of the households 
having between two and four sources of debt. Many (41.9 per cent) of the larger debts were 
incurred mainly to finance the acquisition of commercially productive assets, such as 
tractors, which were owned by nearly a third (30.3 per cent) of the households. Other debts 
were incurred to pay school fees (16.1 per cent), buy food (9.7 per cent) and set up Small- 
Medium- and Micro-Enterprises (SMMEs) (9.7 per cent).  
More than half (57.6 per cent) of the households involved in a tobacco joint venture showed 
the greatest concern over debts. For such households, "debts" ranged from R6 449.80 to 
R22 328.82. The debts related to a deficit in the repayment of loans advanced to cover 
direct production costs. The debts were not linked to costs of renovating dilapidated 
cottages, as some respondents among the smallholders assumed. The latter cost was 
funded through a ‘social responsibility’ donation by British American Tobacco (BAT) South 
Africa).  
Water account arrears for Hereford Irrigation Scheme amounted to R281 165.00 in 2003.  
The arrears constituted a major source of collective debt for Hereford smallholders. 
Although Mpumalanga provincial Department of Agriculture and Land Administration 
(DALA28) settled the 2003 water account, farmers continued to appeal to government for 
                                                     
28 DALA has since become Mpumalanga Department of Agriculture Rural Development and Land 
Administration 
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assistance with the settling water-related costs. In 2006, the smallholders benefited from a 
government subsidy worth approximately R2.2 million, which was provided through the 
DWAF Policy on the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers29. The subsidy 
was meant to ensure that water prices remained constant despite upgrading of agricultural 
infrastructure, thereby ensuring that smallholders continued to have access to water 
without incurring large water-related debts. 
Although the subsidy grant cushioned smallholders against the negative effects of debts, 
such assistance did not seem sustainable in the longer term given that the debts, which had 
largely been due to production of capital intensive crops within joint venture contracts, 
were likely to persist so long as such arrangements and the requirement for users to pay for 
water at its economic value existed. In the event that smallholders became independent of 
joint ventures and strategic partnerships, it seemed debatable whether they would be able 
to sustain profitable productive water use without government subsidies. Such possibility 
seemed as if it migh pressurize smallholders to produce high value crops using water-
efficient methods in an attempt to off-set water prices and bank loans, or else to trade away 
their water allocations.  
4.5.3.3 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability, according to questionnaire responses by Hereford smallholders, was mainly 
associated with lack of clean water to drink (100 per cent), natural disasters such as floods, 
drought, frost and strong winds (87.9 per cent), loss of possessions and theft (36.4 per cent), 
serious accidents (12.1 per cent), serious illness in the household (21.2 per cent) and 
violence in the community (3 per cent).  
Shortage of clean drinking water was perceived by all respondents to be a major constraint 
to well-being in Hereford Irrigation Scheme. Although the Groblersdal Water Purification 
Works were situated a ‘stone’s throw’ away, directly across the R33 Stoffberg road on the 
northern boundary of the scheme, smallholders used raw irrigation water diverted from the 
Hereford canal for drinking and other domestic purposes. A water purification plant that 
was installed in 1997 had since broken down. Since then, Hereford Irrigation Board had 
                                                     
29 Interviews with DWAF official, Mr Tshilidzi Mathobo, 20 February 2007. 
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constructed sluice gates and storage tanks along the line portion of Hereford canal to 
provide smallholders with access to raw water for domestic purposes (Figure 14). This was a 
temporary measure to tide smallholders until a more acceptable and permanent solution 
was found. Despite this, the threat of water-borne disease remained a common concern for 
all the households. Smallholders had yet to submit to Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality 
an application for potable water supply services. 
 
 
A significant proportion (87.9 per cent) of smallholders considered natural disasters, such as 
floods, drought, frost and strong winds, to be contributing factors to livelihood vulnerability. 
A flood event that all respondents alluded to was when in 2000 the Olifants/Lepelle River 
overflowed and inundated low-lying areas along the banks. In Hereford Irrigation Scheme, 
flooding resulted in extensive damage to crops and infrastructure and in deepening feelings 
of insecurity. By contrast, reference to droughts related mainly to the low rainfall received 
in some of the years following smallholders’ occupation of the irrigation scaheme in 1997. 
Frosts and strong winds were said to be less common but nonetheless had negative impacts, 
particularly on vegetable crops produced. 
 Crime was mainly associated with theft of possessions. More than a third of households 
had been exposed to such crime. Some women expressed their anxiety about having to 
commute between the irrigation scheme and homesteads in Tafelkop and Motetema, since 
absence from either homestead left property exposed to possible theft. Straddling therefore 
created difficulties in securing household material assets.  
FIGURE 14 HEREFORD: ABSTRACTION POINT AND CANVAS-PROTECTED TANKS FOR 
TEMPORARY SUPPLY OF RAW WATER FOR DOMESTIC USE, 2004  
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Serious illness was present in approximately a fifth of the households. Disclosed illnesses 
included bad coughs, colds and flu, heart disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, asthma and 
diarrhoeal diseases (Table 13). HIV and Aids (HIV/AIDS) were not reported in any of the 
households. There was universal qualitative awareness, however, of the prevalence and 
means of contracting of HIV/Aids. Ailing household members were whispered to mostly 
reside in homesteads in Tafelkop and Motetema, although such members were often said to 
belong to ‘other’ people’s households that those of respondents. 
 
 
Fear of violence in the community affected one out of the thirty-three households on the 
scheme. The issue seemed to be a sensitive one as the respondent showed reluctance to 
discuss the details. There was evidently less fear of violence in 2004 than in the years 
following occupation, when tensions between the black and white farmers were high and 
vagrants had yet to accept that the irrigation scheme was no longer a de facto open access 
resource. 
4.5.3.4 Shortage of Irrigation Water 
Shortage of irrigation water was a major constraint to crop production. Smallholders 
irrigated their crops for a limited time on three days per week, taking turns to access their 
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shares of available water. Water use was monitored by one of the smallholders, who also 
acted as a pump attendant. Crops were sometimes subject to water stress, which impacted 
negatively on produce quantity and quality.  
Hereford Irrigation Board allocated sufficient water to irrigate 160ha (or 83.2 per cent) of 
the 192.2ha of land in the scheme. Such allocation was in terms of a water allocation system 
that applied to all farms under the Board’s management, wherein all farmers along the 
Hereford canal were allocated 7 200 cubic litres/ha/year, which covered approximately 80 
per cent of water requirements for each hectare on a farm or smallholding. However, at the 
time of the study, less than half of the 160ha in Hereford was actually under irrigation. 
Under-utilization of the smallholders’ allocation was ascribed to shortage of irrigation water 
due to inadequacy of irrigation infrastructure. This specifically related to the water storage 
dam in the scheme and the unlined section of Hereford canal, upstream of the irrigation 
scheme. 
DALA rehabilitated the water storage dam in 2003, at a cost of R7million, and barely a year 
later in 2004 the bentonite lining of the earth bed had developed cracks that led to 
increased rates of seepage and thereby reduced storage capacity (Figure 15). A greater 
portion of water loss, however, was from the unlined section of the Hereford canal (Figure 
16). The Hereford canal began at the Loskop Dam on the upper reaches of the Olifants River 
and stretched for approximately 44km before discharging water back into the Olifants River. 
In 2004, the upper 17km were unlined while the lower 27km were concrete-lined. The 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme was situated below the unlined section of the canal. Prior to the 
concrete lining of the lower 27km of the canal, seepage rates were high and the estimated 
water loss was 60 per cent. Persistent water loss of 30 per cent, which was reported by key 
respondents to in-depth interviews, was largely due to excessive seepage in the unlined 
17km of the canal.  
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FIGURE 15 HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: WATER STORAGE DAM AND 
ABSTRACTION POINT ALONG LINED PORTION OF HEREFORD CANAL, 2004 
 
 
FIGURE 16 HEREFORD: UNLINED SECTION OF HEREFORD CANAL, 2004 
Ground-truthing revealed fields and access roads that had been inundated by water from 
the canal. Massive stands of 'Queen of the Night' (Cereus jamacaru DC), which is declared 
under the Conservation of Agriculutral Resources Act (CARA) to be an invasive alien plant 
species, grew along parts of the unlined canal. To alleviate these problems, Hereford 
Irrigation Board hired private operators to compact the unlined canal banks and clear the 
Queen of the Night stands, at a relatively high cost30. Towards resolving the water loss 
problem, both black and white farmers reached consensus on the need for emerging small-
scale farmers to apply for assistance from government to cover part (R2.2 million) of the 
R12 million required to cover the costs of lining the upper section of the canal.  
Water loss affected most of the farmers along the Hereford canal, particularly those below 
the unlined section. However, smallholders on Hereford Irrigation Scheme appeared to be 
more vulnerable than established white commercial farmers. This was because the latter 
had larger landholdings and therefore greater water allocations. Established farmers also 
seemed to have greater leeway to manipulate their water allocations by irrigating smaller 
                                                     
30 Hiring of machines for soil compaction along the 17km of unlined canal reportedly cost the irrigation board 
more than R300 per hour per machine in 2004. Interview and field survey with the water control officer/bailiff, 
Mr John Barnardie, 13 October 2004.   
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parcels of land than the 80 per cent coverage per hectare prescribed by Hereford Irrigation 
Board. This enabled them to irrigate their crops more effectively that smallholders. Some of 
the observed established commercial farmers had combined access to between two and 
five sources of irrigation water, including the Hereford canal, the Olifants River, the Loskop 
canal and the Moses River. Such water was stored in storage dams within their private 
farms, and was for their private use. Such a strategy enabled these farmers to effectively 
double, triple, quadruple or even quintruple their stocks of irrigation water and guard 
against possible shortage. Such practices contributed to inequitable access to productive 
water use and, in particular, the vulnerability of Hereford smallholders’ livelihoods. 
Sources of vulnerability for smallholders were two-fold. Firstly, vulnerability emanated from 
risks associated with water shortage, which threatened farm-based livelihoods in particular. 
While threats of poor crop and livestock yields affected both members and non-members of 
joint ventures, the former were at greater risk. This was due to the basis of joint ventures 
upon legal contracts, wherein failure by smallholders to satisfy contractual obligations with 
respect to produce delivery could result in income failure, defaults on loan repayments 
and/or losses of livelihood assets. Secondly, vulnerability could arise from requirements to 
off-set costs of lining the Hereford canal and re-sealing the bottom of the water storage 
dam in Hereford Irrigation Scheme.  Such requirements made access to water potentially 
unaffordable to smallholders, who already had difficulty with paying the 2004 tariff of 
R802/ha/year31. According to projections by Hereford Irrigation Board’s water bailiff, the 
2004 tariff of R720/ha/year [note the discrepancy] could rise by an additional R750/ha/year 
following the lining of Hereford canal. In light of anticipated risks, Hereford Irrigation Board, 
which represented established commercial farmers, and smallholders reached a consensus 
on the need for concerted effort to solicit government assistance. Between August and 
September 2004, both parties lodged applications for government financial assistance to 
cover the costs of lining the Hereford canal.  
During consideration of the plight of smallholders, what became clear was that objectives of 
the Agricultural Sector Strategy to support these farmers in their quest to enter mainstream 
commercial agriculture would not be tenable without significant government subsidies.  
                                                     
31 Letter from the Chairperson of the Hereford Farmers Association to the Mpumalanga Provincial Department 
of Agriculture and Land Administration, 15 September 2004. 
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Towards resolving the evident constraints, DWAF adopted a new policy on Financial 
Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers in September 2004. The policy was intended 
to provide grants to ‘resource poor’ irrigation farmers, such as Hereford smallholders. It was 
through this policy that the smallholders obtained the grant of R2.2 million to cover their 
share of infrastructure upgrade costs.  
A newly formed institutional structure called Mpumalanga provincial Coordination 
Committee for Agricultural Water (CCAW) assisted Hereford smallholders in their mission to 
secure access to productive water use. CCAW CCAW was responsible for agricultural water 
use issues and comprised a cluster of government departments, such as Environmental 
Affairs, Water Affairs, Agriculture and Land Administration, among others. Prior to the 
granting of the smallholders’ subsisy, CCAW requested a written confirmation from the 
Department of Public Works that the lease agreements would not be terminated. It 
remained to be seen whether or not policy interventions, as well as the apparent emerging 
unity of purpose among black and white Hereford farmers, would strengthen the 
smalholders’ quest to enter mainstream commercial agriculture.  
 
Besides efforts to secure government financial support, smallholders also began to be more 
proactive in staking their claim to equitable access to key decision-making platforms 
namely, Hereford Irrigation Board and Groblersdal Local Municipality. This contrasted with 
the smallholders’ lack of confidence and information in the earlier years of occupation, 
when they resorted to bringing in a traditional healer to help them to get more water 
through prayers for rainfall. Through increased confidence, access to information and self-
assertion, smallholder began to direct grievances about insecure access to relevant water 
governing bodies. They also demanded direct representation in the canal-wide Hereford 
Irrigation Board as a means of guarding against allowing others to take water allocation 
decisions that might negatively affect their livelihoods. 
4.5.4 SUMMARY 
Although Hereford smallholders were classified as 'resource poor', there was evidence that 
they were gradually increasing their livelihood resources. After gaining access to land 
through occupation and enduring a lengthy process to formalize their tenure, smallholders 
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had proceeded to adopt a range of strategies to secure their livelihoods against risks and 
hazards. Such strategies were based partly based on social networks with key role-players in 
government, civil society and the private sector. Formal and informal joint venture partners 
and facilitatory NGOs featured prominently among such networks, ensuring that 
smallholders gained production skills, technology, management services and access to credit 
facilities and markets. The shadow side of such ventures, however, was an increase in the 
incidence of debts in farmer households. What seemed to count in the smallholders’ favour 
were the relatively high degrees of freedom that this group individually and collectively 
enjoyed, as well as the increasing bargaining strength of Hereford Farmers Association, 
particularly in dealing with external institutional actors. These strengths were demonstrated 
by the farmers' pro-active strategy to secure access to productive water use through 
government subsidies, inclusion and self-representation in the Hereford Irrigation Board 
and use of formal and informal social networks to obtain required resources.   
4.6 FARMER ORGANIZATION 
Hereford smallholders were organized into a collective structure named ‘Hereford Farmers 
Association’. A key underlying principle of Hereford Farmers Association was to actively 
involve women and youth in commercial farming activities. The executive committee was 
elected by simple majority of all members ‘in good standing’ at an Annual General Meeting. 
Funding was obtained through contributions of annual membership fees. The extent to 
which stated governance principles had actually been articulated within formally and 
informally within Hereford Farmers Association was of interest to the research project. 
However, obtaining such insights involved a lengthy process of building and gaining the 
farmers' trust, necessarily because smallholders were keenly aware that they had been 
publicly labeled land 'invaders' and their agency negatively compared to the politicized and 
orchestrated land occupations in Zimbabwe. Consequently, Hereford smallholders were 
wary of engaging with new researchers. With time, sufficient trust was built to enable open 
communication. 
Hereford smallholders had linkages both within the group and with other organizations. 
According to the chairman of the Hereford Farmers Association, smallholders derived their 
organizational identity from Tafelkop Farmers Association (TFA), which was established on 
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10 February 1994 by a group of black farmers from disadvantaged communities in the 
Sekhukhune area. Objectives of the TFA were to enable landless black farmers from 
neighbourhood rural communities to gain access to productive land, use the land for agri-
business purposes, create jobs and contribute towards social and economic growth in the 
region. TFA was affiliated to the National African Farmers Union (NAFU), and had grown into 
an 800-member organization that transcended boundaries of four provinces namely, 
Mpumalanga, Limpopo, the North West and Gauteng32. TFA membership included men, 
women and youth. The organization's national office was currently based at the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme. The chairman of Hereford Farmers Association was also the chairman of 
TFA. The term "Hereford Farmers Association" was used formally to distinguish the 33 
smallholders in Hereford Irrigation Scheme from the rest of TFA members. Hereford 
Farmers Association was also closely linked to the Bakgaga ba Kopa Cooperative, an 
organization that provided assistance with procurement of agricultural inputs for black 
farmers in Greater Sekhukhune District.  
 
Internally, Hereford Farmers Association was organized into the following structures: 
 Management Committee; 
 Hereford Vegetable Growers Association (HVGA), which was registered as a cooperative; 
 Hereford Tobacco Growers Association 
 Hereford Women's Project; and  
 Hereford Youth Project. 
The Management Committee for Hereford Farmers Association also served as the 
Management Committee for TFA and Bakgaga ba Kopa Cooperative. The committee 
consisted of five executive and five ordinary members. HVGA and Hereford Tobacco 
Farmers Association were most closely linked to joint ventures in the scheme.  The Women's 
and Youth Projects were described as "struggling" due to lack or inconsistency of funding.  
A key respondent from the local office of the DALA identified yet another structure, which 
was the Hereford Irrigation Committee. However, the chairman of Hereford Farmers 
Association denied the existence of this structure. According to him, this structure was 
suggested to them and they decided not to form it. Smallholders had been asked to form an 
                                                     
32 Interview with the Chairman of the Hereford Farmers Association,11 December 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 186 
irrigation committee, which would nominate one member to represent them in Hereford 
Irrigation Board. However, drawing from their past experiences with the irrigation board, 
which consisted almost entirely of white commercial farmers, smallholders perceived that 
such inclusion would simply further white farmers' intentions to avoid transforming the 
Board. This was in contradiction to requirements of the National Water Act of 1998. 
Hereford Farmers Association contended that the suggested irrigation committee would 
eventually become a Water User Association (WUA), which meant that the black farmers 
would be formally excluded from the Hereford Irrigation Board. Members of the Hereford 
Farmers Association pointed out the stark contrast between their possible exclusion from 
the Board with historical inclusion of white smallholders who previously occupied the same 
portions of farm 53JS Loskop South that comprised Hereford Irrigation Scheme.  
While perceived and actual conditions that determined racially-based exclusion and 
inclusion from the irrigation board were not clear, it was evident that black farmers had a 
low degree of trust in both white members of the Irrigation Board and some of the local 
officials in the water and agriculture sectors. Despite efforts to support smallholders, the 
local officer of DALA, in particular, was perceived to be sympathetic to white farmers’ 
interests, to some extent, by virtue of being married to a white spouse. In light of this, the 
Executive Committee of Hereford Farmers Association had since May 2004 formally 
expressed their dissatisfaction with being represented by the DALA official on the Hereford 
Irrigation Board, and to demand direct representation by one of the own members. 
However, smallholders wanted such representation to be in their own terms. 
Indications were also that there are a few smallholders who were dissatisfied with power 
dynamics in the organization. Some of the smallholders expressed concerns about what 
they perceived to be a unilateral style of leadership that left very little space for individual 
voices to be heard within the group. However, there were also very strong fears about 
voicing dissent, as well as fears that the leadership would find out that some within the 
executive had taken initiative to communicate directly with the researcher. With the 
passage of time, however, such fears subsided and the research process was able to 
facilitate open discussions on key issues of concern to smallholders. In such platforms, many 
smallholders communicated without fear, and leadership made an effort to account to 
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ordinary members on certain burning issues, such as expenditure versus lack of progress on 
some government-funded initiatives. 
4.7 REHABILITATION AND 'REVITALIZATION' OF THE HEREFORD 
IRRIGATION SCHEME: STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS AND RESOURCES  
 
Following formal acceptance of smallholders’ occupation of Hereford Irrigation Scheme in 
1997, a number of stakeholder institutions contributed funding towards rehabilitating the 
infrastructure and services on the scheme. Table 14 provides a summary of direct financial 
assistance provided by identified stakeholders. Although there was significant expenditure 
on social needs, the biggest financial investments were related to water supply and crop 
production. For example, in 2003 and 2004 respectively DALA provided R7million for dam 
rehabilitation and a post-settlement grant of R550 000 for the construction of a vegetable 
pack house. In 2004 DALA in conjunction with CCAW settled, on behalf of smallholders, an 
outstanding water bill of R281 165. In 2006, DWAF provided a subsidy of approximately R2.2 
million towards lining of the upper reaches of Hereford canal.  
 
Table 14 HEREFORD: KEY FUNDING FOR REHABILITATION AND UPGRADING OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND REVITALIZATION OF FARMING, 2000 - 2006 
Date Purpose Source of Funding Amount in Rands 
2000 Surveying and sub-division of plots 
in sections 236 to 239 of 53JS 
Loskop Farm South  
Mpumalanga Provincial 
Department of Agriculture 
60 469.56 
2000 Construction of a canal to link 
plots 29, 30, 31 & 32 to water 
storage dam  
Mpumalanga Provincial 
Department of Agriculture 
+/-1500.00 
 Drilling of boreholes for domestic 
water supply 
Mpumalanga Provincial 
Department of Agriculture 
50 000 – 75 000 
2001 Grant for domestic electricity 
installations and training (no 
connections) 
ESKOM Development 
Foundation 
99 724.30 
2003 Rehabilitation of storage dam  Mpumalanga Provincial 
Department of Agriculture 
7 000 000 
2003 Settlement of outstanding water 
account  
Mpumalanga Provincial 
Department of Agriculture 
281 165 
2004 Post-settlement grant towards the 
construction of a pack house for 
the HVGA 
Mpumalanga Provincial 
Department of Agriculture 
550 000 
2006 Smallholders’ contribution 
towards concrete lining of 
Hereford canal  
DWAF financial assistance 
(subsidy) for resource poor 
irrigation farmers. 
2 200 000 
Source: Fieldwork 
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Alongside efforts to rehabilitate irrigation infrastructure and revitalize farming in the 
scheme, smallholders individually and collectively developed complex linkages with 
government departments, such as DALA, DWAF, DEAT, DLA and Public Works, as well as 
other institutional structures and actors (Figure 17). Linkages were with the following, 
among others: 
 Individual white commercial farmers within the Hereford area 
 Africare (REAP Programme)  
 Sekhukhune Farmers Development Trust (SFDT) 
 Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality 
 Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality (LED Committee on Agriculture)  
 Mpumalanga Coordinating Committee on Agricultural Water 
 Hereford Irrigation Board 
 ESKOM Development Foundation 
 British American Tobacco (BAT), TobaccoSA, Golden Leaf Ltd. and Limpopo Tobacco 
Processors Pty Ltd (ex-MKTV): Tobacco Joint Venture with Hereford Tobacco Growers 
 OBARO 
 Nature Choice Farms/ NFM Marketing Pty Ltd: Vegetable Joint Venture with Hereford 
Vegetable Growers Association (HVGA) 
 Limpopo Tomato Growers Association (information sharing) 
 Swallow International 
 Yukon International 
 University researchers 
 Other local and international donor organizations 
Following occupation of the scheme in 1997 and infrastructure rehabilitation, Hereford 
smallholders became involved in several contractual joint ventures with private investors. 
The most notable among these entailed contract farming of vegetables and tobacco. A 
number of less formal partnerships also emerged between individual smallholders and 
established commercial farmers from the broader Hereford area. The following sections 
examine the formulation and implementation of selected formal and informal contract 
farming arrangements for tobacco and vegetable production in Herefored Irrigation 
Scheme.   
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FIGURE 17 HEREFORD IRRIGATION SCHEME: STAKEHOLDER SUPPORT NETWORKS FOR 
SMALLHOLDER MARKET ENTRY 
4.8 HEREFORD TOBACCO PROJECT: PRIVATE INVESTOR-LED JOINT 
VENTURE, 2003/2004 
4.8.1 ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
The Hereford Tobacco Project was a joint tobacco production venture that was initiated in 
2001. The joint venture had two distinct phases. The earlier phase ran for two years from 
2001/2002 to 2002/2003, and was administered by a private tobacco growers' company 
called the Magaliesbergse Kooperatiewe Tabakplanters Vereniging (MKTV). The latter phase 
lasted one year, which was 2003/2004, and was administered by Tobacco RSA. 
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The project was aimed at the "social and economic empowerment of small farmers to 
become independent tobacco farmers within five years"33. The project involved 19 of the 33 
smallholders in Hereford Irrigation Scheme and a consortium of three private sector 
institutions namely, Tobacco RSA, British American Tobacco (BAT-South Africa) and SA Gold 
Leaf (SAGL).  
The agreement between the farmers and the private investors was that each farmer would 
set aside at least 1ha for the growing of tobacco. The private investor was responsible for all 
project administration, including provision of production inputs such as seeds, pesticides 
and fertilizer, skills training, crop harvesting, processing and marketing, and payment of 
farmers' labour costs and profits. Employees of Tobacco RSA carried out the key production 
activities, including ploughing, planting, cultivation, application of pesticides and fertilizer, 
harvesting, sorting and processing. Smallholders closely watched these activities so as to 
learn the production skills. There was also some training through workshops and literacy 
classes. The smallholders' main responsibilities were to irrigate the crop at specified times, 
and to assist with weeding. Provision was made within the project for remuneration of such 
labour, which involved between two and five workers, depending on crop hectarage. 
Smallholders tended to hire farm labourers from outside their households. Although the 
project provided for remuneration at minimum wage rates, some farm labourers appeared 
to earn less than that. A few of the smallholders and farm workers interviewed indicated 
that the latter's cash income was supplemented by food obtained through working on the 
plots. Such food was either produced or purchased by smallholders and shared with the 
workers.  
Regarding the joint venture agreement, there was no written contract between the 
smallholders and private investors34, but only a "nominal" contract”35. Nevertheless, all the 
farmers committed themselves to planting 1ha of tobacco for the joint venture. BAT-South 
Africa donated funding for the project. SAGL provided management and technical expertise. 
At the time of the study in 2004, Tobacco RSA played the leading role, administering the 
project funds. In this role, Tobacco RSA had replaced MKTV, which had been actively 
                                                     
33
 Tobacco RSA Press Release, May 2004 
34
 Interview with Tobacco RSA Manager for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Projects, 13 October 2004 
35
 Interview with CEO for TISA and Tobacco RSA, 09 March 2005 
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involved at the beginning of the project but had since filed for bankruptcy and been 
liquidated.  
MKTV had worked with officials from the Provincial Department of Agriculture in providing 
support to the small-scale farmers. This was through supplying funds for the operation of 
machinery from the Department of Agriculture, camping allowance for the operators 
(government officials) and restoration of the community hall on the scheme. The future 
plans of MKTV were to provide R3 million to cover costs of production, renovation of the 
dilapidated houses on the scheme, provision of electricity supply to the commu nity hall and 
houses and construction of tobacco sorting rooms, among other costs. As Table 13 in 
Section 5.7 shows, ESKOM Development Foundation rehabilitated electricity supply 
infrastructure and provided electricity to the irrigation scheme but did not make 
connections to smallholders’ houses. BAT-South Africa provided a donation of 
approximately R3.2million towards renovation and construction of houses (R1 034 823) and 
curing barns (R686 610) and to cover other capital, direct and indirect production costs of 
the joint venture. SAGL provided extension and technical services, and Tobacco RSA gave 
management and administrative support to the joint venture. There seemed to be a strong 
link between projected production and funding plans expressed by MKTV in 2001/2002 and 
subsequent provision of funding by BAT-South Africa. Under the 2003/2004 joint venture 
agreement, BAT-South Africa, through Tobacco RSA, funded much of the activities and 
expenditure planned by MKTV in 2001/2002.  
The perception by some respondents was that after filing for bankruptcy, MKTV had re-
emerged under a different name - "OBARO" - and with links to Tobacco RSA and another 
company named Limpopo Tobacco Processors. This view seemed to have been informed by 
the re-employment of MKTV's employees in Tobacco RSA and Limpopo Tobacco Processors. 
The joint venture manager, for example, was dually employed by both companies. 
Perceptions also seemed to have been informed by the fact that the office of Tobacco RSA 
was located within the same premises that MKTV had previously occupied, the difference 
being that instead of "MKTV", the signage on the premises had changed to "OBARO". Key 
respondents who were interviewed by the study, such as the Tobacco RSA Manager for BEE 
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Projects cum Agronomist for Limpopo Tobacco Processors36, could not give clear 
explanation about the nature of these companies' relationships. Neither could the 
respondents explain the process that had led to the dissolution of MKTV and the re-
employment of its employees in Tobacco RSA and Limpopo Tobacco Processors. Follow-up 
interviews with the senior management of the Tobacco Institute of South Africa (TISA) and 
Tobacco RSA helped to clarify the institutional arrangements37.  
It emerged that TISA was an umbrella institution for all the private sector role players within 
the 2003/2004 tobacco joint venture. Members of TISA were BAT-South Africa, JT 
International South Africa and Tobacco RSA. Tobacco RSA, in turn, had ten members 
namely: SAGL, BAT-South Africa, Limpopo Tobacco Processors, Gamtoos Tobacco 
Cooperative, Swedish Match South Africa (Leonard Dingler & Best Blend), World Class 
Connection Trading, SA Nicecentury Trading cc, Universal Leaf SA, Dimon and Tribac cc. 
Within this institutional arrangement, Limpopo Tobacco Processors was directly linked to 
the erstwhile MKTV through having bought the liquidated company and taking over some of 
the MKTV staff. Because of the overlapping linkages between TISA and Tobacco RSA, the 
staff of both institutions performed dual functions both at head office and local levels. 
Further to explaining the complexity of the institutional arrangements, respondents from 
TISA/Tobacco RSA provided information on problems experienced by the tobacco joint 
venture in 2004.   
4.8.2 JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: 2003/2004 
According to key respondents from TISA/Tobacco RSA, the joint venture experienced a crisis 
during the post-harvest period from September to October 2004. The promised earnings 
had not only fallen far below expectations, but farmers were said to have incurred large 
"debts". Tensions were very high. The realization that earnings from the 2004 tobacco crop 
were far below expectations was a primary cause for concern among the tobacco growers in 
the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. The reason given by Tobacco RSA for failure of the 2004 
season was primarily that the tobacco crop produced by smallholders had been sub-
standard (i.e. of poor quality). This was due to a number of factors, including low rainfall, 
                                                     
36
 Interview conducted in Groblersdal on 13 October 2004. 
37
 Telephonic interviews held with Stellenbosch-based executives on 09 March 2005. 
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late season planting by Tobacco RSA and the inexperience and, according to one Tobacco 
RSA employee, “poor management” by most of the smallholders. Added to these 
constraints, Tobacco RSA officials considered “high expectations” by all key stakeholders to 
have contributed to deepening of anxiety and insecurity among smallholders.   
A second source of apprehension among smallholders was that representatives of Tobacco 
RSA had communicated distorted information to smallholders, stating that their poor 
performance had resulted in significant "debts" (Column E of Table 15 below). The "debts" 
were actually deficits resulting from the difference between expenditure on direct 
production costs (Column C) in 2004 and repayments towards defraying production costs 
(D) from the money received from sales of tobacco (A), less the payments to the farmers (B). 
Since the overall cost of the joint venture had been funded through a 'donation' of 
approximately R3.2million from BAT-South Africa, it was not clear how the deficits could be 
regarded as debts. According to TISA/Tobacco RSA, conditions of the ‘nominal’ joint venture 
agreement had been that expenditure by Tobacco RSA on the indirect socio-economic costs, 
such as renovations to houses, constituted a donation, but smallholders were responsible 
for their share of direct production costs. Without a written contract establishing the exact 
structure and conditions of the financialarrangements, it was not easy to reconcile the 
differing views between smallholders and Tobacco RSA, and Tobacco RSA had consequently 
decided to write-off the smallholders’ debts. 
Table 15 Shows that one farmer, Mqeda Nkathazo, had significantly higher net receipts and 
repayments than the others and, consequently, relatively lower deficits. Performance by 
this farmer was particularly significant when compared to that of two smallholders namely, 
Refilwe Monageng and Jabulani Stimela, whose previous experience in tobacco production 
resulted in profits of over R23 000 (see Table 16 in Section 4.8.4.1). The two smallholders 
were among a group of four who were assisted by a white local tobacco producer between 
1998 and 1999. The farmer taught them production skills, and harvested and marketed the 
tobacco on their behalf. Smallholders participated in all the production work, including 
planting, weeding, application of fertilizers and pesticides and irrigation. Their tobacco crop, 
which was bought at the same price as that of the white farmer, generated profits. In light 
of such background, Hereford smallholders expressed a view that tobacco bought directly 
from black farmers was automatically classified as ‘scrap’ or poor quality tobacco, while that 
 
 
 
 
 194 
bought from white farmers was viewed to be of higher quality. Other smallholders 
suspected irregularities in the manner in which Mqeda Nkathazo’s account was represented 
in the 2003/2004 statement of accounts. Without a written contract for the joint venture 
and in light of complexities around institutional arrangements for the tobacco joint venture, 
it was difficult to establish exactly what went wrong in the 2004 season.  
TABLE 15 HEREFORD: SMALLHOLDER FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS FOR TOBACCO 
PRODUCTION, 2003 - 2004 
Name* Plot 
No. 
A B C D E 
Net 
Receipts 
Paid to 
Farmer 
Direct Costs Repayments Balance Due 
Phineas Sithole L 9 122.12 3 192.73 23 841.25 (5 929.36) 17 911.89 
Goitsemang Pelotona M 16 922.43 5 992.85 29 360.06 (10 999.59) 18 360.47 
Kgositsile Boikhutso A 8 383.25 2 934.14 27 179.93 (5 449.10) 21 730.83 
Bohutsanyana Modimo B 13 739.66 4 808.88 24 826.15 (8 930.78) 15 895.37 
Refilwe Monageng J 7 610.15 2 663.55 23 214.06 (4 946.59) 18 267.47 
Thabang Raperekisi K 9 353.32 3 273.66 20 420.78 (6079.66 14 341.12 
Kedibonye Motsamai Y 13 318.30 4 661.40 27 767.06 (8 656.90) 19 110.16 
Jorosi Mdluli Z 8 207.36 2872.58 20 010.42 (5 334.79) 14 675.63 
Kereng Maphala P 16 844.77 5 895.67 24 563.51 (10 949.09) 13 614.42 
Jabulani Stimela Q 13 742.78 4 809.97 31 261.61 (8 932.79) 22 328.82 
John Dlamini C 13 616.44 4 765.75 28 848.44 (8 850.69) 19 997.75 
Themba Shabangu D 8 373.27 2 930.65 23 468.01 (5 442.63) 18 025.38 
Tirelo Sontaga H 6 775.25 2 371.34 23 078.76 (4 403.93) 18 674.83 
Mqeda Nkathazo I 26 474.50 9 266.05 23 658.23 17 208.43) 6 449.80 
Michael Somkhosi W 13 772.78 4 820.47 17 437.07 (8 952.29) 8 484.78 
Nkele Simelane X 14 488.14 5 070.85 31 691.25 (9 417.30) 22 273.95 
Pinkie Dube R 7 270.94 2 544.83 22 845.91 (4 726.12) 18 119.79 
Serobe Molapo S 5 006.35 1 752.22 17 915.86 (3 254.13) 14 661.73 
Petros Mphuchane E 8 247.86 2886.75 25 145.85 (5 361.10) 19 785.75 
TOTAL  221 269.67 77 444.34 466 534.21 (143 825.27) 322 708.94 
[KEY TO TERMINOLOGY USED 
Net Receipts: Amount of money received from sale of tobacco produced by the farmer. 
Paid to Farmer: Amount of money paid out to the farmer by Tobacco RSA. 
Direct Costs: Expenditure by Tobacco RSA on production costs (e.g. seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) in 2004.  
Repayments: Amounts deducted from the net receipts received from sale of tobacco produced, to repay 
expenditure towards direct production costs.] 
 
*Names have been changed to protect the identity of persons listed. 
Source: Tobacco RSA, 2004 
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4.8.3 SMALLHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: ORAL 
TESTIMONY 
This section documents perspectives of different smallholders on the performance of the 
tobacco joint venture in 2003/2004. The views were obtained through in-depth interviews 
with individual smallholders and focus group discussions with male and female 
smallholders.  
4.8.3.1 Refilwe Monageng*: Plot J 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the contention by Tobacco RSA that the tobacco was of poor quality: 
"Some time early this year, when the tobacco was thriving, we had an open day in 
which MKTV38 representatives brought visitors to my plot to show them the crop. One 
visitor asked how much I expected to earn from the crop. I replied that I did not really 
know. The visitor then posed the question to the Tobacco RSA [Tobacco RSA/Limpopo 
Tobacco Processors] BEE Projects Manager, who replied that the crop should fetch at 
least R30 000. However, I was very surprised when after the harvest I was paid a sum 
of just above R2500. Yesterday afternoon [i.e. 13 October 2004, which was soon after 
the researcher’s interview with Tobacco RSA/ Limpopo Tobacco Processors BEE 
Projects Manager] two employees of MKTV came and gave me a little more than R100 
and said that an amount of just above R400 had been deposited into my bank account. 
For me, these small amounts are a far cry from the R30 000 that I expected. I am very 
concerned about this.  
                                                     
38 Smallholders interchangeably used the terms MKTV and Tobacco RSA for private investor representation 
within the tobacco joint venture. 
Background: 
Age: 62; Gender: Male; Married with 2 dependent children. 
Education: Never went to school, but has since attended adult education classes (ABET). Can read and write 
a bit. 
Monageng has been growing tobacco in the scheme since 1998. He originally came from the Middelburg 
area and arrived in Tafelkop in 1973. He worked in Witbank as a driver until he lost his job in 1984. He had 
since sold vegetables that he purchased from commercial farms and subsequently bought himself a tractor. 
For 3 years he had produced maize from other people's disused fields around Tafelkop. He lacked secure 
land tenure and access to irrigation water, yet desired to grow vegetables commercially. He was among the 
original group of black farmers that occupied Hereford in 1997. With his family, he went through the 
hardship of rehabilitating the overgrown plot and dilapidated buildings and turning both into a productive 
asset and a home. From a tobacco production partnership that he and three other farmers had with a local 
commercial farmer, Joppie Graham, he earned R23 655.22 in 1998-9 (see Table 15 in Section 4.8.4.1). When 
he joined the MKTV-led Hereford Tobacco Project, he therefore had had training in commercial tobacco 
production and processing.  
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"My concern is also due to that when my tobacco was ready for harvesting, MKTV sent 
its employees to come and harvest my prime tobacco. I was not at home then. They did 
not weigh it, or if they did, they never informed me how much was taken or how much 
money I had earned. So far, my earnings have only been from the 'scrap' tobacco…."  
On the assistance with renovations to the house occupied by his household: 
"When MKTV began the renovations, my wife and I had already started on the 
renovations and had completed the roof and some windows. MKTV then provided 
assistance with 5 window frames and panes, 9 doors and door frames, floors for 3 
rooms and all painting. My wife and I fixed everything else. The problem now is that 
MKTV employees keep saying that I should remove the roofing, and they will take my 
metal roofing sheets in exchange for their own supply to make it simple and uniform to 
the rest of the tobacco growers' houses. This is my house, and I like it with its heaped 
roof…I have also refused to accept their offer of smaller windows. I like the large 
windows that I installed - they bring in more light and air…"39 
 
4.8.3.2 Pinkie Dube* - Plot R 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
39
 Interview date: 14 October 2004. 
Background 
Age: 60; Gender: Female; Married with 9 children, 5 of who are dependent.  
Education: Never went to school, but can read and write a bit. 
Dube was born in Steelport (presently within the Greater Tubatse local municipal area). Her family was 
forcibly removed from Steelport in 1961. She arrived in Tafelkop as a young unmarried woman (18 years 
old). She worked in the farms until 1969, when she married Goodman. "Goodman used to work in Boksburg 
(Gauteng) when we got married, but lost his job when we had our sixth child". Kgoshi Rammupudu at 
Tafelkop allocated her a 2ha field in which she grew maize. Because she had no knowledge of proper farming 
methods, she only used to get 2 bags of maize. As part of a group of black farmers, she met Agricultural 
Extension Officer Mr Mahlukwane, who taught them how to plough, plant, apply fertilizer, and many other 
things. Her production then increased to between 40 and 50 or even 80 bags of maize. She would then 
market her produce at a cooperative in Tafelkop.  
“This is how I brought up my children. However, there was a problem with water. Our men then tried 
to find an alternative farming area and identified Hereford, where there was water. We then invaded 
Hereford as a group of 33 farmers. The place was run down, the fields overgrown and so on. We 
stayed, persevered and transformed Hereford into the productive place you see today. Moving to 
Hereford was therefore difficult - not only due to the effort used to make the place productive and 
habitable - but also due to the resistance by white farmers”. 
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On the issue of the earnings that fell short of expectations: 
"I have grown tobacco with MKTV for 3 years. From 1ha, I got R12 000 in the 1st year 
and R3 000 in the 2nd year. This year (2004) I got only R500 for 3 months of my labour 
on the 1ha field. In addition, I have a debt. I am not sure of the amount I owe MKTV, 
but the figure is over R4000. The reason given was that the quality of tobacco was low. 
In my view, the quality of this year's tobacco was better than that of the previous 
years. We have a photograph taken by Deon Meyer [Tobacco RSA/Limpopo Tobacco 
Processors BEE Projects Manager] some time this year showing how good our tobacco 
was. There is no way I can understand how I now owe over R4000. I spent not more 
than R2000 on fertilizer, pesticide, seeds and other inputs. I need to see the 
statements. Nothing has been said about tobacco prices falling…In the 1st and 2nd 
years, we were told that we had made losses, but that these had been settled by 
MKTV. In the 3rd year, this has not been done. Has MKTV shifted previous losses to the 
3rd year? After all the labour we expended on tobacco, we gain nothing but debts! I 
have decided not to grow tobacco anymore."40 
4.8.3.3 Kabelo Mabalane*: Plot W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the issue of debt: 
"At a meeting in September [2004] with the Tobacco Institute of South Africa and BAT, 
we were informed that we owed a lot of money. Initially I was told that I owe R20 000 
                                                     
40 Interview date: 11 October 2004 
Background 
Age: 63; Gender: Female; Widowed with 6 adult children and 9 grandchildren, all dependent. Education: 
Never went to school, cannot read or write. 
Mabalane moved to Tafelkop after forced removal from Maloeskop (where the local district office of the 
Provincial Department of Agriculture and Land Administration is presently located). A land claim for this land 
has been submitted, and the claimants have been assured of restitution. Before occupying the land in the 
irrigation scheme, Mabalane practiced subsistence farming, growing maize in the land around Tafelkop. Her 
decision to move to Hereford was determined by water shortage in the Tafelkop area. Asked what had 
driven her, as a woman alone and elderly, to venture into commercial farming, she replied:  
"Hunger. and the need to rely on myself, which I have done since my husband passed away in 1986".   
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or R22 000 to the Tobacco Institute of South Africa. Recently I was told that I also owed 
over R8000, but I am not clear what this amount is for. They also said that this would 
be recovered from the next tobacco crop, but we refused to grow tobacco again. We 
will instead grow sweetcorn and other vegetables [with a new vegetable joint 
venture].”41  
4.8.3.4 Phineas Sithole*: Plot L 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the issue of losses and debt: 
"We started growing tobacco last year, using hired labour that was paid by MKTV. 
Although BAT assisted us with the tobacco curing tower and windows for the house, 
we had to buy our own roofing material. The harvest this year shows that we made a 
loss. The reason is not clear. We all have losses. The debts that we are said to owe are 
from renovations to the houses…"42 
4.8.3.5 Elsie Maphala, daughter of Kereng Maphala*: Plot P  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
41
 Interview date: 11 October 2004. 
42 Interview date: 11 October 2004. 
Background 
Age: 67; Gender: Male; Married with 2 wives and widowed through the death of a third wife. 
Dependents include 3 children and elderly mother.  
Education: Never went to school but can read and write a little. 
Sithole moved to Tafelkop following forced removal from Braakfontein. Before occupying the land in 
Hereford, he farmed maize and sometimes tomatoes for subsistence. Water shortage prompted his decision 
to move into Hereford. Difficulties with this move were mostly associated with having to clear the fields and 
make the place productive and habitable.  
"We began growing vegetables like butternut, beetroot, spinach, beans, tomatoes and cabbage for 
sale on the streets of Groblersdal and to supply local traders. Marketing was a problem. The new 
partnership with NFM will assist. They [NFM] have prepared the fields and will produce sweetcorn, 
imparting skills to us farmers." 
 
Background 
Age: 76; Gender: Male; Married. Dependents include 3 children and 2 grandchildren. 
Education: Never went to school; can read a little. 
Maphala's original home was in Tafelkop. Before occupying the land in Hereford, he was self-employed, 
repairing tractors for farmers in the Ramokgwebane area around Tafelkop. He had no tractor himself. His 
wife, Cynthia, was unemployed then, and did not do any farming in Tafelkop. Maphala moved to Hereford 
because he felt that repairing tractors was not enough, and that farming would generate more money to 
look after his family.  
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On the effects of loss of livelihood assets (due to debts associated with earlier an earlier 
joint venture) on the smallholder’s capacity to participate in tobacco joint venture: 
"We grew tobacco with MKTV last year [2003]. We stopped growing tobacco some 
time in 2003 when the Land Bank repossessed most of our father's productive assets, 
including two ploughs and other machines, to settle a debt that he owed.  This 
discouraged him from further production. This year [2004] we did not grow any crops 
due to lack of money….not because we lacked water. Since the repossession of assets 
by the Land Bank, our mother has resided mostly in Tafelkop, caring for the home and 
children. Our father has been self-employed, mending fences and repairing 
tractors…More recently, our parents have begun to anticipate being part of the new 
vegetable production contract between the 15 members of the Hereford Vegetable 
Growers Association (HVGA) and NFA."43 
4.8.4 JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: PERSPECTIVES BY OTHER STAKEHOLDERS  
This section documents views expressed by other stakeholders regarding performance of 
the 2003/2004 tobacco joint venture. Respondents included the DALA Projects officer based 
at Maloeskop office, which is located about 15km from Hereford Irrigation Scheme, a 
member of Hereford Irrigation Board management committee and various commercial 
farmers from around the Hereford area. 
4.8.4.1 DALA Projects Officer, Maloeskop Local Office 
In an interview held on 14 October 2011, this official stated: 
"The tobacco joint venture is having serious problems. The current crisis should be 
viewed against the background of how some of the smallholders have done in previous 
years. In 1999, before the smallholders entered into a joint venture with MKTV, Joppie 
Graham, who owns a neighbouring commercial farm, assisted four of the farmers. 
These were Jabulani, Refilwe, Spencer and Matthew (Table 16). Profits were very high. 
Jabulani got around R23 000 and Refilwe R23 600. The others did not do so well. This is 
what encouraged the other smallholders to go into the joint venture with MKTV…” 
                                                     
43
 Interview date: 11 October 2004 
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TABLE 16 SMALLHOLDER ACCOUNTS FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTION PARTNERSHIP 
BETWEEN FOUR SMALLHOLDERS AND LOCAL COMMERCIAL FARMER JOPPIE 
GRAHAM, 1999 
Producer Production Costs (in Rands) Total Cost Receipts 
from 
sales 
Profit 
Mechanization Chemicals Fertilizer Labour Insurance 
Refilwe 
Monageng 
1 750.00 3 751.35 2 719.08 2018.91 5040.00 15 279.34 38 934.56 23 655.22 
Jabulani 
Stimela 
2 936.50 4 817.43 3 769.50 2 626.72 6 804.00 20 954.16 43 982.40 23 028.24 
Matthew 
Mokolobetsi 
2 861.46 4 817.43 3 716.58 2 024.75 6 804.00 20 224.22 22 527.68 2 303.46 
Spencer 
Mahlathini 
3 045.00 5 349.51 4 032.00 2 183.26 7 560.00 22 169.77 17 368.96 -4 800.81 
Total Harvest per Producer: 
 Refilwe Monageng: 34 763kg of tobacco harvested from a 2ha field and sold at R1.12/kg 
 Jabulani Stimela: 39 270kg of tobacco harvested from a 3ha field and sold at R1.12/kg 
 Matthew Mokolobetsi: 20 114kg of tobacco harvested from a 2.7ha field and sold at R1.12/kg 
 Spencer Mahlathini: 15 508kg of tobacco harvested from a 3ha field and sold at R1.12/kg 
Source: DALA records of Hereford tobacco production, 1999 
Examination of smallholder accounts showed that insurance costs were relatively high, 
ranging from 30 to 34 per cent of the total production costs (Table 16). This implied that 
tobacco was a risky crop.  
Regarding DALA’s role in safeguarding smallholders against undue exposure to risks 
associated with tobacco production:  
 
"I have tried to advise the smallholders to grow vegetables that have high profit 
margins, such as paprika. I have arranged for meetings with companies such as 
Tygerbrands Vegetable Canners. I have also suggested that they should plant long-
term growing crops, such as table grapes, oranges and macadamia on 4 to 5ha of the 
communal plot [Plot MI] and on two other plots next to it. For table grapes, for 
example, the capital required for production in the 1st year would be R150 000 per 
hectare. For the next 4 years, the production costs would be R50 000 per hectare. After 
this the costs would become significantly lower, and the fruit would be harvested…The 
profits could be used by the smallholders’ cooperative to buy tractors and other inputs. 
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Although the initial costs look prohibitive, a R3 to 4million LRAD grant is possible. In 
addition to this, there is possible assistance by [white] commercial farmers."44          
5.8.4.2 Stephanus Van Meulen*: Local commercial farmer and member of Hereford 
Irrigation Board management committee   
 
"A proposal was made to smallholders to grow oranges or table grapes and 
vegetables, with subsidies from government and assistance from the white commercial 
farmers. Somehow, they decided to go with the MKTV tobacco scheme. From what we 
know, tobacco farming has never been profitable in the long run in this area. However, 
if the smallholders could start with vegetables and then for the longer term, also begin 
by planting say a hectare of grapes or oranges, things might work out better. They 
could then increase the hectare of fruit according to what they can afford. The capital 
costs of establishing the orchard would be relatively high to begin with and the turn 
over would take a while – say 4 to 5 years - but eventually the profits would be 
higher."45 
5.8.4.3 Marie Van Niekerk*: Commercial farmer formerly resident in the Greater 
Groblersdal area 
"We used to own a farm along the Vaalfontein Road between Groblersdal and Marble 
Hall, and have since moved to the States [USA]. We entered into a tobacco production 
scheme with MKTV, and it failed. The reasons for the failure were not very clear, 
although there was talk of reduced tobacco prices. As crime and violence increased in 
the area, with one of our relatives murdered, we ultimately gave up and migrated to 
America…"46  
5.8.4.4 Gerhadus Booysens: Local respondent with links to the Hereford commercial 
farming sector 
"The activities of MKTV in this area have been known for a while. The land that is 
presently occupied by the small-scale farmers in Hereford was abandoned by white 
tobacco producers due to failure by a production scheme they entered into with MKTV. 
                                                     
44 Interview, 14 October 2004 
45 Informal Interview, 13 October 2004 
46 Informal interview, 15 October, 2004 
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MKTV is now under different ownership since filing for bankruptcy. There are rumours 
about the whole issue and it is not clear what exactly has happened. We have tried to 
advise the smallholders, but they suspect that we just want to discourage them. The 
activities of MKTV really need to be investigated…"47 
4.8.5 PERSPECTIVES FROM SENIOR MANAGERS OF TOBACCO RSA AND TISA48  
4.8.5.1 Issue of Joint Venture Losses 
According to senior managers of Tobacco RSA and TISA, joint venture losses were due to a 
number of factors. There had been a dry spell and low rainfall in the early part of the 
planting season. Consequently, planting was done late in December instead of October. 
Most of the smallholders were inexperienced and hence did not properly supervise the 
tobacco production on the plots. For example, some of the farmers had gone off to do other 
business in town when the harvesting began. Despite all this, the farmers had unrealistic 
expectations. They “thought that by simply going into commercial tobacco production, they 
would become rich overnight… [however]… Growing growing tobacco is not easy, and in the 
farming industry in South Africa, a farmer can often make a living but not get rich. This takes 
a lot of work, even during weekends…" 
4.8.5.2 Issue of Irregular Harvesting of Monageng's Prime Tobacco Crop49  
Tobacco RSA and TISA respondents conceded that mistakes might have been made along 
the way, and that they were still learning. They further said that they normally 
communicated with smallholders through meetings, where private investor representatives 
informed farmers about what was happening and what needed to be done. One respondent 
stated: “We might not have got it all right and this is regrettable." However, the private 
investor representatives did not seem to have considered making reparations for 
smallholders like Monageng, who clearly had been unjustly deprived of their rightful 
income. Such omission seemed to imply that these representatives deemed adequate the 
ad hoc R100 that was given to Monageng on the afternoon of the researcher’s visit to the 
                                                     
47
 Interview: 13 October, 2004 
48 Interviews on 9 March, 2005 
49 See Section 5.8.3.1 
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Groblesdal offices of Tobacco RSA/Limpopo Tobacco. Given that prior to irregular harvesting 
of Monageng’s crop, the estimated income was R30 000, the flippant dismissal of such 
injustice was tantamount to robbery and contrary to the ethic of corporate social 
responsibility espoused in the various company policies.    
4.8.5.3 Issue of Debts 
One of the respondents confirmed that the debts have been written off. The respondent 
pointed out that debts incurred by the farmers during the 2003/2004 joint venture were not 
the only debts smallholders had. When Tobacco RSA came into the joint venture, many of 
the smallholders already owed debts totaling about R200 000 to local input suppliers like 
OBARO and NTK. Such debts were associated with earlier initiatives, whereby smallholders 
produced cotton, tomatoes and other crops. The consortium of private investors, which 
included Tobacco RSA, BAT-South Africa and SA Golden Leaf, paid the debts for them. 
Smallholders also owed a lot of money to the Land Bank who, when they heard that 
“something” was coming up in Hereford, also wanted to get their money back. The 
consortium refused to enter into any arrangement with the Land Bank, and therefore the 
proceeds of the joint venture were never linked to the Land Bank debts. Hereford 
smallholders had also made losses in a preceding tobacoo joint venture with MKTV. When 
MKTV was liquidated, the debts were also written off. The respondent commented that 
smallholders' debts were part of MKTV's financial problems since MKTV had financed the 
joint venture."  
4.8.5.4 Issue of Profile and Status of MKTV 
A respondent from Tobacco RSA and TISA explained that MKTV Tobacco (Pty) Ltd was 
founded in 1909 and was the oldest tobacco cooperative body in South Africa. Over the 
years, MKTV played a lead role in the development and protection of the South African 
tobacco industry. MKTV was also a pioneer in marketing, modernization and export 
requirements for its members and for the tobacco industry. The company was also 
instrumental in the formulation of tobacco related statutory regulations and bodies. Due to 
a number of reasons, MKTV went out of business between 2002 and 2003, and a new 
company called Limpopo Tobacco Processors (LTP) was formed. 
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4.8.5.5 Envisaged Way Forward 
 
One respondent stated that after the tobacco harvest, private investors had held two to 
three meetings with smallholders between October and November 2004. He further said: 
“At the meetings, we tried explain how the joint venture works. However, the farmers 
wanted guarantees that they would not end up with debts if they went ahead with 
tobacco production. Of course there are no guarantees in the farming industry. It is a 
risky enterprise and therefore we could not give any assurances. As a result, 17 
farmers have declined to proceed with the joint venture." 
According to senior managers of Tobacco RSA/TISA, only two of the 19 farmers had agreed 
to continue growing tobacco. The rest had refused. Part of the problem was that there were 
internal politics and conflicts within the group of farmers, whereby “some led others astray 
and influenced them not to grow tobacco." One respondent concluded”: 
"I don't think there is a recipe for success in joint ventures involving emerging small-
scale farmers. If the smallholders are willing to grow cash crops like tobacco, they need 
to be willing to work hard. There is also a need to manage expectations. A farmer can 
mostly make a living and not become rich from farming. We need to identify the right 
areas to grow tobacco without irrigation. Perhaps irrigation schemes are not the 
appropriate places to grow the crop. What is most important in our view is that there 
should be partnership with government and financing institutions in these joint 
ventures. In this case, BAT provided funding and Tobacco RSA provided project 
management services. Partnerships with government and financing institutions would 
lead to the development of proper business plans for the joint ventures. However, the 
problem for us at the moment is that government is hostile to tobacco. Hence there is 
also a need to change attitudes within government because tobacco production can 
lead to the creation of jobs and to economic growth." 
4.8.7 SUMMARY 
Experiences in this joint venture showed that black economic empowerment in agriculture 
required attention to be given to issues of power, gender, accountability, transparency, 
communication and risks associated with capital intensive crops such as tobacco. There was 
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also a need for support to strengthen farmer organizations so that they could engage more 
effectively and equitably both within the group and with external role-players. Research 
findings pointed to strengths and weaknesses in the governance of the Hereford Farmers 
Association.  
Strengths derived from the farmers’ pro-active move to claim secure access to land, water 
and other resources in the irrigation scheme, and from their growing confidence and 
support from government and other stakeholders. Among these factors, land gave 
smallholder the principal motivation to claim further rights of access to water, decision 
making and government funding. There were also strengths associated with the support 
given by private investors in the tobacco joint venture. Such strengths mainly related to the 
transfer of crop production skills to the small-scale farmers. All the respondents expressed 
an appreciation of the knowledge gained from the extension and technical services provided 
by Tobacco RSA. Skills transfer was largely through direct observation, training workshops 
and literacy classes. Such skills transfer and education were critical to building confidence 
among the smallholders.   
Weaknesses related mainly to the management of power relations within the joint venture, 
the smallholder group and households. Power distributing cleavages included wealth, socio-
economic class, degrees of social organization, gender, age and politics, among others. The 
prevalence of power dynamics indicated a need to ensure sound governance practices 
within the joint venture and Hereford Farmers’ Association. 
4.9 OVERVIEW OF A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PROCESS TO PROMOTE 
SMALLHOLDER ENTRY INTO GLOBALIZED VEGETABLE AGRI-BUSINESS 
4.9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section presents findings on a process through which a multiplicity of stakeholders 
contributed towards ensuring entry by Hereford smallholders into the globalized vegetable 
agri-business sector. The process had its roots in the multi-stakeholder consultation process 
that took place after occupation by landless black farmers of the deserted Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme in February 1997. The section traces such process from 1999 to 2006.  
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Many of the issues around the process revolved around provision of a vegetable packing 
house (commonly termed “pack house”). The pack house symbolized the key to Hereford 
smallholders’ success in entering the globalized agri-food systems. Smallholders’ 
expectations of joint venture success were closely tied to the possibility of realizing a 
longstanding vision for a pack house located within Hereford Irrigation Scheme. Indeed, 
throughout my fieldwork from 2003 and 2006, the Hereford case study was dominated by 
talk of the pack house. The dream appeared to finally come into fruition following approval 
in 2004 of a government post settlement grant of R550 000.  
4.9.2 HEREFORD VEGETABLE PACK HOUSE: ORIGINS 
The idea of a vegetable pack house for Hereford smallholders emerged in 1999 through the 
Rural Enterprise and Agribusiness Programme (REAP), which was driven by a United States 
based NGO named Africare. The initiative was part of a bigger programme by Africare to 
promote commercialization of small-scale irrigation farming in the Greater Sekhukhune 
District. Ten rural communities were involved in this initiative, whose four components 
were extension and training, marketing, water development and cooperative development. 
Following a decision to grant land rights to smallholders occupying Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme, under auspices of the LRAD Programme, Africare and other stakeholders 
collectively selected the irrigation scheme to be a pilot project to promote entry by black 
farmers into the highly competitive export-orientated commercial farming and agri-business 
sectors.  
Africare contracted a private firm named ‘Yukon International’ to conduct a feasibility study 
on 40ha of land in the Hereford Irrigation Scheme and in other small-scale irrigation 
schemes in the Nebo Region of Greater Sekhukhune. The initial assessment of Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme showed that although smallholders had access to water and were well-
organized as a group, they lacked access to markets. The verdict of Yukon International was 
that a pack house was feasible, and that three high value vegetable crops that could be 
produced were courgettes, baby cauliflowers and paprika. As a result of that verdict, plans 
were made for the construction of a pack house on the Hereford Irrigation Scheme. 
In an attempt to address this need, Africare facilitated the formation of a joint venture 
between smallholders and two private marketing firms namely, Yukon International and 
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Swallow International, which were buyers and exporters of vegetable commodities. Yukon 
International was based in the United States while Swallow International was based in 
Swaziland. In both arrangements, production of “baby” vegetables for the export market 
was considered to be a viable niche for Hereford smallholders.  
During the first year of baby vegetable production in 1999, the farmers attended a training 
course to develop skills in quality control and marketing. They also harvested and sold 
produce over a five month period from May to September. The initial attempt to export 
crops of high quality floundered because of failure by smallholders to meet international 
standards for export of perishable produce. Drawbacks included distance from airports and 
unavailability of refrigerated transport, which led to spoilage of crops and subsequent 
reduction of value. A key shortcoming, however, was the lack of a 'pack house' of 
acceptable international standards, in which to prepare and package produce under the 
required export processing conditions.  
This initial experience reinforced the concept of a pack house located in Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme primarily to serve its members but also other vegetable producers within the 
locality. Working in collaboration with the National Department of Agriculture, Africare 
secured funding of R1.4 million to initiate the pack house project. The REAP project was 
expected to generate and improve farm-based and non-farm based livelihoods, directly for 
217 small-scale farmers and 61 people employed in the pack house and nursery, and 
indirectly for 2 500 people working within the production cooperative. At least 50 per cent 
of Greater Sekhukhune District's more than 10 000 farmers were envisaged to utilize the 
pack house. A further 50 per cent of farmers were expected to see a large improvement in 
access to inputs, such as seedlings from a nursery to be established in the thirty-fourth plot 
that was set aside for collective use by members of Hereford Farmers’ Association. Other 
expected improvements were access to markets through improved post-harvest handling of 
produce, improved farm management skills and access to market information and bulk sales 
through cooperatives.  
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4.9.3 REAP PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: CONTESTATION OVER LOCATION OF 
PACK HOUSE  
4.9.3.1 Overview of the Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making Process and Contestation  
Towards post-pilot implementation of the REAP project in 2000, a major challenge for 
Africare was that the idea to build a pack house had emerged from within a process of 
market development for historically disadvantaged farmers in Greater Sekhukhune District, 
and there was no available funding for construction of the pack house. A second and related 
challenge for Africare was about ‘ownership’ of the pack house50. In line with requirements 
of the IDP process, Africare tabled REAP pack house project plans to Greater Groblersdal 
Local Municipality, with the intention to include the project in municipal Local Economic 
Development (LED) plans and thereby mobilize funding through ISRDP institutional 
arrangements.  
At local municipality level, Greater Groblersdal’s LED Committee for Agriculture initiated a 
consultative process on REAP’s envisaged post-pilot project implementation. The LED 
Committee for Agriculture was considered to be the relevant municipal structure for dealing 
with farmer support initiatives, such as joint ventures in Hereford and similar smallholder 
irrigation schemes, within the local municipality. Decision-making by this institutional 
structure brought together large and small-scale commercial farmers, communal farmers, 
locally based officials of relevant government departments, NGOs, the agri-business sector 
and the local and district municipalities. For some among these stakeholders, Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme seemed to be a natural choice for locating the vegetable pack house, 
given that the REAP pilot project had been implemented in Hereford. A resolution was 
therefore taken to proceed with plans to locate the pack house in Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme. Plans to locate the pack house in Hereford Irrigation Scheme, however, 
subsequently sparked off contestation among stakeholders.  
Some stakeholders argued that the pack house should be located on ‘neutral’ ground and 
clearly seen to be a productive resource for all resource-poor farmers in the broader district. 
The rationale was that REAP plans included at least nine other groups of farmers in 
smallholder irrigation schemes across the district, apart from smallholders in Hereford 
                                                     
50 Interviews with Mrs Pearl Moruasui, former Site Manager for Africare’s Nebo Regional office in Groblersdal.. 
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Irrigation Scheme. Despite REAP projections that 50 per cent of all such farmers from 
various parts of Greater Sekhukhune District would use the pack house, proponents of 
relocation argued that situation of the pack house in Hereford Irrigation Scheme would give 
impression that these smallholders enjoyed privileged access to benefits of state funding. 
Suggestions were therefore made that site selection criteria should critically include 
‘location from which the pack house could best serve the interests of all farmers in Greater 
Sekhukhune District and not only smallholders in Hereford Irrigation Scheme and its 
immediate rural hinterland’. 
Contestation was also strongly linked to emergence of the pack house project at a time 
when the idea of "developmental" local government was beginning to be strongly embraced 
both nationally and in Greater Sekhukhune. This was also a time when institutional actors 
were grappling with institutional restructuring following promulgation of the Municipal 
Systems Act 23 of 2000 and re-demarcation of municipal boundaries, among other reforms. 
For stakeholders in intermediary institutions, and Greater Sekhukhune District in particular, 
there were questions regarding appropriateness of the local municipality to assume 
responsibility for decision-making whose implications traversed the district as a whole. Key 
stakeholder institutions reached a stalemate and contestations remained unresolved, 
effectively reiterating the need to clarify the issue of project ownership. 
In an attempt to address the ownership issue, the REAP Steering Committee and Africare 
took a decision in 2001 to form Sekhukhune Farmers Development Trust (SFDT), which 
would own and manage the pack house. SFDT was registered in 2001 as a trust organization. 
A board of trustees was democratically constituted, with a female farmer as chairperson of 
the board. Official documentation51 stated that establishment of SFDT was a response to 
needs of emerging farmers in the Greater Sekhukhune District.  
From the debate that emerged around the best possible location, the REAP Steering 
Committee established within itself a Pack House Task Team to address the problem of 
location. In 2001, the Task Team set in motion a decision-making process, whose 
participants included representatives of the National Department of Agriculture, DALA, 
tribal councils and REAP Irrigation Projects. These had previously normally made decisions 
                                                     
51
 SFDT Information Brochure  
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about the local chapter of the Africare Programme. The REAP Steering Committee decided 
that for practical purposes the pack house had to be located elsewhere in the district, where 
it would be accessible to all small-scale irrigation farmers in Greater Sekhukhune, as 
opposed to Hereford Irrigation Scheme. In 2002 the ultimate decision, by consensus, was 
that the pack house would be located in the town of Groblersdal. This decision effectively 
sealed the decision to shift the location of the pack house away from Hereford Irrigation 
Scheme to a ‘neutral’ location, but did not resolve dissent.  
Consequent to the decision, efforts were made to identify a pack house site that would be 
politically acceptable to most stakeholders and at the same time logistically practical, in 
terms of the envisaged model of commercial production. This proved to be a daunting and 
complex task52, which required a series of preparatory decisions, resources and actions. 
Ultimately, the REAP Steering Committee and SFDT rationalized that the urban centre of 
Groblersdal possessed requisite infrastructure, services and human resources to support a 
pack house enterprise.  
Preparation began with the REAP Steering Committee undertaking trips to visit similar 
initiatives elsewhere to observe how such projects were conceptualized. These were 
followed by the drafting and publication of calls for submissions of proposals for the design 
and construction of the pack house. The tender selection process was concluded in February 
2003. Concurrent with these developments, a new council for Greater Groblersdal Local 
Municipality took office and the new mayor promised to consider a request for municipal 
assistance in allocating a site for the pack house. This promise did not materialize, however, 
and SFDT eventually had to buy land within Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality. Two 
plots of land were purchased by SFDT, through a tender process, in the industrial section of 
the town of Groblersdal. Africare provided funding for this. The local municipality responded 
                                                     
52 I encountered difficulties with unravelling the complexities of the process of pack house 'capture', with 
some respondents giving different versions of the process on each occasion they were interviewed and others 
deliberately withholding information. Consequently, the approach I took was to triangulate all information and 
to request available documentation relating specifically to the project. Attempts to get information and 
documentation from the Greater Groblersdal local municipality were unsuccessful. Research revealed that the 
LED Manager for the local municipality had initially been one of the plot holders on the scheme, and had 
subsequently left the scheme under circumstances that were clear not very clear to the research. This section 
of the report therefore relies on information collected from other key stakeholders, including Africare, 
Sekhukhune Farmers Development Trust (SFDT), Greater Sekhukhune district and the Hereford Farmers 
Association. 
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to this acquisition of land by proffering funding for the construction of the pack house, 
through the municipal Local Economic Development (LED) Fund. A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) was then drafted between the Greater Groblersdal local municipality 
and SFDT. Provisions of the MOU were that the local municipality would have ownership of 
the project for three years, after which the ownership would be transferred to the SFDT.  
The foregoing decisions and MOU elicited greater debate, contestation and power 
dynamics. It was at this point that the Greater Sekhukhune District Council earnestly joined 
the fray and flexed its muscle, as the structure with ultimate responsibility over local 
economic development, in terms of legal provisions of the Municipal Systems Act and 
Municipal Structures Act as well as institutional arrangements for the ISRDP and IDP. 
At the district municipality level, there was debate over the choice of the town of 
Groblersdal, which was located just 1km away from Hereford Irrigation Scheme, as a site for 
the pack house. Some institutional actors considered the decision to be a façade to ensure 
that benefits of REAP remained entrenched within the local municipality and, in particular, 
accessible to Hereford smallholders. Questions were raised therefore about the choice of 
Greater Groblersdal over four other local municipalities in the Greater Sekhukhune District. 
To a large extent, such debates were underpinned by competition for access to expected 
economic benefits from the pack house enterprise. Such benefits included higher incomes 
for farmers and allied sectors, farm-based and non-farm employment opportunities for local 
people and prestige associated with what was perceived to be a potentially high profile 
project. The REAP Steering Committee and SFDT reiterated their rationale that the urban 
centre possessed requisite infrastructure, services and human resources to support a pack 
house enterprise.  
4.9.3.2 Perspectives of Hereford Smallholders on the Multi-Stakeholder Process: Resource 
Capture 
Despite evidence that the REAP Steering Committee and SFDT had ultimately adopted a 
compromise position that considered views of diverse stakeholders while simultaneously 
accommodating Hereford smallholders, the latter rejected this decision and rationale. They 
argued on the basis of principle and practicality.  
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Firstly, their principled view was that the decision making process was corrupted by political 
expedience and self-interest of certain individuals within district and local municipalities, 
who stood to benefit from the pack house project. Consequently, the final decision reflected 
such self-interest rather than interests of farmers.  Hereford smallholders further argued 
that the pack house had originally been intended to benefit their group, which had actively 
participated in the pilot experiment to produce baby vegetables for export. The then-
incumbent municipal manager for Greater Sekhukhune District and the site manager for 
Africare corroborated this view.  
Secondly, Hereford smallholders raised questions about the practical logistics of 
transporting produce over distances ranging from one to over one hundred kilometers, 
particularly without refrigerated transport. They further pointed out that their own surveys 
of similar projects and assessment of logistics of transporting produce over the one to two 
kilometre intervening distance showed that it was not practical to locate the pack house in 
Groblersdal. They also pointed out that, according to requirements of international 
standards for perishable export crops, it was not hygienically desirable to locate the pack 
house in an industrial area, where pollutants could contaminate produce.  
The smallholders surmised that the decision-making process had effectively disregarded 
REAP pilot phase findings regarding specific conditions required for successful entry into 
commercial export sectors for perishable produce. They perceived their lack of secure land 
tenure to have been a prime factor in the decision to change the planned location of the 
pack house to Groblersdal. In spite of the Hereford smallholders’ unhappiness with the 
decision making process and result, implementation of the pack house project went ahead 
and in 2004 construction of a vegetable pack house began in the industrial area of 
Groblersdal.  
4.9.3.3 Perspectives of other Key Stakeholders on the Multi-Stakeholder Process: Power 
Dynamics 
Interviews with various key respondents, who were involved in the decision making process, 
revealed that there were power dynamics between the district municipality and the local 
municipality in the debate surrounding the pack house project. Apparently, officials within 
the district municipality’s ISRDP Nodal Delivery Team had taken the REAP pack house 
 
 
 
 
 213 
proposal directly to the provincial Department of Local Government and Housing (DLGH) 
without consulting Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality. The latter was unhappy that the 
district municipality had not acted according to proper procedure, and had in fact 
overlooked the role of the local municipality in making decisions about an issue within its 
jurisdiction. This information could not be verified with the district municipality’s ISRDP 
Nodal Delivery Team since all officers who had been in that team were no longer employed 
by the municipality, and the structure had since been quietly abandoned53.     
Other identified power dynamics were between the Greater Sekhukhune District Mayor, 
who is also the political champion of the ISRDP, and the then District Municipal Manager. 
Views were expressed that the pack house issue was one of the factors that contributed to 
the escalation of tension between the two individuals and the ultimate departure of the 
latter. Attempts to gain further insights into this matter were not fruitful. Efforts to 
interview the mayor were repeatedly unsuccessful throughout the course of field research. 
However, an interview with the manager of the mayor’s office revealed that the District 
Mayor had become involved in the matter largely because it was realized that the board of 
the SFDT was not representative enough of the interests of the district as a whole.  
A key respondent from the Independent Development Trust (IDT), which played an advisory 
role to the Greater Sekhukhune nodal delivery team, had a similar but contrasting view. This 
was that the involvement of the district municipality was justified, not so much by issues of 
power but by the need for a district level structure to facilitate the filtering of project 
funding from the National Department of Agriculture, through the Provincial Department of 
Local Government and Housing, via the district municipality and ultimately to Greater 
Groblersdal Local Municipality.     
4.9.4 AFTERMATH OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
4.9.4.1 Failure and Despondency: 2003 to 2004 
The multi-stakeholder process to promote resource-poor irrigation farmers’ entry into 
export market orientated vegetable production ended in 2003 while the private investor-led 
tobacco joint venture ended in 2004. A longitudinal overview of both initiatives showed that 
                                                     
53 Interview with new Municipal Manager for Greater Sekhukhune District, Mr Tito Nkadimeng, 22 April 2004. 
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the years 2003 and 2004 were the doldrums for Hereford smallholders. Smallholders lost 
confidence in the multi-stakeholder ISRDP process, which had ended in their critical loss of 
an opportunity to gain access to a vegetable pack and thereby the key to success. They 
became desperate for a semblance of hope that their aspirations and efforts had not been 
in vain. Consequently, many of the smallholders agreed to become involved in a 
reconstituted tobacco joint venture, although their recent experience with MKTV had 
highlighted the risks associated with such a contract farming model. When the tobacco joint 
venture collapsed in 2004, it seemed as if all hope had been lost.  
The sense of hopelessness was reinforced by indications that erstwhile and possible support 
structures were shutting down. While views continued to differ regarding whether or not 
problems with the multi-stakeholder decision-making process were due to issues of power, 
protocol and/or resource capture, the LED Committee for Agriculture for Groblersdal Local 
Municipality virtually collapsed due to lack of an LED Plan for the municipal IDP and what 
was a broadly perceived to be lack of leadership and support within the municipality. 
Similarly, the ISRDP Nodal Delivery Team structure for Greater Groblersdal Local 
Municipality was quietly abandoned and employees redeployed to work in mainstream 
sectors of the IDP54. SFDT quickly lost impetus and relevance, owing to legitimacy questions 
that the structure was not representative enough of the interests of all emerging farmers 
the district as a whole. Despite brave attempts to regain legitimacy and relevance, the trust 
organization was compelled to close office in 2004. Africare gradually wound down the 
REAP initiative, recalled Nebo Regional office staff and finally closed office in 2004.      
As feelings of despondency over the ‘lost’ pack house and failed tobacco joint venture 
deepened among Hereford smallholders, questionnaire and interview data showed that 
vegetable producers had resorted to marketing their produce in roadside stalls and to local 
informal traders. Smallholders obtained some relief from a farmer support initiative by a 
private firm, Hereford International, which donated dairy cattle to interested smallholders. 
Such livestock was intended to alleviate food and livelihood insecurity, which had become 
rife following the series of shocks from project failures. Beneficiaries of the donation used 
the milk for own consumption as well as for sale within the irrigation scheme and 
                                                     
54 Interview with new Municipal Manager for Greater Sekhukhune District, Mr Tito Nkadimeng, 22 April 2004. 
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surrounding localities. The leadership of Hereford Farmers Association vowed that they 
would not utilize the pack house in Groblersdal as a matter of principle and for practical 
reasons. Their objective was to persist in seeking assistance for the construction of a pack 
house located within the irrigation scheme. Such effort yielded two related results. The first 
was a new vegetable joint venture independently initiated by the Hereford Farmers 
Association. The second was an unexpected crystallization of support from the National 
Department of Agriculture, Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality and Greater 
Groblersdal Municipality.  
4.9.4.2 Resurgence of Contract Farming: Hereford Packaging House and Farmer-Led 
Vegetable Joint Venture 
An application for financial assistance that Hereford smallholders submitted in December 
2003, through Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality, unexpectedly gained support from 
the district municipality in the latter half of 2004. According to the then-incumbent district 
Municipal Manager, the district-wide focus of the project had become impracticable due “a 
number of reasons”. These included the time and effort required to overcome the frictional 
effect of distance on transportation costs and quality of perishable produce, shortage of 
irrigation water over much of the district and the huge amounts of funding required to 
make such a large number of small-scale farmers competitive enough in the horticultural 
sector.  
Following this sudden turn of events, efforts by the leadership of Hereford Farmers 
Association paid off between September and October 2004, when Hereford smallholders 
initiated a new joint venture for vegetable production and marketing. The joint venture 
involved a group of 15 farmers. In anticipation of such a self-driven enterprise, these 
smallholders had earlier formally constituted and registered a cooperative named Hereford 
Vegetable Growers' Association (HVGA). A business plan had been drawn up as part of an 
application by HVGA for government funding of approximately R900 000 towards the 
construction of a vegetable packaging house.  
Simultaneously in the latter half of 2004, the National Department of Agriculture approved a 
post-settlement grant of approximately R550 000 for the construction of a pack house and 
tunnels on the communal plot in Hereford irrigation Scheme. The grant was less than the 
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R900 000 requested by the HVGA but probably more realistic, given that not all the 
smallholders wanted to be part of this joint venture. Smallholders proceeded to sign a 
contract with a private firm, Nature's Choice (NFM) Farms (Pty) Ltd. Furthermore, NFM 
Farms established a new company, NFM Marketing, whose objective was to handle 
marketing for the joint venture between NFM Farms and HVGA. Smallholders within HVGA 
had a 25 per cent stake in the Alberton (Johannesburg) based marketing company. The joint 
venture’s first contract involved the production and marketing of sweetcorn to supply 
warehouses of retailers like Spar, Woolworths and Pick 'n Pay. Other crops that were to be 
produced included pumpkin, butternut and green beans.  
According to the project business plan, objectives of the joint venture were to: 
 Produce "quality fresh vegetables" to supply the local, national and international 
markets; 
 Process and package the vegetables; 
 Generate income from the project, keep it sustainable and use it as a support base 
for the emerging Hereford farmers venturing into the fully commercialized sector; 
and 
 Create job opportunities for both the project owners and some of the unemployed 
people from surrounding communities. 
Business plan projections, however, were based upon crop production estimates that 
included the entire 160ha of irrigated land falling within the Hereford Irrigation Scheme, 
whereas just under half (45.5 per cent) of all smallholders were members of HVGA, and 
these with plots of varying sizes. Implicit within projections were assumptions that all the 
smallholders would pool their individual land rights into the joint enterprise, and that water 
allocations and availability would remain constant. Consequently, the proposed budget for 
the pack house was significantly inflated and the award subsequently reduced by nearly 
half. Similarly inflated were the total projected earnings from this joint venture, which 
ranged from approximately R4.5million in the 1st year to R13.7 million in the 5th year. These 
figures were based on tunnel production and conventional irrigation of tomatoes and 
cabbages, at an annual gross profit margin of approximately R24 500/ha and R26 000/ha 
respectively.  
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The resurgence of contract farming and, in particular, the vegetable pack house project, 
initially gave smallholders renewed hope that their aspirations would be realized. This also 
contributed to the decision by many of the smallholders to abandon tobacco production 
following the failure of the 2004 venture. However, the joint venture with NFM Farms and 
NFM Marketing foundered in 2005. Poor logistical management of crop harvesting and 
disputes over responsibility for transport costs resulted in delayed harvesting of sweetcorn. 
With rising concerns over possible losses, inner group power dynamics and conflicts set in as 
smallholders jostled for pole position in a contested harvest roster. Collective interest gave 
way to individual self interest, and earlier plans to pool labour resources fell away as each 
farmer held on to his or her farm workers. Consequently, the most of the sweetcorn crop 
was either lost or relegated to livestock feed. The pack house, by contrast, was constructed 
but by 2007 remained incomplete and unused. By then, smallholders had collectively rallied 
around compelling their leadership to account for expenditure of the R550 000 post-
settlement grant funds.    
4.10 DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES  
Findings from Hereford Irrigation Scheme pointed to a number of key issues pertaining to 
interactions among multiple stakeholder institutions, between the contracting parties and 
among smallholders who were involved in joint ventures during the pilot phase of the 
national RESIS Programme. This section presents a concise discussion of key issues.  
4.10.1 SMALLHOLDERS AND BIG BUSINESS: A QUESTION OF POWER 
Hereford tobacco joint ventures brought together stakeholders with varying degrees of 
power and influence. Private investors’ power derived largely from their substantial 
financial resources, technology and market linkages. Smallholders’ access to government 
grants and subsidies, farmer credit schemes and networks with influential actors and 
structures within government and civil society gave them some leverage. Despite this, 
smallholders viewed their lack of land ownership rights to be a significant setback. Low 
levels of literacy, commercial farming skills and access to markets also limited the power of 
small-scale farmers. The manner in which project issues were handled, such as 
communication, transparency and accountability, gave a good indication of the balance of 
power between smallholders and private investors.  
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Issues of transparency and accountability were evident in some of the views expressed by 
respondents. In the case of Refilwe Monageng, private investors did not demonstrate 
accountability and neither took responsibility for ensuring fairness and adequate 
compensation. Consequently, Monageng and most of the other smallholders lost trust in 
the integrity of the private investors. What compounded Monageng's lack of trust in the 
dealings of Tobacco RSA was the lack of transparency in the manner in which the crop was 
harvested in his absence and the failure by Tobacco RSA to communicate the details of the 
transaction. The significance of discrepancy between expected and actual earnings from 
Monageng’s crop pointed to a dire need for close scrutiny of procedures for interactions 
and transactions between contracting parties.  
While Monageng’s absence during the harvesting of crop on his plot was due to the fact that 
he had not received communication from the Tobacco RSA employees, Tobacco RSA officials 
interpreted his absence to be indication of “poor management” and lack of commitment. 
This was despite that these officials gave smallholders inadequate notification of their 
intention to harvest tobacco, and did not effectively check whether or not all affected 
smallholders had received notification. This showed that Tobacco RSA staff either 
misunderstood or misrepresented the communication and accountability problem. The 
manner in which Tobacco RSA handled the communication of this critical information did 
not demonstrate sufficient regard for accountability requirements between joint venture 
partners. Critically, this incident demonstrated the unequal power relations between 
smallholders and private investors. The relatively weaker bargaining position of Monageng 
was a factor in the trivialization of his commitment to farming by Tobacco RSA employees.  
The communication problem was compounded by events that took place during a Hereford 
Project Publicity Day, which was held in the irrigation scheme on 24 March 2004 (TISA, 
2004). The field day was intended to be an incentive for smallholders to continue to grow 
tobacco. However, the same event also contributed to raising the farmers' expectations. 
Granting the possibility that the quality of some of the smallholders’ tobacco was indeed 
sub-standard, views expressed by Monageng and Pinkie Dube illustrate some of the 
unintended consequences of 'show-casing' a project. Alongside exposition of project 
achievements, private sponsors of the field day should have had a clear strategy to manage 
expectations. One way could have been to ensure that the field day did not only highlight 
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good aspects but also pointed out the down-side of entry by smallholders into mainstream 
commercial farming and provided them with constructive advice on how to address 
constraints.  
Private investors’ field and office employees showed no respect for the farmer's need to 
know about the outcome of harvest of his prime crop, for which he had laboured hard to 
produce. Rather, they acted as if the crop belonged to Tobacco RSA and, beyond the labour 
that the farmer had already tendered and been paid for, the farmer had become 
expendable. The employees' attitude contrasted with Monageng's reference to the crop as 
"my prime tobacco" and one of the senior Tobacco RSA managers' allusions to "the tobacco 
crop". Monageng's case illustrated the need to clarify issues of ownership of a 'jointly' 
produced crop. Apart from clear definition of roles, resources and responsibilities of 
contracting parties, what seemed clearly requisite was a contract that spelled out 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation procedures. Also needed was strong legal basis 
for compliance by private investors and requirement for them to exercise due diligence and 
historical awareness in dealing with resource-poor and historically disadvantaged 
smallholders. Without such a regulatory framework, it did not seem feasible that 
smallholders could be effectively protected from the negative effects of non-compliance by 
more powerful private investors.  
The Hereford tobacco joint venture also highlighted the need for private investors to adopt 
appropriate communication mechanisms when dealing with farmers, such as smallholders 
of Hereford Irrigation Scheme. Many of the smallholders had low levels of literacy and 
some, like Kabelo Mabalane, were clearly confused about financial accounting systems. In 
the absence of clear understandings about the source of debts, other smallholders, like 
Phineas Sithole, rationalized the confusion by reasoning that the debts could have derived 
from renovations made to the houses. The voiced intention to demand financial statements 
by the assertive among smallholders, such as Pinkie Dube, indicated a growing lack of trust 
in Tobacco RSA's accounting. It also pointed to a need for greater transparency in 
communications between Tobacco RSA and small-scale tobacco producers. The confusion 
about debts increased smallholders' frustration with the 2003/2004 tobacco joint venture 
and created a profound sense of uncertainty and vulnerability. This uncertainty, more than 
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the internal smallholder group politics perceived by some in Tobacco RSA, led to the 
decision by most of the farmers to abandon tobacco production for vegetable production.  
4.10.2 GENDER ISSUES  
Studies by van Koppen (2001), Bastidas (1999), Zwarteveen (1997) and Zwarteveen & 
Neupane (1996) suggest that irrigation farming is not gender neutral, but that gender roles 
and rights strongly determine crop types and levels of production and food security. 
However, although women often played more active roles in day-to-day crop production in 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme, their participation in decision-making tended to be limited. 
Although Hereford Farmers Association was purportedly predicated upon good governance 
principles, such as gender equity, democratic accession into office, involvement of the 
youth, accountability and transparency, such principles appeared to have only been partially 
pursued. Indications were that there were unaddressed gender power issues among 
smallholders within the organization. 
Female farmers were generally less informed about joint venture decisions than their male 
counterparts. A case in point was the decision to resolve the debt issue. In one example, 
smallholder Phineas Sithole knew the fact that the debts had been written off from his 
attendance of a project meeting, which was held at the premises of Hereford Farmers 
Association. However, his second wife, Maina, did not attend this meeting and did not have 
the information. Ironically, Maina (aged 47) was the household member most actively 
involved in the day-to-day production of crops on the plot. By contrast, Kabelo Mabalane, 
who was a 63-year old widowed female head of household and registered occupant of land 
on Plot W, had more access to meetings and therefore decision-making platforms. While 
such access might be construed to confer a greater degree of power than that of 
unregistered married women, Kabelo’s lack of formal education was a major constraint to 
her understanding of financial issues. This undermined her capacity to influence decision 
making processes.  
The debt resolution issue therefore highlighted the gender division of labour and power 
dynamics within the smallholder group, within households and among individuals. These 
factors were related to variables such as levels of individual and household literacy, social 
networks and security of access to bases of power and productive wealth. In the case of the 
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Sithole household, Phineas was the registered occupant of the productive land in Plot L and 
therefore had access to meetings in which the decisions were taken and information 
communicated. Conversely, his second wife Maina had access to productive land through 
marriage to Phineas, and relied on him to pass on information from meetings. Despite her 
relatively higher contribution to crop production in the irrigation scheme, she was in a 
weaker position to influence the decisions and access information that affected her 
livelihood.  
Compared to married women like Maina Sithole, elderly and illiterate female smallholders, 
such as Kabelo Mabalane, were in a more vulnerable position. Such women had to contend 
with more challenges, such as the dominance of male smallholders on the scheme, 
advanced age, illiteracy and burdens of taking responsibility for the well-being and food 
security of their entire households, including grandchildren. Such contraints left these 
elderly female smallholders feeling more uncertain and vulnerable than most of the other 
smalleholders. Therefore, although all smallholders theoretically had the same degree of 
access to livelihood assets, such as productive land and water, and opportunities, such as 
membership of a joint venture, those female smallholders who were most poorly endowed 
with capacity and capability to effectively utilize endowments and entitlements remained 
relatively more disadvantaged than the rest.  
Amid such gender inequalities, Hereford Women’s Project was described as “struggling”, 
due to inconsistency of funding, and was largely invisible. There was also no indication of 
how such a project would contribute to mainstreaming the strategic interests of women 
farmers, irrespective of whether or not they were registered smallholders, and women farm 
workers in the irrigation scheme. In contexts such as Hereford, where men dominated land 
holding (see Table 9 in Section 4.4) and decision making arenas, it seemed important for the 
Hereford Women’s Project to have clearly articulated and actively pursued objectives to 
address women’s strategic interests. Despite observed weaknesses, women's project 
provided a possible opportunity for women farmers to mobilize their greater involvement in 
decision making and access to information.   
Observations that gender power dynamics in irrigation schemes are often problematic (van 
Koppen, 2001; Bastidas, 1999; Zwarteveen, 1997; Zwarteveen & Neupane, 1996) suggested 
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a need for clearly stated and funded programmes of action around awareness creation, 
adoption and promotion of gender-sensitive principles.  South African financing mechanisms 
for support to black smallholders, such as of those of CASP, AgriBEE and the DWA Policy on 
the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers, make provisions for gender 
equity. The DWA policy, in particular, goes a step further by basing levels of financial grants 
on the proportion of historically disadvantaged females within decision-making structures of 
farmers’ legal entities. However, such frameworks needed to go beyond issues of gender 
equity by mainstreaming gender and generating gender perspectives not only in rhetoric 
but also in practice.  
4.10.3 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CAPITAL-INTENSIVE CROPS 
A major source of risk to livelihood security for smallholders related to decisions to promote 
smallholders’ market entry through their involvement in capital intensive production of cash 
or industrial crops. Such decisions were based on perceived ‘niches’ within regional and 
global markets. The decision to involve Hereford smallholders in the tobacco joint venture, 
despite that production of the crop under contract with MKTV had historically been 
unsuccessful in Hereford55, appeared to have been influenced by the decline of tobacco 
production in Zimbabwe following orchestrated “fast-track” land reform. Firstly, the decline 
in imports of Zimbabwean tobacco by BAT-SA to around 10 per cent of levels of previous 
years reduced competition from Zimbabwe’s prime quality tobacco and created a gap in 
supply. This seemed to provide an opportunity for entry into the tobacco sector by South 
African smallholders. However, broader market trends also showed that Brazil had 
increased its output of prime tobacco, thereby claiming a significant share of the market. 
Secondly, BAT-PLC, a major role-player in world tobacco trade, had recently nominated 
Brazil, the United States and Zimbabwe as major sources of tobacco for the future56. 
Effectively, the longer term competitiveness of small-scale tobacco producers in Hereford 
remained as uncertain as it had historically been, when white smallholders occupied the 
irrigation scheme.  
                                                     
55
 See Sections 5.8.4.3 and 5.8.4.4 of this thesis. 
56
 Interview with the General Manager of BAT – Zimbabwe Ltd., 06 May 2005. 
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Channeling significant investments towards capital intensive crops, such as tobacco, and 
selecting crops on the basis of perceived short-term opportunities seemed to predispose 
smallholders to the risk of debts and losses. While such risk is typical of most commercial 
farming activity, Hereford smallholders were particularly vulnerable to possible losses 
emanating from changing trends, given that their historical background of deprivation and 
prevailing poverty and inequality posed significant constraints to market entry and survival. 
Smallholders’ crop production accounts (see Table 15 in Section 4.8.2 and Table 16 in 
Section 4.8.4.1) showed that tobacco was a capital-intensive crop. Direct production costs 
accounted for between 89 per cent and over 320 per cent of the farmers’ net receipts from 
tobacco sales in 2004. In 1999, production costs per farmer ranged from 39.2 per cent of the 
receipts from sales for the more successful farmers to 127.6 per cent for the less successful. 
The insurance costs, which are shown in Tables 16, were relatively high, accounting for 
between 30 and 34 per cent of the total production costs. This implied that tobacco was 
also a risky crop. The high risks involved, requirement for substantial capital outlay and 
financial losses experienced by successive tobacco joint ventures in Hereford raised 
questions on the ability of smallholders to sustain tobacco production without long term 
financial assistance.  
Studies by de Klerk (1996) on similar farming schemes in the Western Cape suggest that 
adequate financial support is central to any programme to establish small-scale farmers. A 
critical factor determining the viability of farming activity is ‘gearing’. This is the degree to 
which farming activities are funded by a small-scale farmer’s own funds relative to finance 
through creditors’ funds. A “rule of thumb” of the South African Agricultural Union 
considers that farms with a debt of more than 30 per cent in their financial structure are 
unsound, while those with a debt level above 50 per cent are unlikely to survive (Ibid.). The 
study qualitatively examined tobacco joint venture debts and their broader institutional 
context against established ‘best practice’, such as outlined by De Klerk (Ibid.).  
The South African Minister of Finance’s announcement in February 2005 of the launch of a 
government-funded credit scheme to support emerging small-scale farmers (Business 
Report, 2005) was greeted with optimism within commercial farming circles. This was 
despite the fact that agricultural credit schemes for small-scale farmers, which have 
 
 
 
 
 224 
traditionally been an important component of agricultural development projects, had often 
failed. In the case of Hereford, tobacco production costs had been often far exceeded 50 per 
cent of net earnings, with much of the costs financed through a subsidy grant from BAT 
South Africa as well as subsidies from government. It seemed that, since subsidies were not 
sustainable in the long term, smallholders – if they survived the initial phases of market 
entry - might in future resort to credit schemes to finance the production of capital 
intensive crops. In such event, the high ratio between possible debts and net earnings could 
render small-scale tobacco producers vulnerable to downturns in tobacco market prices. 
There seemed to be a need therefore for a cautionary approach to farmer credit schemes as 
a means of supporting market entry by smallholders.  
Following observations of failure by supply-led credit, critics have placed particular 
emphasis on the need to ensure institutional efficiency, sustainability of the credit 
programmes measured in terms of few default incidences, viable interest rates and the 
degree of integration of the credit project with the overall development of a rural financial 
market. In the wake of new institutional designs, there have been concerns whether or not 
loans are used efficiently by borrowers, institutions meet farmers' demands for credit, credit 
programmes enhance farmers' access to market and whether they treat borrowers 
equitably. While such concerns call for continued studies to evaluate credit delivery 
initiatives by development projects, there also seems to be a need to examine the potential 
of credit to significantly raise small-scale farmers’ degrees of leverage, rendering their 
attempts at commercial production highly risky. Such an examination is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
4.10.4 JOINT VENTURE RISKS IN THE CONTEXT OF RURAL POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY 
The Hereford case pointed to the fact that emerging producers within joint ventures, who 
were often resource poor and vulnerable, carried an inordinately high proportion of risk. 
They lacked sufficient information on market trends and enjoyed very little power to 
influence producer prices. By contrast, private investor partners had greater access to 
information on market trends, a stronger vested interest in the produce and yet carried a 
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relatively lower risk. This asymmetry reflected the larger structural inequalities that 
characterize much of South Africa’s rural economy.  
An example of Hereford smallholders’ vulnerability to risks associated with capital intensive 
farming related to the decision by Hereford farmers to grow tobacco, despite the fact that 
similar ventures with MKTV had historically been unsuccessful in Hereford. Perceptions 
were  that the decline of Zimbabwe’s prime tobacco production and exports to BAT – South 
Africa, following the orchestrated “fast-track” land reform, constituted opportunities for 
entry into the tobacco sector by small-scale South African farmers. While joint venture 
partners differed in their views about emerging farmers’ crop production skills and the 
quality of tobacco produced, prospects for successful market entry were foreclosed by an 
increase in Brazil’s share of prime tobacco output as well as nomination by BAT – PLC of 
Brazil, the United States and Zimbabwe to be major sources of tobacco for the future57. 
Failure by private investors to factor global tobacco markets trends into formulations of 
BEE-based corporate social responsibility projects unduly exposed smallholders to risk and 
raised questions about the sustainability of joint ventures that promote capital intensive 
crops, such as tobacco, as a means of empowering emerging farmers.  
In the aftermath of joint venture failure, smallholders’ apprehension about involvement in 
joint ventures could be understood in light of livelihood insecurity, such as observed in the 
household of Kereng Maphala (see Section 4.8.3.5). Maphala lost most of his productive 
assets when the Land Bank repossessed these in lieu of a pre-existing debt owed by the 
smallholder. This severely curtailed Maphala’s capacity to engage in the Hereford Tobacco 
Project and, alternatively, to grow any other crops in 2004. While the smallholder awaited 
recovery from asset loss, individual members of his household adopted various coping 
strategies. They diversified their livelihood strategies away from primary reliance on farming 
to greater reliance on informal off-farm employment. However, the vulnerability of this 
household was likely to be of longer term given that the total household income came from 
Maphala’s intermittent self-employment in odd jobs, such as mending fences, daughter 
Elsie’s informal employment in exchange for food and soap, and a child support grant of 
R340 for two of Elsie's children (see Box 3 in Section 4.5.2.5).  
                                                     
57 Interview with the General Manager of BAT – Zimbabwe Ltd., 06 May 2005. 
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Maphala’s case was by no means unique. The widespread failure to repay loans within the 
scheme was recognised prior to the tobacco joint venture. The Land Bank’s involvement in 
Hereford Irrigation Scheme was linked to the REAP programme, which since 1997 had 
provided the farmers with inputs on a no-interest credit to the value of R54 052 through the 
government's erstwhile National Agricultural Sector Investment Programme. A mere R7 
332.10 had been repaid by 2000, and an evaluation of REAP recommended that the Land 
Bank should be involved in designing a scheme in which REAP could provide funds for on-
lending by the bank to the farmers, with the bank monitoring repayments. It was not clear 
whether Maphala's debt was linked to the REAP assistance. However, recurrence within 
Hereford of joint ventures that provided credit to farmers and exposed them to risks, debts 
and possible losses of assets and livelihoods seemed to require urgent interventions to 
break the vicious cycle of vulnerability and livelihood insecurity.  
The broader local context in which joint venture projects such as Hereford’s were 
undertaken was one that was not only designated by government to be an ISRDP poverty 
node, but also one that was renowned as a cradle for rural resistance to apartheid. At the 
micro-level, Hereford Irrigation Scheme was the site of historical and ongoing contestations 
over land, water and related resources between emerging black farmers and established 
white farmers. Multiple stakeholder interests therefore converged upon processes of 
agricultural ‘development’ within the irrigation scheme and in the municipal arena. For key 
stakeholders in the private sector, involvement in economic empowerment of Hereford 
smallholders provided an opportunity to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by 
fostering entry by black petty commodity producers into the tobacco sector. A corollary to 
such involvement was that in partnering with smallholders, private investors not only 
broadened their access to productive agricultural resources but also spread the risk of 
capital intensive tobacco farming.  
The failure of joint ventures in Hereford Irrigation Scheme suggested a need for measures to 
reduce exposure of emerging farmers to the high risks associated with capital intensive 
farming.  In contexts where redress of results of past discrimination has been central to 
debates about impacts of government interventions, it was imperative that joint ventures 
should not reverse the limited gains made by emerging black farmers since 1994.  
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4.10.5 COST AND BENEFITS SHARING ISSUES IN JOINT VENTURES 
Linked to the issue of risk was the question of mechanisms for sharing costs and benefits by 
joint venture partners. In the case of Hereford, private investors, farmers and government 
all variously contributed to the production of tobacco, vegetables and other crops. On the 
one hand, private investors made significant contribution, with BAT-South Africa providing a 
grant of R3 million and Tobacco RSA providing technical and managerial services to the 
tobacco joint venture. While BAT-South Africa’s capital input assisted farmers by eliminating 
debt-related costs and risks, it raised questions around ownership and control of the crop. 
On the other hand, the government made even greater contribution, paying R7 million for 
the rehabilitation of the water storage dam on the scheme, R281 165 to settle arrears in the 
emerging farmers’ water account and R550 000 towards the construction of greenhouses, 
among other expenses (refer to Table 14). Government also funded, through the policy of 
the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers, a further R2.2 million required 
by emerging farmers towards lining the Hereford canal. Government also made other non-
monetary contributions in the form of extension services, mechanization and, most 
importantly, land, which was envisaged to be transferred to the emerging farmers in terms 
of the Hereford LRAD project. Apart from contributing their labour and participating in 
decision making, the farmers were mostly recipients of assistance from private investors 
and government. This was expected to change with eventual cessation of government 
subsidies and introduction of ‘efficiency’ measures of the IWRM approach. 
Despite their seemingly modest contribution, smallholders nonetheless enjoyed relatively 
high degrees of freedom to make decisions about the private investors they entered into 
joint ventures with. While this indicated a relatively high degree of devolution of decision 
making, it also highlighted weaknesses pertaining to the capacity of the farmers’ 
organization to negotiate terms and conditions of joint venture arrangements. Absence of 
written contracts for tobacco joint ventures from 2002 to 2004 and inflated business plan 
projections by a vegetable joint venture in 2005 were cases in point. There remained needs 
to clarify issues around ownership and control of produce and for joint venture partners to 
agree on principles of communication, transparency and accountability. 
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Devolution of decision-making power in the case of Hereford did not translate into desired 
power for smallholders within joint ventures. In light of the significant financial and non-
monetary contributions by government, and in view of the core objectives of the 
Agricultural Sector Strategy, the National Water Act, the Land Reform Policy and the ISRDP, 
it was imperative that policy practitioners provided structured and coordinated support to 
farmers entering into joint ventures.  
4.10.6 INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION AND MONITORING 
Scholars observe that challenges to achieving integration between local authorities and 
water-related institutions tend to persist long after sector reforms have been put in place, 
often with negative impacts on local people’s livelihoods and wellbeing (Tapela, 2002b). The 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 established municipalities as developmental local 
authorities and accorded them the legal responsibility to promote, undertake and 
coordinate all development planning and budgeting, facilitate compliance with the 
principles of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations and monitor the 
impact and effectiveness of any services, policies, programmes or plans within their areas of 
jurisdiction. While the Hereford case showed that there was an attempt to achieve a degree 
of integration across spheres and sectors of government, and between government, civil 
society and the private sector, the support provided by the multiplicity of stakeholders to 
emerging farmers was often fragmented, and coordination and monitoring was generally 
lacking. The export-orientated pilot vegetable project, which was facilitated by Africare 
under REAP, showed that the capacity of the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality to 
play effective coordination and monitoring roles was limited.  
In the case of Greater Groblersdal local municipality, the LED Committee for Agriculture 
constituted a relevant structure for dealing with cases such as joint ventures in the Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme. Such structure brought together large and small-scale commercial 
farmers, communal farmers and relevant locally based government departments, NGOs and 
the agri-business sector. However, in the aftermath of district-level contestations about 
location of the Hereford pack house, Greater Groblersdal LED Committee for Agriculture 
virtually collapsed owing to the lack of an LED Plan for the municipal IDP and a broadly 
perceived lack of leadership and support within the municipality.  
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While the link between local municipal LED Committee for Agriculture and Mpumalanga 
Coordinating Committee for Agricultural Water (CCAW) had lacked coherence, the collapse 
of the former structure left a gap in institutional arrangements for effective coordination of 
support to smallholders in irrigation schemes and addressing their requirements within 
municipal IDPs. Subsequently, there were moves at provincial and regional levels towards 
improved coordination. Promotion of entry into commercial production by emerging 
farmers became driven by the CCAW. This structure brought together actors from the 
environmental cluster, namely, officials of departments for water, agriculture, land and the 
environment. The Mpumalanga CCAW provided a key link between the national and the 
local spheres of government and, in particular, with the pilot phase of national RESIS 
Programme. It was through the CCAW that Hereford Farmers Association and Hereford 
Irrigation Board submitted applications in August and September 2004 respectively for 
government subsidies for improved access to water. A common view by some actors within 
the CCAW was that the smallholders’ application would receive approval because of their 
classification as 'resource poor irrigation farmers' and also because of their association with 
the LRAD Programme. Consequently, the application by Hereford Farmers Association was 
lodged in terms of the DWA Policy on Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation 
Farmers, whose adoption in September 2004 coincided with and seemed to be informed to 
an extent by Hereford smallholders’ need for support.  
4.10.7 MONITORING 
In addition to the need for improved coordination, joint venture settings such as those of 
Greater Sekhukhune District and Hereford Irrigation Scheme, in particular, seemed to 
require effective monitoring mechanisms. Smallholders were poised to strengthen the 
security of their land tenure, obtain further substantial assistance from government and 
enter highly competitive and globalized commodity sectors. The faced significant constraints 
to their aspirations, while the various support mecahnisms by government fell short of 
meeting farmers’ requirements. With the emergence of ‘public-private partnerships’ and 
AgriBEE, private investors offered additional options for support to emerging farmers. Such 
milieu, however, was influenced by a multiplicity of convergent, divergent and overlapping 
stakeholder interests. Complexities of managing such diversity of interests and associated 
power dynamics were compounded by autonomous individual and collective decision-
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making by smallholders. Within such flux, definition of requirements for accountability and 
monitoring became blurred. While the Municipal Systems Act vested municipalities with the 
legal mandate to coordinate development interventions within their areas of jurisdiction, 
the local authorities lacked capacity to perform coordinating roles, which raised questions 
about their capacity to assume monitoring roles.  
The Hereford case suggested that policy and decision makers needed to find ways of 
ensuring that joint ventures involving resource poor irrigation farmers were effectively 
monitored, not only for economic viability, but for compliance with BEE objectives, impacts 
on livelihood security and downward accountability.  Criteria for monitoring performance of 
RESIS Programme contract farming arrangements and, more broadly, agricultural 
commercialization interventions necessarily had to accommodate the diversity of 
smallholder farming objectives and livelihood contexts.  
 4.11 CONCLUSION 
 
The Hereford case epitomizes South Africa's challenge of addressing rural poverty and 
inequality through coordinated strategies involving government, civil society and the private 
sector, in partnership with local people. Whereas governance problems of the Hereford 
tobacco project were largely contained within the joint venture arrangement, those of the 
vegetable project were largely driven and politicized by external influences. The pack house 
project illustrates how involvement of a multiplicity of stakeholders, including 
municipalities, in the governance of joint venture projects, such as the Hereford vegetable 
project, can impact upon livelihood strategies and aspirations of black farmers in 
smallholder irrigation schemes. The vegetable pack house, in particular, assumed an 
allegorical image through which smallholders’ struggles to eke sustainable livelihoods from 
the gains made through access to productive land were played out.  
Following what they perceived to be failure of the initial vegetable pack house project, 
smallholders decided to enter into partnership with MKTV and later Tobacco RSA, regardless 
of advice to the contrary. This indicated the level of the smallholders’ mistrust in the 
broader stakeholder participation process. By closing their ranks and engaging in an 
independent joint venture with MKTV and Tobacco RSA, the farmers effectively tried to 
reclaim their freedom to determine their livelihoods. However, they lacked capacity to 
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discern flaws in the bases and structure of institutional arrangements for tobacco 
production. The unintended failure of the tobacco project in 2004 indicated the need to 
build trust, confidence and cooperation in relationships between smallholders and other 
stakeholders, as a means to enhancing decision making capacity of the latter and thereby 
reducing undue exposure to risk. Smallholders’ interests, rather than the diffuse interests of 
an ill-defined constituency at large, necessarily have to be at the centre of such 
relationships.  
The role of municipalities in the multi-stakeholder decision making process, in particular, 
should be seen in light of the decentralization ethos of developmental local government. 
The Municipal Systems Act 23 of 2000 gave municipalities the legal responsibility to 
coordinate development planning, implementation and budgeting within their areas of 
jurisdiction. Assumptions of the logic of such decentralization are that local institutions can 
better discern and are more likely to respond to local needs and aspirations; and that when 
downwardly accountable local authorities possess discretionary powers over significant 
issues within their local jurisdictions, there is good reason to believe that greater equity and 
efficiency will follow (Ribot, 2002: 5). Contrary to such assumptions, devolution of decision-
making, in the case of Hereford’s vegetable project, attempted a democratic and equitable 
resource allocation process but in the process failed to achieve fairness and effectiveness. 
Allegations of power dynamics, resource capture and procedural flaws all point to 
perceptions that the decision making process became perverted by individual self-interest, 
political clout and preoccupation with interests of an ill-defined farming constituency at 
large, at the expense of practical realism about the specific problem at hand.  
Part of the dilemma can be traced back to institutional arrangements for constituency-
based decision making. Under such conditions, governance practices tend to predispose 
elected councillors’ accountability towards pursuing the interests of their constituencies. 
Differences in degrees of power, influence and vested interests among elected councillors 
often result in decisions that favour the interests of the more powerful among stakeholders 
and actors. Although the negative effects of power dynamics on the Hereford vegetable 
project were eventually resolved, smallholders were cast for a while into positions of deep 
vulnerability. During this time, they lived precariously, constantly devised coping strategies, 
such as livelihood diversification, straddling and, for most farmers, greater reliance on off-
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farm employment than farm-based productivity. The legacy of the difficult time became 
evident in the increase of subsistence livestock farming alongside crop production within 
the irrigation scheme.  
It might be tempting to surmise, in the final analysis, that despite flaws in decision making 
processes, such as described above, municipalities can play useful roles in pursuing the 
interests of local people and coordinating the facilitative and monitoring roles by other 
stakeholder institutions. It might also be tempting to assume therefore that the degree to 
which municipalities can fulfill these roles depends on the extent to which they are 
downwardly accountable. It might indeed seem worth commending the district and local 
municipalities for eventually exercising leadership and magnanimity in resolving the effects 
of a flawed multi-stakeholder decision making process for the Hereford vegetable project. 
However, shifts in the behaviour of municipal actors towards institutional cooperation and 
support to Hereford smallholders were more likely due to pressure from above. 
 Such reasoning draws on the fact that the Hereford Irrigation Scheme was the focus of 
attention by a wide range of stakeholders and observers ranging from local to international 
levels. The designation of Greater Sekhukhune District as an ISRDP node placed an 
additional imperative on government interventions to be seen to be effective in addressing 
issues of poverty and inequality and, in particular, redressing historical injustices and 
empowering black farmers. International events, such as the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, also contributed to increasing focus on the manner in which 
municipalities exercised governance within the ISRDP poverty node (Tapela, 2002a). Given 
this background, it would seem that municipal actors were under constant scrutiny and 
influence from an undefined power source above. While such power evidently had strong 
links to or indeed was part of government, the invisible power source also seemed to have 
similar links to and/or be part of the tripartite alliance, or at least the ANC. Government, 
ANC and the Tripartite Alliance as a whole are the key powerful actors that were commonly 
shared by smallholders and municipalities. Government, ANC and the Tripartite Alliance 
were also the key actors driving land and agrarian reform as well as rural development. The 
district mayor, who was the ISRDP political champion, was an ANC deployee. The majority of 
councillors in both the local and district municipality were members of the ANC (Ibid.). All 
the smallholders were members of the ANC and had networks with affiliated organizations. 
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In the absence of tangible evidence about the exact identity of the force behind decision 
making concerning the Hereford vegetable project and interventions in the irrigation 
scheme in general, the study could only allude, with confidence, to the existence of a hidden 
source or sources of influence.      
Given significant government expenditure on promoting farmers' livelihoods, the need for 
effective coordination and monitoring of joint ventures cannot be overstated. However, 
what seems more critical is the need to examine the basis of government intervention on a 
hybrid of neo-liberal development approaches and social welfare or anti-poverty 
approaches. In the context of the prevailing commoditization of productive water and land 
resources, and the recurrent failure of joint ventures, government subsidies might not be 
sufficient to secure the livelihoods of emerging farmers. Although the government has made 
moves to address the financial requirements of emerging farmers, there is still need for a 
broader range of support services, including the development of skills that strengthen 
farmer organizations to enable them to deal with both the internal and external power 
issues. Such skills contribute to the effectiveness of existing efforts to develop production, 
processing and marketing skills.  
Hereford joint venture projects have been located within a designated ISRDP poverty node 
that is renowned as a cradle for rural resistance to apartheid as well as a site for on-going 
contestations over access to bases of productive wealth and social, economic and political 
power. This context places a strong imperative on policy makers to ensure that government 
interventions comprehensively and effectively address macro-economic policy objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
CHAPTER 5 
 PHETWANE IRRIGATION SCHEME 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Phetwane Irrigation Scheme is a government-owned scheme located within Hindustan farm 
in Ward 9 of Greater Marble Hall Local Municipality in the Greater Sekhukhune District 
(Figure 18). The scheme is located in a communal area under the leadership of Kgoshi 
Matlala of the baKone people. In terms of the RESIS programme design, Phetwane is part of 
the Upper Arabie Balemi Irrigation Scheme Trust58, which comprises a group of four 
irrigation schemes within Cluster 11 of the programme. This cluster consists of a total of 
nineteen (19) irrigation schemes located along the eastern banks of the Olifants River 
immediately downstream of the Flag Boshielo Dam (previously known as Arabie Dam) 
(Figure 18). Phetwane Irrigation Scheme occupies 52.77 ha59 out of 426 ha of irrigated land 
within the Upper Arabie irrigation area (Table 17).  
 
There are forty nine (49) smallholders in the scheme. Forty seven (47) of these farmers took 
part in a RESIS joint venture to produce cotton in 200460 and a RESIS-Recharge strategic 
partnership in 2008. These institutional arrangements were part of the LDA-driven RESIS 
Programme. Key stated objectives of the programme were to promote entry by black 
                                                     
58 Upper Arabie is registered with the Department of Justice as a trust organization (Certificate J246 of 2004, 
Trust Number 3011/040 under the Trust Property Control Act (57) of 1988.   
59
 Constitution of the Phetwane Farmers Association 
60
 Focus group discussion with irrigation farmers at a meeting held in Phetwane village on 11 December 2003. 
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farmers into commercial agriculture and to ensure food security in communities living in 
and around irrigation schemes. Revitalization of crop production in Phetwane began in 2003 
during the earlier stage of Phase 2 of the RESIS Programme. Revitalization was preceded by 
rehabilitation of infrastructure from 2001 to 2003 under the Community Production Centres 
(CPCs) Programme led by the Limpopo provincial Department of Public Works. Following 
rehabilitation and revitalization of the irrigation scheme, smallholders received support 
from various government, non-governmental and private sector agencies. Phetwane 
smallholders complemented this support by investing, to varying degrees, their time, labour 
and other resources towards utilizing opportunities presented by available arable land, 
water, sound irrigation infrastructure, training courses, joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships within the irrigation scheme. 
This chapter outlines Phetwane people’s experiences of shifts towards agricultural 
commercialization. Particular attention is given to the contract farming arrangements and 
their interactions with the livelihoods of smallholders and other members of Phetwane 
community. Initially, the location of Phetwane is described, followed by presentations of the 
historical background, land allocation, socio-economic profile, overview of livelihood 
aspects of water and land use, and farmer organization. The chapter proceeds to present 
findings on the RESIS joint venture and RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership. Attention is 
given to interactions between agricultural commercialization interventions and contract 
farming arrangements, on the one hand, and livelihoods of smallholders as well as other 
members of Phetwane rural community. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of 
findings. 
 
5.2 LOCATION  
5.2.1 SITUATION 
Phetwane Irrigation Scheme is situated in Hindustan farm, which is approximately 30 km to 
the north-east of the small town of Marble Hall. The irrigation scheme is in Ward 9 of 
Ephraim Mogale (formerly Greater Marble Hall) Local Municipality, within Greater 
Sekhukhune District. The scheme is located in a communal area under the leadership of 
Kgoshi Matlala of the baKone people.  
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In terms of the RESIS programme design, Phetwane is a constituent of Cluster 11, which 
consists of a total of nineteen (19) irrigation schemes located along the banks of the 
Olifants/Lepelle River downstream of Flag Boshielo Dam. Within Cluster 11, Phetwane is a 
constituent of Upper Arabie sub-cluster, which comprises a group of five irrigation schemes. 
These include Mogalatsana on Coetzeesdraai farm, Krokodilheuvel or “Crocodile”, 
Setlaboswane on Vogelstruiskopje farm and Elandskraal (Figure 18). The first four schemes 
comprise a trust organization named Upper Arabie Balemi Irrigation Scheme Trust61. 
Phetwane Irrigation Scheme occupies 52.77 ha62 out of 545 ha of land within the Balemi 
Irrigation Scheme Trust area (Table 17). Located immediately downstream of Flag Boshielo 
Dam (formerly Arabie Dam), Phetwane is lies upstream of all RESIS Cluster 11 irrigation 
schemes in the Olifants/Lepelle River basin.  
 
 
FIGURE 18 LOCATION OF PHETWANE IN THE CONTEXT OF UPPER ARABIE BALEMI 
IRRIGATION SCHEME TRUST AREA, 2009 
 
                                                     
61 Upper Arabie is registered with the Department of Justice as a trust organization (Certificate J246 of 2004, 
Trust Number 3011/040 under the Trust Property Control Act (57) of 1988.   
62
 Constitution of the Phetwane Farmers Association 
 
 
 
 
 237 
TABLE 17 PHETWANE IN THE CONTEXT OF UPPER ARABIE BALEMI IRRIGATION 
SCHEME TRUST AREA, 2009 
Name of Scheme Total Area (in hectares) Number of Farmers 
Phetwane (Hindustan) 52.77 49
63
 
Mogalatsane (Coetzeesdraai) 131 98 
Krokodilheuwel 243 202 
Setlaboswane (Vogelstruiskoppie) 119 99 
Total for Upper Arabie Balemi Trust Area 545 (396 irrigated) 445 
Source: Limpopo Department of Agriculture, 2002:46 
5.2.2 SITE AND BIOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Phetwane Irrigation Scheme is sited on very gently sloping terrain within the valley of the 
Olifants/Lepelle River, at approximately 800m altitude. The communal area is bordered by 
the Lepelle River to the west and Makotswane River to the north, while the Flag Boshielo 
Dam lies directly to the south and the smaller Makotswane (Buffelsdoorn) Dam is to the 
north-east.  
In the broader Greater Sekhukhune area, the undulating grassy plains of the Highveld give 
way to the lower-lying Bushveld areas and the mountanous terrain dissected by the 
Oliphants/Lepelle River system (Tapela, 2002). Rainfall is seasonal and is distributed mostly 
in the summer months from November to April, while the winters are generally cool and dry 
(Ibid.). The ecological diversity of the area has encouraged the establishment of a number of 
tourist resorts and nature reserves, such as Schuinsdraai and Leswana Nature Reserves, 
which are respectively located to the west and south-east of Phetwane.  
5.2.3 POPULATION   
In 2004, there were 195 households in Phetwane64. At an estimated average of 5.5 persons 
per household65, the total population of Phetwane in 2004 was approximately 1073 people. 
The study surveyed 72 per cent (140) of all Phetwane households and 98 per cent (47) of 
irrigation plotholders’ households. The questionnaire survey gathered data on 
                                                     
63
Focus group discussion with irrigation farmers held in Phetwane village on 11 December 2003.  
64
 Discussion with chairperson of the Community Development Committee, Mr Petros Magane, on 19 April 
2004. This figure differs from the Phetwane village population data in the Greater Marble Hall IDP of 2008-9.  
65
 Socio-Demographic Data in the Final Report of the Greater Marble Hall Municipality IDP, Volume 1: Analysis. 
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characteristics of a total of 413 adults aged eighteen (18) years. Of these, 47 (or 11.4 per 
cent) were pensioners aged 65 years and above. A few households from among irrigation 
plotholders and the rest of the village population were selected for in-depth follow-up 
interviews and informal discussions. While some of these households were interviewed 
once, others were interviewed several times at interval over a two-and-a-half year period. 
During the course of the study, several focus group discussions were held with smallholders 
and interested members of Phetwane community.  
5.2.4 WATER SOURCES AND USES 
Phetwane was dissected by a number of rivers and streams, principal of which were the 
Olifants/Lepelle and Makotswane Rivers. While the Makotswane River and smaller streams 
were seasonal, the Olifants/Lepelle River flowed throughout the year. A significant 
proportion of the flow was impounded by the Flag Boshielo Dam and smaller proportions of 
water collected in numerous, deep, crocodile-infested pools within the river, thus ensuring 
water availability during the drier months. Such water pools were used primarily for fishing.  
Water sources for Phetwane community included both natural drainage and man-made 
hydraulic features, such as irrigation schemes and domestic water supply infrastructure. 
Natural sources included the Olifants/Lepelle and Makotswane Rivers, wetlands, rainfall and 
groundwater. Man-made water infrastructure included the Flag Boshielo Dam, which was 
situated upstream of the community, the Makotswane Dam and canal, homestead taps 
within private dwelling units, infrastructure for livestock water supply and irrigation 
infrastructure, which included a floppy irrigation system and canals. There were, however, 
no dip tanks for the livestock.  
Fifty-two (52) hectares of agricultural land were set aside for the smallholder irrigation 
scheme. The rest of the agricultural land was allocated to pasture. No land was set aside for 
dryland or rain-fed crop farming. Hence, rainfall was the main source of water for pasture 
and a wet season supplementary source for the irrigation scheme. Since 2005, rainfall had 
also been used to supplement irrigation of homestead gardens, which relied mainly on 
potable water from domestic water supplies. The number of homestead gardens increased 
significantly following interruption crop production in the irrigation scheme in 2003. This 
phenomenon was reinforced by rising food prices. However, there were no investments in 
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rainwater harvesting technologies, other than the breaking up of soil to enhance 
percolation.  
The Flag Boshielo and Makotswane Dams were replenished by rain water mainly during 
rainy seasons. The catchment area of the Flag Boshielo Dam was much larger and the dam, 
whose wall was raised by five metres in 2005, provided most of the water for domestic, 
irrigation and livestock uses in Phetwane as well as in a number of other smallholder 
irrigation schemes downstream. By contrast, the Makotswane Dam had a small catchment 
area and a lower storage capacity. Although the dam wall was recently raised, assurance of 
supply remained low due to the frequency of droughts in the local catchment area. The 
Makotswane Dam appeared to have been decommissioned as the main source of water for 
Phetwane and the neighbouring Mogalatsana Irrigation Scheme due to opportunities 
presented by the greater availability of water from Flag Boshielo Dam and rehabilitation of 
irrigation infrastructure under RESIS and RESIS-Recharge.  
Direct rainwater users were primarily livestock owners and, to a lesser extent, households 
with homestead gardens. In principle, access to communal pasture was open to all 
recognized members of the community and was subject to locally defined rules regarding 
management of animal populations, grazing regimes and maintenance of pastures. In 
practice, however, pastoral land was mainly used by livestock owning households. A 
relatively small proportion (24 per cent) of households owned cattle, while the majority (87 
per cent) owned goats. Beyond grazing requirements, the rangelands provided sources of 
firewood, construction and fencing poles and raw material for traditional fishing rods and 
fish traps, among other resources.  
The study identified one wetland in the largely dry area. The wetland was in the lower 
reaches of a tributary of Makotswane River to the north of the village. An elderly male 
landless farmer, who lived next to the wetland, had established several food gardens on 
land adjacent to the seasonally waterlogged core of the wetland area. The farmer grew 
crops such as maize, beans and pumpkins in the rainy season and sweet potatoes in the dry 
season. The farmer relied on soil moisture rather than direct abstraction of water from the 
stream. 
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5.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Phetwane Irrigation Scheme was established in 1957 in a small village on Hindustan Farm in 
the Rakgwadi area of Lebowa homeland. The farm is located in a communal area under 
Kgoshi Matlala of baKone-ba-Matlala people. According to Claassens (2001: 9), baKone-ba-
Matlala arrived in Rakgwadi in 1957 following their move from Madibong in 
Sekhukhuneland. Claassens (ibid.) links the background to this move to Pedi people’s 
resistance to bantu authorities’ ‘betterment’ policy and to the policy of ‘tribal self-rule’ in 
Sekhukhuneland and the apartheid authorities’ efforts to undermine this resistance. In 
documenting the history of the Sekhukhuneland Revolt of 1958, Peter Delius (1996: Chapter 
4) alludes to apartheid authorities’ manipulation of the paramountcy of traditional 
leadership, headmen and some black civil servants as a means towards breaking Pedi 
people’s resistance to Bantu Education and to the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. The latter 
combined with the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act of 1959 to strengthen the 
political power of government-appointed traditional leaders. Kgoshi Frank Shikoane Matlala 
Maseremule, father of the current Kgoshi Mokgome M. Matlala, was among the first 
headmen (dikgoshana) to break resistance and accept from the apartheid government 
chieftainship of a separately recognised baKone-ba-Matlala tribe (Claassens, ibid; Delius, 
ibid:118). He was offered twenty-two farms near Marble Hall, including Hindustan, to 
accommodate his people. This land was purchased after 1936 by the state from white 
owners and allocated in trust to various communities living under the authority of their 
respective chiefs and village heads, including Chief Matlala (Claassens, 2001; Lahiff, 1999: 
vii).  
While the land purchase was linked to the promulgation of the Native Trust and Land Act 18 
of 1936 and resettlement of baKone-ba-Matlala to events preceding the passing of the 
Bantu Promotion of Self-government Act of 1959 (Lahiff, 1999:19, Claassens, 2001), the 
establishment of Phetwane Irrigation Scheme in 1957 also followed publication in 1955 of 
the Tomlinson Report66 (Perret, 2001; Vink & Kirsten, 2000).  
Following the establishment of the irrigation scheme at Phetwane, Kgoshi Matlala allocated 
irrigated plots to a number of original and latter settlers on Hindustan Farm. Lahiff (1999:22) 
                                                     
66
 See Section 1.1, pages 23 – 24. 
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observes that while plots allocated from 1969 onwards were based on ‘permission to 
occupy’ certificates (PTOs) issued in terms of the Bantu Areas Land Regulations 
(Proclamation R188 of 1969), it is not clear what form the original registration of plots took. 
What is clear is that from 1957 onwards newly-settled Phetwane farmers began producing 
maize and other grain crops using flood (canal) irrigation67. Water was obtained from the 
Arabie Dam, and the crops produced were stored in a warehouse in the neighbouring village 
of Mogalatsane in Coetzeesdraai Farm, also under Kgoshi Matlala. Production was 
subsidized by the apartheid government until the 1970s when Lebowa homeland authorities 
gained political and administrative authority over labour reserves.  
During the 1970s, the central apartheid government withdrew subsidies and Lebowa 
authorities assumed the responsibility of subsidizing production and operational costs of the 
irrigation scheme. Field owners formed cooperatives and provided labour during planting, 
cultivation, irrigation and weeding68. Ploughing and harvesting were done by “white people” 
(according to Phetwane farmers), who paid smallholders two to three bags of grain from 
each season’s harvest, after deductions for technical assistance, use of tractors and bank 
loans. The farmers’ reference to white people attests to the lived experience and memory of 
apartheid era racial cleavages in the local area as well as the low level of participation by 
black farmers in agricultural production in the scheme during that time. These farmers 
mainly provided cheap labour while public institutional actors and ‘expatriates’, who were 
mainly of European descent, exercised prerogative over production-related decisions and 
activities.  
After 1994, the post-apartheid government abruptly withdrew state subsidies that had 
propped up the scheme since 1957 (Bembridge, 2000; Perret, 2001). The withdrawal of 
subsidies appears to have been influenced, to some extent, by intensification since the 
1980s of an international drive towards irrigation management reforms aimed at enhancing 
“efficiency” in the use of land, water and infrastucture as well as states’ financial and human 
resources. The “centerpiece” of these reforms has been Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT), which has invariably involved the partial or entire transfer of management of 
irrigation systems to Water User Associations (WUAs) or other non-government agencies, 
                                                     
67
 Focus group discussion with irrigation farmers at a meeting held in Phetwane village on 11 December 2003. 
68
 Focus group discussion with irrigation farmers at a meeting held in Phetwane village on 11 December 2003. 
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and the downsizing or withdrawal of government’s role in operation and maintenance, fee 
collection, water management and conflict resolution (Shah et al, 2002). In the South 
African case, Perret (2001) ascribes the withdrawal of state subsidies also to the 
government’s macro-economic policy shift from the RDP to GEAR around 1999, with the 
subsequent adoption of neo-liberal approaches and notions of efficiency. From this 
perspective, the withdrawal of subsidies to schemes such as Phetwane was partly informed 
by perceptions that these schemes were under-productive and inefficiently run. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing rationales, withdrawal of subsidies also seems to have been 
influenced by the post-apartheid government’s objective to dismantle apartheid machinery 
in Bantustans and former homelands. Sekhukhuneland’s history of resistance to colonial and 
apartheid repression (Delius, 1996) appears to provide a key imperative for this objective.  
5.4 LAND ALLOCATION AND TENURE RIGHTS 
Forty nine (49) smallholders occupied 52.77 ha of land in Phetwane irrigation scheme. Most 
of the smallholders were among original inhabitants of Hindustan Farm, who settled in 
Phetwane around 1957. While the legal basis for plot allocations prior to 1969 is not clear 
(Lahiff, 2001), all smallholders in Phetwane stated that they had ‘permission to occupy’ 
certificates (PTOs). These were issued to them or their deceased spouses and/or parents by 
Kgoshi Matlala, who also allocated plots of land within the irrigation scheme. A number of 
plots seem to have been inherited by PTO holders’ male and female children aged below 
sixty years (Figure 19; Table 18). Plot sizes ranged from 0.52 to 1.86 ha (Table28 in n Section 
5.8.3).  
In 2004, the majority (82.6 per cent) of irrigation plot holders were women and men aged 
60 years and above. At least 15.2 per cent of all plotholders were over eighty years old, and 
two of these were aged 102 years. A number of elderly smallholders died between the time 
fieldwork commenced in 2004 to its completion in 2008. These were replaced by their adult 
children. Despite this, names of the deceased tended to remain listed for a while among 
registered smallholders. Respondents were unable to explain the procedure used to replace 
names of deceased smallholders. 
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TABLE 18 PHETWANE: ALLOCATION OF PLOTS THROUGH PTOs BY GENDER AND AGE, 
200469 
  Male % Female % TOTAL % 
40-49yrs 3 6.52 0 0 3 6.4 
50-59yrs 2 4.34 3 6.52 5 10.6 
60-69yrs 2 4.34 16 34.04 18 38.3 
70-79yrs 3 6.52 11 23.91 14 29.8 
over 80yrs 4 8.7 3 6.52 7 14.9 
Total 14 30.42 33 70.99 47 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2004 
Contrary to the tendency for men to hold land rights, which is observed in many communal 
areas of South Africa (Lahiff, 1999; Platzky & Walker, 1985), most of the PTO-holding 
irrigators (71.7 per cent) were elderly women aged fifty (50) years and above  (Figure 19; 
Table 18). Phetwane farmers explained this anomaly as having resulted from colonial and 
apartheid practices of sourcing predominantly male labour from the Sekhukhuneland 
reserve through a Native Employment Bureau Office (NEBO) located in the present-day rural 
settlement of Nebo. This practice left a larger working population of women to carry out 
farming activities in communal lands. In the case of Phetwane, although Chief Matlala 
allocated a significant number of PTOs to male members of the community, some PTOs 
                                                     
69
 Data is based on interviews with 47 out of 49 Phetwane farmers.  
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FIGURE 19 PHETWANE: ALLOCATION OF PLOTS THROUGH PTOs BY GENDER AND 
AGE, 2004 
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were issued to single or widowed female heads of households (e.g. Respondent A70 in Box 
5). This resonates with observed customary law in which the right to land usually applies to 
male heads of households but in practice is sometimes extended to women (Bennet, 
1995:170 in Lahiff, 1999:13). Many of the Phetwane men who obtained PTOs in the 1950s 
had since died and their land rights had since been inherited by their living spouses or, in 
some cases, their off-spring (Respondent B71 in Box 5). This ran counter to PTO regulations 
that granted exclusive life-time usufruct rights.  
Due to the fact that PTOs had been retained within the same households and extended 
families over a long time, irrespective of old age or death, many of the elderly Phetwane 
farmers perceived their PTOs to be a secure form of land tenure, and the usufruct rights 
accorded by PTOs to be inalienable. Such perceptions persisted despite that the repeal of 
the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act in 1991 through the Abolition of Racially Based Land 
Measures Act had rendered PTOs obsolete until the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) of 
2004 formally recognized PTOs as ‘old order rights’. Perceptions of security of land tenure 
were evidently conflated with traditional practices in which land allocated to a household by 
a Chief effectively remained at the disposal of that household for as long as it remained part 
of the community. With agricultural commercialization and the resurgence of contract 
farming in 2003, there emerged inter-generational contestations over land rights between 
elderly Phetwane smallholders and younger landless and jobless members of the 
community.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
70 Psuedonym used. 
71 Psuedonym used. 
Box 5 Examples of the pattern of PTO allocations in Phetwane 
 
Respondent A - Isabel Matsatsi, a woman farmer aged 69 years old in 2004:  
I was born in a siSwati speaking family in Bushbuckridge. I was never married but had children. I arrived in 
the Rakgwadi area in 1962 and settled in Mogalatsane [a neighbouring village]. In 1974 I got permission from 
the Phetwane headman to build a homestead and settle in this village… The “community society” facilitated 
my entry into the scheme. As a destitute and unmarried woman, I worked on the irrigation scheme for five 
years, providing labour together with another woman. This labour served as payment for the irrigated plot 
(Plot 5) that was allocated to me… I personally hold the PTO to this plot.  
 
Respondent B - Modireng Modipelo, a woman farmer aged 65 years old in 2004:   
I arrived in Phetwane with my husband in 1963. We came from Jane Furse. I only had one child, my first born 
child who was born in 1963. Chief Matlala allocated us a [rain-fed] field and a plot on the irrigation scheme, 
and also a PTO certificate. The PTO was under my husband’s name. It changed to my name after he passed 
away. From 1963 to 1984, we grew maize and wheat for sale in Marble Hall…  
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While smallholders strongly believed that their rights to irrigated land were secure, a 
number of landless and unemployed younger people of working age argued that irrigated 
plots should be redistributed in their favour. They premised their argument upon a principle 
in the ANC’s Freedom Charter that “The Land Shall be Shared Among Those Who Work It!” 
Beyond invocation of the ANC’s Freedom Charter, a central issue underpinning arguments 
for redistribution was that the landless and unemployed youth provided much of the labour 
in the irrigation scheme, under the employ of elderly smallholders. They therefore 
considered themselves better placed than the latter to play active roles in commercial 
farming. Contestation by the youth was also linked to high unemployment levels in 
Phetwane village (see Section 5.5.2.3) and to initial expectations that agricultural 
commercialization would generate entrepreneurial and employment opportunities. Given 
that 82.6 per cent of plots on the irrigation scheme were formally held by twenty percent 
(20 per cent) of the adult population aged 60 years and above, intergenerational 
contestations over irrigated land were perhaps not surprising.  
The study could not establish whether or not arguments for land redistribution were linked 
to the Communal Land Rights Bill consultation process of 2003, which coincided with the 
beginning of a RESIS joint venture in Phetwane. Such process actively involved the then-
councillor for Ward 6, who represented the local ANC constituency in parliamentary 
hearings on the bill. It seemed possible that local dynamics around the consultation process 
filtered from elected leadership to the youth. What was evident was that elderly 
smallholders appealed to traditional leadership for support. Since the traditional leadership 
institution had strong control over communal land rights allocation, such strategy enabled 
smallholders to protect their land rights.  
While CLRA recognized PTOs to be old order rights, which strengthened smallholder’s 
security of tenure, the legal instrument also potentially provided a basis for redistribution of 
access through leasing of land. Provisions for this mode of redistribution, however, had yet 
to be tested against obligations of traditional leadership to ensure livelihood security for all 
households within the community. Manona et al (2010) observes that the institutions and 
tools to handle efficient land transactions, particularly in the form of leases, are not 
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available in many smallholder irrigation schemes. The scholar recommends that quitrent 
tenure be transformed to a perpetual or long term conditional state lease system and the 
PTO system to be transformed to usufruct or statutory rights, which should both be 
underpinned by different levels of local level land administration system. This is expected to 
remove systemic obstacles to land exchange, thereby enabling improved land utilisation and 
productivity on smallholder irrigation schemes. However, the argument for a redistribution 
of irrigated plots was complicated by informal arrangements for shared access to land plots 
between smallholders and landless people, which pre-dated RESIS and were based on 
kinship relations and other social networks (Box 6).  
Although irrigated plots in Phetwane were formally allocated to 49 farmers, in practice at 
least fifty-six households were identified by this study as having direct shared access to the 
land (Figure 20; Table 19). Sharing arrangements were often cast within extended family 
contexts and linked to cultural notions of ‘responsibility’ and ‘reciprocation’. Such 
arrangements broadened the social base for livelihood security for elderly smallholders and 
landless and indigent people in the community. Effects of informal sharing arrangements 
included a reduction of exclusive access to plots by people aged over 70 years old and an 
increase in access by people mainly in the 40 – 49 year age group and, to a lesser extent, the 
60 – 69 year age group (Figure 20; Table 19).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 6 Example of shared access to an irrigated plot of land: Excerpt from a discussion with members 
of an extended family, 2004 
 
Respondents - Mosate extended family, including widow Mmabatho Mosate (PTO-holder), Modire Mosate 
(brother of Mmabatho’s deceased husband) and Segametse Mosate (his wife)  
 
Modire: My wife and I arrived in Phetwane in 1976 from Masanteng, near Buffelsdoorn Dam [a few 
kilometers east of Phetwane]. We were allocated a food garden close to the river. We later got a 
plot (Plot 1) in the irrigation scheme from my late brother’s wife, Mmabatho, who still has the 
PTO. We currently have two food gardens, one of which belongs to Mmabatho… Our dilemma is 
that we are struggling to look after our youngest daughter and five orphaned grandchildren, 
children of our son who died. These children are all still at school. What should we do in this case, 
where the orphans need to be cared for but are above the age limit for child care grants?  
 
Mmabatho: It is for this reason that I gave them (Modire and Segametse) my plot and garden….  
 
Segametse: I need my own field. Space is there further downstream of the irrigation scheme…  
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TABLE 19 EFFECT OF SHARING ARRANGEMENTS ON ACCESS TO PLOTS ALLOCATED 
THROUGH PTOs, BY AGE, 2004 
Age Group PTO allocation Access via PTO and Sharing Percentage change 
40-49yrs 6.52 10 3.48 
50-59yrs 10.86 10 -0.86 
60-69yrs 36.95 38 1.05 
70-79yrs 30.43 28 -2.43 
over 80yrs 15.22 14 -1.22 
 
The foregoing discussion shows that it was not easy to argue for land redistribution on the 
basis of simplistic notions of a need to redress skewed land allocations to the elderly.  Inter-
generational tensions over land rights required responsible authorities to engage with 
problematic issues around a historical practice of granting exclusive and indefinite usufruct 
rights to irrigated land in Phetwane. Provisions for leasing of such land, for example, seemed 
to be potentially useful in addressing smallholders’ need for land tenure security and young 
people’s interests in access to land.  
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FIGURE 20 EFFECT OF SHARING ARRANGEMENTS ON ACCESS TO PLOTS 
ALLOCATED THROUGH PTOs, BY AGE, 2004 
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5.5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF PHETWANE COMMUNITY 
5.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Phetwane Irrigation Scheme is located on land occupied by Phetwane community. 
Livelihoods of irrigation farmers were therefore intertwined with those of the rest of 
members of the community. This section presents findings on socio-economic profiles of 
smallholder and non-smallholder households. 
5.5.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF HOUSEHOLDS  
5.5.2.1 Language Composition 
The predominant language spoken in virtually all Phetwane households was Pedi. A number 
of the elderly also spoke other languages, such as Ndebele, Swati, Afrikaans, English and 
Zulu. This was mainly due to their origins outside the Rakgwadi area and/or interactions 
with other ethnic groups through migrant labour. A significant proportion of people 
between the ages of eighteen and fifty were proficient in spoken and written English, owing 
to their relatively higher levels of formal education than those of older members of the 
community. 
5.5.2.2 Gender Composition 
The questionnaire survey showed that there were more adult women than men in 
Phetwane (Figure 21; Table 20). Women constituted 56.7 per cent while men made up 43.3 
per cent of the adult population aged eighteen (18) years and above. The village had a 
predominantly young adult population. Young adults in the age group of eighteen to 
twenty-nine (18 – 29) years constituted 38.5 per cent of the total adult population. Most (80 
per cent) of the adult population was aged below sixty.  
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Table 20 PHETWANE COMMUNITY: ADULT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY GENDER 
AND AGE, 2004 
Age Group 
Male Female Total 
n % n % n % 
18 -29 73 17.68 86 20.82 159 38.5 
30 - 39 32 7.75 42 10.17 74 17.92 
40 - 49 31 7.51 35 8.47 66 15.98 
50 - 59 16 3.87 15 3.63 31 7.5 
60 - 69 7 1.69 29 7.02 36 8.71 
70 -79 4 0.97 14 3.39 18 4.36 
over 80 5 1.21 3 0.73 8 1.94 
Don't know 11 2.66 10 2.42 21 5.08 
TOTAL 179 43.34 234 56.65 413 99.99 
 
5.5.2.3 Employment 
Phetwane had a relatively high rate of unemployment. Unemployed persons of working age 
constituted more than three-quarters (75.3 per cent) of Phetwane’s adult population (Figure 
22; Table 21). This figure was significantly higher than the unemployment rate of Greater 
Sekhukhune District, which was 64.8 per cent (see Table 6 in Section 2.6.2.5). By contrast, 
self-employed, full-time employed, seasonally employed and occasionally employed persons 
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FIGURE 21 PHETWANE COMMUNITY: ADULT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY 
GENDER AND AGE, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 250 
of working age constituted thirteen percent (13.3 per cent) of the village adult population, 
while pensioners constituted eleven percent (11.4 per cent).  
 
 
 
TABLE 21 PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT POPULATION, 2004 
 Number of people Percentage 
Employed 55 13.32 
Unemployed 311 75.3 
Pensioners 47 11.38 
Total 413 100 
 
Figure 23 and Table 22 show the extent to which the bulk of Phetwane’s working age 
population was not gainfully employed in 2004.  Young people aged between 20 and 29 
years constituted the largest proportion (31.8 per cent) of the unemployed (Figure 23; Table 
22).  
13.3% 
75.3% 
11.4% 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Pensioners 
FIGURE 22 PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT 
POPULATION, 2004 
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FIGURE 23 UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE GROUP, 2004 
 
TABLE 22 UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE GROUP, 2004 
Age Group 
Rate of Unemployment 
Number of people Percentage Frequency 
18 -19 36 10.06 
20 - 29 114 31.84 
30 -39 60 16.76 
40 - 49 50 13.97 
50 - 59 24 6.7 
60 - 64 12 3.35 
65 -69 21 5.87 
70 - 79 18 5.03 
above 80 8 2.23 
Age unknown 15 4.19 
Total 358 100 
 
There did not seem to be any positive correlation between the level of formal education and 
rate of employment in Phetwane. Indeed, the highest proportion of the unemployed was 
found among the more educated (Figure 24; Table 23). Of the 11 people identified by the 
questionnaire survey as holding diplomas, degrees or other tertiary qualifications, 10 (or 91 
per cent) were unemployed. At the same time, while migration to other places for 
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employment purposes is very low, most migrations are related to purposes of getting 
tertiary education.  
 
 
FIGURE 24 UNEMPLOYMENT OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION EDUCATION, 2004 
 
TABLE 23 UNEMPLOYMENT OF WORKING-AGE POPULATION EDUCATION, 2004 
 
Education Level No of unemployed % of unemployed 
Never went to school 32 10.28 
Still at school 58 18.65 
Std. 3 or less 23 7.40 
Std. 4 - 5 21 6.75 
Std. 6 - 8 61 19.61 
Std. 9 - 10 102 32.80 
Tertiary/Diploma/Degree 10 3.22 
Other 0 0 
Don’t Know 4 1.29 
Total 311  
Source: Fieldwork, 2004 
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Figure 25 and Table 24 show the employment status of Phetwane’s adult population by 
gender in 2004. Men constituted the greater proportion (61.8 per cent) of the full-time, 
seasonally, occasionally and self- employed in the village (Figure 25; Table 24). Of these, 
more men (73 per cent) than women (27 per cent) had full-time paid work. Women made 
up the bulk of the unemployed adult population in the village. The unemployment rate for 
women was approximately 51.6 per cent, while that of men is 35.1 per cent. Women, 
however, were observed to assume a greater share of unpaid household labour and 
responsibilities for caring for young children and the old. Women were also more visible in 
providing labour on the irrigation scheme, mostly weeding and picking cotton. Such 
employment generated very low wages (40c per kilogram of cotton picked or R20 per day 
for a few days labour) and was generally not declared in women’s responses to 
questionnaire interviews. 
Besides shared access to irrigated land (see Section 5.4), a number of households in the 
village derived part of their livelihoods from casual or seasonal employment on the 
irrigation scheme. The extent of such employment, however, was not easy to determine. 
While primary observations and interviews with key respondents showed that a number of 
unemployed, landless and indigent people were occasionally and seasonally employed on 
the irrigation scheme up to August 2004, the questionnaire survey identified a relatively 
small number of such people. Following the failure of a cotton joint venture in 2004 and the 
subsequent suspension of production activities on the scheme, there was an increase in the 
transient nature of employment on the scheme and a reduction in levels of such 
employment. However, since the questionnaire survey was carried out at the height of 
cotton production, more plausible reasons for the low employment rates identified might 
be the very low wages deriving from labour on the scheme, which made minimal 
contributions to the basket of household financial resources. Possible negative social 
connotations associated such labour might have contributed to reluctance by many of the 
unemployed, who were seasonally or occasionally employed on the scheme, to disclose 
such employment.   
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FIGURE 25 PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT POPULATION BY GENDER, 
2004 
 
TABLE 24 PHETWANE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF ADULT POPULATION BY GENDER, 
2004 
Employment Status 
Percentage Frequency 
Total Male Female 
Unemployed 145 35.12 213 51.57 86.69 
Self-employed 4 0.97 3 0.73 1.7 
Full-time paid employment 22 5.33 8 1.94 7.27 
Seasonal employment 1 0.24 2 0.48 0.72 
Occasional employment 6 1.45 4 0.97 2.42 
Status unknown 1 0.24 4 0.97 1.21 
Total 179 43.35 234 56.66 100.01 
 
A number of landless and unemployed Phetwane men also engaged in informal fishing along 
the Olifants-Lepelle River below Flag Boshielo Dam. Such informal livelihood activity was 
largely criminalized by past and prevailing environmental legislation. From 2003 to 2007, 
members of Phetwane community tended to keep informal fishing hidden from outsiders. 
With increasing trust between these and the researcher, in 2008 fishers organized 
themselves and approached the researcher for assistance regarding their apsirations to 
generate livelihoods, employment, income and local economic development from riverine 
inland fisheries associated with Flag Boshielo Dam. Such request was communicated to 
relevant institutional actors in LDA and Greater Marble Hall Local Municipality.  
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5.5.2.4 Income 
Questionnaire data showed that a total of about eighty-seven percent (86.69 per cent) of 
the adult population in the village does not derive income from paid employment. The 
questionnaire survey revealed, however, that more Phetwane women (56.4 per cent) than 
men (43.6 per cent) relied on social grants for income. Such grants included old age 
pensions, disability grants, child support grants and care dependency grants. A significant 
proportion (31 per cent) of the adult population received social grants. This represented 64 
per cent of households with access to social grants. Among such households, a number had 
access to more than one social grant. Some (16 per cent) had access to two grants while 
others (4 per cent) had access to three grants. Most (83 per cent) of the grants received by 
the latter consisted entirely of child support grants. One-fifth (20.4 per cent) of the 
Phetwane adult population received child grants. Women commanded a greater share (97 
percent) of the child grants disbursed in the village than men (3 per cent).  
However, income data was not entirely accurate as respondents were generally reluctant to 
disclose other sources of household incomes than social grants. For example, there was no 
disclosure of income from informal fishing activities, which were a criminalized source of 
livelihood and food security for most of the unemployed and landless households. Apart 
from fears of possible prosecution, a significant number (68 per cent) of respondents 
expressed concerns over crime.  Many respondents therefore either deliberately under-
declared incomes or inadvertently excluded proxy incomes, such as food from natural 
ecosystem sources like rivers and from self-started home gardens. For ethical reasons and 
out of respect for people’s need for privacy, the researcher did not insist on getting 
respondents to give more income-related information than they were comfortable with. 
Instead, proxy measures were used to cross-reference responses to the more direct 
questions on income.  
Proxy indicators included data on household expenditure and, less directly, the status of 
household nutrition. Questionnaire data showed that monthly expenditure tended to be 
higher than declared incomes in some households. Such expenditure related to items such 
as food, energy, education, medication, transport, entertainment, furniture, debt 
repayment, rates, insurance policies, funeral expenses and other items. An example was 
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that of a household in which, reportedly, none were employed, none received social grants 
and yet, although the household received no income and had relatively very little debt 
(R100 – R499), the average monthly expenditure for the household was R6200. 
5.5.2.5 Household Material Resources 
The rate of ownership of household material resources was relatively low. Household asset 
ownership varied among different households in the village and between smallholder and 
non-smallholder households (Figure 26). The former were generally headed by older and 
less formally educated members of the Phetwane community, while the latter households 
were headed by younger people. 
 
FIGURE 26 PHETWANE: MATERIAL ASSET OWNERSHIP BY HOUSEHOLD, 2004 
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Non-smallholder households generally owned more electrical appliances, such as 
cellphones, radios and micro-wave ovens than smallholder households. By contrast, 
smallholder households owned a significantly higher proportion of fridges, electric stoves 
and livestock than non-smallholders. Asset ownership did not necessarily point to greater or 
lesser affluence, however, as many households with the more expensive types of assets also 
had debts and relatively low incomes.  
5.5.2.6 Crop production 
Three types of arable land were allocated to crop production. These were, firstly, plots of 
land within the irrigation scheme, secondly, micro-scale (less than 0.1 ha) food gardens 
adjacent to the scheme and along the irrigation canal and, thirdly, home gardens. No land 
was set aside for rain-fed crop farming in Phetwane. According to key respondents, the 
reason was that there was a shortage of rangeland for livestock. Traditional leaders 
reportedly took exception to encroachment by crop farming into rangeland.  
Cotton was produced in the irrigated plots in 2004 and, after a four-year lull in production, 
potato and maize crops were grown in 2008. Home gardening became prolific after RESIS 
joint venture implementation prohibited gardening along the irrigation canal. Home 
gardening grew exponentially as South African food prices increased in 2005 while crop 
production in the irrigation scheme ground to a halt. Many households grew vegetables and 
maize in home gardens, using purified domestic water supplies to irrigate crops particularly 
in the dry season. A few households also seasonally grew wheat in the home gardens. 
Not all households had access to arable land, however. The landless included the more 
recently established households of newcomers to the community and married children and 
grandchildren of original settlers. It was common to find elderly parents holding land rights 
while their adult children did not. Prior to RESIS agricultural commercialization, villagers had 
devised strategies to ensure broader food security within the community. Through kinship 
relations and other social networks, the practice of share-cropping, in particular, broadened 
access to available arable land. Smallholders also provided a safety net through informal 
employment of the landless in crop production, harvesting and processing. Although 
financial incomes from such work were very low, labourers often were paid proxy incomes 
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in the form of portions of the harvest, which enhanced food security for these vulnerable 
households.  
5.5.2.7 Food Consumption 
Expenditure on food was relatively low, with average monthly income spent on food being 
R300 per household. A narrow range of food items was consumed per household per week, 
and emphasis was on staple foods, such as mealie meal, and cheaper foods, such as cooking 
oil, bread and vegetables (Figure 27; Table 25). Almost all Phetwane households consumed 
mealie meal and cooking oil throughout the week, and over 60 per cent ate vegetables and 
bread at least once a week. The rate of bread and vegetable consumption varied among 
households. While 64.2 per cent of Phetwane households ate bread, 22.4 per cent 
consumed it everyday and 29.9 per cent ate bread once a week. Without reliable data on 
household incomes, it was difficult to determine the relationship between income and 
expenditure of food items. 
 
Most households (over 70 per cent) stated that they hardly ever or never consumed 
protein-rich foods, such as milk, meat, fish, chicken, pigs legs (trotters), peanut butter and 
margarine. Protein-rich food, particularly meat, was relatively more expensive and therefore 
beyond the reach of many households in the village. However, tripe was a particularly cheap 
source of protein, and 43 per cent of Phetwane households consumed it at least once a 
week. A greater proportion (86 per cent) of smallholder households ate the tripe non-
smallholder households. The former households were mostly headed by pensioners, who 
probably consumed tripe due to both their low household incomes and personal 
preferences. By contrast, the relatively low rates of tripe consumption by non-smallholder 
households seemed to be more closely linked to younger people’s preferences than to 
income or employment.  
Although field observations in 2004 and 2005 showed that increasing numbers of informal 
male fishers were actively exploiting inland fisheries resources below Flag Boshielo Dam 
wall, questionnaires findings were that the majority (84 per cent) of households did not eat 
fresh fish or “did not know” how many times per week they ate fish. The rest of households 
ate fish every day (2.9 per cent), four to five times per week (5.7 per cent) and at least once 
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a week (7 per cent) ate fish at least four to five times a week. Follow-up in-depth interviews 
revealed that household fish consumption was much higher than was declared, and that 
questionnaire respondents had been reluctant to disclose their consumption of fresh fish 
because informal fishing was criminalized by past environmental laws.  
 
FIGURE 27 PHETWANE COMMUNITY: CONSUMPTION OF SELECTED FOOD, 2004 
 
TABLE 25 PHETWANE: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF CONSUMPTION OF SELECTED 
FOOD, 2004 
 
  
Eaten once 
a week 
Eaten 4 - 5 times 
a week Eaten everyday  Do not eat Don't know 
Vegetables 29.9 26.9 6 35.8 1.5 
Cooking oil 38.8 22.4 32.8 6 0 
Mealie meal 0 4.6 93.8 1.5 0 
Bread 29.9 11.9 22.4 34.3 1.5 
Eggs 13.4 10.4 9 64.2 3 
Tripe 24.6 16.9 1.5 56.9 0 
Meat 13.4 6 3 73.1 4.5 
Milk in tea 6 1.5 9 79.1 4.5 
Drinking milk 0 1.5 1.5 89.6 7.5 
Sour milk 3 1.5 3 89.6 3 
Fruit 11.9 3 3 79.1 3 
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5.5.3 SELECTED LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES AND CHALLENGES  
5.5.3.1 Informal Fishing by the Unemployed and Landless   
In 2008, fieldwork by the study found that most of the landless and unemployed men of 
Phetwane actively engaged in informal fishing along the Olifants-Lepelle River below the 
Flag Boshielo Dam. Among such fishers were young people who had prior to the failure of a 
RESIS joint venture been employed by smallholders in the irrigation scheme.  
The study identified six distinct categories of fishers, as well as distinct gender biases in the 
different categories. These categories were: survivalist subsistence fishers, livelihoods-
orientated subsistence fishers, informal recreational anglers, locally-based resource-poor 
commercially-orientated fishers, externally-based large-scale commercial fishers and 
externally-based formal recreational anglers. Most of the fishers were of male gender, but 
subsistence fishers included a few women, who were very poor, fished for food security and 
either headed their households or were reportedly neglected or under-supported by 
spouses working in urban centres further afield, such as in Gauteng Province and 
Polokwane.  
Subsistence fishers were mostly poorly-resourced men and women members of the 
Phetwane community, who practiced hand lining using basic tackle, such as twine and 
hooks, to catch mostly small fish for their own consumption. Small-scale resource-poor 
commercially-orientated fishers were mostly the better resourced Phetwane men, who 
practiced fishing as a livelihood, owned fishing tackle (rods, hand lines and hooks) 
purchased from retail outlets in the small town of Marble Hall,  and sold most of their catch 
to local communities and to travelers using the main tarred roads passing by the village. 
Larger scale commercial fishers were mostly outsiders, who were more affluent, mostly 
male, used highly specialized hand lines and drag nets, boats and rafts, camped by the river 
for between one and several days, rented space and electricity for their chest freezers from 
Phetwane residents, and transported their catch in four-wheel drive vehicles to distant 
markets in urban centres such as Tzaneen, Polokwane and Groblersdal. While fishers from 
Phetwane invariably did not have licenses and therefore fished informally and often illegally, 
the better resourced outsiders often had fishing licenses.  
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The main types of fish caught by Phetwane fishers were silver fish or carpenter and bream. 
Small-scale commercial fishermen sold the larger fish, which weighed up to 3kg for 
carpenter or silver fish (Argyrozona argyrozona) and between 450g and 2kg for bream. Local 
fishers expressed concerns that while about possible over-fishing, difficulties they 
encountered in obtaining fishing licenses and the lack of effective regulatory mechanisms 
governing access to the fishing spots, sizes of fish catches, types and uses of fishing tackle, 
and management of the ecosystem. The smaller net users sold their fish along the roadside 
and at road intersections. The price of a big tilapia fish (about 20 centimetres long) was 
around R20. Prices for large silverfish or carp (between 40 and 60cm or more) varied 
according to the time of day, often ranging from R40 to R60 for a big fish in the morning and 
early afternoon but reducing to between R20 and R40 towards the evening. On average, 
local subsistence fishers could earn a gross profit of between R100 and R250 per day. Gross 
earnings for resource-poor commercially-orientated fishers could theoretically go up to 
around per R500 per day, depending on fishing effort. 
Such informal livelihood generation activities were largely criminalized by past and 
prevailing environmental legislation. The Limpopo Environmental Management Act (Act 7) 
of 2003, in particular, prohibited the conduct of fishing activities without a permit but 
allowed owners of land surrounding an artificially created aquatic system to fish without 
permits. Effectively, this implied that Phetwane’s informal fishers technically could fish 
without a permit, since their communal land partially surrounded the artificial fishery 
around Flag Boshielo Dam. Members of Phetwane community, and fishers in particular, 
were not aware of such a loophole and so conspired to keep informal fishing hidden until 
they found out from other fishers, who came from other areas in the province, about a 
suspension of requirements for fishing permits by the Limpopo Environmental Management 
Act.  
Informal fishing ultimately came to the fore as a major and openly-conducted source of 
livelihood when a locally-based monitoring and enforcement team of officials and rangers 
from the Limpopo Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism 
(LEDET) formally recognized the legitimacy of local informal fishers. In 2008 the LEDET team 
initiated a Community Outreach programme, whereby environmental officers explained to 
members of local communities, such as Phetwane, the importance for them to jealously 
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guard the fishery and thereby contribute to ensuring the sustainability of the ecosystem and 
their livelihoods.  
5.5.3.2 Debts 
Most Phetwane households had debts, but these were very small. The largest proportion of 
debts ranged from less than R100 to R500. About a third of all debts were between R500 
and R1000. The smaller debts were often incurred for purposes of buying food and paying 
for school attendance, health care and medical services. Other debts related to ceremonial 
feasts, funerals and burials, farming, furniture, clothing, building materials, catering utensils, 
contributions to burial societies and faith-based organizations, and repayment of existing 
debts. Indebted households owed money mainly to community members, burial societies, 
micro-lenders and merchandise shops. There was no significant difference in the incidence 
of debt between smallholder and non-smallholder households.   
5.5.3.3 Livelihood Shocks  
Livelihood shocks in Phetwane were mainly associated with general joblessness in 
households, witchcraft issues, death of many livestock, loss of possessions through theft and 
perceived risk crime in the community. A significant number (68 per cent) of respondents 
stated that they often or sometimes felt unsafe from crime. Such crime was often linked to 
theft of household possessions, such as shown in an exceprt from an informai discussion in 
Box 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 7 Example of vulnerability to crime in Phetwane, 2004 
 
Mildred ‘Lulu’ Morupisi is a 40-year old unmarried daughter of a woman smallholder. She works 65km 
away from Phetwane as a nurse in a large hospital in the Greater Groblersdal Local Municipality. She is 
unable to commute daily due to the long distance to her workplace and the varied shifts that her job 
entails. Consequently, she leaves her children in the care of her mother and her home unattended for 
almost a week at a time.  
 
I have suffered three break-ins over the past ten to fifteen years, in which all my household possessions 
were stolen. Each time I lost my furniture, electrical appliances, clothes and kitchen utensils. I recovered 
most of the items stolen in the second theft. These had been taken to Mogalatsane [a village neighbouring 
Phetwane] to be sold. In the third theft, the thieves were caught red-handed when they came to collect the 
final load…I feel that thieves within Phetwane target working people. They know that after a while your 
house will be full of goods. They then collude with thieves in neighbouring villages to steal your possessions. 
While the local thieves observe your movements for an opportunity to break in, they do not take an active 
part on the day of theft. This way, they avoid being linked to the crime…  
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Throughout the duration of the study, there was a perpetual atmosphere of uncertainty in 
Phetwane community and allegations of witchcraft were rife. A significant number of 
respondents (25 per cent) cited witchcraft as a source of vulnerability for their households. 
The study interviewed respondents who claimed to have been subjected to witchcraft, 
others who complained of having been accused of witchcraft and yet others who believed 
that witchcraft existed in the village, even though they personally had not been affected by 
it.  Although it was beyond the scope of this study to delve deeper into the witchcraft issue, 
it was worth noting that allegations of witchcraft were often linked to personal or 
household crises, such as death of a person, death of livestock, serious illness and loss of a 
job by the main breadwinner. Such allegations were sometimes linked to persons perceived 
as holding alternative viewpoints to the majority or who managed to cope against the odds 
that many could not overcome.  
Vulnerability to witchcraft accusation, in particular, was best understood in the context of 
Sekhukhuneland’s historical reputation as the 1980s epicentre of witch burnings in South 
Africa, which Delius (1996) documents. Historical burnings of persons accused of witchcraft 
in Sekhukhuneland were ascribed to a combination of poverty and rural resistance to 
colonial and apartheid repression, among other factors. However, the contemporary wave 
of witchcraft allegations in Phetwane seemed to be driven by a different set of factors, 
including poverty, livelihood shocks and effectiveness of coping strategies. A number of such 
factors were directly linked to agricultural commercialization and, in particular, failure of 
contract farming arrangements in the irrigation scheme.    
5.5.3.4 Coping Strategies 
Individuals and households used a range of strategies to cope with problems relating to 
poverty, unemployment, shocks and vulnerability. Social grants and social networks (Box 8) 
were critical to the survival of many households in Phetwane. Coping strategies included a 
reliance on relatives and neighbours for moral and material support. Many households 
depended on loans from community members, micro-lenders and burial societies.  Others 
constantly obtained credit from formal retailers and informal traders, such as vendors and 
‘spaza’ owners. A number of households had personal savings accounts and insurance, 
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particularly through membership of burial societies and church organizations. Prior to 
agricultural commercialization, other households had shared access to arable land.  
In such cases, landless people temporarily used land that landholders did not cultivate. In 
other cases, landholding and landless households, often members of the same extended 
family, collectively produced and shared food crops. There were also cases whereby 
indigent households provided labour in exchange for a portion of the harvest. Due to the 
relatively low levels of livestock ownership in Phetwane, no similar arrangements were 
observed with regard to cattle farming. The exact details of land sharing varied according to 
specific circumstances, and those involved were often reticent to give details about their 
arrangements. Reasons for reticence were deeply embedded in cultural notions of 
‘responsibility’ and ‘respect’ for each other and for valued personal relationships. There was 
also pride associated with avoiding disclosure of personal information to ‘outsiders’, 
particularly with respect to possible risks of stigmatization of poor relatives, friends and 
neighbours.  
Some forms of insurance were less tangible. Examples included the purchase of various 
items, such as catering utensils, for use in funerals, weddings and similar events. These 
events were an important part of social life in the village and in extended families. 
Contributions in cash, kind and labour towards such events strengthened social relations 
and, through reciprocation, strengthened relations ensured a broader array of future 
support from all involved. A number of respondents indicated that their debts emanated 
from purchases of catering utensils and from obligations to contribute to events such as 
funerals.  
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5.5.3.5 Health Issues 
The most frequently disclosed illnesses included cold and influenza, bone disease, bad 
coughs, acute respiratory disease (ARD), asthma, hypertension (BP) and diarrhoea (Figure 
28). The frequency of disclosure of chronic diseases, such as heart disease, stroke, 
tuberculosis and epilepsy, was relatively low, while there was no disclosure of HIV and AIDS, 
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and measles. Other diseases included failing eyesight 
and painful limbs. While disabilities such as deafness, physical disability and mental illness 
were readily disclosed, there was a general reluctance to disclose socially problematic 
issues, such as drunkenness, smoking and use of drugs. People’s needs for and rights to 
privacy probably influenced the degree to which health issues were disclosed. For ethical 
reasons, the study captured only the data that respondents were willing to disclose.         
Box 8 Example of the importance of Social Grants and Social Networks 
 
Mavis Mokwena is a 42-year old unmarried mother of five. She was born in Bushbuckridge in Mpumalanga 
and came to live in the village upon marriage to a Phetwane man. Her husband has since deserted her, 
leaving her to single-handedly fend for their children and grandchild. She has few relatives in Phetwane, 
no burial insurance and no bank account. However, she has strong links with Phetwane community 
members and is very active in day-to-day activities in the village. Mavis is unemployed most of the time, 
and her household heavily relies on a child grant of R170 for her grand-daughter. Mavis often obtains 
loans from community members in order to buy food for her family. She also relies on her links with 
community members to gain access to occasional short-term employment opportunities in the irrigation 
scheme, within the village and in surrounding rural areas.  
 
When her eldest daughter died in 2005, she had no money, no burial insurance and no close relatives in 
the village to support her, apart from her own unemployed and dependent children. Her amicable 
relations with community members ensured that she got a lot of emotional support. However, this was 
not enough to help her meet the costs of the funeral and burial. The loans that she obtained from a few 
community members and the food that she got on credit from a local retailer were also not adequate. 
Effectively, what she faced was the prospect of giving her daughter a pauper’s funeral. Mavis’s woes 
ended precisely because her social networks extend beyond Phetwane and as far as Bushbuckridge, some 
260km away. Her relatives traveled all the way to Phetwane, bringing with them money, a cow, food and 
transport to help with the burial. In her time of crisis she realized that while social networks in general are 
important, kinship relations, specifically, may be more critical for major life events such as death, 
irrespective of distance.   
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FIGURE 28 PHETWANE: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF DISCLOSED ILLNESSES AND 
DISABILITY, 2004 
 
5.5.4 CONCLUSION 
Within government and non-governmental interventions, black small-scale farmers, such as 
those of Phetwane, are considered to be ‘resource poor’. In the case of Phetwane, there 
was no significant socio-economic differentiation between households that had direct 
access to irrigated plots and those without. There was also no significant difference 
between households with direct access to irrigated plots and those without. For these 
reasons, it was reasonable to deduct that Phetwane households were resource-poor, 
irrespective of whether or not they had access to irrigated plots.  
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Although opportunities for paid employment within the village were scanty, relatively few 
individuals of working age seemed to migrate to other places in search of work. Reasons for 
this were not clear. What emerged from the study, however, was that levels of 
despondency and strife were high, with many households citing lack of food security or 
hunger as a major source of difficulty.  
 
5.6 PRELIMINARY PHASE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALIZATION IN 
PHETWANE: 2001 TO 2004 
 
Implementation of the RESIS programme from 2001 to 2004 in Phetwane was characterized 
by two distinct phases. The preliminary phase consisted of engineering-centred 
reconstruction or ‘rehabilitation’ of dilapidated irrigation infrastructure. The second and 
core component of Phase 2 of the RESIS Programme involved constitution of contract 
farming arrangements, specifically joint production ventures, between registered 
smallholders and private investors. A substantive objective of involving smallholders in both 
the preliminary and core implementation phases was to enable farmers to effectively 
manage operational functions of the irrigation scheme.  
5.6.1 INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION  
Rehabilitation of the Phetwane Irrigation Scheme began in 2001 under the CPC Programme 
driven by the Limpopo Department of Public Works. The Public Works department 
appointed Independent Development Trust (IDT) as implementing agent. Initially, a Concept 
Business Plan was approved in December 2000, following which actual reconstruction of 
infrastructure commenced (Limpopo (Northern Province) Department of Agriculture, 2001). 
Approximately R14 million was set aside for rehabilitation of schemes in the Arabie/Olifants 
irrigation area, which comprise Cluster 11 of RESIS. Of this amount, Upper Arabie was 
allocated a total of approximately R6.3 million. Table 26 shows that over R4 million was 
disbursed from 2000/2001 to 2002/2003 and a further R1.4 million allocated from 
2001/2002 to 2002/2003 primarily for rehabilitation of the 19,5km long main irrigation 
furrow or canal from Coetzeesdraai to a balancing dam at De Paarl farm, construction of a 
new main canal from Flag Boshielo Dam to link up with the existing main canal at 
Coetzeesdraai and to repair pumps sumps at Phetwane, Coetzeesdraai, Krokodilheuwel, 
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Vogelstruiskopjes and Gataan72 (Figure 29). The provincial Department of Public Works 
contributed funding towards the rehabilitation of water pumps and other infrastructure73. 
There was also a shift from flood to sprinkler irrigation, as part of the drive towards 
improving efficiency in water use. Additional funding was allocated towards farmer training, 
development of small and medium enterprises (SMMEs), a ‘Start-up Fund’ and professional 
fees and overhead costs of implementing agencies (Table 26).  
TABLE 26 CONSOLIDATED FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION AND 
OVERHEAD COSTS ON THE UPPER ARABIE IRRIGATION SCHEME 
 
 
Budget Item 
February 2001 Business 
Plan 
Additional Funding 
Financial Years 
2000/2001 - 2001/2002 
Financial Years 
2001/2002 - 2002/2003 
A. INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION 
1 New canal construction 3 070 000  
2 Rehabilitation of existing canal system  561 200 
3 Rehabilitation of existing flood irrigation 
systems (100m/ha) and sprinkler system 
175 000 (123 500) 
4 Cleaning of balancing dams  60 000 
5 Land planning for irrigation systems  292 500 
6 Rehabilitation of scheme roads 26 000 45 000 
7 Fencing 140 000 50 000 
8 Rehabilitation of existing pump stations and 
electricity connections 
53 000 260 000 
9 Rehabilitaion of buildings 18 000 60 000 
10 Conservation works 18 000  
 Total 3 500 000 1 205 140 
 VAT (14%) 490 000 168 720 
 TOTAL (including VAT) 3 990 000 1 373 860 
B. SMME AND PROFESSIONAL COSTS 
11 SMME capital 100 000 51 000 
12 Farmer training 48 838 65 813 
13 Start-up fund 97 676 131 626 
14 Professional fees and overhead costs 180 700 242 509 
 Total 427 214 490 948 
 TOTAL  4 417 214 1 864 808 
 OVERALL CONSOLIDATED FUNDING: R6 282 022 
Source: Limpopo (Northern Province) Department of Agriculture (2001) 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
72 Interviews with various RESIS practitioners, including IDT regional manager Mr Simon Malepeng, IDT official 
Ms Shalati Makubele and LDOA Senior Manager: Infrastructure Mr Rex Mtileni, held at Phetwane Irrigation 
Scheme on 27 July 2004.   
73
 Interview with Limpopo Provincial Department of Public Works official, Mr Tirelo Makgethi on 10 May 2004. 
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FIGURE 29 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PHETWANE IRRIGATION SCHEME RELATIVE 
TO SIMILAR SCHEMES IN RESIS CLUSTER 11, 2009    
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Phetwane farmers report that the rehabilitated furrow never became operational and 
pumps were unable to supply adequate water. The delay in the use of the furrow was 
related to a major capital project to raise the Flag Boshielo Dam wall by five metres to 
augment storage capacity74. This project took place concomitant to rehabilitation of 
schemes in Upper Arabie and was accompanied by a temporary five-year transfer of the 
water away from irrigation schemes to various mines.  
The decision to reallocate water was partly based on a need by government to raise capital 
to fund the revitalization of smallholder schemes in the Arabie Olifants area. The agreement 
between mining houses and government included an undertaking by the former to pay  
R700 million during the 2001 to 2002 financial year towards development of Cluster 11 
irrigation schemes and rural communities in the Arabie Olifants area. By 2004, the money 
had not been transferred to Sekhukhune District Council for allocation towards these 
purposes. The money remained in the coffers of both the provincial departments of 
Agriculture and Public Works. The retention of the money was due to a perception by 
Department of Public Works officials that the district council lacked lacked accountability, 
which was informed by a previous instance of misuse of the balance of funds left over from 
a Department of Public Works-led project to rehabilitate pumps in Olifants/Lepelle irrigation 
schemes. In the said instance, decision makers in the district council went against advice by 
Public Works officials to allocate such funds towards construction of new higher capacity 
pumps to enhance dry season water supply to Upper Arabie. In the financial year from 2003 
to 2004, the district council instead allocated the money towards construction of additional 
buildings in a school elsewhere in the district under circumstances that were widely 
regarded as lacking transparency.  
The decision to transfer smallholder irrigation scheme water allocations to mines was also 
based on a view by government authorities that irrigation schemes had not used their water 
allocation in the five years prior to the Flag Boshielo dam wall project. The rationale was 
therefore that a temporary reallocation of water would contribute towards more efficient 
use of resources during the duration of the project. Phetwane farmers argued that while 
                                                     
74 Interview with IDT regional manager Mr Simon Malepeng, at Phetwane Irrigation Scheme on 27 July 2004.  
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production levels in Upper Arabie schemes were greatly reduced due to post-1994 cessation 
of government subsidies, a few farmers had continued to produce vegetables and maize 
primarily for subsistence. Water shortage due to breakdown of water pumps and 
sedimentation and vegetal growth in a canal linking Phetwane to the Lola Montes Dam to 
the south-east of Phetwane (Figure 29) confined such production mostly to high rainfall 
years. These remnants of crop production were halted when government-driven 
rehabilitation and revitalization activities commenced, leading to food insecurity and 
nutritional constraints in a number of households.   
5.7 OVERVIEW OF RESIS IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS: 2003 TO 2004 
 
The revitalization of agricultural production began in Phetwane in 2003 with the growing of 
cotton in a joint venture between farmers and Noordelike Sentrale Katoen (NSK), a private 
investor based in Makopane (erstwhile Potgietersrus) within the Limpopo Province. A key 
defining feature of the onset of revitalization in Phetwane was the shift in institutional 
arrangements for project implementation.  
5.7.1 INSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Whereas the provincial Department of Public Works had been responsible for implementing 
rehabilitation of the scheme, the provincial Department of Agriculture (LDA) assumed 
responsibility for implementing the revitalization project in Phetwane. The role of IDT as 
implementing agent for the Department of Public Works, however, spilled over into 
implementation of RESIS by the Department of Agriculture. This was due to the overlaps 
whereby Public Works responsibilities ended in December 2003 and those of LDA began in 
January 2004, while the contract between IDT and the Public Works department ran up to 
March 2004. To avoid duplication in the use of public finance, the LDA could only appoint a 
new implementing agent, Ndzalo, as from April 2004. Given the ultimate objective of RESIS 
to transfer irrigation management to farmers, the new institutional arrangement also 
brought a significant shift in approach to IMT project design.  
In contrast to salient features of international experience with IMT, revitalization project 
design in Phetwane emphasized the enhancement of the wealth-creating potential of 
smallholder irrigated agriculture through promoting high value crops, strengthening access 
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to markets and improving extension and technical support systems. The joint venture was 
therefore an initial step towards commercialization of production in Phetwane.  
The rationale for involving a private investor in the joint venture partnership was that this 
actor would enable farmers to gain access to finance capital, technology, production skills 
and markets. Farmers would contribute their labour and access to irrigated land to which 
they held PTOs. The provincial Department of Agriculture had overall responsibility for the 
implementation of RESIS and facilitated the joint venture through funding, appointment of 
implementation agencies and approval of the private investor partner. IDT initially acted as 
implementing agent for the RESIS project from late in 2003 to March 2004, during which 
time the agent brokered a joint venture between Phetwane farmers and a private investor. 
As from April 2004, the Department of Agriculture appointed Ndzalo as a replacement for 
IDT.  
5.7.2 INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION 
The Phetwane RESIS project converged with a number of government programmes within 
the ISRDP node of Greater Sekhukhune. These included the Water Allocation Reform 
Programme led by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) and the Provincial 
Support Programme driven by the national Department of Public Service and Administration 
(DPSA). RESIS also converged with black economic empowerment (BEE) initiatives by private 
investors such as NSK. Consequently, various public and private institutions were involved in 
the revitalization of Phetwane, as in other smallholder schemes located in former homeland 
areas in Limpopo, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal.  
There was a general consensus among institutional actors that coordination and integration 
of RESIS activities in the Arabie Olifants area were weak, owing largely to low levels of 
capacity and accountability within the district municipality. Mpumalanga and Limpopo 
provincial Departments of Local Government and Housing (DLGH) and the national 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) had made efforts to enhance 
municipal capacity through the Municipal Support Programme (MSP) and the Municipal 
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System Improvement Grant (MSIP), respectively. The departments used funding from 
donors, such as the European Union (EU), but such efforts had yet to yield tangible results75.  
Interviews with various institutional actors involved in the implementation of rehabilitation 
and revitalization of smallholder irrigation schemes revealed that apart from weaknesses in 
municipal capacity and accountability, there was also competition for control over resources 
and action space among institutions, such as the departments of Agriculture and Public 
Works and implementing agencies such as IDT. Such competition was heightened by the 
shift from rehabilitation to revitalization, with the attendant shift of primary responsibility 
from Public Works to LDA, as responsible authority, and from IDT to Ndzalo, as 
implementing agent for RESIS in Upper Arabie. Tensions were related to a lack of “proper” 
handover of responsibility from one institution to the next76. 
5.7.3 ENGAGEMENT WITH SMALLHOLDERS 
A result of problems of institutional coordination was that Phetwane smallholders often got 
by-passed by communications among the various institutions. This left farmers with a 
general mistrust of government interventions in the scheme. Owing to negative perceptions 
about their earlier exclusion from much of critical communications and decisions relating to 
rehabilitation of the scheme, Phetwane smallholders were initially reluctant to participate in 
joint venture activities associated with RESIS. Their reluctance was also due to fears about 
risks associated with the envisaged framework of commercial production.  
Smallholders argued that engagement in commercial production would land them in a 
vicious cycle of debt and lead to losses of existing household assets. After a series of 
consultations involving farmers, IDT and government officials, forty-seven (47) of the forty-
nine (49) farmers were persuaded to take part in a cotton joint venture, while the remaining 
two preferred to be excluded. When Ndzalo took over from IDT as implementing agent, its 
practitioners insisted on a modified RESIS programme that emphasized revitalization rather 
                                                     
75 Interview with Limpopo DLGH official, Mr Sam Bambo, held on 01 December 2003. 
76
 Interviews with various officials of departments of Public Works, Agriculture and IDT, and with private sector 
officials of Ndzalo and NSK, held during research in 2003 and 2004.  
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than rehabilitation, and on a redressing of the manner in which practitioners of government 
interventions engaged with small-scale irrigation farmers77.  
5.7.4 PRE-DEVELOPMENT SURVEY 
Towards redressing engagement smallholder and community practices by institutional 
actors, Ndzalo conducted a ‘pre-development survey’ prior to the inception of a cotton joint 
venture in 2003. The objectives of the survey were to elicit views of smallholders and other 
interested members of Phetwane community regarding the envisaged framework of 
irrigation scheme development and to facilitate consensus on a shared vision for such 
development78. The pre-development survey specifically sought to identify needs, 
aspirations, fears and concerns of the Phetwane community, including farmers, non-
farmers, women and the youth. Table 27 shows some of the problems, needs and 
aspirations identified by members of Phetwane community during the survey.  
A broad range of problems and needs were identified. Although these were not prioritized, 
they gave a clearer perspective on the multiplicity of livelihood issues facing smallholders 
and the broader impoverished rural community. Results of the pre-development survey also 
gave project implementers a glimpse into the social challenges that RESIS and contract 
farming arrangements would have to interact and grapple with.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
77
 Interviews with Dr Marna de Lange and Mr Laduma Tembe of Ndzalo, held respectively on 10 and 11 May 
2004 in Polokwane.   
78
 Interview with Messrs Johan Aderndoff, Evans Kgasago and Kenny Moabelo, held at Tompi Seleka College of 
Agriculture, Greater Marble Hall Local Municipality, on 27 July 2004 
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TABLE 27 PHETWANE COMMUNITY: PERCEPTIONS ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, 
NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS, 2003 
Problems Needs 
Unemployment Employment opportunities e.g. through poultry, sewing, 
bakery and brick making projects 
Lack of irrigation water in the [irrigation 
scheme] fields and for home gardens 
Additional infrastructure for direct abstractions from 
Olifants/Lepelle River; improvement of existing irrigation 
infrastructure (each farmer needs individual set of pipes and 
sprinklers; Water management structure to manage sharing 
and use of water. 
Lack of water within homesteads; Lack of 
money (tokens) to pay for water 
Household water supply in yards for both domestic uses and 
gardens. 
Shortage of arable land Involvement of non-farmers in RESIS projects 
Lack of money for production inputs Assistance with inputs 
Lack of markets for produce and lack of 
transport to available markets 
Storage place for produce, grading of roads,   
No agricultural extension officer Training in farming skills, e.g. livestock, vegetable and poultry. 
Theft of crops and irrigation pipes Improved security, e.g. through installation of flood lights; 
policing forum. 
Poor fences, stray livestock and loss of crops Fence around irrigation scheme and livestock camps 
(paddocks) 
No sustainability planning for projects Training of irrigation management structures. 
Hunger and poverty Production of food crops, e.g. maize, wheat, potatoes and 
groundnuts. 
For women: Challenges of balancing child 
care and housework with farming 
Creches (child care facilities) 
Absence of men, making women de facto 
heads of households 
- 
Teenage pregnancy Youth involvement in agriculture; bursaries for studies in 
agriculture. 
Crime Police station and policing forum 
Drug and alcohol abuse Recreational facilities, e.g. soccer field, social worker services 
Lack of projects and recreational facilities for 
the youth  
Projects e.g. poultry, sewing, bakery and brick making; and 
electricity for agricultural projects 
High number of funerals, which take up 
money and time 
- 
Dysfunctional community structures, 
nepotism and lack of transparency 
Support and training for structures; empowerment of youth 
structures 
Conflict within the community - 
 Post office, health clinic, better education for children, 
community halls. 
 
5.7.5 ORGANIZATION OF INSTITUTIONS  
The pre-development survey was complemented by a participatory process to develop a 
complex institutional framework for project management that would engage with the 
agricultural commercialization process and joint venture projects. Firstly, Ndzalo’s project 
implementation team facilitated a process to delineate a multi-stakeholder project 
management structure and clear institutional procedures for the RESIS project in Phetwane 
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and the broader Upper Arabie Balemi Trust area. Secondly, project implementers facilitated 
the formation of institutions required to enable smallholders to legally contract with private 
investors. 
5.7.5.1 Project Management Structure and Organization 
In 2003, Ndzalo actively engaged with Upper Arabie Balemi Trust communities, including 
Phetwane, and other key stakeholder institutions regarding the design of an appropriate 
project management structure. Upper Arabie Trust administered four community based 
irrigation schemes located along the eastern banks of the Olifants River within Greater 
Sekhukhune District (Table 17 in Section 5.2.1). These schemes included Phetwane 
(Hindustan), Mogalatsane (Coetzeesdraai), Setlaboswane (Vogelstruiskoppie) and 
Krokodilheuwel (“Crocodile”). Phetwane and Mogalatsane were located in Ward 9 of 
Greater Marble Hall Local Municipality, while Setlaboswane and Krokodilheuwel were 
located in the Makhudu-Thamaga Local Municipality.  
Figure 30 depicts the institutional structure that was proposed. Ndzalo considered that, 
since smallholder irrigation schemes were integral parts of rural communities, such as 
Phetwane, it was important to ensure a degree of intergration between existing local 
community structures, which local people lived with and understood, and the envisaged 
project management structure, which was a novel and unfamiliar construct. Ndzalo’s 
rationale was that it would be futile to overlay a completely new and disconnected 
structure, which might not be appropriate or relevant to the prevailing local context and, in 
particular, the community development framework.  
To facilitate Upper Arabie Balemi Trust’s engagement with all the four Community 
Development Forums (CDFs) at the broader irrigation area level, Ndzalo facilitated the 
formation of a collective Development Forum. Membership of this forum included tribal 
authorities, councillors and officials of Marble Hall Local Municipality, LDA, DWAF and 
LEDET79. Such a management structure was needed to optimize linkages between the RESIS 
project and the broader IDP process driven by Greater Marble Hall Local Municipality and, 
by extension, the ISRDP in Greater Sekhukhune District. The project management structure 
                                                     
79 Interview with Messrs Johan Adendorff, Evans Kgasago and Kenny Moabelo of Ndzalo at Tompi Seleka 
College of Agriculture, 27 July, 2004. 
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was also intended to enable effective engagement with relevant external organizations, 
such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Land Bank, established 
commercial farmers, South Africa Cotton, Noordelike Katoen Sentrale (NSK) and various 
other private companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards developing the RESIS project management framework, a number of consultations 
were held with various institutions represented in CDFs of the four villages in the Upper 
Arabie Balemi Trust area. These included tribal authorities, community development 
committees, village water committees and organizations for women, farmers and the youth. 
Within each village, members of these community-based structures were nominated into 
five sub-committees, which respectively attended to human resources, natural resources, 
services, technical aspects and non-farming issues relating to water use. One member of 
each of the five sub-committees was nominated into a village-level water management 
committee. All four such committees collectively comprised the WUA Management 
Committee for Upper Arabie Trust area. The WUA was central to the proposed project 
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management structure in that it was the link between local communities, RESIS 
Development Forum and and external role-player organizations (Figure 30).  
The RESIS project management structure was abandoned in 2004 because it was unwieldly 
in conceptualization and cumbersome in articulation80. In Phetwane, difficulties related to 
weaknesses in community leadership, organizational capacity and social cohesion, and 
interaction of these with issues of poverty and insecurity. The proposed project 
management structure had been premised upon assumption that pre-existing community 
structures would be functioning well enough to accommodate RESIS-related modifications. 
However, the antecedent institutional framework at community level was severely 
weakened by a largely invisible and ineffective CDF as well as power dynamics between 
elected and traditional leadership. These challenges were exacerbated by, among other 
factors, a relatively low level of social cohesion, pervasive poverty, high unemployment rate, 
landlessness, substance abuse and a general lack of ease due to perceived vulnerability to 
risks from witchcraft and crime. These multiple challenges undermined trust in institutional 
processes and, consequently, the proposed RESIS project management structure had to be 
discontinued. 
5.7.5.2 Phetwane Farmers’ Organization 
Concomitant to consultations regarding the aforementioned RESIS project management 
structure, smallholders in Phetwane, Mogalatsane, Krokodilheuwel and Setlaboswane were 
organized into formal institutional structures, which were to function primarily at the 
operational level. Operational responsibilities for these structures related to the day-to-day 
management of crop irrigation, including the operation and maintenance of pumps, 
collection of fees, monitoring of water and land use and resolving of conflicts among 
irrigation farmers.  
In 2003, a group of 47 interested Phetwane smallholders was formally constituted as 
‘Phetwane Farmers Association’ (PFA)81. This association was a constituent of the larger 
‘Upper Arabie Balemi Irrigation Scheme Trust’, which was formally constituted and 
                                                     
80 Interview with Mr Lazarus Mosena (name withheld) of Temong cc.  
81
 Section 5.1.2 of the Constitution of Phetwane Farmers Association. 
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registered as a trust organization in 200482. A management committee for PFA was put in 
place, which consisted of a Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer and committee members 
representing five sub-committees. Portfolios of the sub-committees reflected those of the 
larger trust organization and included: Human Resources; Technical Issues; Services (e.g. 
water and electricity); Non-Farming Issues; and Natural resources (Figure 30). The same 
structure was replicated in farmers’ associations in all other villages within Upper Arabie.  
Since such associations were constituents of the Upper Arabie irrigation area, there was a 
need to form a central structure that would assume regulatory, coordination and 
integration functions. Upper Arabie Balemi Irrigation Scheme Trust was established 
specifically to meet this need. 
 
According to the draft constitution of the Trust, membership was limited to a maximum of 
twenty-three people representing farmers, government, the local municipality and the 
implementing agency. The Trust consisted of twelve (12) elected representatives of the four 
village-based irrigation farmers’ associations, a representative seconded from the local 
municipality, delegations from relevant government departments and one representative of 
the implementing agency, whose membership was limited to the duration of contract. 
Specific responsibilities of the Upper Arabie Trust included securing and managing a regular 
water supply from the Olifants (“Lepelle”) River, ensuring optimal land use and promoting 
sustainable agriculture within the Upper Arabie area, securing agricultural production 
services markets for farmers on schemes in the area, maintaining irrigation infrastructure 
and good financial management83. The Trust also undertook to protect the interests of its 
members with respect to agricultural production and water use, improve rural livelihoods in 
and around the scheme and to take “a political stance” in all its activities84.  
Further to the above undertakings, implementing agent Ndzalo suggested: that Executive 
and Management Committees should:  
 Make policies and decisions for the benefit of the project and the farmers;  
                                                     
82
 Upper Arabie is registered with the Department of Justice as a trust organization (Certificate J246 of 2004, 
Trust Number 3011/040 under the Trust Property Control Act (57) of 1988.   
 
83 Draft Constitution of Upper Arabie Balemi Irrigation SchemeTrust, Section 3.1. 
84
 Ibid. 
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 Allow for emergency decisions to be taken at short notice when the management 
committee is unavailable; 
 Negotiate with joint venture partners and others; and 
 Manage legal as well as traditional tenure arrangements for land and other 
resources85. 
This suggestion was not captured in the draft constitution. The legal basis for Upper Arabie 
Trust’s responsibility over land tenure arrangements was not clear. Ndzalo’s 
recommendation appears to have overlooked the role of traditional leadership structures, 
which was particularly pertinent to smallholder irrigation schemes located in rural 
communities. Given that CLRA accorded traditional leadership a prominent role in land 
administration within communal areas, where such leadership was recognised, traditional 
leaders were likely to emerge as key actors in contestations over irrigated land in schemes 
such as Phetwane. An example of this oversight was Section 7.3 of the draft constitution of 
Upper Arabie Trust, which stated: 
Where a person does not wish to farm or is no longer capable of farming on the 
scheme, that person shall be encouraged to make their land available to more capable 
farmers through the established Lease Agreement. The Management Committee 
should develop criteria for determining who is/is not capable of farming. If a person 
does not wish to lease his/her land to someone willing to farm it, then such a person 
shall be referred by the Management Committee to the Extension Officer who will 
consider taking away that piece of land and allocating it to a suitable applicant.   
 Although expropriation measures were not implemented during the course of the study, 
they were likely to prove problematic, as demonstrated by the case of Thabina Irrigation 
Scheme (Veldswich, 2004), which was also a RESIS pilot project. Reallocation of plots away 
from PTO holders in Thabina resulted in contestation of beneficiaries’ rights to the land and 
impacted negatively on the pilot project.  
                                                     
85
 Ndzalo’s Training Manual for the development of RESIS Project Structures. 
 
 
 
 
 281 
5.7.6 CHALLENGES TO DEVOLUTION: WUA REGISTRATION FAILURE  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned land rights issues, Upper Arabie Trust was effectively 
the heart of the complex institutional framework that emerged with the onset of the RESIS 
project in Phetwane and, more broadly, the Upper Arabie area. While irrigation farmers’ 
associations, such as PFA, interacted directly with village level structures, the trust 
organization was the link between farmers, on the one hand, and the Upper Arabie 
Development Forum and external organizations and institutions, on the other. A key 
principle that Ndzalo, as facilitator, insisted upon was that the new structure should be 
established as part of the existing institutional framework within the locality. By embedding 
the new structure in this manner, the facilitator largely avoided competition for political 
action space between the new and existing structures in Phetwane.  
Since water use was a key unifying factor for the various locally-based structures and their 
constituencies, including PFA and Phetwane irrigation farmers, Upper Arabie Trust was 
intended to evolve into a Water User Association (WUA). An application in 2001 by Upper 
Arabie Trust for the draft constitution to be approved to enable water users to be registered 
as a WUA never received a response from DWAF. The study’s enquiry showed that the 
application had been forwarded by the DWAF office in Groblersdal to the Limpopo regional 
DWAF office in Polokwane, where it was to have been sent to the DWAF head office in 
Pretoria for approval. Despite a protracted follow-up effort, the study could neither 
establish reasons for the delay nor trace what happened to the application.  
DWAF regional office in Polokwane had no record of the application. Rather, officials 
surmised that, due to a separation of functions in which Limpopo regional office in 
Polokwane became responsible for Water Services while Mpumalanga became responsible 
for Water Resources Management, the Upper Arabie application might have been 
forwarded to the latter office. However, the study was not able to find any record of the 
WUA application in Mpumalanga or in the DWAF head office in Pretoria. Efforts to interview 
the local Groblersdal-based DWAF official responsible for water allocation were 
unsuccessful as the official remained consistently “unavailable” throughout the entire 
duration of the study86. The study found, however, that by 2006 only one WUA had been 
                                                     
86
 Responses concerning Mr Kobus Pretorius, DWAF Groblersdal local office. 
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established in the whole of Greater Sekhukhune. DWAF officials ascribed delays in the 
registration of WUAs for black irrigation farmers, such as those of Upper Arabie, to a lack of 
capacity to process applications for registration of WUAs and water allocations. Black 
farmers appeared to be more adversely affected by this lack of capacity than white farmers, 
who had largely been able to register their water use through irrigation boards within the 
Olifants/Lepelle River Basin and, in some cases, had registered access to several water 
sources87. 
Despite the delayed WUA registration, Upper Arabie Trust and its constituent farmers 
associations became involved in the first commercialization initiative by RESIS in the area. 
With specific regard to Phetwane, Upper Arabie Trust entered into a joint venture contract 
to produce cotton with NSK. The joint venture was initiated through facilitation by IDT and 
later handed over to Ndzalo. The latter became the implementing agent for a newly-
emerged programme that shifted away from engineering-centred scheme rehabilitation 
towards a comprehensive initiative to enable farmers to effectively manage operational 
functions of the irrigation scheme and to enter into commercial agriculture.    
5.7.2 CONCLUSION 
The development of a complex structure for management of revitalization of agricultural 
production in Upper Arabie was necessitated by the fact that critical issues underlying the 
RESIS Programme design were points of convergence for the various local and external 
institutions and organizations. These included water use, socio-economic development, 
food security, environmental conservation and black economic empowerment. There was a 
need therefore to integrate interventions by RESIS with the interests of other institutions. 
Such an approach resonated with principles of IWRM, which the Global Water Partnership 
(GWP, 2000) defines to be “a process which promotes the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems.”  
                                                     
87
 Interviews with Mr Jaco Burger, Farm Manager of Schoeman Broedary (EDMS) BPK, Mr John Barnadie, 
Water Control Officer of Hereford irrigation Board, and farmers Ms Sunette Klaasens and Mr Herman Boete, 
held on 13 October 2010.  
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The IWRM approach provided overarching guidance to policies, strategies, decisions and 
activities relating to water use, development, management and conservation. A core 
principle of the IWRM approach was devolution of water management responsibility to the 
lowest appropriate level. Attempts to register the WUA failed, thereby leading to devolution 
failure. Consequently, LDA continued to represent smallholders in decision making about 
RESIS contract farming arrangements.    
The IWRM approach was also considered a key approach towards achievement of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). While the Municipal Systems Act of South Africa 
vested municipalities with the responsibility to coordinate development within their areas 
of jurisdiction, a key challenge for the RESIS project in Phetwane was the lack of effective 
coordination, owing largely to the lack of adequate managerial and skills capacity within the 
local and district municipalities.  
Poor coordination also characterized communications between the Development Forum 
and external organizations, on the one hand, and smallholders, on the other hand. Since 
much of the communication between the Management Committee of Upper Arabie Trust 
and PFA was verbal, it was not easy for the study to determine the exact source of the 
problem. However, findings showed that some of the information communicated by Upper 
Arabie Trust to PFA was not adequately relayed to smallholders. At the same time, the PFA 
management committee ascribed the communication problem to farmers’ forgetfulness or 
tendency to misinterpret relayed information, and alluded to the advanced age and lack of 
formal education of most smallholders.   
Problems of poor coordination ultimately negatively affected Ndzalo’s project 
implementation in Phetwane. Ndzalo tried to instil a sense of project ownership in 
Phetwane by embedding the RESIS project within a pre-existing community level 
institutional framework, which local people understood. However, this well-intentioned 
strategy was undermined a number of factors, including poor communication, lack of 
effective coordination and weaknesses in community leadership and social cohesion, among 
others. These problems proved to be major setbacks when the cotton joint venture was 
implemented in Phetwane. 
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5.8 RESIS: COTTON JOINT VENTURE, 2003 TO 2004 
 
This section explores the implementation of a cotton joint venture between Phetwane 
farmers and a private investor. Different phases of the joint venture are examined, starting 
from inception, through cotton growing and harvesting, to the post-harvest phase. 
5.8.1 INCEPTION PHASE: SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER 2003  
Commercialization of agricultural production began in Phetwane late in 2003 with 
preparations for the growing of cotton in a joint venture between farmers and Noordelike 
Sentrale Katoen (NSK), a private investor based in Makopane (erstwhile Potgietersrus) 
within the Limpopo Province. The selection of cotton was largely determined by 
opportunities presented by an increase in the capacity of existing ginneries and a 
concomitant increase in the demand for raw cotton. According to NSK management, the 
company’s decision to enter into joint ventures with small-scale irrigation farmers was 
influenced mainly by the Limpopo provincial government’s policy statement that joint 
ventures were an important part of agricultural reform88. By entering into partnerships with 
the farmers, NSK considered that the company could increase acreage from which it sources 
cotton, while at the same time addressing corporate social responsibility issues through 
black economic empowerment. There was therefore a perceived convergence of interests of 
both government and private investor. 
The selection by the Limpopo Department of Agriculture and IDT of cotton, which is a 
relatively low value but high cost crop was questioned by actors in various circles, including 
research institutions, government, NGOs and the private sector. There were questions 
about the rationale behind opting for small-scale irrigation farmers to grow cotton, which at 
the time commanded a market price of R4000 per ton (R4 per kilogram), as opposed to 
opting for lower cost-higher value crops, such as wheat. Phetwane farmers also expressed 
their apprehensions about the riskiness of growing cotton, which they were not familiar 
with and which, in the case of crop failure, would pose problems of food security for their 
households. However, their need for money influenced their decision to enter into the joint 
venture. In spite of questions over the riskiness of the venture, a contract was signed by 
                                                     
88 Meeting with NSK Director, Dr Graham Gerber, and his team of employees responsible for implementing 
cotton joint ventures in Limpopo, held in Mokopane (formerly Potgietersrus) on 15 October, 2004. 
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members of the Upper Arabie Trust executive committee, on behalf of Phetwane farmers, 
and senior managers of NSK. IDT facilitated the partnership arrangement. 
NSK committed to supplying production inputs, financial capital, infrastructure, personnel 
and markets. The financial capital contributed by NSK was R500 000, which matched the 
contribution by Limpopo Department of Agriculture. The money was spent on planting seed, 
fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, irrigation labour costs,  hiring of additional personnel, 
irrigation transport costs, land preparation costs, maintenance costs for irrigation 
equipment and fences, water pumping costs, electricity, diesel, aerial spraying, insurance 
and a ten-year loan for infrastructure such as pipes. NSK undertook to impart production 
skills to farmers through formal training and practical demonstration in the field. Farmers, 
on the other hand, committed to availing their land to the joint venture, growing cotton 
under the guidance of NSK and selling the harvested cotton and cottonseed to NSK. Farmers 
also undertook to accept NSK’s instructions relating to choice of seed varieties, applications 
of fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides and any other production-related responsibilities as 
directed. Conditions of the contract clearly stated that the cotton produced belonged to the 
farmers and guaranteed that NSK would buy the crop at market value. The contract made 
allowance for the joint venture to continue for three years, on condition that the 
partnership ran according to plan. Although the private investor could exit after fulfilling 
obligations to enhance farmers’ sustainability in commercial production, there was a 
possibility to extend the partnership if farmers deemed it necessary. 
One proviso was that NSK would enter into the joint venture contract with Upper Arabie 
legally constituted as a WUA. Contracts were therefore not entered into with individual 
farmers or individual farmers’ associations, such as PFA, but collectively with all registered 
plotholders in Phetwane through Upper Arabie Balemi Trust, which was an umbrella 
organisation. Other provisos were that the provincial Department of Agriculture would 
assume responsibility for rehabilitating pumps stations, while implementing agents would 
facilitate communication with farmers and training of farmer in various aspects of 
commercial production management.  
Although the conditions of the contract stipulated that profits and debts would be shared 
equally, perceptions between farmers and the private investor differed. NSK senior 
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management concurred that profits and debts were to be shared equally. In addition to 
that, the private investor also undertook to reinvest 50 per cent of their profit towards 
cotton production in the following season89. According to Phetwane farmers, however, they 
were entitled to 50 per cent of the profits, while NSK would get 12 per cent and earmark the 
remaining 37 per cent for reinvestment into joint cotton production in the following season. 
The reason for discrepancy of understanding was not entirely clear but seemed to be linked 
to a change-over of implementing agencies from IDT to Ndzalo. 
The view held by a number of institutional actors was that when IDT brokered the joint 
venture deal, the implementing agent did not facilitate organizational development of the 
PFA Management Committee. Consequently, all communication between NSK and farmers 
was through the Phetwane farm manager. This accounted for the farmers’ constant refrain 
that NSK did not consult them about decisions but simply instructed the farm manager to 
tell them what was to be done. Farmers became concerned about the inappropriateness of 
communication and lack of participatory decision-making, and they began to question the 
purported ‘partnership’ in the joint venture. They could not call upon IDT to assist since the 
implementing agent was winding down operations in anticipation of the end of contract in 
March 2004. At the same time, the replacement of IDT by Ndzalo was not yet complete. The 
communication and participation problem became partly resolved following Ndzalo’s 
facilitation of a project management framework that placed Upper Arabie Trust at the 
centre of RESIS project administration and PFA within the existing community level 
institutional set-up. By that time, however, the contract was already in place, together with 
the variance in perceptions.     
Although the communication and participation problem was often ascribed to IDT’s 
oversight of the need to develop the organizational capacity of PFA, the problem seemed 
more to the point an issue of power relations between joint venture partners. The financial 
clout commanded by NSK was pitted against the poverty and lack of commercial production 
skills of smallholders. It was perhaps not surprising therefore that, in the absence of a 
conscious effort by IDT to ensure equitable stakeholder participation, power dynamics 
emerged.  
                                                     
89 Meeting with NSK Director, Dr Graham Gerber, and his team of employees responsible for implementing 
cotton joint ventures in Limpopo, Meeting held at Mokopane 15 October 2004. 
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5.8.2 COTTON GROWING PHASE: JANUARY TO MAY 
In spite of differences over the content and implementation of the joint venture contract, 
preparations for cotton production began in November 2003. A major setback was soon 
encountered. This was with regard to a delay in the supply of fertilizer, which was a critical 
input factor at planting stage. NSK alleges that during discussions on the joint venture 
contract, IDT had declined to assume responsibility for sourcing inputs, citing a lack of 
capacity to do. At the time of planting, after NSK had obtained quotes for fertilizer, IDT 
halted the imminent purchase and instead came up with a different supplier, whose quote 
was much higher. NSK management alleges that there was a personal connection between 
the supplier and the IDT officer responsible. This resulted in a delay in the supply of 
fertilizer, and consequently delays in planting. Planting and irrigation began in January 2004. 
A high degree of enthusiasm was observed among smallholders, who were mostly 
pensioners90. This was due to anticipation of high income from cotton. The smallholders’ 
view was that the joint venture would be a success if the income justified expenditure, in 
terms of capital, labour and other costs. Each day, many went to their irrigated plots very 
early in the morning and carefully tended the cotton plants until late in the afternoon. A few 
smallholders hired workers to assist with day-to-day tasks on the plots. It was as if the 
elderly among farmers had been given a new lease of life. Most of these recalled with fond 
memories the esteem they acquired from their “successful” involvement in a past 
commercial farming venture with “AMS” in the 1970s. Success, in that instance, was 
measured by the number of 90 kilogram bags of grain that farmers got from each harvest 
after production costs had been deducted. Success was also measured in terms of the food 
security enjoyed by plotholders’ households. Alongside maize and wheat, farmers had been 
able to grow vegetables for sale and for household consumption. Amid all the optimism and 
positive recollections of the past, however, there were a few voices of dissent by elderly 
women farmers. One stated: 
In the past we used to eat well from this land. We used to grow beans, spinach, 
pumpkins and mealies in our plots. Now we stand on the outside and look over the 
                                                     
90 Fieldwork between April and July 2004. 
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fence, watching the big tractors growling away, “grrrr…grrrr…..grrrr”, as they 
prepare the land for cotton. We cannot eat cotton… 
At the beginning of planting in January, 46 of the 47 farmers registered with the joint 
venture were each paid R200 for availing their land to the joint venture. There were no 
records of payment to the 47th farmer, who was a woman aged 65 years and who the PFA 
management committee confirmed was actively involved in the joint venture. The treasurer 
of the PFA acknowledged that official records of the joint venture were inaccurate. The 
treasurer alluded, for example, to the fact that plot numbers assigned to plotholders were 
mismatched. There was also mention of about twenty other farmers who actively 
participated in the joint venture, using plots located downstream of the original boundaries 
of the irrigation scheme, whose names did not appear on the list. This raised questions on 
the effectiveness of the implementing agent’s role, and indeed about who exactly benefited 
from the joint venture. The study was not able to obtain the view of the excluded woman 
farmer.   
Records showed that during the five-month cotton growing phase from January to May, the 
same 46 farmers were paid money for labour relating to irrigation. Payments were at the 
rate of R180 per ha for four out of five months and R360 per ha in February (Table 28). The 
double rate for February was due to a need to rectify expenditure on production labour 
costs, which had been budgeted for duration of six months but shortened by late season 
planting to five months. Given the range of plot sizes from 0.5 to 1.86 ha, total earnings per 
farmer ranged from R561.60 to R2008.80 (Table 28). The lowest paid farmer earned an 
average of R112.32 per month while the highest paid earned R401.76.  
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TABLE 28 PHETWANE: EARNINGS PER FARMER FOR IRRIGATION-RELATED LABOUR, 2004 
 
Plot 
number 
Plot size 
(ha) 
Name of farmer 
(Psuedonym) 
Gender Age Earnings in Rands (R)* 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May TOTAL 
1 1.51 Mosate Mmabatho F 74 271.80 543.60 271.80 271.80 271.80 1630.8 
2 1.17 Shatile Mmaletsatsi F 56 210.60 421.20 210.60 210.60 210.60 1263.6 
3 1.13 Sekgoma Karabo  F 84 203.40 406.80 203.40 203.40 203.40 1220.4 
4 0.77 Mosate Morago F 61 138.60 277.20 138.60 138.60 138.60 831.6 
5 0.77 Matsatsi Isabel F 69 138.60 277.20 138.60 138.60 138.60 831.6 
6 1.27 Dlamini Mokgadi F 74 228.60 457.20 228.60 228.60 228.60 1371.6 
7 0.96 Masinini Mago F 59 172.80 345.60 172.80 172.80 172.80 1036.8 
8 1.14 Maloba Mopelo F 62 205.20 410.40 205.20 205.20 205.20 1231.2 
9 1.07 Makuku Magdalina F 61 192.60 385.20 192.60 192.60 192.60 1155.6 
10 0.91 Malapane Maseta F 76 163.80 327.60 163.80 163.80 163.80 982.8 
11 0.95 Malapane Norby M 46 171.00 342.00 171.00 171.00 171.00 1026 
12 0.97 Makuku Raishaka F 86 174.60 349.20 174.60 174.60 174.60 1047.6 
13 0.92 Sekgoma Mathakge F 69 165.60 331.20 165.60 165.60 165.60 993.6 
14 1.02 Maganedisa Madila F 75 183.60 367.20 183.60 183.60 183.60 1101.6 
15 1.06 Modipelo Modireng F 65 190.80 381.60 190.80 190.80 190.80 1144.8 
16 0.94 Sekgoma Ntoane F 76 169.20 338.40 169.20 169.20 169.20 1015.2 
17 0.84 Mahlomongwe Ramofe M 70 151.20 302.40 151.20 151.20 151.20 907.2 
18 0.94 Mamasela Setlhare M 86 169.20 338.40 169.20 169.20 169.20 1015.2 
19 1.06 Matema Ramaina F 71 190.80 381.60 190.80 190.80 190.80 1144.8 
20 1.1 Lekotse Baruti M 40 198.00 396.00 198.00 198.00 198.00 1188 
21 0.99 Mmamadi Kagiso F 61 178.20 356.40 178.20 178.20 178.20 1069.2 
22 1.86 Bosepele Aganang M 74 334.80 669.60 334.80 334.80 334.80 2008.8 
23 1.2 Maina Maria F 66 216.00 432.00 216.00 216.00 216.00 1296 
24 1.17 Kodumela Selina F 66 210.60 421.20 210.60 210.60 210.60 1263.6 
25 1.19 Naledi Ramathosa F 75 214.20 428.40 214.20 214.20 214.20 1285.2 
26 1.21 Dlamini Louis M 93 217.80 435.60 217.80 217.80 217.80 1306.8 
27 1.23 Lekotse Masetlha F 67 221.40 442.80 221.40 221.40 221.40 1328.4 
28 1.21 Mashinini Lekgotlha M 59 217.80 435.60 217.80 217.80 217.80 1306.8 
29 1.25 Motsephiri Ramakhene M 102 225.00 450.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 1350 
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30 1.23 Nkgadime Mopelong F 74 221.40 442.80 221.40 221.40 221.40 1328.4 
31 1.2 Maganedisa Makgatho F 60 216.00 432.00 216.00 216.00 216.00 1296 
32 1.22 Lekotse Lethaba M 44 219.60 439.20 219.60 219.60 219.60 1317.6 
33 1.17 Mashinini Willard M 71 210.60 421.20 210.60 210.60 210.60 1263.6 
34 1.19 Mmogopolong Kgari M 58 214.20 428.40 214.20 214.20 214.20 1285.2 
35 1.26 Mmogopolong Modikeng F 53 226.80 453.60 226.80 226.80 226.80 1360.8 
36 1.14 Makomoto Modire F 60 205.20 410.40 205.20 205.20 205.20 1231.2 
37 1.18 Balope Martha F 65 212.40 424.80 212.40 212.40 212.40 1274.4 
38 ? - - - - - - - - - 
39 1.23 Leshalaba Kgaitsadi F 81 221.40 442.80 221.40 221.40 221.40 1328.4 
40 1.25 Maganedisa Witbooi M 86 225.00 450.00 225.00 225.00 225.00 1350 
41 1.19 Sodindwa Sarah F 60 214.20 428.40 214.20 214.20 214.20 1285.2 
42 1.24 Mankgopotse Mmamaina F 78 223.20 446.40 223.20 223.20 223.20 1339.2 
43 1.26 Maganedisa Malefatshe F 73 226.80 453.60 226.80 226.80 226.80 1360.8 
44 1.29 Maina Katlhego M 69 232.20 464.40 232.20 232.20 232.20 1393.2 
45 1.23 Segasese MAthema F 76 221.40 442.80 221.40 221.40 221.40 1328.4 
46 0.52 Maganedisa Maria F 70 93.60 187.20 93.60 93.60 93.60 561.6 
47 1.00 Maimane Mooketse M 64 180.00 360.00 180.00 180.00 180.00 1080 
48 ? Shatile Modike  F 65 ND ND ND ND ND 0 
49 ? - - - - - - - - - 
TOTAL PAID  9289.80 18579.60 9289.80 9289.80 9289.80 55738.80 
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There were differing perceptions at village level on the exact purpose of the payments made 
from January to May. Members of the PFA management committee, the Phetwane farm 
manager and the agricultural extension officer, on the one hand, asserted that the 
payments were ‘allowances’ to enable farmers to subsist until they received payment after 
the harvesting and sales of cotton. Phetwane farmers, on the other hand, considered that 
the payments were ‘remuneration’ for their labour. While such divergence might have been 
due to differences in interpretation, equally, the difference might have been due to a 
distortion of terminology during translation from Afrikaans into sePedi when information 
was imparted to farmers. Nevertheless, production account records specifically stated that 
these payments were ‘labour costs’. Production accounts also showed that labour costs 
were paid out as loans to farmers. The loans were to be deducted from the farmers’ income 
after cotton sales. By the end of the cotton growing season towards the end of May, the 
total collective loan to farmers was R55 738.80, minus interest charges.  
5.8.3 COTTON PICKING PHASE: JUNE TO AUGUST 2004  
Cotton picking began at the end of May 2004 and continued until the beginning of 
September. Farmers were still enthusiastic and optimistic about the expected income. As 
they picked cotton, they wore no protective clothing and their hands and fingers got 
lacerated. The hard work resulted in many aching backs, hands and legs among the largely 
elderly group of farmers. Many hired paid labour to assist with cotton picking tasks.  
 
Early in the cotton picking season, farmers expressed two concerns91.  The first was that the 
scheme was experiencing water shortage due to drought and the subsequent drying up of 
the small Lola Montes Dam from which Phetwane Irrigation Scheme obtained water. Since 
the scheme did not have alternative sources of water, such as abstractions from the Olifants 
River or Flag Boshielo Dam, water shortage caused a degree of apprehension about the 
sustainability of the joint venture and future commercial farming in Phetwane. The second 
concern was about high costs of hired labour.  
                                                     
91 Fieldwork between April and July 2004. 
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Although the joint venture budget allowed for cotton picking costs at a rate of R0.40 per 
kilogram, in many cases farmers were compelled to pay workers R20 per day. No 
mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the workers’ rate of pay did not exceed 
budgeted labour costs. The PFA management committee, Ndzalo and the farm manager 
anticipated problems with the labour arrangements that farmers were individually entering 
into, but could not intervene effectively. Many farmers were not fully aware of the risks 
involved. Even if they were, they had no choice but to accept the price determined by 
workers or face the prospect of losing much of their cotton crop. Many farmers therefore 
rejected advice by the PFA management committee, Ndzalo and the farm manager and 
adopted various strategies to cover costs of hired labour. Some attempted to manage risk 
by working together with their workers on the plots and paying them amounts lower than 
the average daily charge of R20. That way, they managed to reduce their labour costs. 
Others used their entire remuneration for cotton picking labour to pay hired workers R20 
per day, but still owed workers by the end of the cotton picking season. These farmers, who 
were mostly pensioners, were then forced to use their pensions to pay off labour-related 
debts.  
Joint venture records showed that, for the three months of cotton picking, 46 of the 47 
registered farmers were paid a total of R35 595.88 for their labour (Table 29). The rate of 
remuneration was R0.40 (40c) per kilogram (kg) of cotton. The highest paid farmer, a 
woman aged 61 years, got R1808.40 while the lowest paid received R211.60. The study 
examined remuneration for cotton picking in relation to cotton yields.    
Collectively, farmers harvested a total of 61 200kg. The productivity rate was 1 224kg per 
ha, which was lower than the projected 2200 to 2500kg per ha (i.e. 49 – 56 per cent of 
projection). The yield achieved by the highest paid farmer was 4521.2kg per ha, which was 
roughly twice the value of the projected yield. The lowest paid farmer achieved a yield of 
410kg per ha, which is less than 25 per cent of the projected yield. Although the farmer 
holding the largest plot (1.86ha) received a total payment of R2008.80 for irrigation labour 
and R1319.68 for cotton picking labour (Table 29), the farmer achieved a yield of 1773.8kg 
per ha, which was below the projected yield. By contrast, the farmer holding the smallest 
plot (0.52ha) received R561.60 for irrigation labour but did not harvest any cotton, thereby 
getting no pay.  
 
 
 
 
 293 
TABLE 29 PHETWANE: EARNINGS FROM COTTON PICKING AT R0.40 PER KILOGRAM, 2004  
 
Plot 
Number 
Plot size 
(ha) 
Name of farmer* 
Gender  
 
Age 
( in years) June July August  TOTAL 
Average 
earnings per 
month 
1 1.51 Mosate Mmabatho F 74 285.2 285.2 100.8 671.2 223.73 
2 1.17 Shatile Mmaletsatsi F 56 557.6 557.6 165.2 1280.4 426.8 
3 1.13 Sekgoma Karabo  F 84 222 222 210.8 654.8 218.27 
4 0.77 Mosate Morago F 61 296.8 296.8 60.4 654 218 
5 0.77 Matsatsi Isabel F 69 317.8 349.2 141.2 808.2 269.4 
6 1.27 Dlamini Mokgadi F 74 590.4 317.8 183.6 1091.8 363.93 
7 0.96 Masinini Mago F 59 280.4 590.4 110.8 981.6 327.2 
8 1.14 Maloba Mopelo F 62 510 280.4 244 1034.4 344.8 
9 1.07 Makuku Magdalina F 61 860.4 510 438 1808.4  602.8 
10 0.91 Malapane Maseta F 76 389.6 860.4 310.8 1560.8 520.27 
11 0.95 Malapane Norby M 46 948.8 389.6 372.4 1710.8 570.27 
12 0.97 Makuku Raishaka F 86 562 948.8 124 1634.8 544.93 
13 0.92 Sekgoma Mathakge F 69 335.32 562 179.2 1076.52 358.84 
14 1.02 Maganedisa Madila F 75 753.2 335.32 325.2 1413.72 471.24 
15 1.06 Modipelo Modireng F 65 633.76 753.2 225.6 1612.56 537.52 
16 0.94 Sekgoma Ntoane F 76 0 633.76 146.4 780.16 260.05 
17 0.84 Mahlomongwe Ramofe M 70 409.6 409.6 62 881.2 293.73 
18 0.94 Mamasela Setlhare M 86 576.8 576.8 259.6 1413.2 471.7 
19 1.06 Matema Ramaina F 71 390.12 390.12 206.8 987.04 329.01 
20 1.1 Lekotse Baruti M 40 419.6 419.6 293.2 1132.4 377.47 
21 0.99 Mmamadi Kagiso F 61 595.2 595.2 292.8 1483.2 494.40 
22 1.86 Bosepele Aganang M 74 532.04 532.04 255.6 1319.68 489.39 
23 1.2 Maina Maria F 66 366.4 366.4 267.6 1000.4 333.47 
24 1.17 Kodumela Selina F 66 348.4 348.4 142.4 839.2 279.73 
25 1.19 Naledi Ramathosa F 75 481.2 481.2 125.2 1087.6 362.53 
26 1.21 Dlamini Louis M 93 321.6 321.6 446 1089.2 363.07 
27 1.23 Lekotse Masetlha F 67 363.2 363.2 270.4 996.8 332.27 
28 1.21 Mashinini Lekgotlha M 59 0 0 0 0 0 
29 1.25 Motsephiri Ramakhene M 102 0 0 0 0 0 
30 1.23 Nkgadime Mopelong F 74 0 0 0 0 0 
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31 1.2 Maganedisa Makgatho F 60 0 0 0 0 0 
32 1.22 Lekotse Lethaba M 44 0 0 0 0 0 
33 1.17 Mashinini Willard M 71 0 0 0 0 0 
34 1.19 Mmogopolong Kgari M 58 95.2 95.2 128 318.4 106.13 
35 1.26 Mmogopolong Modikeng F 53 182.8 182.2 65.6 430.6 143.53 
36 1.14 Makomoto Modire F 60 175.2 175.2 151.6 502 167.33 
37 1.18 Balope Martha F 65 70.4 70.4 86.8 227.6 92.53 
38 ? - -  - - - - - 
39 1.23 Leshalaba Kgaitsadi F 81 179.6 179.6 114.8 474 158 
40 1.25 Maganedisa Witbooi M 86 238 238 136 612 204 
41 1.19 Sodindwa Sarah F 60 69.6 69.6 187.6 326.8 108.93 
42 1.24 Mankgopotse Mmamaina F 78 90.4 90.4 200.8 381.6 127.20 
43 1.26 Maganedisa Malefatshe F 73 190.4 190.4 148 528.8 176.27 
44 1.29 Maina Katlhego M 69 0 0 211.6 211.6 70.53 
45 1.23 Segasese MAthema F 76 194 194 190.4 578.4 192.80 
46 0.52 Maganedisa Maria F 70 0 0 0 0 0 
47 1.00 Maimane Mooketse M 64 0 0 0 0 0 
48 ? Shatile Modike  F 65 ND ND ND ND ND 
49   - - - - - - -  
TOTAL EARNINGS BY 46 FARMERS   
 
13833.04 
 14181.64 7581.2 35595.88 
 
[* Psuedonyms used] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 295 
Such data showed that there were wide variations in achievements by different farmers, 
despite that all farmers had been given the same allowances and proportional payments for 
labour. The total yield collectively achieved by Phetwane farmers was significantly lower than 
projected.  
Projections of income had been premised on farmers’ achieving high grade (HA/A1) cotton. 
While the early harvest in June achieved this grade, subsequent harvests were of lower grade 
(HB/A1 and (HBSG/BSG), owing to water shortage on the scheme. NSK records show that, after 
deductions of the ginning fee, transport, Nakpo levy and cotton levy, Phetwane farmers’ 
income from cotton fell from the projected R4000 per kg to R3500 per kg. The implication of 
this, and the lower than projected quantity and quality of yield, was that the joint venture as a 
whole made a loss. The nature of gearing (according to De Klerk, 1996) in the Phetwane case 
could not be accurately determined, owing to the fact that many of the elderly and illiterate 
farmers did not keep records of the actual labour costs their incurred outside of the joint 
venture framework. However, it is reasonable to surmise that, since the actual labour costs 
evidently exceeded the budget92 and the projected income from cotton fell by 12.5 per cent, 
the debt component for the smallholders’ share of production costs was much higher than 
anticipated. 
5.8.4 POST-PRODUCTION PHASE: SEPTEMBER 2004 TO JULY 2006 
Within the study, joint venture success or failure was measured by the extent to which the 
venture met its objectives. At the same time, the importance of Phetwane people’s perceptions 
could not be overlooked. This section gives a post-mortem examination of the cotton joint 
venture, paying particular attention to people’s perceptions but not losing sight of the RESIS 
project objectives.  
Following failure of the joint venture to meet income objectives, LDA, NSK and Ndzalo were 
faced with the difficult task of deciding how to deal with the problem. LDA was concerned 
                                                     
92
The joint venture budget covered a fraction of the farmers’ actual labour costs, for example, 23% and 47% of 
those for Mmabatho Mosate of Isabel Matsatsi (see Box 10 and Table 29).  
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about implications of the setback on future plans to promote agricultural commercialization in 
smallholder irrigation schemes and to build the capacity of farmers to manage such schemes. 
NSK was concerned about cutting losses of the 2004 season and going ahead with other future 
plans. Actors from key stakeholder institutions reassured the management of NSK that the 
losses incurred by smallholders did not constitute debts since the R500 000 subsidy from 
government was a grant and not a loan to farmers. As a result NSK became willing to continue 
with the joint venture in 2005 and to rectify mistakes of the previous season. Farmers, 
however, were deeply disappointed (Box 9) and for many months after losses were announced, 
they were vehemently against having anything to do with NSK or any other externally-based 
institutional actors. 
 
 
 
A major source of discontent was the debts that farmers incurred through hiring labour at R20 
per day. By the end of the cotton picking season, many still owed workers. Pensioners among 
the farmers were forced to use their pensions to pay off labour-related debts, resulting in food 
insecurity within their households (Box 10). Debts snowballed as these households were 
compelled to obtain loans from other community members to buy food or to obtain food on 
credit from local retailers (Box 10). Such households were caught in the debt trap for many 
months after the cotton picking season. 
 
 
 
 
Box 9 Example of Phetwane farmers’ disappointment with the joint venture 
 
Witbooi Maganedisa, elderly male pensioner aged 86 years old bitterly stated: 
 
“The crooks came and made us grow cotton, making us believe it was ours, and yet they knew we were 
harvesting it for them… My heart is aching (Mosadi oa batho, pelo ibotlhoko). If I stop and talk to you about 
issues of the scheme, I will collapse and die…”  
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In their analyses of the cotton joint venture, farmers compared the venture with a previous, 
apartheid era joint venture and surmised that the previous venture was better (Box 11). 
Farmers were unhappy that the joint venture contract treated them collectively, were 
particularly dissatisfied with their collective assumption of losses irrespective of levels of 
productivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 10 Examples of experiences with food insecurity and debts after the joint venture 
 
Isabel Matsatsi, female pensioner, 69 years old: 
“Hiring labour [for cotton picking] cost me R900. I used all the money I got from the joint venture, 
roughly R200 per month, to pay workers and also paid them partly from my pension, at R20 per 
day…I now owe the shop money for food and my debts are increasing with interest. I do not know 
how I will survive… I live with two sons who are unemployed. One of them is divorced and his two 
children also live with me. The mother of the children works for government and is therefore not 
eligible for child support. However, she gives us mealie meal [25kg], sugar [2.5kg], cooking oil [2.5l], 
tea leaves [250g], laundry soap [1kg], bath soap, vaseline [skin emollient] and a few small items 
every month. This is what has been keeping us going since our problems started [following the joint 
venture]”. [The researcher calculated the value of this support with Isabel, and came to a figure of 
about R170 of support per month.]”   
 
Mmabatho Mosate (aged 74) and extended family, who share use of her plot: 
“We hired five people to pick cotton. We still owe them after paying them part of their money. We 
paid them R20 per day, and paid out a total of R400. We still owe them R1780. These people want 
their money…” 
“Our hope was that we would pay them from earnings after cotton sales….” 
“It is difficult…In this home we get money from two pensions. This amounts to R1480. It is not easy 
to see how we will manage to pay the workers.” 
“We have two food gardens and we did grow some vegetables – spinach, beetroot, onion and 
cabbage – despite that most of our time was taken up by the joint venture. The gardens have not 
done very well though.” 
“Although we want to grow more crops, we do not have money to buy seeds and manure [fertilizer]. 
Water is also a problem.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 298 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In light of the farmers’ unyielding reluctance to work with NSK, owing to failure by the joint 
venture to generate the envisaged incomes, the private investor accepted that the venture had 
to be discontinued. Officials of LDA were disappointed with this outcome and decided to review 
the Phetwane case. For about four years following the end of the cotton joint venture, 
production in the irrigation scheme came to a standstill. Although farmers were keen to grow 
food crops, such as maize, wheat, sunflower and vegetables, they were instructed to desist 
from using land on the scheme. One reason was that farmers owed a huge electricity bill for 
water supply costs related to cotton production. Another reason was that LDA planned to 
develop new high-technology ‘floppy sprinkler’ irrigation infrastructure in Phetwane and other 
irrigation schemes in the Upper Arabie Balemi Trust area. Prior to and during infrastructure 
development, farmers were not allowed to use the land. Local views were that exclusion of 
Box 11 Smallholders’ perspectives on performance of RESIS joint venture and ensuing hardship  
Isabel Matsatsi, female pensioner, 69 years old:  
“Before the joint venture with NSK, I made R3000 from wheat per year. Our decision to grow cotton 
was influenced by the theft of cables and pipes [towards the end of 2003]. There was therefore no 
water. Expected earnings from cotton were also higher than for wheat. I picked over 1 ton of cotton 
[she actually picked over 2 tons!] but got absolutely nothing…” 
 
Mmabatho Mosate (aged 74) and extended family, who share use of her plot: 
“Before the joint venture with NSK, we grew maize and wheat on the scheme. We used to get 
around 60 bags of maize, which was mostly for our own consumption. The maize would last the 
whole year. With wheat, we would get 84 bags, which we would sell at R90 per bag….”   
 
Ntoane Sekgoma, woman pensioner aged 76: 
“I have grown cotton before. I grew cotton after 1994 and sold it to OTK in Marble Hall. White 
people there could not believe an old woman like me could grow such high grade cotton, and one 
accused me of having stolen the cotton from white farms…I also grew wheat before the joint 
venture with NSK. I have continued to grow wheat since the 1970s, selling it in Marble Hall and 
getting good money. With that money, I managed to buy sufficient food for my family for the year. I 
also managed to send all my children to school. I know therefore that it is possible for black people 
to succeed in commercial farming…. Yes, I am disappointed by the cotton joint venture, but am 
determined to succeed… Since we have been told not to use our plots on the scheme, I will grow 
wheat in the space around my house [about 1.2ha]. I have already bought seed and fertilizer, as you 
can see the stock… [in the garage]. I have also hired a tractor and ploughed the land all around. All I 
am waiting for is the rain… There are some, however, who do not understand my attitude in this 
village. They have recently been accusing me of witchcraft because I seem to be progressing, 
whereas they are still struggling after the joint venture failure.”  [Ntoane died in her sleep in 
September 2005, a month after this conversation. Her plot was inherited by her eldest son, who 
subsequently became the chairman of the PFA management committee and reported being 
compelled to sign the strategic partnership with Temong cc “under the barrel of a gun” (see Section 
5.9.1)]. 
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smallholders from access to land in the scheme, particularly during rainy seasons, contributed 
to deepening food insecurity especially for households that had hitherto had singular or shared 
access to irrigated plots. 
5.9 RESIS-RECHARGE: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 2008 
5.9.1 INCEPTION OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
In November 2008 Phetwane smallholders, formally constituted as ‘Phetoane Irrigation Farmers 
Cooperative’, entered into a three-year strategic partnership with Temong cc, trading as Arthur 
William Creighton (AWC). This strategic partnership was preceded by a cotton joint venture 
between commercial plot holders and NSK, which ran from 2003 to 2004 and left smallholders 
indebted, food insecure and reluctant to enter into new contracts with private commercial 
agricultural enterprises (Section 5.8). During the four years that lapsed before smallholders 
entered into a strategic partnership agreement with Temong cc, LDA made a significant 
financial investment into the development of a new floppy sprinkler irrigation system to replace 
the older conventional sprinklers. LDA also sought to pacify Phetwane smallholders and re-gain 
their interest in contract farming. At that time, some of the children of elderly and deceased 
Phetwane smallholders joined the fray, purportedly in defence of their smallholders’ rights.  
According to the youth, their involvement was a defence of progenitorial land rights, through 
ensuring that their elderly parents did not get ‘cheated’ by external agencies. However, 
involvement of the youth might also have been a means to their gaining access to perceived 
financial benefits from strategic partnerships. Explanations that youth involvement was a 
defence of parental land rights pointed to a conflation of customary land tenure rules with land 
tenure rights formalization through PTOs. Regulations governing PTOs and issued in terms of 
the Bantu Areas Land Regulations (Proclamation R188 of 1969) granted exclusive lifetime 
usufruct rights. In practice, however, such rights in black rural communities were generally 
viewed to be rights in perpetuity, to be inherited by living spouses and/or their off-spring. Given 
that government interventions in Phetwane were perceived to harbour threats of alienating 
benefits from such land rights, the purported stance of Phetwane youth therefore resonated 
with traditional customs pertaining to land.  
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Despite evidence that there had been a marked deterioration of trust between smallholders 
and LDA, department officials did not sufficiently engage with smallholders to allay their 
concerns over possible losses of income. Rather, LDA’s strategy was to encourage smallholders 
to again place their land, water and infrastructure resources at the disposal of a strategic 
partnership with Temong cc, which traded as AWC. This was done through an empowerment 
partner within Temong cc, who formerly worked for LDA as an extension officer based within 
the locality of Upper Arabie. Through the empowerment partner, Mr Lazarus Mosena, Temong 
cc by-passed smallholders and actively engaged with the traditional leader, Kgoshi (chief) 
Matlala, in order to get smallholders to agree to the strategic partnership.  
The Temong cc empowerment partner was familiar with the local power dynamics and, in 
particular, was aware that many of the elderly smallholders had a strong allegiance to the chief. 
Such allegiance was demonstrated after failure of the cotton joint venture with NSK, when 
these smallholders appealed to Kgoshi Matlala, rather than elected councillors, for 
intervention. Elderly smallholders’ respect for the authority of the chief was strongly linked to 
his customary role as custodian of land rights. This role had given Kgoshi Matlala power to 
allocate irrigation plots since 1957.  
The chief’s role in land allocation did not seem to have been weakened by the obsolescence of 
the Bantu Areas Land Regulations and emergence of the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) of 
2004, which had yet to take effect. Under CLRA, the power of traditional leadership was, 
theoretically at least, counterbalanced with the power of elected members of land committees. 
PTOs or ‘old order rights’ were upgraded into ‘new order rights’, effectively meaning that 
smallholders’ land rights remained secure. The persistence of elderly smallholders’ allegiance to 
the chief also indicated that his power base was broader than land rights issues. It was 
entrenched in elderly smallholders’ trust in the traditional governance system. Consequently, 
when Kgoshi Matlala accompanied Temong cc to a meeting held on 01 November 2008 to 
discuss the strategic partnership with smallholders, many of the elderly smallholders agreed 
with the chief that the contract was acceptable.  
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The chairperson of Phetoane Farmers Cooperative, who was heir to an elderly woman 
smallholder who passed away in 2005, and Mr Arthur Creighton, on behalf of Temong cc, 
signed the contract on 01 November 2008, witnessed by four people. Duration of the contract 
was to be from 01 November 2008 to 01 November 2011. Thereafter, Temong cc was to 
relinquish its shares either to Phetwane smallholders or to shareholders nominated by LDA as 
part of an “exit strategy”. According to some of the smallholders, the chairperson of Phetwane 
Farmers Association, re-constituted as Phetoane Irrigation Farmers Cooperative, was compelled 
to sign the contract before reading it. In the chairperson’s own words, he “signed under the 
barrel of a gun”.  
5.9.2 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
Sharing of costs and benefits within the partnership agreement was such that the two parties 
would each get a 50 per cent share of profits in each of the three years of the contract 
duration. As in the case of Makuleke, Temong cc assumed more active roles in the enterprise 
while smallholders became ‘equity labourers’, whose roles were effectively reduced to those of 
passive beneficiaries. As equity labourers, smallholders’ roles were largely to relinquish their 
access to land, water and infrastructure to the strategic partnership and to receive dividends at 
the end of each production and marketing cycle. This contrasts with the more active 
involvement of smallholders in crop production during the 2003 to 2004 cotton joint venture. 
Given that the most (82.6 per cent) of the smallholders on Phetwane are over sixty years old, it 
is perhaps not surprising that many were happy with the labour arrangement. Difficulties 
associated with cotton production labour had been a major source of grievance for the elderly 
smallholders, who were too infirm to do all work and were hence compelled to hire labour at 
their own cost.   
Roles, responsibilities and obligations of Temong cc, Phetwane smallholders and the Limpopo 
Department of Agriculture were broadly according to the generic contract model used in many 
similar RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships, except that between EBIS Trust and AWC.  Active 
roles in the enterprise, however, were heavily skewed towards Temong cc. Phetwane 
smallholders played the role of passive ‘equity labourers’, who had very little influence over 
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decision making. As equity labourers, smallholders’ roles were largely to relinquish their access 
to land, water and irrigation infrastructure to the strategic partnership and to benefit from 
dividends at the end of each production and marketing cycle.  
In an effort to facilitate the strategic partnership, the provincial department of agriculture 
contributed substantial capital expenditure (R500 000 budgeted for 2008/2009 alone) towards 
developing floppy sprinkler irrigation in Phetwane.  This was part of part of floppy sprinkler 
infrastructure development for all four schemes in the Upper Arabie Balemi Trust area. 
Although AWC preferred centre pivots, which he used in similar partnerships with smallholders 
of Makuleke (Chapter 6) and Elandskraal, he was willing to work with smallholders using the 
floppy sprinkler system93. 
5.9.3 CONTRACTUAL FLAWS  
Evidence showed that the Phetwane contract was flawed both in the process of inception and 
in the technical and substantive contents. Firstly, there were procedural irregularities created 
by failure to respect the democratic principle in engagements with smallholders. Secondly, 
when the chairperson of Phetwane’s management committee signed the contract, smallholders 
believed that they were entering into a partnership with Mr Arthur William Creighton (AWC) 
and not Temong cc. Clause 8 of the contract identified Arthur William Creighton as the strategic 
partner. It was only after smallholders scrutinized a copy of the signed contract that they 
realized that the agreement contained various confusing statements about the partner they 
had contracted with. The front page of the Memorandum of Agreement, which was not signed 
by the chairperson of the smallholders’ group, clearly identified the partner as “Temong cc 
trading as Mr Arthur William Creighton (AWC) and duly represented by Mr Arthur William 
Creighton”. Clause 5.1.3 of the contract and small print at the bottom of each page and on the 
last page also mentioned Temong cc. However, all other references to the strategic partner 
within the contract referred to “Arthur William Creighton”, not to Temong cc. This and the fact 
that the existence of the empowerment partner was not made explicitly clear at the meeting of 
                                                     
93 Meeting with Mr Arthur William Creighton at Modimolle (formerly Nylstroom): 14 March 2008. 
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01 November 2008 might account for the view among the younger and more literate of 
Phetwane smallholders that Temong cc did not negotiate in a transparent manner.  
Smallholders also realized that the contract had other technical errors after they had entered 
into the agreement. An example of such errors was the discrepancy between the reference to 
“PFIC”, which Clause 5.1.3.1 explained was abbreviation for Phetoane Farmers Irrigation 
Cooperative, and reference in Clause 13.3 to “SIFC”, which Phetwane smallholders have 
queried. While errors such as this might have been due to shoddy revision of the cut-and-paste 
generic contract template, the fact that there were typographical errors in a legally binding 
document brought into question the level of quality control exercised by those administering 
the drafting of strategic partnership contracts. 
5.9.4 DISSATISFACTION OVER POWER AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING ISSUES 
As in the case of all other RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership contracts except that between 
EBIS Trust and AWC, a distinctive feature of the Phetwane strategic partnership agreement was 
that the contract, as an institutional arrangement, governed relationships primarily between 
smallholders and private investors. The contract also governed relationships between these 
contracting parties and LDA, as responsible authority. Theoretically at least, the contract 
remained critical to allocating degrees of power and control among these three parties. This 
was irrespective of the possibility that the power of private capital might otherwise have 
curtailed the exercise of power by LDA and smallholders. The involvement of LDA was based on 
an assumption that the government department would ensure that AWC complied with 
obligations to train smallholders, among other contractual requirements. The background to 
LDA’s involvement was that past experience had shown that smallholder institutions generally 
did not have sufficient capacity to deal with power dynamics associated with engagements with 
private investors. 
Despite LDA’s involvement in the contractual arrangement, the more educated and younger 
among Phetwane smallholders saw themselves as having been deprived of much of their 
power. For example, Phetwane smallholders were not happy with clauses such as Clause 12.3, 
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which stated that “shareholders of the Partnership will not be entitled to transfer their shares 
freely”. In light of the fact that the younger smallholders contested the merits of awarding 25 
per cent of shares to Temong’s ‘black empowerment partner’ from outside the ranks of local 
farmers, this clause restricted transfer of the contested shares to Phetwane smallholders. Of 
particular concern was that consideration of such transfer was subject to consent by LDA. The 
black empowerment partner in question was a former employee of LDA and smallholders 
feared that LDA officials might adjudicate in favour of their former colleague. Dissatisfaction 
with Clause 12.3 also related to perceived restrictions of smallholders’ degrees of freedom in 
making decisions that would affect their lives. Furthermore, there were perceptions that the 
contract accorded LDA inordinate decision making powers, whereas smallholders’ long-standing 
PTOs or old order rights gave them a significant stake, in terms of secure land tenure rights, in 
interventions in Phetwane Irrigation Scheme. Effectively, the younger among smallholders felt 
disempowered by the strategic partnership contract, while the same contract empowered 
external black individuals at the expense of land rights holders.  
Another contentious issue raised by younger and better educated among Phetwane 
smallholders was the lack of transparency and accounting relating to accrued interest from a 
government grant of R500 000, which was deposited into a trust account on behalf of 
Phetwane smallholders. Although the study was not able to verify this information, it resonated 
with allegations by Elandskraal smallholders about earlier conduct by Temong’s empowerment 
partner.   
5.9.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTRACT 
Although the Phetwane strategic partnership contract was signed in 2006 with a view to 
commencing implementation on 01 November 2008, by October 2009 this strategic partnership 
had yet to be implemented. A major constraint, according to smallholders, was that the floppy 
sprinkler system was not yet functional. 
Despite delays to project implementation, five labourers from Phetwane underwent training in 
various operational skills. Two of these were trained as pump operators, two were trained in 
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health and safety issues and one worker got training in operating the floppy irrigation system. 
The training was part of skills development for Upper Arabie Balemi Irrigation Trust area. Five 
people from each of the four irrigation schemes comprising the trust area took part in the 
training session. Beyond this, there was no other implementation activity by the time the study 
was concluded in 2009. 
5.10 SUMMARY 
Prior to the RESIS project, the history of Phetwane revolved around the creation and 
dismantling of an apartheid framework for social security in labour reserve. An essential feature 
of such reserves was the marginalization of the majority of indigenous people from the 
mainstream economy. Marginalization remained a defining feature for rural communities, such 
as Phetwane. Although post-1994 reforms had sought to address challenges of poverty and 
inequality, an immediate result of the sudden withdrawal of subsidies was a deepening of food 
and livelihood insecurity for resource-poor small-scale farmers and rural communities living in 
neighbourhoods of irrigation schemes. Phetwane Irrigation Scheme, in particular, virtually 
ceased to function and infrastructure deteriorated, while levels of uncertainty and insecurity 
among smallholders, farm workers and the broader local community increased as hunger, 
unemployment and poverty reportedly took their toll.  
In light of consequences such as these, the LDA initially prioritized both commercial production 
and food security objectives in the design of RESIS. The longer term plan by the department 
was eventually to transfer irrigation management to farmers, in accordance with similar 
developments in many countries globally. As the RESIS programme unfolded, however, there 
was a shift away from objectives of commercial crop production and livelihood and food 
security towards a greater emphasis on infrastructure development, strategic partnerships for 
integrating smallholders to agri-business. State interventions during both the RESIS and RESIS-
Recharge phases had critical implications for livelihoods of individuals, households and the 
community, and conversely, affected members of Phetwane community responded in ways 
that significantly affected institutional arrangements and interventions.  
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Some particularly significant responses to effects of RESIS and RESIS-Recharge interventions, 
among other concomitant factors, were increases in informal fishing and home gardening 
activities. Whereas informal fishing had hitherto been viewed to be a subsistence and 
recreational activity that augmented household food supplies, the activity grew in proportion 
and became commercially orientated. In light of the open access scenario that developed due 
to an influx of larger informal commercial fishers from distant locations, Phetwane fishers 
called for assistance in averting possible threats to the security of their livelihoods. By contrast, 
home gardens were said to have been encouraged by a rain water harvesting project, which 
sought to enhance local food security. However, instead of collecting rain water, many 
Phetwane households ‘cannibalized’ state-funded water reticulation infrastructure by making 
illegal water connections and watering gardens. That way, they avoided paying for water 
services in excess of free basic water (6000 litres), but this has negative effects on water 
availability in downstream communities (Tapela, 2009). 
A challenge for the study was that these coping strategies, while evidently linked to RESIS and 
RESIS-Recharge interventions, also had a complexity of other causal factors. For example, there 
was a concomitant increase in food prices nationally in 2005, which contributed to the adoption 
of alternative livelihood strategies. The influx of outsider commercial fishers from other parts of 
Limpopo Province also seems to have influenced decisions by local fishers to diversify from 
informal subsistence and recreational fishing to include commercially orientated exploitation of 
fisheries.  
There seemed to be a need for interventions to, firstly, recognize the socio-economic 
differentiation of resource-poor irrigation farmers and thereby develop appropriately targeted 
smallholder support initiatives. Secondly, there appeared to be a need for agricultural 
interventions to recognize links between farm-based and off-farm livelihoods, and be designed 
accordingly.  
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CHAPTER 6 
MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Makuleke Irrigation Scheme is part of Cluster 4 of the Limpopo provincial RESIS Programme, 
which consists of a total of eight (8) schemes located close to or within the lower reaches 
Levubu River Basin (Table 30). The irrigation scheme is located outside the Levubu River Basin 
and within the catchment area of Mphongolo River. The latter is a tributary of the Shingwedzi 
River, which in turn is a tributary of the Olifants River. Both the Olifants and the Levubu Rivers 
are tributaries of the Limpopo Watercourse System.  
TABLE 30 CLUSTER FOUR OF RESIS PROGRAMME SCHEMES IN LIMPOPO  
 
Name of Scheme Spatial Area Number of Farmers 
Homu 165 22 
Lambani 44 50 
Makuleke 239 243 
Malavuwe 26 24 
Mangondi 17 59 
Matsika 102 47 
Morgan 75 24 
Tshaulu 150 69 
Total 1831 1499 
Source: Limpopo Department of Agriculture (2002:46) 
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In 2002, Makuleke Irrigation Scheme was included in the “Water Care” Programme, a sub-
programme of RESIS Phase 1. Since then, emerging commercial farmers in the smallholder 
irrigation scheme had been involved in a series of contractual joint venture and strategic 
partnership arrangements (Table 31). Farmers had received substantial financial, material, 
technical and managerial support from government, private investors and non-governmental 
organisations. They had complemented such support with own investments of time, labour and 
other resources. At best, support from the various stakeholders had enabled farmers to engage 
in and gain exposure to the workings of commercial agricultural enterprises while earning 
income from farming. The shadow side, however, had been exposure also to the risks 
associated with capital intensive farming. 
TABLE 31 STRATEGIC PARTNERS IN MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME, 2002 TO 2009. 
Year Produce or Product Category of Farmers Strategic Partner 
2002 to 2005 Cotton Emerging commercial farmers  NSK 
2005 Internet-enabled 
cell phones 
Emerging commercial farmers Consortium: Alcatel and Manobi 
(Senegal-based)  
2006  to 2008 Vegetables Consortium of 4 emerging 
commercial farmers (greenhouse 
project funded by GtZ) 
Spar (Makhado)  
2006 to 2008 Vegetables Consortium of 4 emerging 
commercial farmers (greenhouse 
project funded by GtZ) 
Wilderness Safaris and Outpost 
Game Lodge (tourism operators in 
the Makuleke Region of the 
Kruger National Park) 
2008 to 2009 Maize and Potatoes Emerging commercial farmers Arthur William Creighton 
Source: Fieldwork. 
This chapter presents findings from Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. Although particular attention 
is given to agricultural commercialization and livelihoods during the RESIS-Recharge phase, 
reference is also made to RESIS phase joint ventures.  The chapter begins by describing the 
context within which agricultural commercialization unfolded in the Makuleke community. 
Described contextual attributes include location, population, historical background, socio-
economic profile, land allocation and use as well as water sources and uses. Following this, the 
chapter examines agricultural commercialization and livelihoods during the RESIS and RESIS-
Recharge phases. The examination scrutinizes in detail the livelihood strategies adopted by 
various socio-economically differentiated individuals and households in response to joint 
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ventures, strategic partnerships and agricultural commercialization interventions in general. 
Such examination goes beyond the livelihoods of smallholders in the Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme to include livelihoods of the broader Makuleke community. Attention is given to roles 
of community leadership and LDA in mediating relationships between externally-induced 
agricultural commercialization initiatives and the livelihoods of local people. 
6.2 LOCATION 
6.2.1 SITUATION 
Makuleke Irrigation Scheme is located within Makuleke community in Ward Five of Thulamela 
Local Municipality in Vhembe District of Limpopo Province. Before 1994, this area fell under 
jurisdiction of the Gazankulu homeland government. The community is situated within 
Nthlaveni (2 MU) communal area along the western boundary of the Kruger National Park 
(KNP) (Figure 31; Figure 32). The specific area occupied by the Makuleke people is referred to as 
the 'Makuleke area'. This area extends from three to sixteen kilometres to the south west of 
the KNP's Punda Maria gate. The Makuleke area is approximately 5 000 hectares in extent 
(Carruthers 1995). 
 
FIGURE 31 LOCATION OF MAKULEKE COMMUNITY 
 
 
 
 
 310 
 
FIGURE 32 SITUATION OF MAKULEKE COMMUNITY, 2008 
In addition to the Makuleke area, the community owns land in the Pafuri area, historically 
known as the 'Crooks' Corner' (Harries 1984). Since 1998, the area has also been referred to as 
the Makuleke Region. The Pafuri area is situated at the confluence of the Limpopo and the 
Luvuvhu Rivers along the northern boundary of the KNP. This is the point where the boundaries 
of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique intersect (Figure 31). This area, which is 21 887 
hectares in extent (South Africa, 1998), is not occupied by the community but has been set 
aside as a resource that will be used to offset community development. 
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6.2.2 SITE AND BIOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Makuleke communal area is sited on gently undulating terrain, which is slightly dissected by 
Mphongolo River and its tributaries. The only major dam in the area is Makuleke Dam on the 
Mphongolo River. Makuleke Irrigation Scheme is sited along Mphongolo River, downstream of 
Makuleke Dam (see map in Appendix 1). The altitude of the area ranges from 386m along river 
valleys to about 500m in the northernmost and southernmost parts (South Africa, 1999). At less 
than 600m altitude, the area falls within the ‘low veld’ region. The climate is of sub-tropical 
continental type, with relatively low mean annual rainfall (375 – 500mm) that is distributed 
mainly in the hot wet season from November to May (Tapela & Omara-Ojungu, 1999). Rainfall 
also varies over the years, with some years experiencing lower rainfall and droughts than 
others. Vegetation is predominantly the Dry Northern Savanna Bushveld Type, which is kept 
open by the crop farming, grazing by livestock, harvesting of fuel wood and thatching grass and 
seasonal burning for pasture improvement (Ibid).   
6.3 COMMUNITY PROFILE 
6.3.1 POPULATION  
6.3.1.1 Population Distribution 
At the time of the study, the population of Makuleke community was distributed among three 
villages namely, Makuleke (Block I), Mabiligwe (Block J) and Makahlule (Block H) (Figure 32). 
Community records showed that the total population was 3 244 households (Table 32). Average 
household size was approximately five people, which gave an estimated total population of 
over 15 000 people. Makuleke village had the highest population (1 444 households) and was 
the seat of the chieftainship and development administration. Makahlule had the smallest 
population (800 households), while Mabiligwe had 1000 households.  
TABLE 32 MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS, 2008  
Name of Village Number of Households 
Makuleke (Block I) 1444 
Mabiligwe (Block J) 1000 
Makahlule (Block H) 800 
Total Population 3244 
Source: Makuleke Community Administration Office Records, 2008 
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6.3.1.2 Population Growth  
There were no statistics specifically relating to Makuleke’s population growth rate. According to 
Statistics South Africa (StatSA) estimates, the average population growth rate for Thulamela 
Local Municipal Areas from 2001 to 2010 was 1.01 per cent, which was above the estimate for 
the Vhembe District (0.96 per cent), Limpopo Province (0.99 per cent) and South Africa (0.96 
per cent). A water and sanitation survey by DWAF estimated that the total population of 
Makuleke in 1995 was 8 560 people, while a study by Tapela & Omara-Ojungu (1999) estimated 
the 1996 population to be 8 160. Despite differences between such estimates, it seemed that 
Makuleke population had almost doubled in the twelve to thirteen years since the mid-1990s. 
This was significantly higher than the population growth rate of the local municipality, district 
and province. Apart from natural growth variables, such as fertility rate, other identified factors 
included an increase in unregistered immigrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique.  
6.3.1.3 Migration 
Most Makuleke males and fewer females of working age tended to migrate to other areas in 
search of employment opportunities. While male migrations involved all age groups within the 
working age population, women’s migrations were often associated with the younger and 
better educated, whose migration patterns similarly varied from short, oscillatory to long term.  
Many men tended to migrate to Gauteng Province to seek employment while others worked in 
the KNP and towns and mines within Limpopo Province. Women tended to migrate to places 
within Limpopo Province, with fewer going to distant locations. Prior to the broadening of social 
grants beyond old age pensions to include child support grants, in particular, many female 
heads of households tended to migrate temporarily to tomato-growing farms around 
Mogoebaskloof, close to the town of Tzaneen, to work as seasonal tomato pickers (Tapela, 
1997; 1999; 2002). This was a means of supplementing the meager (R185) mean monthly 
incomes that these women earned from working on plots in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme (Ibid.). 
Social grants had effectively released indigent Makuleke women from low paid farm labour in 
the irrigation scheme and from the need to seasonally abandon their households for labour in 
distant tomato farms. Social grants had also effectively increased the time available for 
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women’s reproductive and productive roles as well as ameliorated the levels of poverty and 
vulnerability for women-headed households in Makuleke.  
Whereas historically, older women aged between the mid-twenties and late forties had tended 
to temporarily migrate to commercial farming areas for employment as seasonal tomato 
picking labour, contemporary female migration mainly involved younger and/or better 
educated women. The latter often went beyond the tomato farms to seek employment or 
education opportunities in urban centres further afield. For the labour force that remained 
within the locality, the irrigation scheme and KNP were seen as the loci for economic activity 
and possible sources of livelihood opportunities, employment, income and food security. 
6.3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Makuleke belonged to the Tsonga-speaking group of people who occupied much of the 
eastern Transvaal prior to proclamation of the KNP in 1926. Makuleke people originally lived in 
the portion of land at the confluence of the Limpopo and Luvuvhu Rivers that is also known as 
the Pafuri Area or 'Crook's Corner' in the northern section of the KNP. They were forcibly 
removed from the area in 1969 (Harries, 1984; Carruthers, 1995; Gilfillan 1997 in Tapela, 2001) 
to make way for the northward extension of the KNP. The Makuleke were resettled on “an 
equivalent” piece of land along the western boundary of the KNP. Their dispossession was 
formalised in 1975 under the Development and Trust Land Act of 1936. The removal of the 
Makuleke marked the culmination of a protracted effort by the conservation agencies to evict 
them from the Pafuri Area against their will.  
Gilfillan (1997) states that the dispossession of community land rights such as the Makuleke's 
was gradually effected through a steady down-grading of rights until members of the 
community were declared squatters and evicted in terms of ostensibly race neutral legislation 
that governed legitimate and internationally acceptable nature conservation.  Prior to 1913, the 
community had traditional communal tenure rights over land in the Pafuri area. Under 
traditional tenure systems, all members of the community had usufruct and access rights to the 
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land for various needs. Yet, the finiteness of land was recognised and rationed through an 
allocation procedure based on kinship and local conventions.  
At the promulgation of the Native Land Act 27 of 1913, there was a downgrading of traditional 
rights and the Makuleke held the land at Pafuri in terms of crown tenancy (Gilfillan, 1997). In 
1933, the Limpopo-Luvuvhu confluence area was proclaimed to be Pafuri Game Reserve by the 
Transvaal administration (Harries, 1984; Carruthers, 1995). The exception to this proclamation 
was a small portion called the Makuleke Reserve, which was occupied by some members of the 
Makuleke community. While the Makuleke living within the small reserve had legal tenure to 
their land, the government regarded those living outside the reserve on Crown land that 
became Pafuri Game Reserve as 'squatters' (Ibid.). When the National Parks Board initiated the 
first attempts to move Makuleke squatters from Pafuri Game Reserve, lack of personnel to 
control poaching in the isolated area was cited as the main reason for their eviction (Carruthers, 
1995). Harries (1984) and Carruthers (1995) however have proved that the harvesting of 
natural resources through hunting, fishing and collection by the Makuleke tended to be at 
subsistence level and was never characterised by the ravages of commercial exploitation.  
The Makuleke living in Pafuri Game Reserve were the first to be forcibly removed, but there 
was protracted resistance from those living in the Makuleke Reserve, who mostly included 
members of the royal family (Ibid.). In 1969, the latter were subsequently dispossessed of their 
crown tenancy rights in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, and declared 
squatters on the land (Gilfillan, 1997). The removal was effected soon after the death of old 
Chief Makuleke in 1968 (Carruthers, 1995; Harries, 1984).  
The Makuleke were resettled in the Ntlhaveni 2 MU communal area, on an 'equal' portion of 
compensatory land that was excised from the western part of the park (Harries, 1984; 
Carruthers, 1995). The resettlement land was scheduled for occupation by blacks in terms of 
the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 (Gilfillan, 1997), which meant that although the 
community could use the land they had no security of tenure or title to the land. Respondents 
to the study stated that many of those who lived in Makuleke Reserve initially migrated to join 
other communities elsewhere, such as parts of the former Venda, south-eastern Zimbabwe and 
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south-western Mozambique, where they had kinship relations. Some of these later re-grouped 
with other Makuleke in the Nthlavheni area, where the community is presently based.  
The forced removal of the Makuleke coincided with the nation-wide tide of forced removals 
sanctioned by the apartheid government's Bantu Promotion of Self-government Act of 1959. 
The implications of this coincidence were that other Tsonga people from elsewhere were also 
resettled in the Ntlhaveni area between 1972 and 1973, such that instead of the promised 20 
000 hectares of land, the Makuleke retained a mere 5 000 hectares (Harries, 1984 in Tapela 
2001). This seems to have constituted a major grievance, particularly as the community shifted 
towards commercial agriculture following the development of an irrigation scheme within the 
Makuleke area (LRG, 1995 in Tapela 2001). Following the adoption of the land reform policy by 
the post-apartheid state, the Makuleke lodged a land claim for the restitution of their rights to 
the Pafuri area in December 1995. The community, through a newly-formed Makuleke 
Communal Property Association (CPA), was granted ownership rights to the Pafuri area through 
a Settlement Agreement signed on 30 May 1998 in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 
of 1994. With the restitution of land rights in the Pafuri area, a key question for the Makuleke 
became how to translate their gain into tangible community benefits without compromising 
the natural resource base for the local economy. The Settlement Agreement has subsequently 
had significant bearing on the Makuleke community development plans, projects and political 
power dynamics. 
6.3.3 DEFINING ‘COMMUNITY’ 
For this case study, the study used definitions of ‘community’ that were voiced by members of 
Makuleke community (Tapela et al, 2007). According to representatives of Makuleke CBOs, 
“community is sharing tradition, culture and values. It is the shared consciousness of ancestors. 
It is cohesion and the existence of respect between the young and old and among members of 
various groups”.  Furthermore, “community perpetuates despite day-to-day conflicts” and 
“exclusion happens when a member deliberately excludes him/herself by seriously working 
against or undermining cohesion”. Within Makuleke community, “outsiders are NOT excluded, 
but welcome. However, community is clearly bounded, and not an open access system” and 
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“although we accept other people [into our community], they must adhere to our customs” 
(Ibid.). Indeed, although membership of Makuleke community was drawn primarily from 
Tsonga speaking people who were removed from the Pafuri area in the northern reaches of the 
Kruger national Park, a significant proportion of the population in 2008 consisted of people who 
originate from various localities in Limpopo Province, southern Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 
In focus group discussions conducted during the study, respondents variously stated that 
Makuleke community included a significant number of people who resided outside the 
Makuleke area (Tapela et al, 2007). Many such people lived in distant industrial areas, such as 
the Gauteng Province, and neighbouring areas, such as Mhinga. Their membership of the 
community was retained through kinship and other ties to the Makuleke area, as well as 
migrations in and out of the geographical area. For many of those who lived in industrial 
centres, nexus with the Makuleke area derived partially from their continued support of 
relatives and community initiatives through financial remittances.  
What emerged therefore was that Makuleke people clearly perceived themselves to be a 
porously bounded entity, whose membership expanded and contracted in time according to 
circumstances in the lives of individual members of households. However, they were also 
emphatic in stating that this porosity did not mean that their community was an open access 
system. Rather, there were clear rules and rights regarding access, inclusion and exclusion.  
6.3.4 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
Organizational structures observed within the community included Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) such as local political party structures, interest groups and blended CBO 
structures. These included a local branch of the African National Congress (ANC) and its Youth 
wing and Women's League, Makuleke Irrigation Farmers' Co-operative, Primary Care Group, 
Environmental Club and Women’s Project. The Women’s Project sought to enhance 
entrepreneurial and other interests of Makuleke women.  
The Makuleke community was administered by three governance structures. Firstly, there was 
the Tribal Council, headed by Chief Makuleke and the Royal Family. The Tribal Council was the 
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traditional authority within the community. It was composed of village headmen and elders, 
who advised the chief on aspects of traditional governance. Secondly, Makuleke people were 
administered by a Community Development Forum (CDF), which consisted of elected members 
representing various portfolios including agriculture, women, health, education, transport and 
housing. The third prominent structure was Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA).  
The CDF was established following recognition that, in replacing the Transitional Local 
Government Act (TLGA) of 1995 (South Africa, 1995), the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 had 
not made adequate provision for community level representation in the IDP process. 
Historically, the TLGA provided for community representation through ward councilors within 
Transitional Local Councils (TLCs). TLCs were the democratically-elected third tier of 
government, and ward councilors wielded a considerable degree of political power owing to the 
fact that TLCs were legally responsible for service delivery and community development. Prior 
to 1994, Tribal Councils and South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) had fulfilled 
such roles. In the late 1990s the CDF replaced Makuleke Civic Organisation, which had 
historically acted as a pressure group urging for the delivery of services denied to the 
community under the previous apartheid government. Concomitantly, the Tribal Council had 
continued to wield considerable power as it controlled access to all communally held land 
within the Makuleke area. The political clout of the Tribal Council was also based upon a 
historical legacy of established authority derived from kinship and descent. The blending of 
traditional and elected structures in Makuleke contrasted with tensions typically observed 
between similar structures in many rural communities in South Africa (Ntsebeza, 2006), such as 
Phetwane (Chapter 5). Such blending seemed to have contributed to the relatively high degree 
of social cohesion observed by various scholars (LRG, 1995; Tapela, 1999, 2002; Steenkamp, 
2003).  
Although both the CDF and the Tribal Council could be construed to be building blocks of 
Thulamela Local Municipality, the latter appeared to be the stronger structure since it was 
legally recognised as an integral part of the local municipality, while the CDF was only indirectly 
represented through a ward councilor. Personal observations over a period of ten years 
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revealed that the balance of power between the two structures was strategically maintained 
through a blending of traditional and newer elected structures. This was initiated through 
formation of the Makuleke Tribal Authority Executive (TAE) in the mid-1990s. The TAE was a 
blended CBO structure consisting of Chief Makuleke, the Tribal Council, a former councillor for 
Ward Five (Mr Livingstone Maluleke) who resided in the community and representatives of the 
Civic, Youth, Women’s and Farmers’ organisations.   
The CPA owned the land that was restituted to the Makuleke in 1998 and was responsible for 
ensuring the success of a Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) initiative 
within the restituted Pafuri area. Membership of the CPA was not universal within the 
community, but included, in theory at least, only those who had valid claims to land in the 
Pafuri area of the KNP. These were listed in 1997 and, following constitution of the Makuleke 
CPA as a representative and accountable legal entity in 1998, were formally registered as 
members of the CPA. The CPA was administered by an elected Executive Committee. The first 
Executive Committee was largely drawn from the Makuleke Land Claim Committee, which in 
turn had evolved from the TAE. Many members of the first Executive Committee had since 
been replaced by newer elected members, in line with Makuleke CPA constitutional 
requirements for three-year tenure. Such change resulted in problems relating to loss of 
institutional memory as well as power dynamics between outgoing and incoming members, 
which accounted for the appointment of an ‘official representative’ of the community. 
In an attempt to maintain continuity and strength within the CPA, Chief Makuleke had 
appointed Mr Livingstone Maluleke as the official representative of the Makuleke community. 
The latter was the former Chairperson of the erstwhile Makuleke Land Claims Committee and 
Makuleke CPA. He was also a former councillor for Ward Five of Thulamela Local Municipality 
and, at the time, held a full-time job as the headmaster of a local primary school. Due to a 
perceived need to “retain his expertise”, the post of official representative was created and the 
incumbent appointed. The process through which such representation came about was not 
clear to many respondents, but some considered that the Chief was instrumental in ensuring 
the appointment of the representative. 
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The power base of the Makuleke CPA was primarily its ownership of land in the Pafuri area. This 
portion of land was an extension of the land area occupied by the Makuleke in Nthlavheni, and 
was increasingly linked to the latter as a source of revenue, employment, wealth and power for 
the Makuleke, as well a viable market for agricultural produce from the irrigation scheme. This 
link required the Makuleke CPA executive committee, CDF and Tribal Council to work in close 
collaboration. Although this was initially the case, there were observed episodes when power 
dynamics between the latter two structures undermined their working relationship, while that 
of the CPA executive committee and Tribal Council became strengthened.  
6.3.5 POWER DYNAMICS 
Until around 2004, the different degrees of power between the three community governance 
structures did not seem to have posed a major problem within the community. The blending of 
traditional and elected structures had indeed contributed to the relatively high degree of social 
cohesion observed by various scholars (LRG, 1995; Tapela & Omara-Ojungu, 1999; Tapela, 2002; 
Steenkamp, 2003). The study found that although the community largely retained a semblance 
of cohesion, its leadership and members were split between two main factions. One faction 
consisted of community members with allegiance to Chief Makuleke and the other consisted of 
adherents to Chief Mhinga. The latter was a neighbouring chief who had been engaged in 
protracted conflict with Chief Makuleke since the resettlement of the Makuleke in “his area” in 
Ntlhavheni in 1969. Claassens & Cousins (2008) cite Chief Makuleke’s affidavit in a court case 
related to the CLRA, which states that since the resettlement of the Makuleke in Ntlavheni, 
Mhinga had, among many things, repeatedly tried to thwart various development projects in 
Makuleke as well as attempted to allocate irrigation scheme plots to outsiders and re-name the 
scheme ‘Mhinga Irrigation Scheme’. Prominent among supporters of Mhinga were the 
headman of Makahlule village and an owner of the largest cattle herd in the community 
(estimated at more than 200 head in 1996).  
The observed cleavage was not new but had historically been contained and largely kept hidden 
from outside perceptions through a carefully orchestrated strategic and public relations 
initiative, which was assisted by an externally-based ‘Friends of Makuleke’ trust organization. 
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The objective of the Friends of Makuleke organizational development initiative had been to 
create a cohesive community structure with margins ‘hard’ enough to withstand pressures 
associated with the land claim process of the 1990s. Evidence from studies in the mid-1990s 
(Tapela, 1997; 1999; LRG, 1995) show that the affiliation of Makahlule village, for example was 
contested and such contestation was resolved towards settlement of the land restitution claim. 
While such cleavages had historically been linked to contestations by leadership over power 
and socio-economic resources during the apartheid era and the Makuleke land claim process of 
the 1990s (Tapela, 2001; Steenkamp, 2003), the study found that there had emerged a second 
layer of cleavages in the aftermath of the land claim settlement agreement in 1998.  
Within the observed post-1998 cleavages, politics of ‘belonging’ were evoked and community 
membership became defined according to ‘origin’ rather than “that web of personal 
relationships, group networks, traditions and patterns of behaviour that develops against the 
backdrop of the physical neighbourhood and its socio-economic situation” (Flecknoe & 
McLellan, 1994:4 in Warburton, 1998:15). Many respondents voiced concerns about 
discrimination by traditional leadership against Tsonga-speaking people who originate from 
various localities in Limpopo Province, southern Zimbabwe and Mozambique. By contrast, 
traditional leadership was seen as unfairly according those with traceable origins in Pafuri a 
greater legitimacy of belonging to the Makuleke community than those from rural areas 
elsewhere (Box 12). Those who perceived themselves to be discriminated against were 
distributed across all three villages, but mainly resided in Mabiligwe and Makahlule.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 12 Makuleke Community: Politics of ‘belonging’ 
 
Comment by a local key respondent on political dynamics underlying problems of domestic and irrigation 
water use:  
“There are divisions within the community over who belongs where, who stays where and so on… due to 
forced removals. Despite that we are all Tsonga speakers, we are not united. This division is at the root of all 
that is happening here…. Not long ago, just before the signing of the land claim settlement agreement in 
1998, we were required to fill in forms to apply to be “second class” citizens of Makuleke, although we are 
first class citizens under the South African Constitution!  
We need to heal this division. People from other areas cannot be forced to fall under particular chiefs, for 
example Chief Makuleke. In all other villages, people were forcibly removed with their chiefs and therefore 
have no problems of division. In Makuleke, many of us were brought here without our leaders and had to fall 
under Makuleke. When we resist that, we get into the problems you are seeing now.”  
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In this development, traditional leaders and the CPA were in allegiance and were pitted against 
the CDF. The reason for this was that, while both the CPA and CDF were democratically elected 
structures, the CPA and Tribal Council had a shared power base, which was land in the Pafuri 
area and economic benefits emanating from that. By contrast, the CDF’s power depended on 
the extent to which the structure could mobilize tangible development support from Thulamela 
Local Municipality. The likelihood of the CDF achieving this seemed to be constrained by, 
among other factors, the fact that the Ward Five councilor representing Makuleke in municipal 
decision making belonged to a different community.   
In light of the precarious nature of the observed community cohesion, the glue that held the 
fragmented community together seemed to be the shared territorial space and support that 
Chief Makuleke received largely from residents of Makuleke village, where he resided. These 
and others in the two other villages tended to rally behind decisions and rules ratified by the 
chief, thereby effectively countering dissent. Such socio-political behavior seemed to weather 
the power dynamics that threatened to split the broader community, which perhaps accounts 
for the view that “community perpetuates despite day-to-day conflicts” (Section 6.5).  
Makuleke irrigation farmers, like other interest groups within the community, had variously 
been affected by and responded to political power dynamics according to shifts in their 
fortunes. Perceptions of failure or success and conflicts or conflict resolution within the 
farmers’ group tended to drew community-wide power dynamics into the fray of irrigation-
related issues. Conversely, political factions capitalized on irrigation issues to garner support. 
An interesting aspect of the political dynamics was that the existence of two centres of power 
tended to introduce checks and balances to community leadership, such that a certain level of 
of downward accountability persisted albeit in a less perfect state than most community 
members would have liked to see. Traditional leadership and the CPA, in particular, 
demonstrated such accountability with respect to problematic issues pertaining to RESIS and 
RESIS-Recharge interventions.  
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6.3.6 LAND USE AND TENURE 
Land use in the Makuleke area was mainly agricultural, and Makuleke Irrigation Scheme 
constituted a major development project in the area. The main types of land use in the 
community were arable and pastoral farming, as well as settlement (Figure 40; Appendix 1). 
Some of the land was allocated to a number of individual small, medium and micro-scale 
entreprises (SMMEs) in the transport, retail trade, micro-lending, building and other sectors. 
Many of such enterprises were informal. 
There were two types of tenure systems operating within the Makuleke area. The first was the 
traditional communal system in which the Tribal Authority allocated land, mainly through Chief 
Makuleke or delegated responsibility to headmen of the three villages. The communal tenure 
system applied to village settlement areas, rain-fed croplands and grazing lands. Allocated rain-
fed crop fields were passed down family genealogies, according to customary practice. Land 
under communal tenure was classified as state land and held in trust by the community, 
through the chief. Holders of such land had usufruct rights but no title deeds. However, their 
tenure rights were largely considered to be secure and were recognized by other members of 
the community. The second tenure system was the leasehold system in which land allocation 
was initially performed by the Provincial Department of Lands and Agriculture, through 
consultation with the Tribal Authority. The latter system was subsequently administered by LDA 
and applied to land within the state-funded Makuleke Irrigation Scheme.  
In addition to land tenure in Makuleke, many members of the community collectively owned 
land in the Pafuri Area through their membership of the CPA. This land was largely used for 
natural reseources conservation and tourism-related business ventures. Funds generated from 
commercial activities were channeled towards socio-economic development in Makuleke 
community. The constitution of the CPA attempted to ensure that the sharing of these 
resources was equitable among male and female members of the CPA. The Settlement 
Agreement that was signed upon restitution of Makuleke land rights, however, limited the 
extent to which members of the CPA could utilize natural resources, including valuable 
minerals, in the Makuleke Region of the KNP in Pafuri (Tapela, 2002). Makuleke Irrigation 
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Scheme necessarily had to be seen in context of the Pafuri Area since both were regarded by 
the Makuleke as twin engines for community development. 
6.3.7 SOCIAL SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Makuleke community had a relatively low level of social service and infrastructure 
development. Social services infrastructure within the community included three primary 
schools and one secondary school, a primary health clinic, an administrative office, an irrigation 
scheme office and community production centre, a bed and breakfast lodge and an arts theatre 
owned by the Makuleke CPA, a telecommunications office, individual mobile phone service 
providers, general dealers’ shops, market stalls, and old and new brickyards. Since 2005, access 
roads had been upgraded and tarred and were therefore easier to use than the earlier dust and 
gravel roads, which tended to become impassable during the rainy season. A new wide tarred 
road linked the community to market and administrative centres, such as Malamulele, 
Thohoyandou, Polokwane and Johannesburg. Homesteads consisted of a mixture of traditional 
mud and thatch structures as well as brick and iron or tile dwelling units. The number of 
households living in mud and thatch structures appeared to have decreased from the 77.2 per 
cent observed by Tapela (1997).  
Unlike many similar villages in Limpopo Province, Makuleke villages had street lighting. Most 
homesteads had electricity owing to a land restitution grant of R500 000, which provided the 
R450 000 required for electrification. Although such investment resulted in increased access to 
electricity, a number of the households retained the use of firewood as their main source of 
domestic energy. This was mainly due to inability to pay for electricity supply services. A pump 
station in the irrigation scheme was also powered by electricity. The allocation of commercial 
plots in the irrigation scheme was said to have been partly influenced by the ability to pay for 
the cost of running the electrical pump station supplying water to the irrigation scheme. 
Through a project implemented by Mvula Trust in 1996, domestic water supply was improved 
from a few communal water taps or “stand pipes” (Tapela, 1999a) to a combination of both 
communal stand pipes and individual homestead taps. Improvements in water supply 
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infrastructure had been accompanied by the densification of pit latrines, which remained a key 
feature of community sanitation. Health care workers reported fewer outbreaks of diarrhoea, 
particularly among younger children, than in the 1990s when members of the community were 
often compelled to supplement their domestic water needs with unpurified water from the 
dam or irrigation canals. Despite improvements in water services infrastructure, access to 
potable water remained a major challenge particularly in Makuleke (Block I) and Makahlule 
(Block H) villages. Consequently, many households in these villages had made their own 
investments in homestead taps. A few others had invested in boreholes for domestic water 
supply. While some of such investments were formally registered with the community 
administration office, most were termed “illegal” by both community authorities and 
members94. 
TABLE 33 MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: COMMUNAL AND INDIVIDUAL PIPED DOMESTIC 
WATER SUPPLIES, 200895 
Village Communal Water Taps (“Stand Pipes”) Individual Homestead Water Tap 
Connections 
Reliable 
and 
functional 
Unreliable or 
non-functional 
TOTAL Legal Illegal TOTAL 
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Makuleke 5 13.9 31 86.1 36 100 139 84.8 25 15.2 164 100 
Mabiligwe 33 100 0 0 33 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Makahlule 9 36 16 64 25 100 20 10.4 172 89.6 192 100 
Source: Ground truthing fieldwork, 2008. 
Table 33 shows that Makuleke village also had the greatest deficit in water from homestead 
taps. The village had the highest frequency (84.8 per cent) of households with legally-connected 
                                                     
 
 
95
 Ground truthing by the study found that data recorded by the community administrative office was often 
incorrect. Whereas community records showed that Makuleke and Makahlule villages had 38 and 24 communal 
water taps respectively, this study found that these villages had 36 and 25 communal water taps. Community 
services staff could not supply any data on illegal homestead tap connections. There was clearly a lack of staff 
capacity to gather and provide correct information on water services infrastructure.  
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homestead taps and yet none (0 per cent) of these issued water. By contrast, Makahlule village 
had the highest frequency (89.6 per cent) of illegal connections and a fair proportion 
(approximately 25 to 30 per cent) of both legal and illegal homestead taps provided access to 
water. This might seem to justify why most (89.6 per cent) of the households in Makahlule 
opted for the informal or illegal route of hydraulic property rights creation. The lower 
frequency of illegal connections in Makuleke village might be attributed to the fact that the 
village was situated closer to the dam and irrigation canal, which constituted alternative 
sources of raw water for laundry and bathing purposes, However, the observed differences 
were also due to political power dynamics and issues governance at the village and community 
level. 
From the few telephone lines and the small telecommunications office that existed in the mid-
1990s, there had been a significant expansion of communication services to include a denser 
distribution of mobile phones and public telephone facilities provided by local small 
entrepreneurs. Administrative offices and all schools in the community had become linked to 
the internet.  
6.3.8 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALLHOLDER HOUSEHOLDS 
It was evident that in 2005, emerging commercial farmers had not yet benefited from joint 
ventures and their profiles were broadly similar to socio-economic profiles of many 
unemployed people in the community, including food plot holders. Although commercial plot 
holders and subsistence food producers could both be described as ‘resource poor’, there was a 
degree of socio-economic differentiation between the two groups and among farmers in each 
group. 
This section presents selected findings on the socio-economic characteristics of smallholders 
and their households. Although attention is given to both commercial plot holders and 
subsistence food producers, greater emphasis is placed on the former group of smallholders. 
The rationale is that such farmers were targeted by agricultural commercialization under the 
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RESIS Programme and were commonly called ‘emerging commercial farmers’, which is 
equivalent to petty commodity producers.  
6.3.8.1 Household Size  
While the average size of households in Makuleke community was five (5) people, average 
household sizes for commercial and food plot holders were seven (7) and eight (8) people 
respectively. A possible reason why irrigation farmers generally had larger households than the 
community population in general was that plot allocation in the irrigation scheme tended to 
favour older members of the community, whose households were often composed of three or 
more generations, rather than younger members, whose households consisted of fewer 
generations. The population of food plot holders was generally older than that of commercial 
plot holders. A greater proportion (38.5 per cent) of food plot holders was aged sixty-five (65) 
years and above, while the same age group among commercial plot holders was smaller (26.5 
per cent).  
6.3.8.2 Education  
Many of the emerging commercial farmers were literate but a few had no formal education 
(Figure 33).  Of those who never went to school, one had attended Adult Based Education and 
Training (ABET) classes and could read and write. Three farmers could not read or write and 
eight could not speak English and Afrikaans. Such differentiation underscored the importance 
of ensuring that communications were either conducted in or translated into XiTsonga.  
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6.3.8.3 Employment Status 
The study revealed that the rate of unemployment for the working age population in 
smallholder households was relatively high, while local formal employment opportunities were 
scarce.  A comparison between employment profiles of farmers’ households showed that food 
plot holding households had a greater proportion (62.4 per cent) of unemployed people than 
households of commercial plot holders (52 per cent) (Figure 34). Households of food plot 
holders also had a greater proportion (22 per cent) of people with full-time paid employment 
than households of commercial plot holders (18 per cent). Households of commercial plot 
holders, however, had a much greater proportion (22 per cent) of self-employed people while 
food plot holder’s households had fewer (5 per cent).  
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FIGURE 33 MAKULEKE: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF COMMERCIAL 
PLOT HOLDERS BY EDUCATION AND AGE, 2005 
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FIGURE 34 MAKULEKE: COMPARISON OF EMERGING FARMER AND FOOD PLOTHOLDER 
HOUSEHOLDS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, 2005 
 
Among the 43 emerging commercial farmers, although both males and females had high rates 
of unemployment, more women than men were unemployed (Figure 35). Most (82.4 per cent) 
of emerging commercial farmers, and significantly more men (70.6 per cent) than women (11.8 
per cent), considered themselves to be self-employed, mostly within the Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme. A few (11.8 per cent) farmers considered themselves to be unemployed. One female 
farmer occasionally found casual employment outside the scheme, while one male farmer had 
full-time, paid employment within the irrigation scheme.  
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By contrast, a study conducted in 2000 by Tapela (2002) showed that the unemployment rate 
for heads of households in Makuleke community as a whole was relatively high (Figure 36). 
Significant proportions of men were unemployed and looking for work (23 per cent) or engaged 
in unpaid farm labour (21 per cent). The majority of women were either engaged in unpaid 
house work (37 per cent) or unpaid farm work (32 per cent) while few (2.4 per cent) were 
unemployed and looking for work. Collectively these occupational groups, which had no 
monetary income, constituted nearly three-fifths (57.7 per cent) of the productive population 
of Makuleke community.  
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FIGURE 35 MAKULEKE: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF EMERGING 
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FIGURE 36 MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF PRODUCTIVE 
POPULATION BY GENDER, 2000 
 
6.3.8.4 Income 
Household level employment rates, however, did not necessarily indicate levels of income for 
respective households. Many respondents stated that contributions to household income by 
individual members were not assured. Many migrant workers, for example, did not regularly 
send remittances. Similarly, fully-employed locally-resident household members did not 
necessarily contribute their wages or salaries to the common household pool of financial 
resources. Hence, although food plot holding households had greater proportions of fully 
employed people, levels of poverty for these households were similar to or higher than for 
commercial plot holding households. It was possible that the greater presence of unemployed 
people in food plot holding households tended to deepen levels of poverty, while the greater 
presence of self-employed people in commercial plot holding households tended to ameliorate 
levels of poverty.    
Earlier studies (Tapela, 1997; Tapela & Omara-Ojungu, 1999; Tapela, 1999; 2002) conducted 
prior to the Watercare Porgramme (i.e. RESIS Phase 1) showed that Makuleke households had 
Source: Tapela, 2001 
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relatively low mean household incomes (Figure 37). In 2005, a survey of emerging commercial 
farmers revealed that, levels of household income remained relatively low, with most of the 
farmers earning less than R2000 per month (Figure 38).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t 
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 37 MAKULEKE COMMUNITY: DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED HEADS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS BY MEAN MONTHLY INCOME, 1997 
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FIGURE 38 MAKULEKE: DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL FARMING HOUSEHOLDS BY MEAN 
MONTHLY INCOME, 2005 
 
6.3.8.5 Crop Production 
During the course of the study, the main types of crops grown in commercial plots were cotton, 
maize, potatoes and, to a lesser extent, other vegetables. Most (79.4 per cent) of the farmers 
produced cotton, maize and potatoes. All of the cotton, maize and potatoes were grown 
commercially within contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships. Prior to RESIS-
Recharge strategic partnerships, some of the emerging commercial farmers supplemented 
contractual cotton production with independent production of food crops, such as vegetables, 
maize and fruit. During that time, more than half (55.9 per cent) of farmers independently grew 
vegetables on their plots. Such farmers included six plot holders whose land was excluded from 
the cotton production venture from 2002 to 2005. A significant proportion (78.9 per cent) of 
independent vegetable growers and about half (48.1 per cent) of independent maize producers 
grew food crops for both commercial and subsistence purposes, while a few farmers grew 
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these crops solely for subsistence purposes. Three commercial fruit growers grew mangoes. 
Although the contract between NSK and Makuleke WUA did not permit joint venture members 
to engage in such practice, the WUA management committee appears to have exercised a 
degree of leniency towards informal food producers.  
By contrast, subsistence food producers grew a greater variety of crops. These ranged from 
maize, pumpkins, groundnuts, cow-peas, beans, okra, sweet potatoes and sweet reed. Most of 
the produce was consumed within farmers’ households and the surplus was sold to generate 
small amounts of income, ranging from R10 to R500 depending on productivity, supply and 
demand factors.  
With the onset of RESIS-Recharge and its associated strategic partnerships, independent crop 
production by emerging commercial farmers was disallowed and alternate monocropping of 
maize and potatoes was strictly enforced. These farmers effectively lost control of the 
production enterprise. There was also appears to have been an upsurge in the amount of water 
consumed by commercial plots. The impact of increased consumption on water availability in 
the irrigation scheme as a whole was not clear since different contract farming arrangements 
used different mechanisms of ensuring access to water. For example, an earlier RESIS cotton 
joint venture subsidized water supply costs for food plot holders and required each subsistence 
farmer to pay nominal tariffs of between R10 and R20 per month. By contrast, a latter RESIS-
Recharge strategic partnership for maize and potato production provided no such subsidy. The 
inception of the partnership was accompanied by termination of food plot holders’ access to 
water and, thereby, a halting of subsistence crop production.  
6.3.8.6 Household Material Asset Ownership 
Levels of household asset ownership among smallholders were generally low. However, there 
was evidence of socio-economic differentiation among smallholders’ households. Some 
households had more material assets than others due to various factors, such as remittances by 
household members employed in economic centres elsewhere, disbursements of the land 
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restitution grant, employment opportunities in tourism and conservation, and individual 
entrepreneurship.  
Similarly, levels of household material asset ownership were relatively low (Figure 39). The 
highest frequencies of asset ownership pertained to radios (79.4 per cent), chickens (76.5 per 
cent), cellular phones (67.7 per cent) and refrigerators (67.7 per cent). The high frequency of 
cellular phone ownership was directly linked to the joint venture involving three firms namely, 
Alcatel, Vodacom and Manobi, who provided farmers with internet-enabled cellphones to 
promote access to market-related information. The small proportion (11.8 per cent) of tractor-
owning households belonged to farmers who had acquired these assets through the DBSA loan 
that was resuscitated during the Preliminary Phase of RESIS. Effectively, therefore, farmers’ 
involvement since 2003 in a cotton joint venture had not yielded any significant change in these 
farmers’ incomes.  
Since the inception of RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships, households of commercially-
orientated farmers had become increasingly more affluent than subsistence food producers, 
who were mostly selected from the indigent within the community. While petty commodity 
producers enjoyed access to financial benefits emanating from the strategic partnership’s use 
of commercial plots, food producers were increasingly marginalized from access to food plots, 
with negative effects on household food security.  
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FIGURE 39 MAKULEKE: MATERIAL ASSET OWNERSHIP BY COMMERCIAL FARMING 
HOUSEHOLDS, 2005 
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6.4 MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Makuleke Irrigation Scheme was established by the Gazankulu homeland government in 1991. 
Prior to that in the early 1970s, a weir was constructed across Mphongolo River to create 
Makuleke Dam (Figure 40; Appendix 1). According to respondents from identified key 
stakeholder institutions from the local community, Makuleke Dam belonged to Makuleke 
community because it was built in response to a request by the community. Makuleke’s request 
for the dam was based upon their realization of the aridity of Nthlaveni area, where they were 
resettled following their displacement in 1969, relative to the wetter Pafuri Area, where they 
had subsisted on natural resources around the floodplain and wetlands at the confluence of 
Limpopo and Luvhuvu Rivers.  
A senior member of the Royal Family explained that when the community came to the 
Nthlaveni area, they looked for an area where they could dig for themselves a well for water 
supply. They walked upstream along Mphongolo River till they found a place where, according 
to their experience, they dug a well. The well was dug around a natural spring (called xihlobo in 
Tsonga), which is presently located immediately below the dam wall. The respondent said there 
was another fountain at the upper portion of the dam called bvuma nyundu, which never dried 
up. Another key respondent said that a local traditional belief was that a snake, given a name 
‘tube’ to describe the size of a snake, guarded bvuma nyundu spring. During rainy seasons 
water used to accumulate in the area around the springs. During the apartheid era, government 
agencies used to bring water to the community using a tanker. A weir was built on the very spot 
where the fountain was located in early seventies.  
The weir, however, was small and provided water supply for domestic use and livelstock 
watering. Hence, in early eighties, a plan was proposed to extend the dam with the aim of 
starting up the irrigation scheme. One key respondent explained that the dam “came” as a 
result of a collective request by the local community, Chief Makuleke and the late Mr John 
Mashaba. Mr Mashaba was a farmer and businessman who ploughed land along the river long 
before irrigation scheme development. He was also a close friend of the former Chief Minister 
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of Gazankulu homeland government, Mr Hudson W.E. Ntsan’wisi. Hence, the dam proposal was 
quickly recommended for approval and funding. 
 
FIGURE 40 MAKULEKE LAND USE: 1970 TO 2009 
The construction of the Makuleke Dam, which supplied water to the irrigation scheme, began in 
the late 1980s and the irrigation scheme was established in 1991. Water was channeled from 
the dam by a concrete-lined irrigation canal to a balancing dam and an electricity-powered 
Source: Tapela, 2002; Research 
for this doctoral thesis 
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pump station in the scheme. Unfortunately, according to respondents, both the chief minister 
and Mr Mashaba, who were influential in the planning process, passed away before completion 
of the irrigation scheme development project. Respondents surmised therefore that they 
perceived the existing dam to be an extension the fountain, which, combined with that dam 
construction was at their behest, was why the community had the power to control and look 
after the dam.  
Soon after the scheme was established the traditional leader of the community, Chief Joas 
Phahlela Makuleke, allocated plots on the scheme in consultation with the local agricultural 
extension officer. Irrigation plots were allocated to fifty-two individual tenants who paid an 
annual rental of R100.00, initially to the Gazankulu government department responsible for 
agriculture and, after 1994, to the Northern Province Department of Lands and Agriculture 
(now LDA). Tenants were not exclusively drawn from the Makuleke community, but included 
people from neighbouring communities, such as Mhinga. Smallholders established a 
cooperative organization, Makuleke Irrigation Farmers’ Association, which served their 
collective interests.  
Prior to RESIS Programme interventions, women made up most of the labour in the irrigation 
scheme (LRG, 1995; Tapela, 2002) and on rain-fed arable in the Makuleke area. Agricultural 
productivity remained generally low, owing to allocation of plots to part-time farmers who 
were gainfully employed elsewhere (Box 13). Crop production declined sharply in 1999 due to 
the cessation of government subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 13 Excerpt on the allocation of commercial plots in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme, 1991 
 
With the introduction of newer tenure arrangements, the more powerful or affluent members of the 
community appear to have gained greater control over access to resources, while the poor have become 
further marginalised. This is illustrated by the distribution of plots in the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme that 
was established in the early 1990s (Tapela, 2002).  
 
The 1995 Land Reform Group (LRG) Report states that, despite the fact that access to the plots was open to 
all the Makuleke people living within the vicinity of the scheme, a substantial number of plots were 
awarded mostly to people who were already employed and had the monetary resources. Some of these 
people resided in the more distant neighbourhood of Mhinga. Many unemployed people in the Makuleke 
area had not applied for the plots because they had had "the mistaken impression that land would only be 
given to those who already had some capital" (LRG, 1995 in Tapela 2002:76). 
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6.5 PRELIMINARY PHASE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALIZATION IN 
MAKULEKE: 1999 TO 2002 
6.5.1 PRE-DEVELOPMENT SURVEYS 
In 2002 RESIS project implementing agent, Loxton Venn and Associates (LVA), conducted a pre-
development survey whereby local views were elicited through a group discussion. Although 
survey data was gender neutral, socio-economic needs expressed by members of the Makuleke 
community were broadly similar to those expressed in an earlier 1998 survey by this researcher 
(Table 34). Water remained a most critical need in the community. However, the two surveys 
employed different methodologies, which probably accounted for some of the variations. The 
1998 study by this researcher elicited views through in-depth interviews of individuals as well 
as focus group discussions with women’s groups and institutional structures predominantly 
composed of men. What emerged in the 1998 survey was gender disaggregated data that 
clearly showed differing perceptions of needs among men and women. For example, while men 
indicated that jobs were the second most important need, women stated that the second and 
third most important needs were improved livelihoods and food security respectively. Broadly, 
however, results of the two surveys were similar.   
 
TABLE 34 MAKULEKE: PAIRWISE RANKING BY GENDER OF COMMUNITY NEEDS 
PERCEIVED AS MOST IMPORTANT, 1998 
Male Female 
1. water 
2. jobs 
3. electricity 
4. other (pension) 
5. improved livelihoods 
6. food 
7. land 
8. infrastructure and services 
9. leadership 
1. water 
2. improved livelihoods 
3. food 
4. electricity 
5. leadership 
6. infrastructure and services 
7. jobs 
8. land 
9. other (pensions) 
Source:Tapela, 1999 
6.5.2 RESTRUCTURING OF LAND DISTRIBUTION CRITERIA 
In preparation for inclusion of Makuleke Irrigation Scheme in the RESIS Phase 1 Water Care 
Programme, new criteria were developed in an effort to redress the perceived misallocation of 
 
 
 
 
 
 340 
land that took place at the inception of the irrigation scheme in the early 1990s. The new 
criteria sought to redistribute land in favour of full-time aspirant commercial farmers, on the 
one hand, and indigent people within the community, on the other hand. Land re-allocation 
was restricted to residents of Makuleke community, who had no alternative sources of income. 
Social grants were not counted among income criteria. A deliberate move was taken to exclude 
part-time farmers who, firstly, had alternative sources of income, secondly, were government 
employees and/or, thirdly, resided in other villages elsewhere in Thulamela Local Municipality. 
The study identified 31 farmers who became excluded through such screening process. 
Furthermore, the number of commercial plot holders was reduced from 52 to 46. Among 
excluded farmers, however, were three Makuleke farmers who met all criteria for inclusion but 
were excluded nonetheless. Their plots were allocated to three of the included farmers, who 
ended up with dual access to 5 ha parcels of land (see Section 6.4.3.2). Effectively, therefore, 
land redistribution resulted in a total of 43 commercial plot holders instead of 52. 
6.5.3 LAND RE-ALLOCATION AND USAGE 
6.5.3.1 Overview  
Contrary to some of the official records of the Department of Agriculture (LDA 2002a; b) that 
the area of the scheme was 239 ha (Table 31), Makuleke Irrigation Scheme was found to be two 
hundred and eighty hectares (280.1 ha) in area (Table 35). Land within the scheme was sub-
divided into ‘commercial’ plots, ‘food’ plots and orchards. Commercial plots and orchards 
occupied the largest portion (90.1 per cent) of land.  
TABLE 35 MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: DISTRIBUTION OF PLOTS BY TYPE OF USE 
AND AREA, 200896 
 
Type of Unit Number Average Plot Size (Ha) Area (Ha) Total Area 
Commercial 43 
19 
5.0 
0.5 o 3.4 
216.5 
35.9 
252.4 
Food Plots 273 0.1 27.7 27.7 
Greenhouse Project 4 Less than 0.5 
Total Area 280.1 
 
                                                     
96
 Physical Plan of Makuleke Irrigation Scheme: 2001/2/3. Official records of LDA.  
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6.4.3.1 Allocation of Food Plots 
Of the 280.1 ha that comprised the irrigation scheme, 27.7 ha were reserved for subsistence 
food production, mostly by indigent households (Table 35)97. This portion was sub-divided into 
two hundred and 277 ‘food’ plots of roughly 0.1 ha each. When the RESIS project commenced 
in 2002, 277 food producers occupied the food plots. Four of the subsistence farmers had since 
been replaced by a consortium of 4 emerging commercial farmers, who produced vegetables in 
a greenhouse built with funding from Geselschaft Technische Zusammmenarbeit (GtZ). These 
farmers supplied vegetables to supermarkets, such as Spar and Shoprite, in Thohoyandou and 
Louis Trichardt. Two of the displaced farmers were employed by the consortium. During the 
course of the study, there were therefore two-hundred and seventy-three (273) subsistence 
irrigators, who produced food crops primarily for household consumption and sometimes sold 
surplus produce within the local community. The majority (69.6 per cent) of food plot holders 
were women.  
While the allocation of food plots was primarily intended to favour the most indigent 
households within the community, the study identified a number of non-poor households 
among food plotholders. Such households owned rain-fed crop fields in the area before the 
scheme was established and were displaced by irrigation development. They therefore had 
prior land rights. As compensation, the chief allocated food plots to these households in 1989, 
which they had used since the irrigation scheme was established in 1991. At the time of this 
study, all food plot holders had been stopped from producing crops in the irrigation scheme.   
6.4.3.2 Allocation of Commercial Plots  
Two hundred and fifty-two (252.4) ha had been set aside for commercial production. This 
portion was sub-divided into forty-six (46) ‘commercial’ plots of approximately 5 hectares (ha) 
each and allocated to forty-three (43) emerging commercial farmers or petty commodity 
producers. In an attempt to achieve the equitable allocation of around 5 ha per farmer, some of 
                                                     
97
These statistics differ from those in many reports of the Limpopo Department of Agriculture (LDA). According to 
LDA records, the area of the scheme is variously reported 270 ha (LDA, 2000), 239 ha (LDA 2002a) and 242 ha (LDA, 
2002c). Similarly, the area of the portion reserved for food plots is reported to be 24 ha (LDA, 2002a) and 27 ha 
(LDA, 2002b). Commercial plots are reported to occupy 215 ha (LDA, 2002a) and 243 ha (LDA, 2002b ). 
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the farmers had been allocated a combination of two to three of the nineteen (19) smaller plots 
ranging from 0.5 to 3.4 ha. This left a surplus of three 5 ha plots, which were then allocated to 
to three of the registered commercial plot holders, thus giving them contested access to two 5 
ha plots each. Such dual access to land contradicted the principle of equitable allocation that 
was adopted at the onset of revitalization of the scheme.  
Regarding the issue of contested dual access to 5 ha plots, members of the farmer’s 
management committee ascribed inequitable allocation to the fact that the three farmers had 
entered into informal arrangements to utilize plots allocated to relatives. The sharing 
arrangements were described as involving farmers using both their plots and plots registered in 
the name of a relative, and not shared production on the land. However, the widespread view 
by Makuleke community members and the landless in particular was that such arrangements 
were irregular. Contrary to earlier justifications by members of the farmers’ management 
committee, this study found that those occupying two of the contested commercial plots had 
benefited from the exclusion of three farmers belonging to a political faction that was 
embroiled in a protracted conflict with Chief Makuleke. A consequence of farmer exclusions 
was a sense of tenure insecurity among all smallholders and emerging commercial farmers in 
particular. Some of the insecurity was directly linked to strategic partnerships, which 
introduced uncertainties among smallholders despite government reassurance that such 
contract farming arrangements were viable mechanisms for ensuring entry into the highly 
competitive and globalized agri-food systems.  
6.4.3.3 Allocation of Orchard Plots 
Beyond the groups of 43 petty commodity producers, 273 subsistence food producers and one 
consortium of 4 commercial vegetables growers, three (3) farmers within the community had 
mango orchards that were established prior to revitalization of the scheme. Chief Makuleke 
was one of the fruit producers, but he subsequently removed his mango trees in anticipation of 
joining a RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership.  
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6.4.3.4 Allocation of Smallholdings by Gender 
Examination of land allocation by gender showed that most (79.4 per cent) of the commercial 
plots were allocated to men while most (68.5 per cent) of the food plots were allocated to 
women (Figure 41). Four plots comprising the Greenhouse Vegetable Project were allocated to 
a consortium of four men.  
 
 
Examination of land allocation by age revealed that food plots had a greater proportion (38.5 
per cent) of elderly farmers aged 65 years and above. By contrast, commercial plots had a 
smaller proportion (26.5 per cent) of such elderly farmers. Most (82.4 per cent) of the 
commercial plot holders were over 40 years old, and the predominant age group was 40 to 49 
years old (Figure 42). Unemployed youth within the community were not happy about the 
relatively small proportion (3 per cent) of commercial plots allocated to their age group (18 to 
29 years old). The youth felt side-lined by the land re-allocation process and therefore 
prevented from gaining access to productive resources. Such contestation had compelled the 
WUA management committee to explore possible means to involve the youth in commercial 
agriculture and agri-business. Possible options included a scholarship fund to sponsor tertiary 
education of interested youth. Alternatives also included involving the youth in value adding 
activities, such as processing and packaging of crop produce. The search for alternative 
livelihoods was informed by a belief that the youth were not really interested in farming but in 
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income from farming. For that reason, it was considered futile to allocate a greater proportion 
of land to young people.     
 
 
 
6.5.4 INSTITUTIONAL RE-ORGANIZATION 
Apart from re-allocation of the larger proportion (90.1 per cent) of land a new group of 
emerging commercial farmers, preparations for RESIS entailed a re-structuring of the farmers’ 
organization. Makuleke Farmers Association was reconstituted as ‘Makuleke Irrigation Scheme 
Water User Association’ (WUA)98.  The earlier association was a cooperative structure that had 
previously been formed by the original group of 52 commercial plot holders in the 1990s. The 
constitution of the WUA, through its objective “to have only one organization representing the 
farmers on the scheme”, sought to achieve inclusive representation of both commercial and 
food plot holders. An application for registration of the Water User Association (WUA) had 
reportedly been submitted by an implementing agent99 some years previously, but by June 
2009100 farmers had yet to receive the WUA certificate. Despite that, farmers continued to use 
                                                     
98
 Constitution of the Makuleke Water User Association. 
99
 Golder & Associates, previously Loxton, Venn & Associates (LVA). 
100
 Concern expressed by the Secretary of Makuleke WUA at a workshop on ‘Water, Land and Agrarian Reform’, 
convened by the Water Research Commission (WRC) in collaboration with the international Water Management 
Institute (IWMI), Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), Waternet and the Global Water 
Partnership (GWP). Workshop held in Pretoria on 24 June 2009.    
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the WUA constitution as their main point of reference in matters pertaining to irrigation 
management. Provisionally constituted as a WUA, Makuleke irrigation farmers also paid annual 
membership fees of R400 for emerging commercial farmers and R10 for food plot holders.  
A committee managed affairs of the irrigation scheme on behalf of both emerging commercial 
farmers and subsistence food producers. The committee was composed of an executive 
committee and five sub-committees that were responsible for natural resources, human 
resources, services, technical aspects and non-farming issues. The management committee 
consisted of nominated and elected farmers. Except for one female food plot holder, 
representation in the management committee was exclusively by emerging commercial 
farmers.  
6.5.5 CAPACITY BUILDING 
In preparation for RESIS Programme interventions and irrigation management transfer (IMT), in 
particular, members of the Makuleke WUA underwent training in institutional awareness and 
mobilization. LDA’s farmer support objective was to strengthen the farmers’ organization and 
enable it to take ownership of irrigation scheme management responsibilities.   
During its early tenure, the management committee underwent capacity building in 
organizational development, with specific training in institutional roles and responsibilities. 
Consultants implemented capacity building measures for members of the executive committee 
and sub-committees. Such measures included skills development in leadership, minute taking, 
book keeping, budgeting and financial management.  There was also training in general 
business principles, water management, production and conservation and non-hydraulic 
infrastructure management.  
It was worth noting that capacity building did not emphasized principles of good ‘governance’, 
such as accountability, transparency and equity. Subsequent conflicts in 2007 between 
commercial and food plot holders revolved around issues of accountability, transparency and 
equity. Such conflicts led to divisions within the smallholder group. The only representative 
from among food plot holders then recused herself from the WUA committee, which became 
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reconstituted as ‘Makuleke Farmers’ Cooperative’ in preparation for entry into a new RESIS-
Recharge contract farming arrangement. In March 2009, food producers formed a new splinter 
committee that represented their specific interests as a group. At the time of the study, the 
splint organization was not formalized and the relationship of new committee and the WUA 
was not yet clear.  
6.5.6 RESUSCITATION OF DBSA LOAN  
In August 2000, LDA resuscitated a DBSA loan that was approved for Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme prior to 1994101. The loan of about R900 000 was used to purchase moveable assets 
outlined in Table 36.  
Since preparations towards a new cotton production joint venture with NSK were already 
underway, modifications were made to plans regarding the envisaged use of equipment 
purchased with the DBSA loan. The five sets of tractors and ploughs were deemed inadequate 
for requirements of cotton production. In particular, ploughs were considered to be too small 
for post-harvest destruction of cotton stalks through deep ploughing to bury crop residues. To 
guard against production failure, NSK committed to providing requisite field equipment. A 
decision was therefore taken to re-allocate DBSA-funded tractors and ploughs to five of the 
emerging commercial farmers, who would act as service providers to the irrigation scheme. The 
farmer’s organization, however, retained ownership of the remaining equipment, such as the 
plough, harrow, ridger, slasher, trailer, spray unit and associated accessories. These were to be 
rented out to the five contracted service providers. 
 
 
 
                                                     
101 Source: ‘A Proposal for the use of an existing DBSA moveable assets loan at Makuleke Irrigation Scheme in the 
Northern Region of the Northern Province. Proposal by the Northern Province Department of Agriculture and 
Environment, August 2000. 
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TABLE 36 MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: TOTAL LOAN REQUESTED FROM DBSA, 2000 
Item Preferred Quote by OTK (in Rands) 
5 x 53 kW 2-wheel drive tractors 400 000 
5 x 3 furrow mouldboard plough (450mm) 43 650 
5 x 2.3m medium disc harrow 98 980 
5 x 3 row 2.4m ridger (furrow opener) 26 775 
6 x set of essential accessories (estimate) 30 000  
1 x spray unit (for field crops) 10 013 
1 spray unit (for orchards) 47 520 
1 x 1.5m p.t.o. driven Falcon slasher 8 955 
1 x 6t 4-wheel trailer with drop sides 33 120 
Total excluding VAT 699 013 
TOTAL COST FOR MOVEABLE ASSETS including 14% 
VAT 
792 675 
Loan application facilitation fee (contracted service 
provider) 
86 000 
GRAND TOTAL OF LOAN 878 675 
6.5.7 REHABILITATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
Rehabilitation of infrastructure took place between 2002 and 2003. Since rehabilitation 
activities coincided with the then-newly incepted joint venture with NSK, some of the 
responsibilities were shared between LDA and the joint venture. Table 37 summarizes the 
prepararatory rehabilitation activities, costs and sources of funding. The total cost of 
rehabilitation was approximately R1.5 million.  
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TABLE 37 MAKULEKE IRRIGATION SCHEME: REHABILITATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE, 2000 
TO 2003 
Priority Rehabilitation Action Cost (in Rands) Source of Funding 
1 Reconnection of electricity +/-137 000
102
 NSK (WUA contributed R1450)  
2 Pumphouse: Inspection, servicing and 
repairs to switch gear and electric motors 
60 000 LDA (through WOMIWU 
consultants) 
3 Hydrants: Replacements 69 000 NSK 
4 Food Plots: Replacement of taps in 106 
plots and 8 dragline hoses per plot for 270 
plots 
588 000 LDA 
5 Sprinkler Irrigation: Provision of equipment 2 300 NSK 
6 Fencing: Installation of 6.5km of barbed 
wire fencing for 7km “bonnox” fence 
210 000 LDA 
7 Cattle crossings: Repairs to 3 cattle 
crossings  over canal and related 
infrastructure 
30 000 LDA 
8 Mechanisation Plan and Implementation 
Plan for setting up sustainable 
management structures 
n.d. LDA 
9 Configuration of Pumps: Investigation 
towards change of pump configuration 
(e.g. pump for food plots) 
100 000 LDA 
10 Canal: Sealing of expansion joints where 
necessary along 4km length of canal 
25 000 LDA 
11 Roads and soil conservation measures: Use 
of government equipment to protect 
infrastructure 
100 000 LDA 
12 Drinking water within irrigation scheme: 
Installation of 3 hand pumps 
39 000 LDA 
13 Valves to manage water supply to irrigation 
blocks  
50 000 LDA 
TOTAL 1 412 750  
 
                                                     
102 Meeting with Graham Gerber, Managing Director of NSK, and NSK’s team of personnel responsible for BEE joint 
venture project implementation. Meeting held in Mokopane on 15 October 2004. 
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6.6 EARLY PHASE ONE OF RESIS: JOINT VENTURE WITH NSK 
This joint venture began in 2002 and produced and marketed cotton and maize from 2003 to 
2005. The joint venture was, according to Denison & Manona (2007), a “share-cropping” 
arrangement. During Phase 1 of RESIS, which was termed the Water Care Programme, 
agricultural commercialization interventions were targeted at the ‘business farmer’ type of crop 
producer (see Table 7 in Section 3.7 of Chapter Three). An assumption was made that emerging 
commercial farmers of Makuleke possessed the degree of commercial orientation required to 
pursue higher yields and accept higher risks. The joint venture partner was NSK, which was the 
same cotton ginning and marketing company that is cited in the case of Phetwane (see Section 
5.8 in Chapter 5). The majority (39) of the 43 emerging commercial farmers and 40 of the 46 
commercial plots were involved in the joint venture. One of the farmers, Farmer ‘R’, was 
registered twice and effectively had dual access to allocated land (see Table 38 in Section 6.6.2). 
Excluded plots included three (3) plots with fruit growers’ mango orchards and three (3) plots 
located in the periphery of the irrigation scheme. 
6.6.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The joint venture was constituted in terms of a contract signed in 2002 between emerging 
commercial farmers, constituted as Makuleke Water User Association (WUA) and NSK.  
According to the contract, the main objective was to make a profit out of cotton crop 
production. Profit from wheat production was specified implicitly as a secondary objective. 
While Makuleke WUA and NSK entered into an agreement, LDA initiated a parallel process to 
initiate the Water Care Programme in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. This programme was a 
precursor to RESIS. Although the joint venture was initiated with little involvement of LDA, 
attempts were made to bridge the gap between the joint venture arrangement and strategic 
principles and objectives of the RESIS Programme. The result appears to have been a farmer 
targeting approach that blended the Equity Labourer type with certain elements of the Business 
Farmer type. Such targeting appears to have been based two sets of assumptions.  
The first assumption was that the commercial orientation of Makuleke commercial plot holders 
required the production of crops with “more robust market opportunity” and was “likely to call 
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for higher yields and accept higher risks associated with adopted farming styles”. Secondly, that 
the “reality of scheme running costs and operational management”, on the one hand, and 
farmers’ insufficient skills, market opportunity and financial resources, on the other hand, 
called for commercial partners to invest in or run the farming enterprise. The blended targeting 
approach effectively placed Makuleke farmers under the mentorship of the private investors 
while simultaneously exposing them to risks associated with capital intensive production.  
Examination of institutional arrangements for the joint venture showed that both parties 
equally shared costs, benefits and debts. The private investor also undertook to re-invest 50 per 
cent of its share of profits in the second season103. NSK obtained a bank loan for infrastructure 
rehabilitation and committed R137 000 towards electricity reconnection. Government 
contributed a grant of R500 000 on behalf of farmers and resuscitated an existing DBSA loan 
(Section 6.4.4). NSK’s proviso was that Makuleke farmers should be constituted as a legal entity 
in order for the two parties to enter into a contractual agreement. 
The joint venture contract specified that the duration of the joint venture would continue 
indefinitely, subject to the right of any member to withdraw from it by giving no less than 
twelve (12) month’s written notice to the other member “provided that no such notice shall be 
given, without written permission of NSK, as long as there is any amount due by the joint 
venture or by any member of the association to NSK forthcoming out of this joint venture 
agreement”104. Some of the conditions attached to the duration clause were that: 
• The joint venture should not terminate by reason of the alteration in the shareholding 
of NSK or alterations in members of the association (Makuleke WUA), but should 
continue between the company (NSK), on the one side, and an association duly 
constituted (Makuleke WUA), on the other side;   
• The Makuleke WUA further undertook that for a period of three (3) years after 
termination of the joint venture agreement, for any reason whasoever, it and its 
                                                     
103
 Meeting with Dr Graham Gerber, Director of NSK, and NSK BEE projects implementation team, held at 
Mokopane on 15 October 2004.  
104
 Joint Venture Agreement entered into and between NSK (Pty) Ltd and the Makuleke Water User Association, 
2002. 
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members would continue for the said period to deliver all cotton produced by the 
association or its members to NSK, because of the benefits derived from the joint 
partnership agreement; 
• NSK undertook, for the 3 years after termination of the joint venture agreement, to 
guarantee “a market related price”, uptake of the total cotton and wheat crop and 
ongoing extension services to all growers concerned; and 
• In the event that Makuleke WUA failed to deliver to NSK its members’ total cotton crop 
in the 3 years after termination of the joint venture agreement, NSK would be entitled 
to claim from the association “as pre-estimated and liquidated damages of the ruling 
seed cotton price in cents per kilogram cotton sold elsewhere”. Both NSK and Makuleke 
WUA consented that the damages would be calculated on the basis of the most recent 
crop estimate. In the event of such failure, all amounts due by the farmers’ association 
or its members would become due and payable immediately. Alternatively and at its 
own discretion, NSK would be entitled to claim fro m the association all damages 
suffered as a result of the breach by Makuleke WUA of the terms and conditions of the 
joint venture agreement.         
Regarding the loan account, the contract stated that each member would have a loan account 
in the books of the joint venture, which shall reflect loans made to the joint enterprise. Any 
credit balance in the loan account would bear interest at the prime rate of ABSA Bank Limited, 
and that such credit balance would be repaid to the member who made the loan to the joint 
venture at the end of the crop season in which the loans were made. The contract further 
stated: “For as long as funding required by the joint ventureship is not provided by the 
members in equal shares, interest will accrue and be payable monthly in arrears on the amount 
by which any member’s loan account exceeds such member’s pro rata share or loan accounts of 
the members, at the rate contemplated in clause 4.2.1 [i.e. ABSA’s prime interest rate]”.    
Although the financial clause of the original contract gave both NSK and Makuleke WUA equal 
signatory powers over withdrawals from the joint venture loan account, responsibility over 
book keeping, records of transactions and auditing of accounts was vested with NSK. The 
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private investor, however, was entitled to charge for these services. Alternatively the joint 
venture could appoint an independent accounting firm to perform the same services and defray 
annual costs. Responsibility for business management was vested entirely with NSK, who would 
consult with Makuleke WUA. In that regard, NSK managed daily operational activities and 
implemented all crop production on the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. The joint venture made 
provision for each farmer to hire three workers per five hectares (5 ha) of land. These workers 
were paid R300 per month.   
Duties and obligations of NSK were that the private investor would: 
• Arrange any mechanization contractors on behalf of the joint venture where this was 
needed, and the costs of such contractors would be allocated to the crop being grown at 
the time; 
• Purchase the total cotton and wheat crops grown by the joint venture on property that 
the farmers’ association and/or its members had permission to occupy, at a price which 
would be determined for cotton in April of each year after the effective date, subject to 
“the A-index, exchange rate and export component” as applicable on the date of sale; 
Alternatively, NSK or its designated affiliate would purchase from the joint venture all 
cotton and wheat produced at market-related prices; 
• Supply all bulk equipment necessary to handle cotton, free of charge, to the joint 
venture;  
• Facilitate ongoing training of members of Makuleke WUA in cotton and wheat 
production, financial management and mechanization skills; and 
• Stand as guarantor for any deposit on the electricity and/or water account on behalf of 
the joint venture. 
Makuleke WUA undertook to: 
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• Ensure that its members signed a written cession ceding to the joint venture all their 
rights and privileges in the permission to occupy pertaining to their respective plots of 
land;  
• Ensure that all its members adopted and remained bound to a resolution that Makuleke 
Irrigation Scheme WUA would be the only legally recognized entity that would 
represent any member of the association; 
• Apply for electricity and water connections in its own name; and 
• Ensure that its members signed a suretyship and confirmation of the agreement. 
Rights, duties and obligations of the NSK-Makuleke WUA venture included that the joint 
venture would  
• Hire from among members of Makuleke WUA any staff necessary to perform farming 
operations on the irrigation scheme; 
• Pay for any repair and maintenance costs pertaining to irrigation equipment in the 
scheme; 
• Agree that no land no land rentals would be payable by the joint venture to the 
Provincial Government and/or any individual or institution concerned except in the case 
of an existing Tribal Authority lease; 
• Agree to leave a portion of the scheme open for the association to allocate to other 
crops, these crops funded from the association’s own sources, and the area to be no 
larger than ten per cent (10 per cent) of the total land area allocated to the joint 
venture. The joint venture, however, reserved the right to exclude this area from the 
total area under the contractual agreement, for ease of management. The joint venture 
agreed to initially repair irrigation infrastructure in the externalized cropping area at its 
own cost;  
• Ensure that all necessary documentation is forwarded to the WUA on a monthly basis 
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•  Ensure irrigation infrastructure against flood damage; 
• Have no claim over any grants that might be forthcoming to the farmers’ association, 
unless specifically requested by the association; and 
• Accept risk in any cotton or other crop on behalf of the joint venture only on receipt of 
the cotton or wheat at a depot or ginnery of NSK or its nominee or when the crop is 
collected by a vehicle of NSK or its nominee.   
Some of the key resolutions included that each member would be entitled to an equal vote and 
that any profit or losses of the joint venture in respect of business would be borne by the 
members in equal shares. All loans on the infrastructure, salaries, administrative costs, crop 
inputs and/or any other costs would be repaid by the joint venture before any net profit is 
shared. Responsibilities for repayment of debts incurred by the joint venture were to be shared 
equally. Upon dissolution of the joint venture, the business and assets of the joint venture 
would be liquidated, and the executor would use his sole discretion to allow a member to 
assume sole responsibility for a liability of the joint venture, with the consent of the creditors 
concerned. Other provisions relating to dissolution of the joint venture were that: 
• Makuleke WUA and its member would agree that the WUA shall cede to NSK all of the 
members’ PTO certificates and the full unencumbered use of the land falling under such 
ceded certificates for the duration of the repayment by NSK of any debts owed by the joint 
venture (Clause 18.4.8); 
• NSK would repay the debt owed through the production of cotton and wheat, or any other 
crop that NSK would deem fit at that time, using land and irrigation infrastructure initially 
used by the joint venture. Once NSK settled the debt in full, the land and irrigation 
equipment would revert back to Makuleke WUA and its members for their own use (Clause 
18.4.9).   
• The association would revoke all its rights and title to any of the land, irrigation equipment 
and crops that may be planted by NSK in order to repay any debt owed by the joint venture 
(Clause 18.4.10)  
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On the basis of the above and other conditions, NSK and farmers, constituted as Makuleke 
WUA, signed the contractual agreement. Certain elements of the contract, however, were 
evidently not fair to the farmers. For example, clauses pertaining to joint venture duration 
placed an inordinately heavy burden on farmers, who would remain bound by the contract long 
after their decision to discontinue their roles in the joint venture. Officials of the Limpopo 
Department of Agriculture stated that the department intervened to ensure that contents of 
the joint venture contract did not contradict principles and objectives of RESIS regarding 
support to black farmers. However, the researcher was not able to obtain a copy of the contract 
between LDA and NSK. In the absence of such formal documentation, the study had to rely on 
the business plan for RESIS and on field observations.  
Within the business plan, the Strategic Model for RESIS programme implementation specified 
that the role of Government with respect to Strategic Partners was to provide firstly, a 
framework within which private sector partners could operate (including appropriate policy and 
operating principles and guidelines) and, secondly, access and communication infrastructure105. 
Formally therefore, the government department was vested with a facilitative role to ensure a 
“win-win” outcome within an institutional arrangement to empower black farmers, on the one 
hand, and create a framework within which the private sector partner operated, on the other 
hand. Hence, although the joint venture was started with little involvement of the Limpopo 
Department of Agriculture, field evidence shows that conditions of the original contract 
between farmers and NSK were modified during the RESIS Water Care Project in Makuleke 
Irrigation Scheme. Such modifications pertained mainly to the duration of the joint venture, 
which was reduced to three (3) years as opposed to continuing “indefinitely” and binding 
farmers to the contract for a period of three (3) years after termination of the agreement. 
Modifications also related to the types of crops produced. Whereas the original contract 
primarily emphasized production of cotton and wheat, the joint venture proceeded to produce 
cotton and maize during Phase One of RESIS. Much of the content of the joint venture contract, 
however, remained unchanged.     
                                                     
105 RESIS: A Business Plan for the Revitalization of Smallholder irrigation Schemes in Limpopo Province, November 
2002. Limpopo Department of Agriculture.  
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6.6.2 JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE AND FARMER’S RESPONSES 
NSK and Makuleke WUA appear to have broadly adhered to the roles specified in the joint 
venture contract. Emerging commercial farmers contributed their plots of land as equity in the 
share-cropping scheme. Private investors contributed finance capital, mechanization, technical 
skills, infrastructure repair and maintenance services, access to markets, business 
administration, crop production management services and development of farmers’ skills. In 
addition to the R500 000 capital outlay, NSK contributed approximately R1 million towards 
additional personnel costs and R137 000 towards settling arrears in the electricity account106. 
Of significance was the fact that the NSK joint venture accommodated needs of food plot 
holders and, for example, subsidized their water supply and irrigation costs. This was partly due 
to the dual emphasis on agricultural commercialization and food security during the Early Phase 
of RESIS.  
In the first season of implementation in 2003 to 2004, the joint venture did not generate 
anticipated financial returns mainly due to late season planting, which made the joint venture 
particularly vulnerable to losses107. Production costs for cotton in 2003 accounted for three 
hundred and sixty per cent (360 per cent) of Makuleke farmers’ net receipts after sales. 
Effectively, farmers were left with huge losses. Such losses were absorbed by the government 
grant to farmers108, thus enabling farmers to continue with the joint venture. However, such 
action did not resolve the problem of lack of income for farmers. Despite this set back, farmers 
rationalized that the initial faltering performance of the joint venture was due to “teething 
problems”, which would be resolved with practise. They therefore remained optimistic.   
The second season from 2004 to 2005, however, also failed to yield expected incomes. Failure 
was due to an unanticipated decline in world cotton prices109. Prior to joint venture failure, 
farmers had adopted various strategies to cope with hardship emanating from the previous 
season’s crop production failure. A strategy that many farmers resorted to was using labour 
                                                     
106
 Meeting with Dr Graham Gerber, Managing Director of NSK, held in Mokopane on 15 October 2004. 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Interview with Dr Masoud Shaker, Limpopo Provincial Department of Agriculture, 10 May 2005. 
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from within their own households instead of hiring outside labour. The objective was to retain 
the R300 monthly wage per worker that the joint venture provided for each farmer to hire 
three workers for every 5 ha of land. Another strategy adopted by some of the farmers was to 
quietly disobey rules against growing other crops on land ceded to the joint venture. They grew 
maize and justified this by alluding to their need to assuage hunger in their households. They 
also justified such actions by pointing out that certain emerging commercial farmers were using 
joint venture resources to grow their own crops. These were mostly vegetable producers whose 
plots had been excluded from the joint venture because their plots were “located on the 
periphery of the scheme”. A member of the executive committee of the WUA management 
committee was among the cited vegetable producers. When, after initial leniency towards 
informal cropping practices, the management committee attempted to enforce rules against 
the production of private crops on ceded land, tensions began to rise between farmers and the 
management committee.  
Tensions became manifest in the farmers’ increasing lack of enthusiasm to pick cotton on their 
plots. Lack of motivation was also due to perceptions by farmers, who mostly relied on labour 
from within their households, that cotton picking allowances were too low. Table 38 shows that 
in May 2005, farmers were paid a full month’s allowance for cotton picking labour costs. By 
June, it became apparent that the rate of cotton picking was slower than envisaged. NSK and 
the management committee became concerned that prolonged exposure of the crop to 
weather conditions and pests could possibly jeopardize the joint venture profits. Towards 
salvaging the crop, a decision was taken to replace human labour with mechanization. Farmers 
were therefore paid 7 day’s allowance for the hand picking of cotton in June (Table 38) and 
instructed to discontinue. They were also informed that practical requirements of mechanized 
harvesting would entail a consolidated approach to the cropped land. Effectively, the harvester 
would traverse plot boundaries, all produce would be pooled and plot size rather than yield 
level would determine each farmer’s share of profits. Farmers were not happy about this and 
pointed out that disregard for evident differences in individual farmers’ crop yield and quality 
would be a further disincentive for Makuleke commercial plot holders to continue with the NSK 
joint venture. Despite these concerns, mechanization of cotton picking began on 28 July 2005. 
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The curtailment of time spent on handpicking cotton meant that lower allowances were paid to 
farmers, which exacerbated hardships of both farmers and farm workers. Many farmers could 
not retain their workers since they could not afford to pay wages. The vulnerability of both 
farmers and workers increased as workers lost jobs and farmers could not adequately provide 
for needs of their own households. The strategy by farmers to use labour from within their own 
households, which was a means to retaining the R300 monthly wage per worker, was no longer 
seen as a worthwhile option, since such income fell far below expectations and was not enough 
to satisfy basic needs. The only exceptions to hardships experienced by farmers following joint 
venture failure were those emerging commercial farmers whose plots were excluded from the 
joint venture.  
Such farmers were able to earn income from sales of food crops produced and marketed 
outside of the joint venture contract. This study identified three such farmers. Two of the 
farmers, Renias Chauke and Mr T. G. Phosa, practiced market gardening outside the scheme 
and irrigated their crops using river water and borehole water respectively. A third farmer, 
Farmer ‘B’110, had acquired - amid heated contestation – dual access to two 5 ha plots within 
the irrigation scheme and spread his risk by committing one of the plots to the joint venture 
while retaining the other for his own private use. His total ownership of the production 
enterprise in the second plot gave him the freedom to make decisions and take actions 
independent of external actors. This farmer’s strategy to retain a degree of freedom was 
demonstrated with respect to a cellular phone project aimed at linking farmers to markets.  
 
 
 
  
                                                     
110 Name withheld to protect the privacy of individual. 
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TABLE 38 MAKULEKE: COTTON PICKING ALLOWANCES, 2005 
Name of Farmer* Plot Number Plot Size (in Ha) 
Allowance 
May June 
Renias Chauke 4A & B; 19A 11.8 2124 531 
D 24B 5 900 225 
E 19B 4.8 864 216 
F 14A 5 900 225 
G 22 5 900 225 
H 15 5 900 225 
Tobias Hlongwane 11A1 & B1 6.5 1170 292.5 
J 6 5.4 972 243 
K 18A 5 900 225 
L 12 A& B 6.7 1206 301.5 
A 25A 5 900 225 
C 21B 5 900 225 
M 20A 4.8 0 216 
N 27 5 1800 225 
O 9A & B 7.9 1422 355.5 
P 8A 3.4 612 153 
Q 7B 5 900 225 
R 2A & B 7.4 1332 333 
S 23B 5 900 225 
T 17B 5 900 225 
U 22B 4.8 864 216 
V 26B 5 1098 225 
B 16B 5 900 225 
W 10A & B 6 0 270 
X 1A 5 900 225 
Y 13A & B 7 1260 315 
Z 26B 5 900 225 
BA 24A 5 900 225 
BB 25B 5 900 225 
BC 27B 5 1800 225 
BD 1B 5 900 225 
BE 14B 3.2 576 144 
BF 11A2 & B2 6.6 1188 297 
BG 22A 5 900 225 
BH 20B 5 900 225 
BI 18B 5 900 225 
BJ 17B 5 900 225 
BK 7B & 8B 5.2 936 234 
BL 3A 5 900 225 
R 23A 5 900 225 
    39024 9742.5 
*Pseudonyms and code names used. 
The joint venture project was sponsored by Vodacom and Alcatel in collaboration with Manobi, 
a Senegalese-based firm. In 2005 the project linked farmers to markets via the internet through 
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a joint venture project entitled “Bridging the Digital Divide” implemented by Alcatel, a mobile 
phone company, and Manobi, a Senegal based private investor. This joint venture, whose 
benefits were spread to include a few other scale-scale irrigation farmers outside the irrigation 
scheme, was initiated at a time when smallholders were “hemmed in” by a cotton joint venture 
contract with NSK (Tapela, 2005). They were therefore unable to make use of this opportunity, 
despite their desire to seek alternative production and marketing arrangements111. By contrast, 
Farmer ‘B’ was able to use his cellular phone to market his produce and obtain information on 
possible buyers for future produce. He was also able to retain all his three workers.  
Since the performance of farmers such as Famer ‘B’ starkly contrasted with the poor 
performance of the joint venture, pressure from households and the broader community 
mounted for the joint venture to generate incomes for farmers and job security for workers. 
Such incomes and jobs were seen as contributing to ameliorating poverty and hunger within 
households and unemployment and poverty in the community. Such incomes were also 
considered valid proof of the wisdom of a decision by these farmers to commit their land 
resources to the joint venture. For most of the farmers, commercial plots were the only major 
economic asset that they possessed. As pressure mounted, many of the farmers increasingly 
voiced a demand for greater freedom to grow other crops. This demand was turned down by 
the management committee, who cited contractual restrictions on use of land whose rights had 
been ceded to the joint venture for three years until contract termination in 2005.  
Although the contract made provision for the WUA to allocate 10 per cent of land in the 
scheme to other crops, such land was already allocated to the 277 food plot holders. Among 
these were a consortium of 4 commercial vegetable growers, who used GtZ funding to invest in 
a greenhouse and enter into contracts to supply produce to local supermarkets and tourism 
enterprises in the Makuleke Region of the Kruger National Park. The majority of food plot 
                                                     
111 Within a year of project commencement, LDA took over the Alcatel-Manobi joint venture and, according to 
smallholders, promised to provide computers and internet connection to irrigation farmers. Up to the end of this 
study’s research, this promise had yet to materialize and farmers were no longer electronically connected to 
markets. According to farmers, the move by the department of agriculture was also prompted by political 
questions over the involvement of a “foreign” private investor in efforts to assist resource-poor irrigation farmers.       
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holders, however, were among the poorest and most vulnerable people in the community. 
Although these produced crops primarily for subsistence, many also sold surplus produce and 
earned relatively small incomes of around R500 per crop. In the context of deep poverty, such 
incomes and food crops were important safety nets against vulnerability to hunger and 
resilience-failure. Effectively, therefore, there were no alternative options for independent crop 
production by emerging commercial farmers of Makuleke. What was particularly daunting for 
these farmers was the fact that the joint venture contract still had at least one more year to run 
before most of the emerging commercial farmers could be free to explore alternatives. Caught 
between the contract, on the one hand, and landlessness, poverty and social pressure, on the 
other hand, these farmers demanded that the contract be terminated. In their frustration, they 
reiterated, “We cannot eat cotton!”112  
Failure of the cotton joint venture in the 2004 to 2005 season led to tensions among farmers 
over differences of opinion regarding a decision whether or not to continue with the joint 
venture. The management committee was only too aware of the implications of breaching the 
contract, particularly Clauses 18.4.8., 18.4.9 and 18.4.10. Such implications included possible 
losses of land rights within the scheme as NSK sought to repay debts emanating from 
dissolution of the joint venture. In desperation, the management committee appealed to 
traditional leadership for assistance, since the land was not owned by farmers but held in trust, 
on behalf of the community, by Chief Makuleke.  
The decision by the Chief, in consultation with the Royal Family, the Traditional Council and the 
CPA, was that farmers should allow the joint venture contract to run its course and thus avoid 
compromising land rights that in effect belonged to the community as a whole.  While some of 
the farmers acceded to this decision, others did not. Conflict erupted between the latter and 
other members of the WUA management committee. Tensions spread into the broader 
community, casting people into two main camps. One group consisted of people whose 
allegiance was to Chief Makuleke. The other group was composed of people who supported 
                                                     
112
 See the title page picture of this chapter (Chapter 6), which shows Makuleke petty commodity producers 
voicing their dissent about being compelled to continue growing cotton while they faced food insecurity due to 
lack of income from the joint venture. 
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Chief Mhinga, Makuleke’s long-term adversary. Farmers who been most vocal in expressing 
dissatisfaction about the leadership’s handling of the joint venture issue were then 
marginalized from mainstream political life within the community. 
Despite challenges pertaining to joint venture failure in Makuleke, it was apparent that the 
community had a remarkably high degree of resilience. This became particularly clear when, at 
the height of tension in October 2005, the researcher convened a workshop to engage with 
Makuleke leadership and CBOs, which included a representative of the WUA. A key objective of 
the workshop was to engage these institutions on issues of conflict within the community, how 
such issues intersected with the research process and, conversely, how the study affected local 
power and livelihood dynamics. The background was that conducting research was becoming 
increasingly difficult due to the need to consistently negotiate relationships between the 
researcher and people in the two conflicting camps while retaining the trust of both camps.  
Workshop participants resolved to convene a meeting to address the issue of conflict. The 
proposed meeting was envisaged to exclusively involve members of Makuleke community, who 
would be drawn from key actors in both camps. The CPA committed to sponsoring the meeting. 
The researcher did not attend the proposed meeting and was therefore not privy to discussions 
that took place. However, at a subsequent workshop convened by the researcher in May 2007, 
feedback by farmers was that contentious issues had been resolved and harmony among 
farmers restored. The Limpopo Department of Agriculture had also intervened to bring closure 
to the joint venture with NSK. Farmers were looking forward to a new strategic partnership 
with greater optimism. Resilience of community was captured in the words of one participant 
at the October 2005 workshop, who state that “Community perpetuates despite day-to-day 
conflicts”. 
6.6.3 CONCLUSION 
The unsuccessful cotton joint venture with NSK was an example of Makuleke farmers’ exposure 
to risks associated with capital intensive production (Tapela, 2008). Drawing from studies by De 
Klerk (1996) on similar farming schemes in the Western Cape, adequate financial support is 
central to any programme to establish small-scale farmers, and ‘gearing’ (i.e. the degree to 
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which farming activities are funded by a small-scale farmer’s own funds relative to finance 
through creditors’ funds) critically determines the viability of farming activity (see page 223 in 
Section 4.10.3) is ‘gearing’. Although a rule of thumb of the South African Agricultural Union is 
that farms with a debt of more than 30 per cent in their financial structure are unsound, while 
those with a debt level above 50 per cent are unlikely to survive, in the case of Makuleke, 
cotton production costs far exceeded 50 per cent of net earnings, with much of the costs 
financed through subsidy grants from private investors and government. Production costs for 
cotton in 2003 accounted for 360 per cent of Makuleke farmers’ net receipts after sales, which 
effectively left farmers with huge losses. The poor performance of the first generation of RESIS 
joint ventures seemed to have contributed to the decision by the provincial department of 
agriculture to modify the structure of strategic partnerships in the second phase of RESIS.   
6.7 RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH AWC  
With the onset of RESIS-Recharge in 2005, LDA encouraged farmers to place their land, water 
and infrastructure resources at the disposal of a strategic partnership with AWC for a period of 
three years as from March 2007. This section examines the institutional arrangements and 
implementation of the strategic partnership. The examination is limited, however, by the fact 
that some critical financial records of the partnership were inaccessible to the study. 
6.7.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
6.7.1.1 Modification of Equity Labourer and Private Investor Relationship  
The poor performance of the first generation of RESIS joint ventures may have contributed to 
the decision by the provincial department of agriculture to modify the structure of strategic 
partnerships in the second phase of RESIS. The classification and targeting of Makuleke 
emerging commercial farmers changed from the hybrid business farmer-cum-equity labourer 
type that characterized the NSK joint venture to a distinctly equity labourer type. According to 
the RESIS typology of irrigation farmers (Denison & Manona, 2006), the difference between the 
two types of farmer was that while the business farmer maintained a degree of autonomy in 
decision making, the equity labourer was basically a worker, with very little influence over 
decision making. The sharing of costs and benefits was structured such that the private investor 
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would get a 60 per cent share of profits in the first year and thereafter both partners would 
each get equal (50 per cent) shares.  
6.7.1.2 Contributions by Parties  
Contributions by LDA included over R14 million (R14 159 206.12) financial capital for 
establishing new hydraulic infrastructure comprising twenty-one centre pivots, at an estimated 
cost of R60 795 per ha. Contributions by the private investor included technology, managerial 
expertise and transport worth an undisclosed multi-million rands in value113, as well as a lead 
role in decision-making, management and implementation of the whole enterprise from 
production, technical support, marketing to financial accounting. The contract made provision 
for the private investor to also ensure effective transfer of skills to farmers. A key responsibility 
for the private investor was to ensure that the enterprise was profitable and did not get bogged 
down by debt. Farmers contributed their allocated plots of irrigated land and, when required, 
labour. Labour force requirements of the strategic partnership were mostly drawn from the 
Makuleke community at large. The farmers’ management committee was delegated the 
responsibility to engage directly with the community regarding issues of labour, 
communication, theft and the distribution of benefits to the community, such as casual 
employment and surplus produce. 
6.7.1.3 Organization of Equity Labourers 
When Makuleke emerging commercial farmers entered into a strategic partnership with Mr 
Arthur William Creighton (AWC), they were constituted as ‘Makuleke Farmers Cooperative’ and 
not a WUA. The strategic partnership contract, however, referred to the farmers’ cooperative 
as ‘Makuleke Farmer’s Association’, which was an old name of the organization. The farmer’s 
association became singularly focused on the interests of registered emerging commercial 
farmers or equity labourers, to the exclusion of subsistence farming interests of food plot 
holders. The exclusion of food plot holders from the new organization, however, was not 
formally announced. This and the subsequent physical exclusion of food plot holders from 
                                                     
113 Meeting with Mr Arthur William Creighton in Modimolle on 14 March 2008. 
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access to water and land within the irrigation scheme led to the food plotholders’ 
representative recusing herself from the Makuleke Farmers’ Cooperative. The farmers’ 
organization had effectively been captured by commercial farming interests of equity labourers, 
which converged with similar interests by AWC, as private investor, and LDA, as responsible 
government authority.  
6.7.1.4 Duration of Contract 
The duration of the initial contract was three years as from 19 March 2007 to 28 February 2010. 
Given the substantial capital expenditure by the private investor, the envisaged tenure of the 
strategic partnership was ten (10) years. What was envisaged to change after February 2010 
was shareholding within the partnership. This was because the “exit strategy” of the contract 
made provision for AWC to relinquish his shares either to Makuleke farmers or to shareholders 
nominated by LDA.  
6.7.1.5 Roles, Responsibilities and Obligations  
Roles, responsibilities and obligations of the private investor were that AWC would: 
• Play a lead role in decision-making, management and implementation of the whole 
enterprise from production, technical support, marketing to financial accounting;  
• Ensure effective transfer of skills to farmers, in terms of the Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture Empowerment Framework; and 
•  Ensure that the enterprise is profitable and does not get bogged down by debt.  
Roles and obligations of Makuleke Farmers Cooperative were to: 
• Contribute their allocated plots of land, water and irrigation infrastructure; and  
• Contribute, when required, their labour.  
Delegated responsibilities of the Makuleke Farmers Cooperative’ management committee 
included: 
• Engaging directly with the community regarding issues of labour, communication, theft 
and the distribution of benefits to the community, such as casual employment and 
surplus produce. 
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There were several distinctive features to the institutional arrangements for the strategic 
partnership. These related primarily to issues of relationships, power and exit strategy for the 
private investor. These features were directly aimed at redressing the perceived negative 
aspects of the preceding joint venture contract between Makuleke WUA and NSK. 
With regard to issues of power, a distinctive feature of the strategic partnership agreement was 
that the contract, as an institutional mechanism, was not restricted to governing relationships 
between farmers and the private investor. Rather, the contract governed relationships between 
the three main institutions namely, Makuleke Farmers Association, AWC and the Limpopo 
Department of Agriculture. Although the researcher was not able to obtain a separate written 
record of the agreement between AWC and Limpopo Department of Agriculture, key principles 
governing the relationship between these two institutions were captured in the strategic 
partnership contract. This framework had major implications on the balance of power within 
the strategic partnership. 
6.7.1.6 The Issue of Power  
A key instrument that changed the balance of power was captured in Clause 11 of the strategic 
partnership contract, which stated that “Upon establishment and implementation of this 
agreement, the Partnership will form an integral part of LDA and will interact with other entities 
of LDA, especially the farmers”. Effectively therefore the strategic partnership contract, as an 
institutional arrangement, significantly reduced Makuleke farmers degrees of freedom to make 
decisions or play active roles in crop production, curtailed the decision making power of the 
private investor and transferred much of the power over decision making to LDA. In other 
words, there was a greater centralization of power and control over agricultural 
commercialization in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. Despite reduced powers, AWC retained a 
significant degree of power in terms of financial clout and the “free hand to manage the 
business”, the latter accorded under Clause 9.2 of the contract. In spite of significantly reduced 
powers of Makuleke Farmers Association’s management committee, the structure retained a 
small but critical degree of power, at the local level, to hire labour, distribute surplus produce, 
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deal with issues of theft in the irrigation scheme and represent the strategic partnership in 
communications with the community.  
6.7.1.7 Exit Strategy 
The exit strategy for the private investor, according to Clause 13 of the contract, envisaged that 
upon expiry of the strategic partnership agreement on 28 February 2010, AWC would relinquish 
his shares in the partnership, at no cost, in favour of Makuleke farmers or such shareholders 
that may be nominated for this purpose by LDA. At face-value, such provision appeared to be 
benign enough. However, the part about relinquishing shares to “such shareholders that may 
be nominated for this purpose by LDA” became a major bone of contention between farmers 
and LDA114. Provisions similar to this particular fragment of Clause 13 had similarly been a 
major problem for emerging commercial farmers elsewhere, who have been involved in RESIS-
Recharge era strategic partnerships with AWC. These included farmers in Elandskraal and 
Phetwane.  
6.7.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENT: 2007 to 2009 
6.7.2.1 Crop Production Approach 
The farming approach adopted by the strategic partnership between Makuleke Farmers 
Association and AWC was to: 
• Consolidate farmers’ small parcels of land;  
• Change from the sprinkler irrigation system to centre pivots;  
• Use sophisticated technologies of land preparation;  
• Introduce a high level of mechanization;  
• Drastically reduce reliance on human labour; and  
• Delegate to the farmers’ management committee responsibility over externalized 
issues, such as socially-embedded transaction costs of hiring labour, communicating 
with the broader community, theft and distribution of surplus produce.  
                                                     
114 Meeting the Makuleke Farmers Association management committee at Makuleke Irrigation Scheme, 17 
October 2008; Informal discussion with the secretary of Makuleke Farmers Association at a workshop on ‘Water, 
Land and Agrarian Reform’, convened by WRC in collaboration with IWMI, PLAAS, Waternet and GWP. Workshop 
held in Pretoria on 24 June 2009.    
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6.7.2.2 Roles in Crop Production  
While private investor roles increased, Makuleke farmers’ roles simultaneously became more 
passive rather than active. What emerged was a class of “armchair farmers” whose role in 
farming was mainly defined by privileged access to income derived from the leasing of 
communally-owned and state-sponsored hydraulic infrastructure to private investors, without 
contributing any tangible benefits or compensation to the community for the costs of foregone 
use. Such development was accompanied by an increase in land and water tenure insecurity for 
the less influential and most vulnerable among irrigation farmers, particularly subsistence food 
producers. 
Contributions by the private investor included a lead role in decision-making, management and 
implementation of the whole enterprise from production, technical support, marketing to 
financial accounting. Labour force requirements of the strategic partnership were mostly drawn 
from the Makuleke community at large. The farmers’ management committee was delegated 
the responsibility of engaging directly with the community regarding issues of labour, 
communication, theft and the distribution of benefits to the community, such as casual 
employment and surplus produce. 
6.7.2.3 Performance:  Crop Production and Income for Emerging Commercial Farmers  
From 2007 to 2009, the production pattern consisted of two cropping seasons per year, in 
which cotton and maize production alternated. Effectively, therefore, income from sales was 
paid out in lumps sums twice per year. The strategic partnership performed remarkably well in 
terms of consistency of productivity and income generation for commercial plot holders. 
Commercial plot holders earned, on average, gross incomes of approximately R45 000 per 5 ha 
of potatoes per season and R36 000 per 5 ha of maize per season. Given that each season was 
approximately six months long, and that the cropping pattern alternated between potato and 
maize production, the majority (74.4) of equity labourers earned approximately R81 000 per 
annum from the strategic partnership in 2007/2008. This translated to mean monthly incomes 
of approximately R6 750 for the majority of equity labourers. In light of the fact that in 2005 the 
collective average of monthly incomes for emerging commercial farmer households was R1555, 
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income from the strategic partnership represented a three-fold (334 per cent) increase in 
earnings for nearly three-quarters of farmers whose plots were approximately 5 ha in size. 
Financial gains of farmers with dual access to commercial plots were at least double those of 
the larger proportion of plot holders with singular access.  
6.7.2.4 Exclusion of Subsistence Food Producers 
All 273 food plot holders were excluded from the scheme following inception of the AWC 
strategic partnership in 2007. The process of exclusion of food producers entailed subsistence 
food producers discovering one day that valves and sections of pipes supplying water to the 
food plots had been removed, thus interrupting their access to water. The management 
committee did not communicate with food plot holders regarding the issue and no one claimed 
responsibility. Although perceptions by food plot holders and the Makuleke community at large 
were that the management committee was responsible for cutting off water supplies to food 
plots, the management committee denied stopping food producers from growing crops on the 
scheme.  
At a meeting held between the researcher and the entire management committee on 17 
October 2008, some of the committee maintained that they never issued instructions to stop 
food plot holders from growing crops in the scheme. However, the treasurer, Farmer B, 
explained that food plot holders owed approximately R30 000 when water supply to food plots 
was cut off. It emerged that there were separate electricity accounts for commercial and food 
plot holders. While the NSK joint venture had covered electricity costs for all farmers, the AWC 
strategic partnership paid electricity bills applying to commercial plots and did not cover food 
plot holders. During the transition between the two contract farming arrangements, food plot 
holders had assumed collective responsibility to settle their own account. Each food plot holder 
contributed R20 per month in 2005.  
Food plot holders, who attended focus group discussions convened by the researcher on 20 and 
21 October 2008, confirmed that the reason belatedly given by the management committee 
was that they had failed to settle arrears on their share of the electricity costs for water supply. 
However, they disputed the amount they were said to owe. They accused the management 
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committee of failing to account for approximately R21 000 contributed by food plot holders 
towards payment of their account after the NSK joint venture in 2005. They questioned why the 
needs of food plot holders were not included in negotiations between commercial plot holders 
and government officials concerning a government grant for resource-poor irrigation 
farmers115. They also questioned the basis of the view that food producers were incapable of 
paying for the cost of water supply.  
It appeared that the legitimacy of the management committee was further compromised by 
perceptions that the structure elevated interests of commercial plot holders at the expense of 
interests of food plot holders. The latter were generally very poor and less influential but 
nonetheless a critical mass that constituted a significant constituency within the irrigation 
scheme. In light of perceived illegitimacy of the management committee, the only member 
elected to represent food plot holders resigned from the committee, and food plot holders 
formed a separate committee of seven people to represent their interests. 
Amid contestations over access to benefits from the irrigation scheme, a symbolic feature of 
subsistence food producers’ exclusion by the new institutional arrangement was a heavy-duty 
fence that was installed by the AWC strategic partnership to keep out wild animals from the 
park and crop thieves from surrounding local communities. The fence enclosed both 
commercial and food plots, and access gates located close to Makuleke and Mabiligwe villages 
were removed. Inadvertently or by design, the fence also kept out both commercial plot 
holders, who had ceded their land rights, and food plot holders, who were not part of the 
decision to form the strategic partnership and did not voluntarily surrender access to their plots 
of land. This effectively made it difficult for the mostly elderly and frail food plot holders to gain 
access to their plots, since they then had to walk longer distances to and from their plots. 
Although food plot holders could not use their land due to interrupted water supply these 
farmers nevertheless saw the fence as embodying disrespect of their land rights by the strategic 
                                                     
115 This specifically related to the DWAF Policy on the Financial Assistance for Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers, 
which was adopted in 2005. 
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partnership116. The fence was therefore a source of conflict between emerging commercial 
farmers, on the one hand, and food plot holders, on the other hand. The most acrimonious 
confrontation about the fence, however, related to the issue of distribution by the strategic 
partnership of benefits, such as casual employment and surplus produce, to the broader 
community.  
6.7.2.5 Distribution of Compensatory Benefits  
The strategic partnership generated local employment benefits and surplus produce. As a 
result, there was greater availability of seasonal employment opportunities for unemployed 
community members in crop harvesting activities. Such employment periodically became 
available twice a year during harvest times. The strategic partnership also made attempts to 
distribute surplus produce to households living in the three villages namely, Makuleke, 
Mabiligwe and Makahlule. These achievements, however, were gained at the expense of 
livelihoods of many farmers, particularly food plot holders who are among the poorest and 
most vulnerable people in Makuleke community. The private investor suggested that the 
strategic partnership should compensate food plot holders for their losses by prioritizing them 
in the distribution of employment opportunities. The private investor had also suggested that 
surplus produce should be distributed freely to all interested members of Makuleke 
community. Until March 2008, AWC’s view was that displaced food plot holders were given 
preferential access to employment and that they earned R550 per week for two weeks during 
harvest times. The private investor also believed that surplus food was distributed as 
suggested.  
Contrary to perceptions by the private investor about how compensatory benefits were 
distributed to displaced food plot holders117, no preference was given to these farmers in the 
sourcing of casual labour by the management committee. Similarly, surplus produce intended 
for free distribution to these farmers and the rest of the community was appropriated by a few 
                                                     
116
 Focus group discussions, workshops and interviews held with Makuleke women, men, food plot holders, 
management committee of the farmers association, key resource persons and selected community leaders from 
17 to 22 October 2008.  
117
 Meeting with private investor, Arthur W. Creighton, at Modimolle on 14 March 2008. 
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members of the farmers’ committee and sold for these members’ individual benefit (Box 14)118. 
In a context where levels of poverty, unemployment and food insecurity were high, free access 
to surplus maize and potatoes, casual employment in potato picking and manual work within 
the largely mechanized maize harvesting were greatly valued and in high demand. For that 
reason, the lack of prioritization of displaced food plot holders and indigent members of the 
community in distributions of surplus produce and employment opportunities resulted in 
acrimonious contestations. Such contestations went beyond commercial and subsistence plot 
holders and pervaded the broader Makuleke community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
118
 Information given by 138 respondents in all the five (5) focus groups and one (1) workshop held in Makuleke 
community, as well as by individual emerging commercial farmers. Exception was a meeting with the farmers’ 
management committee (See Table 1 on page 13) 
Box 14 Diversion of communal benefit towards individual gain 
A decision by the private investor was that the strategic partnership should freely distribute or avail access to 
surplus produce namely, lower grade potatoes and potatoes that are not harvested by machine, to the 
Makuleke community in all three villages. The majority of beneficiaries of this gesture by the strategic 
partnership were likely to be the poorest within the community, many of who had lost access to their food 
plots at the onset of the strategic partnership. However, these meagre benefits were captured by elite among 
emerging commercial farmers. 
Firstly, lower grade potatoes were to be transported by trucks and dumped in the villages, for access by 
interested community members. Two members of the executive committee, ‘A’ and ‘B’, diverted the trucks to a 
local secondary school, where they sold the potatoes at R35 per crate. ‘A’ and ‘B’ allegedly either pocketed the 
money raised or did not disclose who they shared it with.  
Secondly, ‘A’ demanded that all persons intending to dig up the left-over potatoes should first fill a crate for ‘A’ 
before proceeding to dig up potatoes for themselves. ‘A’ sold each of these crates for R35, allegedly for his own 
benefit.  
Thirdly, three elderly poor women from one of the villages entered a field through an open gate to dig up left-
over potatoes. When one of the emerging commercial farmers, ‘C’ drove past the field, he noticed that the gate 
was open and proceeded to lock it to prevent livestock from entering. He had not noticed the women in the 
field.  When ‘A’ later drove past the field, he saw the women and began to harass them. He was soon joined by 
‘B’ and the two men assaulted the elderly women and called in the police to arrest them. The women spent 
two nights in prison and when ‘A’ and ‘B’ did not show up for the court hearing, the women were released. 
While there had been a previous instance of arrest for crop theft, many community members considered that 
‘A’ and ‘B’ had grossly mishandled this case. 
The above instances of resource capture, particularly the last one, created a lot of anger within the community. 
The anger soon spilled over into questions about power, discrimination and how the elites perpetuated their 
privileged access to power and resources through ‘divide and rule’ within the community. According to one 
respondent, “Whereas the South African Constitution recognizes that we are all equal citizens, here in 
Makuleke there are first and second class citizens, all living within South Africa...” The ‘second class’ citizens are 
those who are not originally from Old Makuleke in the Pafuri Area. ‘B’, who was also a beneficiary of a plot ex-
appropriated from a farmer who was excluded from the scheme, was murdered soon after the above incidents. 
The perpetrators and motives for the murder remain unclear, and the conflation of irrigation issues and the 
broader power dynamics within the community, the strategic partnership and stakeholder networks beyond 
create a further complication. 
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6.7.2.6 Conclusion 
While food plot holders appeared to have borne the brunt of exclusions from the irrigation 
scheme, commercial plot holders also experienced a degree of exclusion, though to lesser 
extents. With emergence of the AWC strategic partnership and a shift from business farmer to 
equity labourer, these farmers’ roles became passive rather than active. Apart from during 
harvesting and dividend pay out times, emerging commercial farmers became largely invisible. 
What emerged was a class of “armchair farmers”, whose roles in farming were mainly defined 
by privileged access to income derived from the leasing of communal land and state-sponsored 
hydraulic infrastructure to private investors, without contribution of tangible benefits or 
compensation to the community for the costs of foregone use. In particular, ceding of land 
without adequate safeguards for security of land rights and access to water for food plot 
holders deepened the insecurity and vulnerability of the poorest among irrigation farmers.  
Compared to the NSK joint venture, therefore, the AWC strategic partnership initially generated 
desired incomes for Makuleke farmers. However, due to the inaccessibility of critical financial 
records, the study could not determine to what extent such incomes represented actual 
‘success’ of the business enterprise or, conversely, to what extent the apparent success was 
due or not to the benevolence of the private investor and LDA. The latter possibility would 
imply that farmers’ financial gains in the three years of the strategic partnership were heavily 
subsidized by the private investor and LDA, which could not be ascertained by the study. What 
the research identified were effects of agricultural commercialization and the strategic 
partnership on livelihoods in Makuleke.  
6.8 LIVELIHOOD IMPACTS: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND CHALLENGES  
Overviews of contractual arrangements, such as joint ventures and strategic partnership, 
provide useful summaries of effects of agricultural commercialization on Makuleke livelihoods 
during the Preliminary Phase, RESIS Phase and RESIS-Recharge Phase of interventions in 
Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. Deeper understandings and insights are gained through detailed 
scrutiny at four units of analysis. These are the community, farmers’ group, household and 
individual levels. However desirable such analyses might be, the complexity and inter-linkage of 
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rural livelihoods and the multi-causality of livelihood outcomes presents methodological 
challenges to assessments of livelihood impacts. Although economists have devised 
econometric methods that enable disaggregation of effects of different factors causing specific 
outcomes, this study found such methods not sufficiently helpful to gauging qualitative impacts 
of agricultural commercialisation on livelihoods. It became clear therefore that a critical part of 
the study would be to devise a methodology that would provide both valid assessments and 
useful insights on how interventions towards agricultural commercialization have affected 
people living within or adjacent to small-scale irrigation schemes, such as Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme, in poverty nodes in Limpopo Province.  
The study attempted to achieve this by focusing on qualitative and quantitative ways by which 
agricultural commercialization had intersected with livelihoods of the rural poor living within 
small-scale irrigation schemes. A deliberate approach was adopted to side-step the compulsion 
to devote inordinate time and effort trying to attain rigor in isolating variables and effects as a 
means to obtaining, according to conventional wisdom, an acceptable assessment of ‘livelihood 
impacts’. This strategy conferred a greater degree of freedom for the researcher to make 
causal, though cautious, statements about agricultural commercialization and livelihoods. 
However, it did not completely eliminate the need to isolate, where possible, the effects of 
agricultural commercialization from other factors and to distinguish between direct and indirect 
effects and short-term and long-term impacts.  
A pertinent counterfactual question was: What would have happened without agricultural 
commercialisation and contract farming in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme? In a study by Ahmed & 
Lipton (1997:5) on the ‘Impact of Structural Adjustment on Sustainable Rural Livelihoods”, 
authors observe that the “before and after approach”, which is often used to assess the impact 
of reforms, traces economic performance before and after adjustment and attributes 
differences to the adjustment. A major problem with the approach, however, is that it is 
difficult to control for exogenous shocks (Ibid.). The authors further state that such an approach 
can neither show that any element of adjustment or the whole package has succeeded or failed 
in changing a particular variable, nor account for changes that would have occurred without 
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adjustment. The above observations can be transposed to the methodological problem for this 
study. Both structural adjustment and agricultural commercialization, through contract farming, 
are premised on transaction cost economics approaches.  However, the point of departure for 
this study is its focus on livelihoods and its basis on a view that neo-liberal approaches to rural 
development and agrarian reform are inappropriate constructs for resolving challenges of 
poverty and inequality in poverty nodes in Limpopo Province. From that perspective, the 
‘before and after’ approach was only partially useful since it gave precedence to economic 
performance without giving sufficient attention to a whole range of quantitative and qualitative 
livelihood effects occurring between inception and conclusion of contract farming 
arrangements. It was important to gain insights into such effects, since they embodied rural 
people’s experiences and perceptions rather than concerns by other stakeholders about the 
economic viability of projects.  
The study therefore opted to combine the ‘before and after’ approach with narratives that 
traced collective and individual livelihood trends and trajectories throughout the course of the 
observed agricultural commercialization process. The rationale was, firstly, to use comparisons 
of characteristics prior to and after contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships to 
determine qualitative and quantitative effects on livelihoods. Secondly, the rationale was to 
obtain qualitative and quantitative insights into how commercialization processes intersected 
with people’s livelihoods, what coping strategies people adopted and what combination of 
factors predisposed households towards increasing vulnerability or resilience over a period of 
time. During such time, agricultural commercialization approaches shifted and projects came 
and went. Empirical data collection continued to track livelihood trends and trajectories, both 
in direct response to agricultural commercialization and, where possible, to a combination of 
this and other effects.     
The researcher found that variables that were endogenous and exogenous to agricultural 
commercialization often co-existed in many of the affected households, such that it was not 
easy to isolate effects of agricultural commercialization from other effects. For example, there 
was antecedent socio-economic differentiation among different types of smallholders. There 
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were also variations in livelihood generation strategies, shocks experienced and coping 
strategies prior to, during and after the course of joint venture and strategic partnership 
projects. Some of the shocks emanated from outside of projects, while strategies for coping 
with shocks induced by joint ventures and strategic partnerships involved the reliance on other 
resources within the broader ‘baskets’ of livelihoods. It was possible though to make useful 
qualitative and quantitative causal descriptions and analyses of observed phenomena. It also 
appeared that disaggregating the individual facets of household characteristics and effects of 
commercialization was not as critical as acknowledging the reality that rural livelihoods were 
inherently complex and their various facets were closely inter-connected, often inextricably. 
Thus, rigor in isolating variables and effects was perhaps not as important as capturing the 
‘untidy’ reality and analyzing, as faithfully as possible, the intersection between livelihoods and 
agricultural commercialization.      
In attempting to overcome some of the methodological difficulties, the sampling frame for 
Makuleke community included individuals and households who had and had not been directly 
involved in contract farming. The latter did not necessarily constitute a ‘control’ group for the 
study and were therefore not intended to provide answers to the counterfactual question: 
What would have happened without contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships in 
Makuleke irrigation scheme? This was because the existence of causal relationships between 
agricultural commercialization and livelihoods within Makuleke Irrigation Scheme, on the one 
hand, and livelihoods elsewhere within the community, on the other hand, effectively meant 
that the two groups were not sufficiently independent of each other. Causal relationships 
existed despite and because of spatial and institutional disjuncture between the locus of own 
private enterprise and that of RESIS-related enterprises in the irrigation scheme.  Indeed, many 
livelihoods straddled the boundary between the irrigation scheme and the community at large. 
Some livelihoods emerged while others declined due to agricultural commercialization. Through 
such trajectories, linkages between scheme-based and off-scheme strategies were weakened or 
strengthened. Such realities, and antecedent socio-economic differentiation, therefore limited 
the usefulness of a ‘control group’ approach. Rather, the study’s sampling approach was 
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intended to capture the range, as in ‘distance from point of source’, of contract farming 
initiatives.  
This range often traversed physical and institutional ‘enclosures’ associated with the irrigation 
scheme, and could not therefore be adequately captured by a singular focus on the irrigation 
scheme. Combined with a thorough examination of household and individual case specific 
attributes, histories and experiences, however, the sampling approach provided useful 
qualitative and quantitative insights on the extent to which changes in livelihoods could be 
ascribed to specific agricultural commercialization interventions. In particular, this approach 
was useful in highlighting differences in shocks experienced and coping strategies adopted at 
specific points during commercialization processes. The following categories of small-scale 
irrigation farmer were sampled for in-depth individual case studies:  
1) Emerging Commercial Farmer: AWC Equity Labourer (inside scheme); 
2) Emerging Commercial Farmer: Equity Labourer (inside and outside scheme); 
3) Emerging Commercial Farmer: Own Private Enterprise (entirely outside scheme); 
4) Food Plot Holder: Displaced from scheme  
5) Rain-fed cropping/Micro-scale Gardening: Not displaced  
6) Landless/Micro-scale Home Gardening: Not displaced 
The categories of farmer specified above were intended for practical purposes by the study and 
did not necessarily replace but complemented the RESIS farmer categories identified by 
Denison & Manona (2007). Since the study’s examination of livelihoods went beyond the 
confines of Makuleke Irrigation Scheme to embrace also other affected farmers and members 
of the local community, it was found useful to classify different categories of farmers in terms 
of their position in relation to agricultural commercialization and, in particular, the AWC 
strategic partnership of 2007 to 2009.  
Detailed descriptions of research methods and analytical frameworks are presented in Chapter 
One. The following section examines livelihoods of selected individual farmers in the context of 
RESIS Programme interventions and contract farming arrangements in Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme. The subsequent section gives a broad overview of interactions between agricultural 
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commercialization interventions and livelihoods in Makuleke community in general. This is 
followed by a discussion of key findings and issues.  
6.9 CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS AND LIVELIHOODS OF SELECTED 
INDIVIDUAL FARMERS, 2008/2009  
6.9.1 RENIAS CHAUKE: EQUITY LABOURER WITHIN IRRIGATION SCHEME AND 
MARKET-ORIENTATED RIVERSIDE GARDENER   
6.9.1.1 Introduction 
Renias Chauke was a sixty-three (63) year old male small-scale commercial farmer residing in 
Makuleke village. He was married and headed a household of thirteen people, three of whom 
were grandchildren aged below five years. Five members of the household resided elsewhere 
for study and work purposes for most of the year. These did not make contributions to the 
household income. Child support grants contributed R660 towards needs of the three 
grandchildren. The bulk of household income was generated by commercial farming activities 
led primarily by the head of household. Chauke had access to two commercial plots comprising 
11.8 ha of land in the irrigation scheme and 4.1 ha of land along Mphongolo River on the 
outskirts of Makuleke village. The farmer also had a 10 ha plot of land along the Limpopo River 
in Mozambique, which was allocated by a local traditional leader, who once visited Makuleke. 
Although Chauke had no formal title deed to his riverside garden in Makuleke, his land rights 
were secure. All the locally-based household members aged 15 years and above contributed 
their labour towards crop production, harvesting and marketing on a day to day basis. Care for 
the grandchildren was done mostly on-farm as the older household members worked. Although 
this work was shared by male and female members of the household, women seemed to have 
the primary responsibility.  
6.9.1.2 Historical Background  
In his earlier years, Chauke worked in the Orange Free State (OFS) Province, where he taught 
himself about farming. He began farming in Makuleke in 1981 while still a migrant worker. He 
finally returned home in 1983 and became a full-time farmer. His initial experience as an 
emerging commercial farmer was characterized by severe hardship. The only sources of water 
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for farming purposes were seasonal rainfall and Mphongolo River. Access to water in the rain-
fed crop fields was poor and crops were often consumed by stray wild animals from the park, 
without any compensation from conservation agencies. The river was infested with crocodiles 
and fetching water by bucket was therefore risky. Establishing a homestead garden was not an 
option, however. Domestic water supply infrastructure was confined to a few communal 
sources, namely, two boreholes, a small reservoir and five communal taps or ‘stand pipes’119. 
These sources were insufficient for basic human needs and there prevailed a community rule 
against use of potable water for garden irrigation. Rather than resort to rain-fed cropping, as 
most Makuleke farmers did then, Chauke asked for and obtained permission from the chief to 
use land along a portion of Mphongolo River to establish a garden. His first garden was 1 ha in 
area. In it, he honed his skills in tomato production and marketing. Since he could not use 
potable water from communal sources located within the village, he used buckets to draw 
water from the river, which was risky. 
When Makuleke Dam was constructed in the mid-1980s, Chauke established a second garden in 
his homestead. During drought years, he was compelled to walk half a kilometre to fetch raw 
water from the dam using 25 litre cans and a wheelbarrow. From both the riverside and 
homestead gardens, Chauke was able to meet the vegetable requirements of his household and 
to sell the surplus to members of the community. When the Gazankulu homeland government 
completed construction of the irrigation scheme in 1991, a decision by the chief and 
agricultural extension officer to allocate Chauke a commercial plot in the state-sponsored 
irrigation scheme was unanimously supported by members of the community. The farmer used 
this plot productively until irrigation scheme infrastructure collapsed after 1994. In the interim, 
Chauke continued to produce crops, mainly tomatoes, in his riverside and homestead gardens. 
He sold his produce, particularly tomatoes, to Sunny Deep Market in Johannesburg. He 
transported his produce to a collection depot in the small town of Louis Trichardt about 140km 
away, from where the produce was conveyed by a transportation firm, Landman Verwoer, to 
                                                     
119 Water Reticulation Layout Plan for Makuleke Water Project implemented by Mvula Trust on behalf of 
Makuleke Water Committee. Plan prepared by Africon in 1997. 
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Johannesburg. However, profit margins were too low and losses too frequent due to fluctuating 
market prices, spoilage of produce and relatively high transport costs.  
In Chauke’s calculation, he previously earned a gross seasonal income of at least R14 000 from 
tomato crop sales in the formal market in Johannesburg. Apart from costs of seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides and fuel for the water pump, the farmer deducted R500 for transportation costs 
from Makuleke to Louis Trichardt, and R1 to R2 per crate for transportation from Louis 
Trichardt to Johannesburg. Labour expenditure by the farmer and members of his household 
was not factored in. 
6.9.1.3 Interaction with RESIS and RESIS-Recharge Interventions: Livelihood Outcomes  
Following infrastructure rehabilitation under the RESIS Water Care Project in 2002, Chauke 
resumed crop production in the irrigation scheme. Two commercial plots comprising 11.8 ha of 
land were allocated to him as part of a move to redistribute unused or underutilized plots. As a 
result, he scaled down and finally abandoned his homestead garden and the drudgery of 
conveying water over a long distance from the dam. However, since the introduction of joint 
ventures and strategic partnerships in the irrigation scheme in 2003, the farmer found himself 
gradually divested of decision making power over the production system and ultimately 
physically displaced from active roles in crop production. This was a source of frustration. 
Failure of the NSK cotton joint venture to generate expected incomes from 2003 to 2005 
compounded his frustration and influenced his decision to increase the area of his 1 ha 
riverside plot by 3.1 ha to give a total of 4.1 ha.  
The AWC strategic partnership that commenced in 2007 subsequently provided Chauke with 
approximately R90 000 per season for potatoes and R72 000 for dry maize. However, the 
farmer remained frustrated by not being allowed the freedom to actively engage in commercial 
farming in the irrigation scheme. Consequently, he used income from the strategic partnership 
to invest in various forms of infrastructure in his expanded riverside plot. Such infrastructure 
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included a secure fence and gate, a mud-and-thatch store room, a diesel-operated water pump, 
a drip irrigation system120 and an elevated water storage tank.  
Financial expenditure on infrastructure included R5000 for a 5000-litre jo-jo water storage tank, 
R3850 for seven rolls of 50mm irrigation pipes, R4500 for a diesel-powered water pump (Honda 
GX 160), R550 for one hundred metres (100m) of additional 50mm pipes, undisclosed amounts 
of money for 100m of 32mm irrigation pipes, a network of 12mm drip irrigation pipes covering 
1 ha, a perimeter fence, gate and a mud-and-thatch store room. The farmer did not accord 
monetary value to labour expended by members of his household and himself in constructing 
the irrigation furrows, store room and fence.  
From an earlier emphasis on tomato production, the farmer used financial resources gained 
from the strategic partnership to diversify into producing a wider range of crops. He diversified 
from solely growing tomatoes to producing paprika, maize, cabbage, Chinese cabbage, okra, 
spinach, beetroot and potatoes. He no longer supplied the Sunny Deep Market in Johannesburg 
but focused on local informal markets. He also began to experiment with small-scale bee-
keeping and mango production. He considered mangoes to be in high demand by local fruit 
processing industries, which specialized in making ‘atchar’ or pickle. He considered these new 
ventures to be learning opportunities from which he expected to gain insights into 
characteristics of niche markets for honey and business opportunities in the local mango 
processing sector. In light of the envisaged development of his enterprise, Chauke considered 
the capacity of his irrigation infrastructure to be insufficient for his needs and he therefore 
intended to invest in an additional jo-jo tank, pump, and drip and sprinkler irrigation equipment 
at an anticipated cost of around R50 000.  
Costs of household labour for crop production were also not quantified. Crop production inputs 
included seed, chemical fertilizer, pesticides, fuel for operating the water pump, packaging 
                                                     
120 He uses 12mm drip pipes, a 50mm pipe for mielies (maize), 32mm for tomatoes and 40mm for other 
vegetables. He had mistakenly bought the 40mm pipe for tomatoes. Altogether the farmers has 100 metres of 
hose pipe laid out and a further 7 rolls of unused hose. This infrastructure enables him to irrigate under half of his 
garden. He intends buying an additional 400m of pipe and 7 rolls of 20mm drip pipes to cover the rest of his 
garden.  
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material for marketed produce, transport costs. The farmer did not disclose the costs of seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides and fuel for operating his water pump, and had no records of such 
expenditure. Similarly, the farmer kept no records of crop output. However, he was able to 
specify that at the time of the field research, he sold an 80kg bag of dry maize for R200, a crate 
of tomatoes for R50, a bunch of spinach for R5, a 2kg bag of okra for R15 and a bunch of 
beetroot for R2. Since he did not keep records of output, and since his household consumed a 
quarter (25 per cent) of the total yield and sold small quantities on an ad hoc basis to 
community members, he could not estimate the gross income earned from the different crops 
except for tomatoes. Gross income from informal tomatoes sales was at least R500 per day for 
four weeks of the core harvesting period. However, because the farmer did not keep records, it 
was not easy to determine how much net profit the farmer earned from formal and informal 
tomato sales.   
The farmer cited his own lack of record-keeping as a reason for his failure to disclose his actual 
income from market gardening. However, it was evident that he was not comfortable with 
disclosing such information, and the researcher was ethically bound to abide by the 
respondent’s wishes. The farmer, however, subsequently volunteered what appeared to be a 
conservative estimate of his mean monthly income from the riverside garden, which was 
R5000. Among the farmers’ plans were an investment of about R50 000 towards purchase of a 
second 5000-litre jo-jo water storage tank, an additional water pump, a stronger perimeter 
fence and drip and sprinkler irrigation equipment. Future plans also included indeterminate but 
significant investments in his 10 ha plot in Mozambique.      
In year 2007 to 2008, Renias Chauke earned a gross income of approximately R162 000 per 
annum from ceding his 11.8 ha plot to the AWC strategic partnership and from his informal 
riverside gardening enterprise. This translated into a mean monthly income of approximately 
R13 500 per month. Through ceding his allocation of land to the AWC strategic partnership, 
Renias Chauke directly gained a fifteen-fold increase from the R900 monthly allowance he used 
to receive from the NSK joint venture in 2005. His private gardening activities contributed an 
average gross monthly income of approximately R5000. Effectively, the strategic partnership 
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and Chauke’s riverside gardening enterprise contributed to raising the total household income 
from R1410 per month in 2005 to approximately R19 160 per month from 2007 to 2009. 
Contributions by the AWC partnership accounted for most (70.5 per cent) of the farmer’s 
income at the time of the study.  
It was evident that, owing to his dual access to commercial plots, this farmer had the advantage 
of a larger share of profits from the strategic partnership than the majority (74.4 per cent) of 
equity labourers in the irrigation scheme. Qualitative examination of Renias Chauke’s case 
revealed also a complex inter-linkage of livelihood strategies and social networks through which 
the farmer gradually built up the asset base of his household. Critical among these strategies 
and social networks was the process of property rights creation pertaining to the farmer’s 
riverside plot. 
6.9.1.4 Water Use 
The farmer produced vegetables throughout the year. He grew tomatoes, potatoes, paprika, 
sweet potatoes and okra mainly in the hot wet season between October and April. He produced 
spinach, Chinese cabbage and beetroot in the cool dry season. He used his water pump to 
abstract water from Mphongolo River to fill up his 5000 litre jo-jo tank and then used drip 
irrigation to water his crops. Due to the high frequency of dry spells in the wet season, his 
reliance on rainfall necessarily had to be supplemented by water abstractions from the river. He 
therefore irrigated his crops throughout the year, with significantly higher rates of consumption 
in the dry season. His water consumption was approximately 5000 litres of water per day 
during the dry season and 5000 litres per week during the wet season121. Effectively, the farmer 
consumed a total of 900 000 litres (900 kilolitres or 900 cubic metres) of water in the dry 
season and 12 000 litres (12 kilolitres or 12m³) in the wet season. Chauke’s total annual water 
consumption from the river was approximately 912 000 litres (or 912m³). Existing irrigation 
infrastructure did not meet the farmer’s water requirements for intensive horticulture. Hence, 
his intention to install a second 5000 litre water storage tank, to effectively double the water 
                                                     
121
 In-depth interview with farmer Renias Chauke. 
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storage capacity on his land to 10 000 litres. This was to be accompanied by further 
investments in irrigation pipes and a stronger fence to keep out small livestock, such as goats.  
Chauke’s water abstraction and use seemed to be above Schedule One limits but within the 
threshold for General Authorisations, although such thresholds were not explicitly defined in 
the NWA. The farmer’s maximum dry season water consumption of 5000 litres (5m³) per day, 
however, was far below the 50m³ per day threshold requiring registration under General 
Authorisation. Similarly, the envisaged increase in Chauke’s water consumption seemed to 
imply a future daily abstraction rate that was below the mandatory 50 m³ per day registration 
threshold for surface water abstraction under General Authorisation. In terms of the National 
Water Act, Chauke would be required to register his water use. This was due to that while 
Chauke’s use of water on his initial 1 ha garden plot constituted ‘lawful water use’, since such 
use began in 1983 and therefore more than two years prior to 1998, water use on the 
remaining 2 ha plot extension was not.   
Chauke’s case was not unique, as field evidence pointed to the existence of many other similar 
small-producers in Makuleke community and possibly in rural communities elsewhere within 
the Olifants Basin. Individually, these users’ surface water abstractions were above Schedule 
One limits but below the level requiring registration under General Authorisations. Collectively, 
their water abstractions could possibly constitute a significant quantity. At the time of the 
study, there were no clear provisions for General Authorisation of small-scale black 
commercially-orientated users who abstracted quantities of surface water exceeding Schedule 
One limits within the Olifants River Basin122. Although some of the productive uses were 
‘existing lawful uses’, many began after 1998 and hence required registration. Registration of 
these water users, who were often scattered across many different villages, presented an 
administrative challenge for DWA.  
                                                     
122
 See DWAF. 2004. Revision of General Authorisation in terms of Section 39 of the National Water Act (Act 36 0f 
1998). Gazette 26187, Number 399, 24 March. 
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6.9.1.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Chauke’s case was an example of a black small-scale commercial farmer who was emerging 
through self-driven enterprise and other support. The latter included the combined support of 
his household, local traditional leadership, locally-based extension officers, peer group of black 
farmers and the community at large, on the one hand, and state-sponsorship and private sector 
investment, on the other hand. The main impetus for the emergence, however, had been the 
farmer’s own tenacity, commitment and acumen.  
The term ‘equity labourer’ did not seem appropriate for individuals like Chauke, who were 
emerging farmers engaged in diversified commercial farming enterprises with and without 
state support. Such farmers were widely considered to be successful by their peers and many 
other people within Makuleke community and similar communities elsewhere. Farmers such as 
Chauke seemed to approximate the ‘business farmer’ type.  
Renias Chauke’s history shows that, following retirement from migrant labour in the Orange 
Free State (OFS) in 1983, the farmer approached Chief Makuleke to allocate to him a small 1 ha 
plot along Mphongolo River on the outskirts of Makuleke village. Contrary to common practice 
with respect to land allocation for commercial use, the Chief did not quire a royalty from him. 
He proceeded to demonstrate his commitment to becoming a market gardener through sheer 
hard work. During drier seasons when Mphongolo River dried up, he often used a wheelbarrow 
to convey water over a distance of half a kilometre from Makuleke to the garden. In wet 
seasons, he often risked his life by using a bucket to abstract water from the crocodile-infested 
river, which was also the occasional haunt of hippos from the Kruger National Park. The farmer 
was able to supply members of the community with a variety of vegetables, at a time when 
access roads from urban markets were poor and overcoming the frictional effect of distance 
therefore more onerous. Thus, Renias Chauke built a solid farming reputation within the 
community. It was through this social capital that the farmer obtained in 1999 Chief Makuleke’s 
recommendation and the community’s unanimous support that he be allocated two 
commercial plots in the irrigation scheme.  
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Whereas the farmer had achieved relative success prior to RESIS, during the NSK joint venture 
Renias Chauke diverted his time and energy to the joint venture and consequently remained 
with insufficient resources to profitably run his market gardening enterprise. Following 
production failure by the joint venture in the 2004 to 2005 season, the farmer took a decision 
to spread risk by giving greater attention to his garden, where at least he had full control of the 
production enterprise, while ceding his commercial plots to externally-driven commercialization 
initiatives. He requested and obtained from Chief Makuleke a further allocation of land 
adjacent to his existing garden. As had been the case with the earlier riverside land allocation, 
the Chief did not require any royalty from the farmer. Chauke then mobilized all available 
labour resources from within his household and resumed vegetable production. He soon re-
established his reputation as a successful farmer, and tomato producer in particular, within the 
community and surrounding communities in Nthlavheni communal area. Through trans-
boundary social networks, Renias Chauke obtained from a Mozambican chief an allocation of 
10 ha of land along a river in a communal area.  
When the AWC strategic partnership began in 2007, Renias Chauke’s decision to maintain his 
risk-spreading strategy was reinforced by a frustration with being relegated to ‘arm-chair’ 
farming. Arm-chair farming pertained to a change of roles from active business farmer to 
passive equity labourer. This was what the shift in farmer targeting approach entailed during 
the transition from RESIS to RESIS Re-charge. Renias Chauke’s frustration with the equity 
labourer role, however, related specifically to his own personal aspiration to become a 
successful commercial vegetable farmer. Realization that prospects for attaining his ambition 
depended heavily upon support by institutional arrangements, such as the AWC strategic 
partnership, inured him to the bitter taste of having to cede his 11.8 ha plot to the full control 
of the partnership. He seized the opportunity presented by surplus financial, labour and time 
gains from the strategic partnership to invest in infrastructure and inputs for his riverside 
garden.  
From the foregoing account, it is evident that livelihood strategies and assets for this farmer 
were inter-twined in complex ways with the AWC strategic partnership as well as a range of 
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other factors. Some of the factors were antecedent to the partnership, others were 
concomitant to it and yet others were envisaged beyond the duration of the partnership 
agreement. There were flows and feedback loops between various factors and variables. What 
compounded the complexity was the social embeddedness of RESIS Programme 
implementation in Makuleke. Institutional arrangements for the AWC strategic partnership 
attempted to externalize social factors, such as grievances by food plot holders over loss of land 
rights, demands for compensation and contestations emanating from ‘outstanding’ social 
issues. Members of the farmers’ management committee, such as Renias Chauke, were at the 
‘coal face’ of contestations. They therefore had to expend greater time and human resources 
negotiating ways to resolve conflicts, address outstanding social issues and rebuild social 
capital.  
The net effect of such complexity is that it is therefore difficult and perhaps futile, in this and 
similar cases, to seek to accurately determine the extent of impact of the AWC strategic 
partnership on Renias Chauke’s livelihood. This study therefore makes a cautious causal 
assessment that the AWC strategic partnership contributed, to a certain extent, to both 
enhancing and detracting from Renias Chauke’s livelihood. The net effect, however, seemed to 
be a greater personal gain than previous to agricultural commercialization and contractual 
arrangements. Given that the farmer’s livelihood was embedded in the social matrix within 
which he lives, it was difficult to see how gains in one small arena, which is the farmer’s 
individual livelihood, could be completely extricated from losses within the broader social 
arena. In other words, the methodological dilemma still prevails.   
6.9.2 MR T. G. PHOSA: MARKET-ORIENTATED GARDENER WITH PRIVATE BOREHOLE 
IN RAIN-FED CROPPING AREA  
The study identified a robust example of an enterprising commercial irrigation farmer, Mr T. G. 
Phosa, who eked out a livelihood outside the ambit of the RESIS Programme but was 
nonetheless directly influenced by it in devising his livelihood strategies. The objective of 
including the farmer in this examination is to demonstrate the livelihood outcomes of a farmer 
with full control of a self-owned commercial irrigation farming enterprise compared to results 
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of similarly controlled and owned enterprises by emerging commercial and subsistence farmers 
associated with RESIS Programme interventions and, in particular, contract farming 
arrangements. 
6.9.2.1 Introduction 
Mr Phosa was a sixty-eight (68) year old male small-scale commercial farmer residing in 
Makahlule village. He was married and headed a household of nine (9). Three household 
members were grandchildren aged between ten (10) and sixteen (16) years, while three (3) 
others resided elsewhere in Gauteng for study and work purposes during much of the year. 
These did not make contributions to the household income. Child support grants for two of the 
grandchildren contributed R440 per month. The bulk of the household mean monthly income, 
which ranged from minimums of R4 000 to R8 000 to undisclosed higher amounts, was 
generated by commercial farming activities primarily by the head of household and his wife. 
The farmer had no access to land in the irrigation scheme. However, Phosa had land use rights 
to 5 ha of land in the rain-fed crop fields to the south-west of Makahlule village.  
6.9.2.2 Historical Background 
Prior to retirement in 2003, Phosa worked as an agricultural extension officer in various parts of 
Limpopo Province. During that time, he practiced rain-fed crop farming on his field, primarily 
for subsistence. Chief Makuleke allocated this land to him in the 1970s. He used the land for 
rain-fed crop farming until 2003, when he retired. Thereafter, Phosa invested about R57 000 of 
his retirement grant from LDA to enable a shift from subsistence to commercially-orientated 
crop production, and in 2004 became fully productive.  
6.9.2.3 Interaction with RESIS and RESIS-Recharge Interventions: Livelihood Outcomes  
In the farmer’s point of view, his decision to embark on commercial irrigation farming was 
influenced by two main factors. Firstly, he received requests for fresh produce supplies from 
informal traders in Malamulele business centre and surrounding villages, including Bhevula, 
Makahlule and Makuleke. During that time, expectations that the revitalization of food crop 
production in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme would meet local demand for fresh produce had 
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been dashed by the inception of a cotton joint venture, which took up about half of the land in 
the scheme. Secondly, Phosa needed to earn an income after retirement.  
The farmer’s retirement grant provided requisite financial resources for capital investments in 
both infrastructure and production enterprise. Security of land tenure was critical to his 
decision to commit a significant proportion of his financial, human and natural resources to 
invest in infrastructure. Support from local traditional leadership was crucial to ensuring the 
security of his investment, particularly with respect to land tenure security, formalization of 
productive water use through registration of his borehole with municipal authorities and 
application for a connection to the Eskom electricity grid. The importance of the chief’s support 
owed to the traditional leader’s control over land allocation and development of land in 
Makuleke community. Phosa’s investments in hydraulic and related infrastructure further 
strengthened his land rights as well as the security of his household’s access to water.  
Other than the two initial processes to formalize his water and electricity access and use, the 
farmer had subsequently conducted his commercial irrigation farming enterprise outside of the 
formal economy. Unlike Renias Chauke (Section 6.11.1), Mr Phosa did not have a commercial 
plot in the irrigation scheme and therefore could not rely on income from RESIS-Recharge 
contract farming arrangements. Instead, he leveraged his retirement income and combined this 
with his antecedent farming skills and knowledge. He used social networks with traditional 
leadership to gain secure access to land, water and electricity. Upon such foundation, he 
strengthened his position by investing in requisite infrastructure and developing his business 
skills.  
In 2004, the farmer invested about R35 000 towards developing a borehole, electricity supply, 
water pump, irrigation pipes and a perimeter fence in his field. Other expenditure related to 
costs of obtaining the chief’s approval for his commercial enterprise (R200), fees for 
registration of the borehole with either the district or local municipality in the small 
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administrative centre of Thohoyandou123 (over R500) and payment for the chief to travel with 
him to Thohoyandou to support his application to formally register the borehole (R500).  
The farmer also invested in land preparation, purchase of production inputs and the 
construction of a two roomed brick-and-iron roofed building, which was originally intended to 
be a vegetable pack house and store room. Details of the capital outlay are presented in Table 
39. After this, he was not able to obtain state subsidies or assistance and resorted to cost-
saving strategies and starting production at a modest scale. He decided to focus on growing 
tomatoes, beetroot, spinach and okra. He invested in a 5000 litre jo-jo water storage tank and 
one large pipe, with no drip irrigation. This had negative results in that it led to the drying up of 
soil, leaching of nutrients and soil erosion.  
Phosa, his wife and three (3) hired workers contributed labour towards crop production, 
harvesting and marketing on a day-to-day basis. The farmer and his wife, who increasingly 
shared the decision-making role, gradually broadened the range of crops produced to include 
tomatoes, cabbage, onion, water melon, Chinese cabbage, cow peas, butternut, beetroot, 
sweet potato, carrot, okra, and green and dry maize. None of the other household members 
were directly involved in farming activities except one daughter, who occasionally used Phosa’s 
bakkie to transport harvested produce to markets in the nearby small town of Malamulele. The 
same daughter used the bakkie to transport water for household consumption and as part of 
the household’s informal water vending activities.  
To avert these problems, Phosa bought thirty (30) rolls of drip irrigation pipes early in 2005. 
These cost him R16 500 (at a unit price of R550 per roll). Immediate impacts of the change of 
irrigation system were that water became more available to his crops and he was able to 
increase the variety of crops and cropping frequency. This coincided with the period of RESIS-
Recharge infrastructure development in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme, when land preparation 
for centre pivot irrigation completely halted crop production. 
                                                     
123 Efforts by the research to determine whether the borehole was registered with Thulamela Local Municipality 
or Vhembe District Municipality were unsuccessful since neither the farmer nor employees of both municipalities 
knew where boreholes were registered. Most officials of the local office of DWA were away attending to the 
cholera crisis in the province and the few available were unaware of borehole registrations.  
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TABLE 39 CAPITAL INVESTMENTS BY MR T. G. PHOSA, 2003 
Item Amount (in Rands) 
Borehole construction 13 000 
Electricity infrastructure and connection to Eskom grid 5 000 
Electricity wiring  495.00 
5000 litre jo-jo water storage tank 2 500 
Drip irrigation system 16 500 
2-roomed pack house and store room 10 000 
Purchase of electricity cables for connection to farm building 390 
Payment of electrician 200 
Bush clearance 300 
Perimeter fence (labour, material and transport costs) 3282 
Ploughing of field (by hired tractor) 200 
Transport (donkey cart) of cattle dung from farmer’s homestead kraal to the field  80 
Purchase of inorganic fertilizer (2:3:2 and KAN) 258 
1200 vegetable seedlings 126 
Seeds: okra (“mbewu ya mandhandi”) 23.64 
5 – litre spray can 294.75 
Pesticide  39.15 
Hand gloves 25.90 
Watering cans 50.50 
Small implements, such as shovels, picks, hoes and rakes 206 
Hired labour for land preparation and production 2550 
Royalty towards chief’s approval for commercial enterprise  200 
Borehole registration fee 500 
Payment to the chief for travel to municipal office to support farmer’s registration of 
borehole 
500 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 56 720.94 
Fieldwork, 2008 to 2009. 
By 2009, the farmer practised two cropping seasons on 1 ha of green maize per annum and 
grew tomatoes and other vegetables throughout the year in the remainder of his 5 ha garden. 
He had become a major supplier to informal traders in the locality, earning an average net 
income of at least R4000 to R8000 per month. Although he sometimes used the cellular phone 
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from the Alcatel/Manobi joint venture of 2005 to market produce, his view was that many 
buyers “seemed to smell out” his crops since they generally came without invitation. He 
suspected that information got disseminated by word of mouth, mainly by passengers who 
travelled by taxi past his field. Phosa’s achievements also included food and water security for 
his household, being able to use income from farming to educate two (2) of his four (4) children 
up to university level, and purchase of a bakkie (or small truck) with combined funding from his 
retirement grant and income from commercial farming. His future plans included diversifying 
into growing vegetables, such as garlic and pepperdew, for the niche markets. His primary 
target, however, remained the local informal food markets. 
Although the farmer had succeeded in firmly establishing himself in the local informal agri-food 
markets, he encountered challenges with respect to entering local formal markets. Towards 
overcoming these constraints, Mr Phosa had established links with similar black farmers 
elsewhere within the broader Malamulelele area of Thulamela local municipality. Through their 
social network, they sought financial, technical and other assistance from an NGO, Small 
Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA). They had also begun to form a cooperative consisting 
of ten (10) small-scale commercial irrigation farmers. Their collective objective was to mobilize 
funding for hydraulic infrastructure, such as boreholes, and irrigation equipment, as well as to 
derive benefits from economies of scale associated with bulk purchasing of inputs and 
marketing of produce. An important asset in Mr Phosa’s relationship with the network of small-
scale commercial farmers was the cellular phone provided by the Alcatel-Vodacom-Manobi 
joint venture as part of an effort to link farmers to markets.     
Table 40 presents the farmer’s expenditure and income from production in 2008 of green and 
dry maize, tomatoes, cabbage and Chinese cabbage. The table excludes data on production of 
okra, cow peas, pumpkin, butternut, onion, beetroot and carrot. Data shows that the farmer 
earned an annual gross income of between R127 500 and R137 500 from the four types of crop 
presented in the table. His gross profit margin for green maize ranged from R30 000 to R40 000 
per ha, while the net income from both green and dry maize was approximately between R18 
000 and R28 000.  
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For each of his three workers, the farmer generated mean monthly incomes of R600, which 
translated into annual incomes of R7200. In addition to monetary income, the farmer gave his 
workers a share of each harvest, which contributed to enhancing their food security. This non-
monetary contribution constituted a quantifiable income, in terms of cost savings in lieu of 
purchases of the same produce elsewhere by the workers. Given that the average monthly 
income for the poorest residents of Makuleke was less than R500 per month without any 
additional non-monetary income, Phosa’s workers and their households gained greater benefits 
from the farmer’s commercial farming enterprise. Such gains were comparatively greater than 
those that accrued to workers employed by commercial plot holders during the NSK joint 
venture, whose allowance was R300 per month. Although workers seasonally employed by the 
AWC strategic partnership to harvest potatoes and maize seemed to earn higher monetary 
wages, which were R550 per week for two weeks of harvesting in 2008/2009, such income was 
of shorter duration, insecure and in the longer term, of lesser gain than that consistently 
earned by Mr Phosa’s workers. 
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TABLE 40 PART OF PHOSA’S FARM BUDGET, 2008 
CATEGORY EXPENDITURE INCOME 
Item Cost            
(in Rands) 
TOTAL 
ANNUAL 
COST 
Yield Receipts from 
sales 
(Gross Margin) 
Profits 
(Net) 
Capital Investment (outlay): 
2003-4 
Institutional Costs (applications and 
registration with formal and traditional 
institutions), Infrastructure, Land Preparation 
and initial Crop Production  
56720.94 
Monthly Operational Costs Electricity 500 6000  
Fuel (petrol) 400 4800 
Labour: 3 full-time workers at R600 each 1800 21600 
Green maize (1 ha): Intensive 
production of 1 crop per annum 
“Border King” maize seed: 2 x 25kg  bags at 
R162.50 per bag 
325 750 Green maize:     
8000 - 10000 
cobs at R4 per 
cob. 
30 000 to 40 
000 
16 255 – 26 255 
 Fertilizer (CAN and 2:3:4): 3 x 50kg bags at 
R400 during production   
1200 1200 
 Fertilizer (CAN and 2:3:4): 3 x 50kg bags at 
R400 after production   
1200 1200 Dry maize (by-
product): 10 x 
80kg bags at 
R200 each 
2000 
 Pesticides (two types) 195 195 
 Tractor hire 1600 1600 
Dry maize (1 ha): 1 crop per year “Border King” maize seed: 2 x 25kg  bags at 
R162.50 per bag 
325 325 Dry maize: 20 x 
80kg bags at 
R200 each 
4 000 1880 
 Pesticides (two types) 195 195 
 Tractor hire 1600 1600 
Tomotoes (1 ha):  3 crops per 
year 
Composite cost of tomato, cabbage and 
Chinese cabbage seedlings 
 
 
Composite cost of fertilizer: 3 x 50kg bags per 
hectare x 3 ha at R400 per bag, applied twice 
per year  
Pesticide 
15 000  40 crates per 
week at R50 
each for 3 to 4 
months: Gross 
income of R24 
000 -  32 000 
per crop 
84 000 
(at an average 
of R28000 per 
crop) 
 
Cabbage (1 ha): 1 crop per year 3600 7200 10 000 heads at 
R300 for 1000; 
100 heads at R5 
each  
3500  
Chinese cabbage (1 ha): 1 crop 
per year 
600 600  4000  
   47 265  127500 – 137 
500 
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6.9.2.4 Water Use 
Regarding water use, the only written records available related to electricity charges for 
operating the borehole water pump. Since the farmer paid a flat rate of R500 per month 
regardless of water consumption, such records were of limited use. In the absence of written 
records for water consumption, the researcher estimated water quantities on the basis of the 
farmer’s disclosure of the frequency with which he filled his 5000 litre jo-jo tank per month in 
the wet and dry seasons.  
Khosa mean monthly water consumption was greater (200 000 litres) during the dry season and 
lesser (100 000 litres) during the wet season124. He filled his 5000 litre jo-jo tank approximately 
forty times per month in the dry season from May to October and twenty times per month in 
the wet season from November to April. He therefore used an average of approximately 6.7m³ 
of water for irrigation per day in the dry season and 3.3m³ in the wet season. Of these amounts, 
200 litres per day were used for livestock watering while 50 litres per day were used for 
household laundry within the garden perimeter. The frequency of wet season abstractions of 
groundwater was associated with the frequent mid-season dry spells and the drier end-of-
season period, which were characteristic of the prevailing climatic conditions. Effectively, the 
farmer’s total dry season water consumption was approximately 1200000 litres or 1200 
kilolitres, while the total wet season consumption is 600000 litres or 600 kilolitres of water. This 
gave a total annual consumption of 1800000 litres or 1800 kilolitres (1800m³) of water. 
Although Phosa’s water use was geared primarily towards small-scale commercial crop 
production, the water was used for multiple other purposes. These included watering the 
farmer’s livestock, supplementing his household’s domestic water needs and generating 
additional income from informal water vending in Makahlule village. Household laundry was 
also washed in the field and hung on the perimeter fence to dry, thus enabling Phosa’s wife to 
play dual productive and reproductive roles.   
                                                     
124
 In-depth interview with the farmer. 
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Phosa’s water use was above limits of Schedule One, but within the range permissible under 
General Authorisation. At a daily consumption of 3.3 cubic metres (or 3.3 kilolitres) per day in 
the wet season and 6.6 cubic meters per day in the dry season, Phosa’s water consumption was 
less than the mandatory quantity requiring registration, which was 10 cubic metres for ground 
water abstraction125. Likewise, the existing water storage capacity (5000 litres or 5m³) and 
planned capacity (10000 litres or 10m³) on the farmer’s property were far below the threshold 
(10 000m³) required for water use registration under General Authorisation. 
6.9.2.5 Discussion 
Mr Phosa’s case provides insights into enterprising behavior by small-scale black farmers who 
eke livelihoods outside RESIS Programme interventions but within the vicinity of smallholder 
irrigation schemes. While the re-allocation of commercial plots by RESIS Phase 1 (Water Care) 
interventions in Makuleke excluded Mr Phosa, since he was a former government employee, it 
was largely this same exclusion that provided him with the impetus to generate diversified 
farm-based and off-farm livelihood strategies in and around Makuleke Community.   
While the farmer’s small-scale commercial farming enterprise largely fell outside the ambit of 
RESIS Programme, his livelihood strategies and outcomes were directly influenced by 
agricultural commercialization and contract farming arrangements within Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme. Mr T. G. Phosa and similar small-scale commercial farmers viewed “leap-frogging” of 
produce from the irrigation scheme to be an opportunity for their entry into and dominance of 
local informal food markets. The same local food market opportunities were perceived by the 
more enterprising among commercial plot holders within the irrigation scheme, such as Renias 
Chauke. 
In his 5 ha plot in the rain-fed cropping area, Mr Phosa used his pension funds to make 
investments in a borehole, water storage tank, electricity supply, vegetable packing house, drip 
irrigation system, perimeter fence and truck. He applied his skills as a retired agricultural 
extension officer to manage his entire enterprise. He used a cellphone donated by the Alcatel 
                                                     
125
 DWAF. 2004. Revision of General Authorisation in terms of Section 39 of the National Water Act (Act 36 0f 
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and Manobi joint venture of 2005 to market his produce. Mr Phosa jointed a network of ten 
independent commercial farmers, who formed a cooperative and sought assistance from the 
SEDA, since they were not covered by RESIS Programme interventions. Each farmer within the 
group owned his production system but shared in the collective purchase of inputs, including 
training. The group’s plan was to strengthen their entry into local commercial food markets, 
starting with informal markets. So far, Mr Phosa had achieved entry in the latter markets and 
generated meaningful and consistent income, food and livelihood security for his household 
and for his workers. 
Although Mr Phosa’s case appears, at face value, to fall into the ‘control’ group for the study, it 
does not exactly provide answers to the counterfactual question: What would have happened 
without agricultural commercialisation, joint ventures and strategic partnerships in Makuleke 
irrigation schemes? This is because there was a direct causal relationship between agricultural 
commercialization in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme and the emergence of Mr Phosa’s livelihood 
as a small-scale commercial irrigation farmer. Such a relationship existed despite spatial and 
institutional disjuncture between the locus of own private enterprise and that of RESIS-related 
enterprises in the irrigation scheme.  
It also seems that security of land tenure was critical to his decision to commit a significant 
proportion of his financial, human and natural resources to invest in infrastructure. Since his 
enterprise was located in rain-fed croplands, within which Chief Makuleke exercised power 
over land rights allocation, support from local traditional leadership was crucial to ensuring 
formal customary recognition and local support for his venture. Formalization of his water use, 
through registration of his borehole and application for a connection to the Eskom electricity 
grid, was also important in ensuring the security of his investment, access to water and 
commercial enterprise. Other than these two formal processes, the farmer largely conducted 
his commercial enterprise outside of the formal economy. Phosa’s investments in hydraulic and 
related infrastructure strengthened his land rights as well as the security of his household’s 
access to water.  
The case of Mr Phosa indicated that: 
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• With requisite resources, it is possible for black small-scale irrigation farmers to succeed 
in generating gainful and sustainable livelihoods for themselves, their households and 
their workers outside of smallholder irrigation schemes and with full ownership of the 
production enterprise.  
• Financial resources are a critical factor of production for farmers within and outside of 
smallholder irrigation schemes. Alternative sources of finance are particularly critical to 
farmers outside of formal institutional arrangements. At face-value, the profile of Mr T. 
G. Phosa appears similar to many emerging commercial farmers in Makuleke. However, 
a critical difference was that he had greater access to alternative sources of capital 
compared to the majority of Makuleke farmers. While a retirement pension grant 
provided relatively substantial seed capital for Mr Phosa, migrant worker savings 
provided a relatively small start-up capital for Renias Chauke. The former was able to 
begin his enterprise with requisite productive assets and therefore relative ease. The 
latter was compelled to endure hardship and risk for several years before his enterprise 
became established. The growth of Renias Chauke’s enterprise, however, was 
accelerated by financial contributions from the AWC strategic partnership. The same 
can be said for Farmer F and Tobias Hlongwane.    
• In rural contexts, such as Makuleke, social capital is important to securing access to 
productive resources, such as land and water, both for farmers within and outside of 
smallholder irrigation schemes. The differences in Chief Makuleke’s treatment of Renias 
Chauke and Mr T. G. Phosa with respect to royalties attests both to the differing levels 
of social capital between the two farmers, among other factors. By contrast, 
appropriation of riverside land without asking for the Chief’s permission did not 
necessarily imply that farmers, such as Tobias Hlongwane, did not require social capital 
to obtain such land. On the contrary, social capital in the form of established customary 
rules governing use of the commons already existed within Makuleke community and 
farmers used it according to formal though unwritten customary codes. Externally-
driven institutional arrangements, such as RESIS-Recharge institutional actors and 
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partners, seemed to assume that engaging with rural social capital and outstanding 
social issues constituted a transaction cost that was best externalized from the core 
business of contract farming ventures and partnership and delegated to the farmers’ 
organization.      
6.9.3 FARMER F: EQUITY LABOURER WITHIN IRRIGATION SCHEME AND MARKET-
ORIENTATED RIVERSIDE GARDENER 
Farmer ‘F’, like Renias Chauke (Section 6.9.1), was both an equity labourer in the strategic 
partnership with AWC an independent market-orientated riverside gardener within Makuleke 
community. The duality of his farming roles was directly influenced by RESIS Programme 
inteventions. However, his pathway to livelihood diversification was different from that of 
Renias Chauke.   
Farmer ‘F’ was a 60 year old male commercial plot holder, whose 5 ha plot was ceded to the 
strategic partnership. Involvement in the RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership contributed 
approximately R6 750 per month to Farmer F’s total household income. Prior to the strategic 
partnership in 2005, Farmer F’s regular household income was R1270 per month. Almost three-
quarters (R900) of this income was from NSK joint venture allowances for crop production 
labour. Farmer F’s household retained such allowances through using its own labour resources 
rather than hiring outside labour. After production failure by the NSK joint venture in the 2003 
to 2004 season, Farmer F’s household became particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.  
To cope with poverty and hunger, Farmer F became one of several joint venture members who 
informally produced crops on ceded land before the contract with NSK came to an end in 2005. 
He grew vegetables and maize, mostly for subsistence. Amid contestations in 2005 over 
informal crop irrigation on land ceded to the NSK joint venture, the farmer decided to diversify 
livelihood strategies to include informal irrigation on a newly-established 1.5 ha garden 
alongside Mphongolo River, below the dam wall and close to Makuleke Bed and Breakfast 
facility. The farmer’s primary motivation was to produce food crops for subsistence, with 
surplus produce sold within the local community. However, Farmer F lacked requisite financial 
resources to actualize his objective.    
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With inception of the AWC strategic partnership, contributions from the partnership elevated 
the farmer’s total household income from R1270 per month during the NSK joint venture to 
R8498 per month. Of this amount, almost four-fifths (79.4 per cent) came from the strategic 
partnership while the rest (20.6 per cent) derived from the farmer’s informal riverside 
gardening activities and, to a lesser extent, social grants. From his ceded 5 ha plot alone, 
Farmer F earned a total annual income of approximately R81 000 per year in 2007/2008, which 
translated into R6750 income per month. Within context of RESIS Programme interventions, 
this represented a seven-fold (750 per cent) increase to the R900 he used to get from the NSK 
joint venture in 2005.  
Despite the significant increase in income from the AWC partnership, Farmer F continued to 
practice informal market gardening on his riverside garden. Factors that influenced the farmer’s 
decision included a sense of achievement associated with success and freedom associated with 
full control of his own enterprise. These contrasted with the relatively passive role of equity 
labourer in the AWC strategic partnership and failure to earn income as a ‘business farmer’ in 
the NSK joint venture.    
A qualitative examination of contributions by the strategic partnership shows that although the 
initial impetus for the farmer’s decision to establish a riverside garden was production failure 
by the NSK joint venture, the more tangible gains from this decision were causally related to the 
surplus income, labour and time resources that emanated from reductions by the AWC 
strategic partnership of active roles for equity labourers. Farmer F used income from the 
partnership to invest in a diesel-powered water pump, construct a 2500-litre concrete lined 
water storage tank, purchase drip irrigation equipment and erect a perimeter fence and gate. 
Thus, his household material asset ownership became enhanced compared to the meagre 
material assets his household owned in 2005, which included a radio and a cellphone donated 
by the Alcatel-Vodacom-Manobi strategic partnership. The degree to which the AWC strategic 
partnership can be said to have impacted on the farmer’s broader livelihood strategies is 
qualified by the fact that the farmer’s decision to diversify livelihood strategies was antecedent 
to the AWC partnership. This, however, does not detract from the significance of contributions 
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by the AWC partnership. Compared to farmers like Renias Chauke and Mr Phosa (Section 6.9.2), 
Farmer F still had a lot more constraints to overcome before he could establish himself in local 
informal and formal agri-food markets. 
6.9.4 TOBIAS HLONGWANE: EQUITY LABOURER WITHIN IRRIGATION SCHEME AND 
MARKET-ORIENTATED RIVERSIDE GARDENER 
Tobias Hlongwane, was a 56 year old male commercial plot holder, whose 6.5 ha plot was 
ceded to the AWC strategic partnership. His experiences with agricultural commercialization 
were broadly similar to Farmer F’s (Section 6.9.3). However, contrary to other enterprising 
farmers examined the study, who sought to maximize yields through intensive farming 
methods, Tobias Hlongwane’s livelihood diversification strategy was to target a largely 
underrated or unknown and very localized informal niche market for organic vegetables.  
The strategic partnership contribution of approximately R8775 per month represented a 
fourteen-fold (1462.5 per cent) increase to the R600 monthly income the farmer used to retain 
from the NSK joint venture allowance for labour costs. Prior to the strategic partnership in 
2005, Tobias Hlongwane’s total household income was R1110 per month. Nearly half (45.9 per 
cent) of this income was from child support grants, while NSK joint venture allowances 
accounted for the remaining 54.1 per cent. By contrast, from 2007 to 2009, almost nine tenths 
(88.5 per cent) of the farmer’s household income derived from the AWC strategic partnership, 
while the contribution by child grants was reduced to 4.8 per cent. Effectively, therefore, by 
ceding his 6.5 ha plot to the AWC strategic partnership, the farmer increased the margin of 
income from his allocated land. 
While income gains from the ceded commercial plot were a direct result of the strategic 
partnership, the reduction of Tobias Hlongwane’s dependency on social grants was an indirect 
result. This is because the latter was directly due the farmer’s agency in investing surplus 
income and time resources from the strategic partnership in informal gardening activities on a 
0.4 ha piece of land along Mapangu River within communal grazing lands (Appendix 1). Through 
such investments, the farmer was able to maintain a slightly higher level (R1140) of average 
monthly income from ‘other sources’ than the level of his total mean monthly income (R1110) 
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of 2005. Income from informal market gardening filled in the gap created by cessation of the 
NSK joint venture, and exceeded erstwhile income from joint venture allowances by R100. 
When government child support allowances per child subsequently increased from R170 in 
2005 to R220 in 2008, Tobias Hlongwane’s dependence on such income contracted partly due 
to the reduction from three to two the number of children eligible for such grants as well as the 
increasing significance of income from farming activities.  
A qualitative examination of contributions by the strategic partnership reveals other indirect 
non-monetary impacts on the farmer’s broader livelihood strategies. The farmer invested in 
irrigation infrastructure in his riverside garden. Such infrastructure included a diesel-fuelled 
water pump, a 2500-litre ‘jo-jo’ water storage tank, a drip irrigation system, irrigation furrows, a 
perimeter fence and gate. These investments markedly enhanced Tobias Hlongwane’s 
household material assets ownership, which in 2005 consisted of a fridge, a radio and a cellular 
phone that was provided through the Alcatel-Vodacom-Manobi joint venture.  
The farmer also used part of his surplus income to invest in enhancing his farming skills through 
registering for formal training and certification at a local agricultural college. Knowledge gained 
from such investment made the farmer more aware of challenges associated with new entry 
into markets. It also influenced his decision to target niche markets rather than compete with 
established local commercial vegetable producers, such as Renias Chauke and Mr T. G. Phosa 
(see Sections 6.9.1 and 6.9.2). Tobias Hlongwane therefore chose to produce organic 
vegetables, which contrasted with reliance by the established farmers on chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides. His decision paid off as members of Makuleke and neighbouring communities 
increasingly showed a preference for the quality of his produce. Faced with increasing demand, 
the farmer made plans to increase the size of his garden, make further investments in 
additional hydraulic and irrigation infrastructure and widen the market for his produce. 
Although the farmer could not say how much income he earned from sales of organic 
vegetables, since he had no records, he emphasized that gross savings from such marketing had 
enabled him to accumulate in a six month period sufficient capital to buy a 5000 litre jo-jo tank 
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and a drip irrigation system to cover about 2 ha. This was not all the income, as the household 
also made ad hoc use of day-to-day earnings to pay for miscellaneous needs.   
In the case of Tobias Hlongwane, therefore, the AWC strategic partnership could be said to 
have contributed directly and indirectly to enhancing the livelihood assets of the individual 
farmer and his household. However, the degree to which the partnership can be said to have 
impacted positively on livelihoods in this case was strongly determined by the agency of the 
farmer. Tobias Hlongwane used his freedom to make choices about expenditure of surplus 
financial and time resources emanating from the strategic partnership. He made decisions to 
enhance his natural, physical and human assets, and returns from such investments, specifically 
entry into a localized niche market for organic vegetables, reinforced the financial and 
economic assets of the farmer and his household.  Given the farmer’s limited resources and 
significant constraints, the strategy to target a particular localized informal niche market 
appeared to have paid off since it enabled him to survive competition from stronger farmers 
like Renias Chauke and Mr Phosa, who also targeted local informal markets. 
6.9.5 FARMER ‘G’: EQUITY LABOURER IN IRRIGATION SCHEME 
Farmer G exemplified equity labourers who, following reduction of productive roles by the AWC 
strategic partnership, did not diversify their livelihood strategies but instead opted to rely 
heavily on income from leasing their plot allocations to the partnership. Such farmers 
contrasted with Renias Chauke (Section 6.9.1), who used available time and resources to 
diversify and pursue aspirations of becoming fully-fledged commercial farmers outside of RESIS 
interventions and contract farming arrangements.  
Farmer ‘G’ was 48 year old unmarried female commercial plot holder, who had a 5 ha plot that 
was ceded to the strategic partnership between AWC and Makuleke Farmers’ Cooperative. 
Contributions by the AWC strategic partnership had elevated her total household income from 
an average R3 730 per month in 2005 to R10 370 per month in 2007 to 2009. From her 5 ha 
commercial plot alone, Farmer G gained an average income of approximately R6 750 per month 
from the strategic partnership, which represented more than a ten-fold (1125 per cent) 
 
 
 
 
 404 
increase to the R600 monthly allowance she used to get from the NSK joint venture in 2005. 
From 2007 to 2009, contributions from the strategic partnership comprised nearly two thirds 
(62.9 per cent) of her total household income per month, while the rest (37.1 per cent) derived 
mostly from social grants.  
The above quantitative gains had had qualitative implications on the livelihoods of Farmer G’s 
household. While the commercialization model adopted by the AWC partnership had relieved 
farmers of active roles in crop production, Farmer G did not appear to have translated her 
increased time resources to other income-generating activities. However, Farmer G had 
translated such time gains into non-monetary reproductive activities, which resulted in 
qualitative improvements of quality of life and well-being for her household. In particular, 
Farmer G was able to devote more time to caring for four elderly household members, who 
were aged between 74 and 75 years. To be able to do that, Farmer G combined her own 
income from agricultural commercialization in the irrigation scheme with other income from 
social grants. A significant proportion (94.5 per cent) of the latter income was composed of old 
age pensions, which were transient and dependent on life spans of the pensioners.  
Effectively, in this case, ‘arm-chair’ farming replaced self-determination with dependency, and 
it seemed possible that without alternative livelihood strategies or active roles in farming, 
Farmer G’s dependency on subsidized sources of income could become a livelihood in its own 
right. However, such dependency could have critical long term implications on livelihood 
sustainability, since it militated against future prospects for ascendance into full control of 
production systems, to which emerging farmers like Renias Chauke aspired. At the same time, 
capacity constraints of farmers like Farmer G ironically seemed likely to continue to constitute 
opportunities for better-resourced people and enterprises from elsewhere to capture benefits 
associated with smallholder irrigation schemes.   
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6.9.6 MR WILBERT RENDANI HLONGWANE AND MR PHILLIP DUMAS MALULEKE: 
INFORMAL ‘STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP’ FOR SUBSISTENCE RIVERSIDE 
GARDENING 
This example relates to an informal partnership by two elderly subsistence food producers, who 
pooled their meager livelihood resources together to establish a riverside garden as a means to 
overcoming food insecurity following RESIS-Recharge interventions in Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme. Benefits of these farmers’ coping strategy were shared with similarly poor and 
vulnerable members of the community, although the partners clearly defined their ownership 
of the enterprise and boldly defended their right to exclude others from access. Juxtaposed 
with the AWC strategic partnership, this informal partnership engendered a caricature of neo-
liberal corporate structure and relations in that while it painfully lacked financial and 
infrastructure resources, the enterprise was conducted with a significant measure of empathy 
and humanity. Critically, the enterprise provided an important safety net for a few households 
who would otherwise not have been able to cope with shocks due to RESIS-Recharge 
interventions and contractual farming arrangements.    
6.9.6.1 Introduction 
Wilbert Rendani Hlongwane (67 years old) and Phillip Dumas Maluleke (73 years old) were both 
pensioners who resided in Makuleke village. The two men were among the poorest and most 
vulnerable people in the community. They headed households of nine (9) and eleven (11) 
people respectively. Pensions of these men and their spouses amounted to R2000 per month 
per household. Child support grants contributed R380 to Hlongwane’s monthly household 
income and R190 to Maluleke’s. The rest of the adult members of these households did not 
contribute any money because of unemployment and had no tangible livelihood strategies. 
Besides social grants, therefore, households of both men subsisted on riverside gardening by 
the two men, who were occasionally assisted by their wives.  
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6.9.6.2 Background to the Informal ‘Strategic Partnership’ 
In 2007, Hlongwane and Maluleke entered into an informal crop production partnership and 
together practiced subsistence gardening on a small (600m²) piece of land along Mapangu 
River. While Hlongwane was a retired migrant worker, who had never had access to land in the 
irrigation scheme, Maluleke was a former food plot holder. His access to land in the irrigation 
scheme was terminated in 2002 on the basis that he earned an old age pension, which was 
provided by the state to all people aged over 65 years. His loss of land coincided with the onset 
of the RESIS Water Care Project and a cotton joint venture between emerging commercial 
farmers of Makuleke and a private firm, Noordelike Sentrale Katoen (NSK).  
Since Maluleke’s displacement from the scheme in 2002 and Hlongwane’s retirement around 
the same time, the two farmers had separately supplemented food purchased using pension 
funds with food seasonally produced in their rain-fed crop fields or collected from the village 
commons. Factors that compelled Hlongwane and Maluleke to establish their riverside garden 
in 2007 included increasing hardships due to generalized food price increases, joblessness 
within their households, lack of access to land in the irrigation scheme and food insecurity 
within the community due to displacement in 2007 of food producers. Although most of the 
displaced food producers were subsistence-orientated, many had hitherto either sold surplus 
produce or shared it with others in their social netoworks, thereby broadening food security 
within the local community.  
The effects of food producer exclusions and outward-orientation of food production by the 
strategic partnership therefore combined with widespread food price increases to exacerbate 
these men’s challenge to ensure food security for their households. Amid such constraints, the 
two men realized that their physical frailty and their poverty further narrowed their prospects 
to cope with shocks to their livelihoods. They therefore agreed to pool their meagre resources 
together, as a survival strategy, and embark on informal irrigation farming as an alternative 
means to ensuring secure access to food. Following such agreement, they quietly began looking 
for land to jointly establish an irrigated garden. Such a garden constituted a diversification from 
their earlier reliance on rain-fed crop production and pensions.   
 
 
 
 
 407 
6.9.6.3 Livelihoods Generation Process, Strategies and Outcomes  
Towards identifying a suitable place for their farming enterprise, Hlongwane and Maluleke first 
scouted the commons around Makuleke communal lands. They finaly decided to establish their 
garden at a particular place along Mapangu Stream, which was close to a deep pool of water. 
The selected place was part of communal grazing land, distant from built-up areas, outside of 
the irrigation scheme boundary and close to a constant supply of water. Their rationale was 
that such a site would not require the chief’s approval since access to the local commons was 
open to all bona fide members of Makuleke community. A related advantage was that they 
would not be required to pay any royalty to the chief, which they could not afford. 
Disadvantages included a higher risk of crop losses due to birds and stray livestock and wild 
animals from the Kruger National Park, possibilities of crocodile attacks and the greater daily 
walking distance (1.5 km) between the village and the garden.  
While the farmers accepted the challenge of walking the relatively long distance everyday, they 
sought to minimize challenges associated with risks of crocodile attacks and stray animals. They 
first made sure that they knew the exact location and habits of the only crocodile known to 
reside in Mapangu River. To protect their crops from stray livestock and wild animals, they also 
erected a secure perimeter fence and gate using discarded raw material and wooden poles and 
saplings from the bush. The farmers then proclaimed their partnership with a prominently 
displayed signpost at the entrance gate, which clearly stated the company as “Rendani and 
Dumas Pty Ltd”126 and warned against trespassing (“Hakungenwi lapa haikona!”, which is 
Tsonga language equivalent to “Warning: No unauthorized entry!”).  
In terms of institutional arrangements, the partnership involved the two men pooling their 
labour to establish, maintain and guard the fenced riverside garden. Without any access to 
finance, they jointly invested their labour into developing infrastructure, such as two earth 
platforms that enabled manual bucket abstraction of water from the river, irrigation furrows, a 
fence and gate, and a rudimentary pole and thatch shelter that they referred to as their 
“office”. The shelter had a roof but no walls, and served as a source of shade from the hot mid-
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day sun and an overnight storage for buckets and miscellaneous objects. The latter included  
items such as empty hessian sacks, pieces of string and sticks for tying climbing plants, rags for 
cushioning hands from the hard bucket handles and thin scraps of wire for mending holes in the 
fence.  
Hlongwane and Maluleke used buckets to abstract water directly from the river. This 
constituted hard work for the elderly people, who had to carry buckets full of water from earth 
platforms on the river’s edge up a steep bank to their garden above. The farmers stated that if 
they had money, they would invest in a portable water pump and not a borehole. Their 
rationale was that the high rate of theft of transformers in the local district was a major 
deterrent to investments in boreholes. Such crime restricted small-scale farmers to using water 
pumps, which were portable and could be carried home for safe-keeping. Until such time that 
they were fortunate enough to realize their aspirations to own a water pump, the two farmers 
resolved to continue using buckets on a rotational basis, to ease the hardship.  
Hlongwane grew spinach and Chinese cabbage in the cool, dry season and beans and pumpkins 
in the hot wet season. By contrast, Maluleke produced spinach, Chinese cabbage and carrots in 
the cool dry season and pumpkins, cabbage and beans in the hot dry season. Maluleke also 
grew some cassava. The farmers favoured pumpkins, beans and cassava because these crops 
also provided leafy vegetables for relish. They both sold surplus produce to neighbours on an 
ad hoc basis, often when they were tired of eating vegetables and needed to buy meat or to 
avoid spoilage of highly perishable vegetables and/or bolting of leafy vegetables. Their 
individual incomes ranged from R10 per month, when one person bought their vegetables in 
the entire month, to R500 per crop in the dry season, when more buyers approached them. 
Effectively, the farmers ensured that their households had consistent supply of fresh 
vegetables, which they occasionally supplemented with fish caught from the river bank 
alongside their garden or meat bought with financial income.  
The higher demand for their vegetables coincided with the dry season because then, wild 
indigenous vegetables such as okra, spinach-like amaranth and other leafy vegetables were 
scarce. Consequently, during the wet season, the two male farmers focused their energies 
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mainly on their rain-fed crop fields, where they individually grew maize, cow peas, groundnuts, 
okra, pumpkins, indigenous squash, sweet reed and sweet potatoes. Whereas labour in the two 
men’s portions of the riverside garden was virtually male-exclusive, labour in these farmers’ 
rain-fed crop fields was shared by all members of their households. 
Despite the two men’s clearly defined, uncontested and exclusive claims to the property rights 
they created through investments in irrigation infrastructure for their riverside garden, they 
had generously agreed to allow two indigent elderly female neighbours to grow food on a 
portion of their small plot. The women paid no rent as the arrangement was not monetary but 
based on values of social reciprocity and communal responsibility. All four farmers took turns to 
scare off birds from eating vegetables in the garden. They shared the fenced garden space but 
produced crops independently.  
The two men’s decision to allow poor and vulnerable neighbours to use a portion of their 
garden was informed both by their empathy for the neighbours as well as their own realization 
that, due to physical frailty, they were not able to fully utilize their entire garden space or walk 
to the garden everyday to consistently chase birds off the crops. Before Hlongwane and 
Maluleke accepted their female tenants, they were only able to water a third of their portions 
of land each day. Even then, they found it difficult to sufficiently irrigate their crops and ended 
up under-watering with five buckets per row per day instead of ten. This led to water stress in 
the crops and losses of yields. Hence their decision to allow the two women to join them in 
producing crops in the garden.   
6.9.6.4 Water Use: Quantity 
The men and their women ‘tenants’ irrigated 30 rows of vegetables that were approximately 30 
metres long and 60 centimetres apart. Collectively, it took roughly ten 25-litre buckets for 
farmers to water an entire row during the dry season. The estimated total quantity of water 
used on the two men’s garden was approximately 7500 litres (or 7.5m³) per day in the dry 
season. This translated to an average dry season abstraction volume of 1875 litres (1.875m³) 
per farmer per day. Less water was used during the wet season, with watering done only during 
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prolonged dry spells. Water use by these subsistence food producers well within the Schedule 
One water limits. 
6.10 OVERVIEW OF EFFECTS OF CONTRACT FARMING ON LIVELIHOODS IN 
MAKULEKE COMMUNITY  
This section presents findings on the ways in which agricultural commercialization and contract 
farming arrangements affected livelihoods in Makuleke community during implementation of 
the RESIS Programme from 2003/2004 to 2008/2009. Although attention is given to both the 
cotton joint venture of earlier RESIS Phase (Water Care Programme) and the strategic 
partnership of the RESIS-Recharge Phase, emphasis is on the latter. The rationale is that RESIS-
Recharge signified a more dramatic shift away from crop production practices that Makuleke 
farmers were familiar with to a completely different approach, whose neo-liberal orientation 
seemed to ride rough-shod over local livelihood contexts and interests. 
6.10.1 EMPLOYMENT  
Inceptions of the NSK joint venture and AWC strategic partnership were greeted with high 
expectations of job opportunities by unemployed people of Makuleke community. Data on 
employment creation for the twelve months from 2000 and 2003 showed that approximately 
400 temporary, seasonal, long term and permanent jobs were created within and outside the 
irrigation scheme (Table 41)127. In view of the high (84 per cent) rate of unemployment and 
under-employment for the working age population in Makuleke community (Tapela, 2002), the 
employment of 11 per cent of the jobless labour force represented a remarkable achievement. 
Employment data (Table 41) also highlighted the importance of the irrigation scheme as a 
source of local employment, since it provided the highest proportion (32 per cent) of jobs in 
2003. Such jobs were generated by the NSK joint venture, which provided farmers with crop 
production allowances for the employment of three workers in each of the 43 plots within the 
joint venture. Due to poverty and unemployment, many farmers retained their allowances and 
instead sourced labour resources from within their households. Others retained up to two-
thirds (R600) of their allowances and employed between one and three workers from among 
                                                     
127 Interview with CPA Implementation Officer, Mr Dennis Skhalele, held at Makuleke on 08 December 2003. 
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indigent members of the community or informal immigrants and refugees from Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique. Although initiation of the NSK joint venture in 2002 increased access by the 
unemployed and under-employed to seasonal job opportunities in the irrigation scheme, access 
to such jobs was inequitable. Respondents from the broader community stated that such jobs 
were often informally reserved for people with close personal links to commercial plot holders. 
The net effect of NSK joint venture related employment on joblessness within the community 
was therefore not easy to determine. Part of the difficulty lay with the transient nature of some 
of the jobs and the presence of external factors, such as social grants.  
Child support grants, in particular, appeared to have released most of the indigent Makuleke 
women from low paid farm labour in the irrigation scheme and from the need to seasonally 
abandon their households for work in distant tomato farms (see Section 6.3.1.3). Receipts of 
child support grants reduced women’s vulnerability and changed their employment status and 
patterns. The gap left by these Makuleke women in the irrigation scheme was filled by either 
unemployed Makuleke men and women or informal refugees and immigrants from Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique. The latter had settled temporarily or permanently in Makuleke community. 
Although social grants increased the time available for women’s reproductive and productive 
roles, it was not clear whether or not such women could be considered to be ‘unemployed’.   
Despite achievements in job creation by the NSK joint venture and the strategic partnership 
with AWC, the majority of the working age population could not be absorbed by local 
employment opportunities. Most males and fewer women of working age tended to migrate to 
other areas in search of employment opportunities. This tendency characterized the 
community during colonial and apartheid eras, when Makuleke community, like many similar 
communities in South Africa, constituted a labour reserve for urban, mining and industrial 
centres elsewhere (Tapela, 1999). Employment-related migrations observed by this study had 
distinct gender and time characteristics (see Section 6.3.1.3). 
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TABLE 41 EXAMPLES OF JOB CREATION BY MAKULEKE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, 2000 TO 2003 
Employer Nature of employment Type of worker Number of jobs  
Department of 
Public Works 
Construction of buildings in the lodge operated by 
Wilderness Safaris in Makuleke Region of KNP 
(Pafuri); 
Short term  
Builders, bricklayers, general hands – skilled , semi-
skilled and unskilled 
78 
Department of 
Public Works 
Finishing touches to newly-constructed lodge 
operated by Wilderness Safaris; 
Short term  
Electricians (2), plumbers (3), thatchers (5), others (7) 
– skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
17 
Wilderness Safaris 
(sub-contracted 
security firm) 
Anti-poaching activities; 
Full-time, permanent  
Filed rangers 15 
Wilderness Safaris  Hospitality; 
Full-time, permanent 
 
 
 
 
 
Cleaners, waitrons, kitchen staff, general hands, junior 
managers etc 
Skilled and semi-skilled 
(some of these are beneficiaries of the CPA skills 
development programme, which sponsors training of 
two young people per year)  
61 
Outpost Lodge Hospitality; 
Full-time, permanent 
Cleaners, waitrons, kitchen staff, general hands, junior 
managers etc 
Skilled and semi-skilled 
(some of these are beneficiaries of the CPA skills 
development programme, which sponsors training of 
two young people per year)  
18 
Makuleke CPA Joint Management Board Administrator 1 
Makuleke CPA Office administration Implementation Officer, Administrative assistant, 2 
Makuleke CPA Natural Resources Management (data collection) Field rangers 0 
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(2 trained but not 
employed) 
Cotton joint venture 
(NSK & emerging 
commercial farmers) 
Cotton and maize production and harvesting in 
Makuleke Irrigation Scheme; 
Short-term, seasonal 
Unemployed and unskilled farm labourers 
(Among these are informal immigrants and refugees 
from Zimbabwe and Mozambique, who have settled 
temporarily or permanently in Makuleke) 
129 
(theoretically)
128
 
DWAF Working for 
Water Programme 
(WfW) contractors 
Clearance of invasive non-endemic plant species in 
Makuleke Region of KNP (Pafuri Area); 
Temporary (2 years maximum per worker) 
Trained labourers and a skilled supervisor 
 
19 
(2 teams) 
DWAF Working for 
Water Programme 
(WfW) contractors 
Clearance of invasive non-endemic plant species in 
Makuleke community; 
Temporary (2 years maximum per worker) 
Trained labourers  
 
9 
(1 team) 
DWAF Working for 
Wetlands 
Programme 
(WfWetlands) 
contractors 
Clearance of invasive non-endemic plant species in 
Makuleke Region of KNP (Pafuri Area); 
Temporary (2 years maximum per worker) 
Trained labourers and a skilled supervisor 
 
28 
(3 teams) 
London-South Africa 
(LOSA) partnership 
with Makuleke 
community 
Training with possibility of long term employment in 
a newly-developed local textile and handicrafts 
manufacturing and export industry; 
Long term employment beyond the 3-year project 
cycle, subject to availability of funding  
Unemployed women 23 
 (17 women 
remain self-
employed) 
Strategic Partnetship 
with AWC 
Seasonal labour during harvesting of potatoes and 
maize; Consistent employment of +/-5 workers. 
Manual labourers; Operational management support; 
security. 
Data unavailable 
Total number of people employed  400 
                                                     
128 Joint venture provided an allowance of R900 for 3 workers in each of the 43 plots, and theoretically 129 jobs were created at each production and harvesting phase for 3 years. In some cases, 
however, employment opportunities were retained within households of commercial plot holders. 
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6.10.2 INCOME 
From 2003 to 2009, agricultural commercialization through the NSK joint venture and AWC 
strategic partnership broadened access by commercial plot holders to incomes. There was a 
significant difference, however, in the levels of income generated by the two contract farming 
arrangements. Due to crop production failure in 2003 and declines in world cotton prices in 
2004 and 2005, the NSK joint venture failed to generate expected incomes. Instead, farmers 
suffered major losses. Effectively, therefore, the main source of ‘income’ generated by the joint 
venture became the allowances of R300 per 5 ha plot that was intended to cover costs of hiring 
three workers. For many of the farmers’ households, this income therefore ranged from R600 
to R900 per month.    
By contrast, from 2007 to 2009, incomes from the AWC strategic partnership were much 
higher. On average, the majority (74.4 per cent) of commercial plot holders, whose plots were 
approximately 5 ha in size, earned approximately R45 000 from potatoes and R36 000 from 
maize per season. Effectively, they earned an annual income of R81 000, which translated to 
mean monthly incomes of approximately R6 750. A few of the farmers, particularly those with 
dual access to plots, earned at least double these gains. The significance of such increases was 
best compared to earnings by farmers prior to and during the NSK joint venture. 
Prior to the NSK joint venture, commercial plot holders’ earnings from all sources did not 
significantly differ much from similar incomes of other Makuleke heads of households. In 1997 
income from all sources for Makuleke heads of households was R1 665.50 (Tapela, 1999) while 
in 2005 income from all sources for households of commercial plot holders as a group was R1 
555. The reduction of average income in 2005 data was due to the exclusion from the study’s 
sample frame of employed part-time farmers, who had hitherto dominated land allocation in 
the irrigation scheme but had subsequently been excluded when plot re-allocation occurred 
during the Preliminary Phase of RESIS in 1999.  
In 2005, farmers adopted livelihood strategies to capture income from land ceded to the NSK 
joint venture and allowances for cotton production labour. They sourced most or all of their 
labour requirements from within own households and effectively retained crop production 
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allowances. This resulted in household monthly income gains of between R600 and R900 per 5 
ha plot. By comparison, in 2008, dividends from ceding the same sizes of plots to the AWC 
strategic partnership were approximately R6 750. Given that the majority (74.4 per cent) of 
farmers’ plots were approximately 5 ha in size, income from the AWC strategic partnership 
effectively represented seven-fold (750 per cent) to ten-fold (1 125 per cent) increase in income 
for most of the farmers.   
6.10.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION 
Figure 43 presents a summary of findings from a survey of purposively-selected small-scale 
irrigation farmers within a range of categories (see Section 6.9 for detailed findings). The survey 
indicated that contributions by incomes generated by the AWC strategic partnership had cast 
commercial plot holders into significantly higher income brackets than displaced food plot 
holders. The same incomes had also cast commercial plot holders into significantly higher levels 
than non-displaced, subsistence-orientated small-scale irrigators.  
However, excluding income from other sources and crop losses due to environmental shocks 
such as drought, pests and disease, incomes gained by commercial plot holders from ceding 5 
ha of land to the strategic partnership were lower than income from a non-state funded 
commercial irrigation farming enterprise privately owned by Mr T. G. Phosa. This Category 3 
type of Makuleke farmer occupied a 5 ha portion of land in an area allocated to rain-fed 
cropping, which was the roughly the same size as that of most of the commercial plots in the 
irrigation scheme. Excluding income from other sources and environmental shocks, Mr Phosa’s 
income from irrigated farming was almost equivalent to dividends from a 6 ha plot within the 
AWC strategic partnership. This was close to incomes of equity labourers like Tobias 
Hlongwane, who received dividends from a 6.5 ha plot.  
The foregoing comparison excludes one example of an equity labourer within the irrigation 
scheme, whose income emerged to be significantly higher than incomes of Mr Phosa and all 
other equity labourers in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme (Figure 43). Equity labourer Renias 
Chauke is excluded from the comparison because his income from strategic partnership 
dividends was anomalous (Section 6.9.1). This farmer was one of a minority (7.7 per cent) of 
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farmers whose dual access to and ceding of commercial plots resulted in more or less double 
the gains of most other commercial plot holders. Renias Chauke’s ceded plots, in particular, 
comprised 11.8 ha, which was more than twice the average size (5 ha) of most plots yielded to 
the strategic partnership.  
With specific regard to equity labourers, a quantitative examination of total household incomes 
from all sources showed that contributions from the strategic partnership were significantly 
higher for male than female farmers such as Farmer G, for example. Strategic partnership 
dividends constituted more than three-quarters (75 per cent) of the total structure of 
household incomes for male farmers namely, Renias Chauke (78.3 per cent), Tobias Hlongwane 
(88.5 per cent) and Farmer F (79.4 per cent). By contrast, similar dividends contributed a 
significantly lower proportion of less than two-thirds (62.9 per cent) to the total household 
income of female Farmer G, while the remaining 37.1 per cent derived from other sources. 
Since Farmer G was the only woman in the detailed sample, there was a need to ascertain 
whether or not the observed gender difference could be extrapolated to the rest of the female 
equity labourers within the AWC strategic partnership. A qualitative examination of the 
structure of Farmer G’s total household income revealed an exceptionally high reliance on 
social grants. Farmer G’s household of seven (7) people received four old age pensions and one 
child support grant. Due to the strong anomalous influence of social grants in Farmer G’s case, 
gender analysis discounts the results of this comparison. Instead, a rapid survey was conducted 
to cross check Farmer G’s data with that of other female equity labourers. Data from other 
female equity labourers confirmed that the level of female Farmer F’s reliance on social grants 
was anomalous. Households of five out of six (83.3 per cent) of the remainder of female equity 
labourers each received one old age pension and one child support grant, while one received a 
child support grant. Effectively, all the other female equity labourers had lower levels of 
reliance on social grants that Farmer G.It is possible therefore that without female Farmer G’s 
exceptionally high access to social grants and without male Farmer F’s access to irrigated land 
outside the irrigation scheme and a child support grant, income from their equal sizes (5 ha) of 
ceded plots as well as other local sources might have been exactly the same.  
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Small-scale Irrigation Farmer Category 
1 - Emerging Commercial Farmer: AWC Equity Labourer (inside scheme) 
2 - Emerging Commercial Farmer: Equity Labourer and Independent Enterprise (inside and outside scheme) 
3 - Emerging Commercial Farmer: Own Private Enterprise (entirely outside scheme) 
4 - Food Plot Holder: Displaced from scheme  
5 - Rain-fed cropping/Micro-scale Gardening: Not displaced  
6 - Landless/Micro-scale Home Gardening: Not displaced 
 
 
It was beyond the scope of this study to examine livelihoods of Makuleke people who were not 
directly involved in irrigation issues, particularly with respect to the irrigation scheme. For that 
reason, the study reserved comments from casual observations of people outside of the sample 
of six categories of small-scale irrigation farmers outlined in Figure 43 above.  
Key findings were that while commercial plot holders had effectively become part of a small 
class of relatively affluent people within a largely impoverished community, food plot holders 
had become excluded from access to land within the irrigation scheme. In qualitative terms, the 
net result of agricultural commercialization had been an increase in the proportion of relatively 
more affluent households and a widening of the gap between the poorest and the most 
affluent households. The development had magnified differences in class interests and 
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FIGURE 43 MAKULEKE: EXAMPLES OF MEAN MONTHLY INCOME FOR CATEGORIES OF 
SMALL-SCALE IRRIGATION FARMERS, 2008  
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exacerbated power dynamics, resulting in a greater visibility of socio-economic and political 
cleavages. Such developments had particular bearing on relationships among commercial plot 
holders and between commercial and food plot holders in the irrigation scheme. At a broader 
community-level, these farmers’ gains in individual skills enhancement from various 
entrepreneurial and socio-economic development initiatives had yet to translate into tangible 
financial gains for the majority of Makuleke households. 
6.10.4 LAND TENURE INSECURITY 
Insecurity of land tenure was identified in 1995129 and 1998130 as a major concern for farmers 
within the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. The problem of land tenure insecurity dated back to the 
establishment of the irrigation scheme in 1991. While a few subsistence farmers were displaced 
from their rain-fed crop fields when Makuleke Dam was constructed and later upgraded, many 
others lost their land to make way for irrigation scheme development. The study identified 6 
women farmers who lost land rights when their rainfed crop fields were included in the 
irrigation scheme area (Figure 44).  
An examination of how the women gained access to the lost land showed that when the 
Makuleke were resettled in 1969, the chief allowed residents of Mabiligwe village to acquire 
arable land to the west of the village (Figure 40; Appendix 1). The chief did not object to the 
location of the women’s fields, but warned them about possible removal a few months before 
the irrigation scheme was established in 1991. By then, all arable land close to Mabiligwe village 
had been taken, and the women had no alternative but to either request to be allocated plots 
on the scheme or be landless. These women, who were all very poor and lacked formal 
education, were not compensated for their losses and did not receive compensatory allocation 
of plots of land in the scheme. Since these women lacked influence, their voices were not heard 
by traditional and elected leadership131. Their land rights became extinct as a result.  
                                                     
129
 LRG Report prepared in anticipation of the Makuleke land claim against the erstwhile National Parks Board,  
currently known as the South African National Parks (SANParks) Board. 
130
 See Section 2.2.4 and Table 3 of this report. 
131
 Views expressed by Makuleke women in two focus group discussions (See Table 1 on page 15 of this report) 
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FIGURE 44 MAKULEKE: SOME OF THE WOMEN SUBSISTENCE FARMERS WHO LOST 
WITHOUT COMPENSATION ACCESS TO RAIN-FED CROP FIELDS DURING 
IRRIGATION SCHEME DEVELOPMENT IN THE LATE 1980S  
 
By contrast, many other affected households were allocated compensatory food plots by the 
chief in 1989, in anticipation of irrigation scheme development. These households had 
efffectively retained a portion of their land rights plus access to benefits of irrigation 
development. Such households were among the 273 food plot holders in Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme. Although such smallholders had no title deeds, they perceived that the customary land 
allocation process provided them with a degree of tenure security. However, such security 
subsequently proved to be precarious against onslaught by RESIS Programme interventions in 
the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme.   
Tenure insecurity was partially rooted in the fact that land in the smallholder irrigation scheme 
was considered to be state land as well as a resource for the whole Makuleke community. 
Smallholders could lease or obtain permission to occupy (PTO) plots of land from Chief 
Makuleke but had no title deeds to it. Tenure insecurity associated with lack of title deeds 
mainly affected those with access to the larger commercial plots rather than food plot holders. 
For all smallholders, the process of allocating irrigation scheme plots deviated from customary 
practice in that both the chief and the agricultural extension officer played roles in land 
allocation, whereas all other customary land allocations, depending on envisaged use, were 
either conducted by the chief in consultation with his Tribal Council or delegated to headmen of 
the three villages.  
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The involvement of both the chief and agricultural extension officer in plot allocations clearly 
indicated that jurisdiction over land in the irrigation scheme was jointly shared by government 
and local traditional leadership. Contrary to observations in Phetwane, PTOs in Makuleke prior 
to RESIS were not issued in perpertuity, and formal leasing applied to commercial plots. Such 
arrangements enabled the re-allocation of plots in 2002, when part-time and non-productive 
commercial plot holders lost access to land in the scheme to make way for revitalization under 
the Water Care Programme.  
Despite good intentions to redistribute plots in favour of unemployed full-time aspirant 
commercial farmers and indigent food producers at the beginning of the RESIS Watercare 
Project in 2002, three eligible commercial farmers were excluded due to local political power 
dynamics. This reinforced perceptions of tenure insecurity among many emerging commercial 
farmers. The re-allocation of the three particular 5 ha plots resulted in a contested dual access 
by two of the favoured beneficiaries namely, the chairperson and treasurer of the farmers’ 
management committee. By contrast, there was unanimous support for the decision to allocate 
two plots to the third recipient, Mr Renias Chauke (see Section 6.9.1), who was widely 
acknowledged to have demonstrated a good track record of being a keen commercial farmer 
outside of government assisted programmes and strategic partnerships132. It was not clear what 
attributes counted in favour of dual allocation to the chairman and treasurer of the 
management committee, but these beneficiaries were widely perceived to be active supporters 
of Chief Makuleke at a time when the community was fractured by internal power dynamics. 
The treasurer in question was later murdered in the evening of 17 October 2008 in what 
remained an unresolved mystery and police case133. 
In 2005, tenure insecurity re-emerged as a major concern. In a workshop that focused on petty 
commodity producers, these farmers stated that, following discontinuation by the RESIS project 
of rental payments to the provincial Department of Agriculture, Chief Makuleke had introduced 
                                                     
132 See individual case study of Renias Chauke in Section 6.9.1. 
133
 In the morning of the same day, researcher held a meeting with Makuleke Irrigation Farmers’ Committee, which 
the treasurer attended and strongly expressed some concerns regading implementation of the RESIS Programme 
in Makuleke.  
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a requirement for all commercial plot holders to pay a form of royalty to him. This requirement 
was not accompanied by any formal arrangement for tenure security for plot holders, such as 
lease agreements. Farmers reported that tenure insecurity discouraged them from making 
private and collective investments within the scheme, and was therefore a major constraint in 
their efforts to become commercial farmers.134 Dissent over tenure insecurity was exacerbated 
by speculation that the royal family was positioning itself to take over some of the plots.  
Subsequent verification with a key resource person showed that petty commodity producers 
actually paid no rental fees to the chief for use of land within the scheme, but had 
misunderstood a requirement for them to pay application fees for PTO certificates. Such fees 
were payable to LDA, through the Tribal Authority. Perceptions of insecurity had arisen from 
conflation of land tenure issues within the irrigation scheme and political conflicts between 
Chiefs Makuleke and Mhinga, which dated back to the Makuleke land claim in the 1990s, in 
particular. Such conflicts were rooted in the resettlement in 1969 of Makuleke people in the 
Nthlaveni area along the western boundary of the Kruger National Park. Mhinga claimed that 
this area was part of his territory prior to the establishment of the Park in 1926 and was later 
excised from the park to accommodate the Makuleke following their removal from the Pafuri 
Area in 1969. According to historical records of Gazankulu homeland, Makuleke’s chieftainship 
was formally acknowledged as a headmanship. Such designation, which was later proved to be 
illegitimate in court, was of lower status and effectively put Chief Makuleke in the same rank as 
the headmen of his three villages. One of these, the headman of Makahlule village135, did not 
therefore recognize Makuleke’s chieftainship and continued to contest the chieftainship even 
after the matter had been legally resolved. The headman instead gave his allegiance to Mhinga, 
who claimed seniority over Makuleke leadership and therefore purported to be the traditional 
leader of the Makuleke. Promulgation of CLRA in 2004 appeared to have re-awakened the 
conflict, with Mhinga re-invoking his challenge of Makuleke’s chieftainship. 
                                                     
134
 Feedback workshop convened by the researcher in Thohoyandou on 09 May 2007. 
135
 Makahlule village was included  among villages under Chief Makuleke in the later stages of the land claim 
process due to disputes over chieftainship issues (Tapela & Omara-Ojungu, 1999:149).  
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The dissenting headman had garnered support from some among emerging commercial 
farmers, who felt disgruntled about various issues relating to the irrigation scheme. The three 
excluded emerging commercial farmers were among these. The effects of dissent were that 
Makuleke leadership became more visibly fractured into two factions and power politics at the 
leadership level created a dynamic pattern of cleavage and cohesion among farmers. This 
pattern seemed to depend on the manner in which Chief Makuleke and the Royal Family 
handled irrigation-related issues at given points in time.  
The ranks of disgruntled petty commodity producers were swelled by the exclusion since 2007 
of 273 subsistence food producers from the irrigation scheme. This followed the inception of 
the RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership with AWC, who produced maize and potatoes for 
national markets136. The process of exclusion of food producers, whose land tenure had 
hitherto been relatively secure, was marked by controversy. It entailed subsistence food 
producers discovering one day that one section of a pipe supplying water to the food plots had 
been removed overnight, thus interrupting their access to water. No one claimed responsibility 
and the management committee denied stopping food producers from growing crops on the 
scheme. Food producers’ exclusion also emanated directly from infrastructure development by 
the strategic partnership. This involved erection of strong fences for the exclusion of wild 
animals from the Kruger National Park and potential thieves from surrounding villages. The 
fence enclosed both commercial and food plots, and access gates located that were close to 
Makuleke villages were removed. This effectively made it difficult for the mostly elderly and 
frail food producers to gain access to their plots, since they had to walk longer distances to and 
from their plots.  
While the management committee maintained that it never issued instructions to stop food 
plot holders from growing crops in the scheme, excluded subsistence farmers stated that a 
reason given by the management committee for cessation of subsistence production was that 
food producers were unable to pay the electricity tariff for running the pump that supplied 
                                                     
136 Meetings with the private investor (Modimolle, 14 March 2008); LDA officials (Polokwane 12 March 2008); 
representatives of Makuleke Irrigation Management Committee and agricultural extension officer (14 March 
2008); and entire Makuleke Irrigation Management Committee (17 October 2008).  
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water to plots in the irrigation scheme. There were separate electricity accounts for commercial 
and subsistence farmers on the scheme. The account for commercial production was paid by 
joint ventures or strategic partnerships while payment for the subsistence production account 
was the collective responsibility of food plot holders.  
Following an earlier RESIS joint venture between commercial farmers and the tobacco firm, 
NSK, which ran from 2002 to 2005, food producers each contributed R20 over several months 
to cover their arrears for electricity. The total amount collected was purportedly around R21 
000. Subsistence food producers were unhappy about the lack of accounting by the 
management committee for the money contributed by food producers towards defraying their 
water supply costs at the end of the joint venture. Food producers questioned their subsequent 
exclusion from the irrigation scheme on the basis of an assumption that they were incapable of 
paying the costs of water supply.  
According to the agricultural extension officer, members of the farmers’ management 
committee and joint venture documents, water tariffs for food producers were subsidized by 
the RESIS joint venture with NSK, but the subsequent RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership with 
AWC did not make similar provision. If such a view was correct, it remained unclear why, 
despite awareness of the Policy on the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation Farmers 
administered by DWA137, the management committee or LDA had made no attempt to apply 
for a subsidy to cover water supply costs for subsistence food producers.  
It appears that tenure insecurity for subsistence food producers was directly linked to their 
marginalization by agricultural commercialization interventions during the RESIS-Recharge era. 
In particular, the source of their insecurity and exclusion was the strategic partnership contract 
between petty commodity producers and AWC. While the LDA-facilitated contract excluded 
water requirements for food plotholders, LDA secured water access for emerging commercial 
                                                     
137 Before the restructuring of ministries in May 2009, following re-election of the ANC-led government in April, 
the ministry was known as the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). Since restructuring, the ministry 
became Department of Water and Environmental Affairs (DWEA), and water related issues remained under 
administration by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) while the other deparment in the ministry, Department 
of Environmental Affaris (DEA) continued to focus on environmental issues. 
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farmers through a negotiated agreement with the strategic partner. In conceding to this 
arrangement, farmers’ management committee lost, in the eyes of subsistence food producers 
and the majority of members of Makuleke community, the legitimacy to represent all farmers 
in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. As a result, the farmers’ organization was split into two sub-
groupings whereby subsistence food producers formed a splinter organization that they felt 
would represent their interests. This basically was the crux of concerns expressed by the 
deceased treasurer of Makuleke irrigation Farmers’ Management Committee at a committee 
meeting held with the researcher on the morning of 17 October 2008.  
The deceased treasurer and others in the management committee were gravely concerned that 
LDA interventions had placed them in a difficult position within the local community. According 
to the late treasurer, members of the committee were concerned that public perception within 
the community was that they, as a management committee that was wholly drawn from the 
group of 43 emerging commercial farmers, had brokered a deal that privileged their own self-
interests at the expense of household food security for the indigent food plot holders, who 
were less influential. This perception was exacerbated by the fact that the only member elected 
to represent food plot holders had since recused herself from the management committee. The 
treasurer further alluded to ‘some unfortunate incidents and misunderstandings’ that had 
happened since the strategic partnership began. He emphatically expressed his intention to 
demand that LDA officials should come down to Makuleke to face the community and provide 
explanations for decisions made by the department regarding RESIS-Recharge interventions. 
The treasurer concluded by insisting that the researcher should take note of what he was 
saying, but vehemently refused to be photographed.   
6.10.5 PROBLEMS OF SHARING WATER 
Before revitalization of the irrigation scheme, problems of sharing scarce water resources were 
relatively minor, since many of the commercial plots were either under-utilized or unused. 
Consequently, food plot holders were able to produce a variety of crops, such as maize, 
pumpkins, groundnuts, cow-peas, beans, okra, sweet potatoes and sweet reed. Most of the 
produce was consumed within farmers’ households and the surplus was sold to generate small 
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amounts of income, ranging from R10 to R500 depending on productivity, supply and demand 
factors.  
With the onset of RESIS and its associated strategic partnerships, there was an upsurge in the 
amounts of water consumed by commercial plots. The impact of this increase on water 
availability within the scheme was not clear since different contract farming arrangements used 
different mechanisms for sharing water. For example, the NSK cotton joint venture subsidized 
water supply costs for food plot holders and required each subsistence farmer to pay nominal 
tariffs of between R10 and R20 per month. By contrast, the AWC strategic partnership for maize 
and potato production provided no such subsidy, and the inception of this partnership was 
accompanied by termination of food plot holders’ access to water. Such development pointed 
to emerging inequalities in the sharing of water, and raised questions about the security of 
water access for non-commercially orientated water users. There were also questions about 
the formation of a WUA or farmers’ organization that brought together users with varying 
interests in water, conditions of access and markedly different levels of consumption.   
Many of the food plot holders began using water for irrigation more than two years before the 
promulgation of the NWA in 1998, which rendered their water use lawful. By contrast, the 
majority (60.5 per cent) of emerging commercial farmers began using water after 1998, which 
meant that in terms of the NWA many such farmers required a licence to be able to lawfully use 
water for commercially productive purposes. Although a possible assumption could be that 
subsistence food producers had rights of access to productive water use, under Schedule One 
on the NWA, it was not clear to what extent differences in perceived and actual entitlements 
affected access by these two groups of farmers. Within the Makuleke WUA, mechanisms for 
accommodating water access requirements of existing lawful users and users requiring a license 
remained unresolved and no evidence was available to show that the WUA was an officially 
registered entity. 
Contrary to the commonly used narrow conceptions of ‘commercial’ and ‘subsistence’ farming 
practices, both groups of Makuleke farmers showed an overlapping interest to derive financial 
benefit from farming. However, food plot holders were primarily oriented towards own 
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consumption whereas emerging commercial producers were principally geared towards 
markets. Although there had been attempts by government officials to broaden definitions of 
commercial and subsistence and thereby remove the false dualism between the two farming 
systems, there remained practical questions about how to regulate access to water in instances 
where both groups of farmers shared not only the same source but also the same WUA 
structure. Difficulties arose from the fact that differences in production orientation and plot 
sizes resulted in differences in water consumption by emerging commercial and subsistence 
farmers. 
 While the use of water by contractual strategic partnerships exceeded Schedule One limits, it 
was not possible to quantify the amounts of water used by individual and collective subsistence 
food plot holders due to the fact that at the time of the study, crop production by all of these 
farmers was at a standstill. It was therefore not possible to determine whether such use would 
be within Schedule One limits or not. Prior to cessation of food production, individual water use 
by many of the subsistence farmers, who cultivated food plots of approximately 0.1 ha, was 
probably below Schedule One limits. Water account statements indicated that collectively, 
however, the large number (273) of farmers within this group resulted in their consuming water 
in quantities that were above Schedule One limits.  
6.11 COPING STRATEGIES 
During the course of empirical research, it emerged that both commercial and displaced food 
plot holders adopted various coping strategies in response to agricultural commercialization 
during the RESIS-Recharge phase. Although such strategies had previously been adopted in 
response to crop production and income failure by the NSK joint venture, the latter strategies 
were a more significant response to the wholesale exclusion of subsistence food producers by 
the strategic partnership with AWC, and associated reduction of active roles for emerging 
commercial farmers. 
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6.11.1 RELIANCE ON SOCIAL NETWORKS 
6.11.1.1 Social Networks among Equity Labourers 
With respect to contentious issues, such as the exit strategy within the strategic partnership 
contract, among others, the study found evidence that farmers’ social networks became an 
important asset for sharing of information, knowledge and experiences. At a meeting held with 
the management committee of Makuleke Farmers Cooperative on 17 October 2008, 
representatives expressed their awareness that counterparts in other smallholder irrigation 
schemes, and Elandskraal in particular, were experiencing similar difficulties with AWC and 
Temong cc contractual arrangements138. Explaining that they were under a lot of pressure from 
the community at large, committee members also voiced their intention to demand LDA 
officials to “come down to Makuleke to sort out the problems on the ground instead of 
requiring farmers to go up to Polokwane” (in the words of the treasurer, who was later gunned 
down in the evening of the same day).   
The foregoing statement concurs with study findings in 2008 that the chairman of Elandskraal 
EBIS Trust139, Mr Reuben Chauke, was involved in a litigation case against LDA140. He also 
formally alleged that he had been threatened by some LDA officials in connection with a 
number of issues, including his role in defending the land rights of elderly women smallholders. 
These farmers’ subsistence plots had been irregularly incorporated into land leased to the 
strategic partnership between Elandskraal Kgotlelelo, which represented 20 of the 38 
smallholders, and Temong cc, which was the AWC-related empowerment company141. This and 
the lack of compensation of these Elandskraal subsistence farmers for the foregone use of their 
land resonated with similar alienation of land rights of the largely elderly, female and indigent 
                                                     
 
 
139 Elandskraal/EBIS Trust represented 18 of the 38 Elandskraal smallholders in Upper Olifants/Lepelle. These 
smallholders had hitherto rejected LDA’s post-pilot proposal for adoption - in the RESIS-Recharge phase - of an 
AgriBEE framework, which would, among other things, see the farmers partnering with a newly-formed business 
entity jointly owned by AWC and a former employee of LDA, and relinquishing much of their autonomy and control 
over the production enterprise (Section 3.8). 
140 This dispute was eventually settled out of court in November 2009. 
141 See Section 3.8. 
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Makuleke food plotholders at the beginning of the RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership with 
AWC142.  
The foregoing account does not purport to definitively link the tragic event that took place on 
17 October in Makuleke to events surrounding the litigation case in Elandskraal, but serves to 
demonstrate the existence of shared concerns among affected smallholders within irrigation 
schemes in different parts of Limpopo Province. Indeed, there were several problematic issues 
that the deceased Makuleke farmer was embroiled in prior to and during that time, some of 
which had nothing to do with Elandskraal. One issue was the contested exclusion in 2000 of 
three smallholders who had legitimate expectation to be included in the reallocation of plots 
prior to the Water Care Programme (see Section 6.5.3). The second issue related to the 
contested decision to allocate two of the three plots to the deceased treasurer and the 
chairman of the farmers’ executive committee, which in a community characterized by hunger 
for land and income was widely viewed as unacceptable (Ibid.). Thirdly, there was the issue of 
unresolved anger due to the alleged assault and subsequent arrest of three elderly women food 
plotholders, who were found gleaning potatoes left-over from the harvest (see Box 14 in 
Section 6.7.2.5). Fourthly, there was the deceased’s involvement in a concomitant court case 
involving leadership contestation between Chiefs Makuleke and Mhinga, which on that fateful 
day the Makuleke leadership was reported to have won. Fifthly, the 17th of October 2008 was 
also a day on which the strategic partnership with AWC paid out dividends to the Makuleke 
equity labourers, who were widely perceived to be enjoying privileged access to benefits from a 
communal resource at the expense of the marginalised food plotholders, in particular.  
It is beyond the scope of this study to unravel these events beyond surmising that the Makuleke 
commercial plotholders’ social networks were embedded in a complex set of social, political, 
economic class dynamics involving a diversity of stakeholders with different interests and 
strategies. These dynamics were intricately linked due to the fact that they rode on the intricate 
social networks that traversed the boundaries of village and community.   
                                                     
142 See Sections 6.4.3.1 and 6.4.3.4. 
 
 
 
 
429 
 
Some of the social networks, such as links with Elandskraal’s EBIS Trust farmers, were 
established by project implementation agencies, such as LVA, Golder and Associates and 
Ndzalo, during the Preliminary and Early Phases of the RESIS Programme. The networks were 
intended to promote exchanges of knowledge and experiences, and had endured the shifting 
milieu of the RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province. While Makuleke farmers had not been 
able to use cellphones donated in 2005 by Alcatel and Manobi’s ‘Bridging the Digital Divide’ 
project to market their produce, these cellphones became critical instruments for 
communicating with other smallholders in similar circumstances elsewhere. The social 
networks were therefore an indication of achievement by earlier project implementation in 
strengthening organizational capacity among smallholders affected by RESIS Programme 
interventions in different sites in Limpopo Province. Since the study ended in 2009, which was 
before termination of the strategic partnership contract and associated RESIS-Recharge Phase, 
it was not possible to determine the effectiveness of these social networks in ensuring that 
institutional arrangements were adapted to take farmers’ interests into account.    
6.11.1.2 Social Networks among Displaced Subsistence Food Producers 
Food plot holders responded by increasing their self-organization as a group and agency to 
make demands for their land and socio-economic rights to be restored. They appealed to 
traditional leadership and the CPA to intervene on their behalf. Such appeals were based on 
these farmers’ awareness of social contracts between themselves and the representatives in 
these governance structures, as well as the fact that exclusions of subsistence food producers 
largely contradicted the Makuleke CPA constitution, community vision for socio-economic 
development and customary requirements for social integration, fairness and well-being. 
Customary responsibilities of the Makuleke chieftainship and Tribal Council revolved around 
custodianship of, among other things, livelihood interests of all community members. 
Constitutional responsibilities of the CPA included ensuring equity and fairness in access to 
communal property resources, with specific attention to women, the youth and poorest 
members of the association. Although the CPA had emerged in association with restituted land 
resources in Pafuri, the collective community vision for socio-economic development clearly 
linked the restituted land to communal land in present-day Makuleke. Within such vision, 
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tourism development in the Pafuri area of KNP and crop production in Makuleke Irrigation 
Scheme were both considered to be ‘twin engines’ for community development.  
6.11.2 LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION: OVERVIEW OF INFORMAL IRRIGATION 
FARMING   
6.11.2.1 Introduction  
Beyond social networks, strategies to cope with changes to local crop production systems 
included livelihood diversification by commercial and subsistence plot holders. Principal among 
such strategies was an increase in subsistence and commercially-orientated riverside gardening 
and, to a lesser extent, home gardening.  
Riverside gardening had been a component of diverse baskets of livelihoods for a small number 
of households in Makuleke community since the early 1980s (Figure 39 in Section 6.4). In 
Makuleke village, for example, three male farmers had practiced riverside gardening for several 
years prior to 2004. Land and water use surveys of Makuleke community showed that between 
2004 and 2009, there was an increase in the number of informal food gardening activities 
alongside rivers, within homesteads and, to a lesser extent, in rain-fed croplands (Figure 39 in 
Section 6.4 and Appendix 1). The number of riverside gardens began to gradually increase in 
2005. Since 2007, however, the number of riverside gardens increased dramatically.  
At least sixteen riverside gardens were identified along Mphongolo River and its tributary, 
Mapangu River, at the beginning of 2009. A number people were observed clearing bush to 
make way for new gardens and to extend existing gardens. These gardens belonged to 
individuals and households residing in Makuleke village, which was closest to the rivers.  A 
number of other gardens were also identified in a 3 ha area along the seasonal Dumbuzi River 
close to Makahlule village. Due to the break down of a borehole that provided water during the 
dry season, crop production on this site had become restricted to the wet season, when 
gardeners used a combination of rainwater and river water, the latter during dry spells. Since 
data collection by this study occurred in the dry season, it was not possible to determine the 
gender composition of Makahlule riverside gardeners. 
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It was possible that the burgeoning of gardens was due to factors unrelated to contract farming 
in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. Such factors included nationwide food price increases, which 
were also concomitant with the revitalization of Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. However, the 
increase in food gardening also coincided with two critical milestones associated with the NSK 
joint venture of 2002 to 2005 and the AWC strategic partnership of 2007 to 2009. This required 
a closer examination to determine whether or not a causal relationship existed between 
gardens and factors pertaining to agricultural commercialization. A rapid appraisal of riverside 
gardeners was therefore conducted to determine their generalized profiles and durations of 
their gardening activities. This data was cross-referenced through focus group discussions with 
Makuleke men, women, emerging commercial farmers and food plot holders. Findings from 
such discussions were used as a basis for a rapid appraisal of purposively selected riverside 
gardeners.    
6.11.2.2 Informal Commercial Irrigation in Riverside Gardens 
The more enterprising among commercial plot holders within the irrigation scheme, such as Mr 
Renias Chauke (Section 6.9.1), Tobias Hlongwane (Section 6.9.4) and male Farmer F (6.9.3), 
were frustrated by the lack of provision by the strategic partnership for their active 
involvement of farming. These farmers, who were all male, also perceived that orientation by 
the AWC strategic partnership towards distant markets, such as ‘Simba Chips’ in the Western 
Cape, inadvertently created gaps and niches in the local food markets. Hence they quickly acted 
to capture the identified opportunities. They diversified their livelihoods by embarking on 
independent irrigated crop production along local rivers and, to a lesser extent, within their 
homesteads. Their responses varied in robustness and resonated with responses by irrigators in 
rain-fed cropping areas, such as Mr T. G. Phosa (Section 6.9.2).  However, unlike Mr Phosa, who 
also subsisted on his pension as a former agricultural extension officer, these farmers had 
limited financial capital other than incomes from the AWC strategic partnership. Thus, financial 
gains from the partnership inured them to their unpalatable relegation to equity labourers and 
helped them to find expression of their commercial farming ambitions elsewhere within the 
community. Despite that these farmers earned relatively high gross incomes (approximately 
R80 000 to R190 000 per annum in 2007) from leasing their plots to the strategic partnership 
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with AWC, they still desired to be actively engaged in farming rather than be passive “armchair” 
farmers143.  
Mr Renias Chauke stood out among the commercially-orientated riverside gardeners as a 
particularly remarkable example of this spirit of enterprise. Chauke’s garden was located along 
Mphongolo River downstream of Makuleke Dam and upstream of the irrigation scheme. Renias 
Chauke’s history showed that he established a smaller 1 ha riverside garden in 1983, following 
his retirement from migrant labour in the Orange Free State (OFS) and prior to development of 
Makuleke Irrigation Scheme. Owing to his solid farming reputation within the community, he 
was allocated two commercial plots with a combined area of 11.8 ha in the irrigation scheme. 
Following production failure by the joint venture in the 2004 to 2005 season, the farmer took a 
decision to spread risk by giving greater attention to his garden, where at least he had full 
control of the production enterprise, while ceding his commercial plots to externally-driven 
commercialization initiatives. He increased the size of his garden to 4.1 ha and invested in a 
diesel powered water pump, drip irrigation system, jojo tank, perimeter fencing and a 
rudimentary pole and thatch hut that served as a store room. His income from the strategic 
partnership with AWC provided a significant portion of the requisite capital for these 
investments. Furthermore, Chauke persistently sought new opportunities to diversify his 
farming enterprise, and to improve his capability by learning from others with greater farming 
and marketing skills than himself and through experimentation. He also shared his knowledge 
with other farmers within Makuleke and elsewhere. Through such sharing, a visiting chief from 
Mozambique gave him a 10 ha plot in a village within the neighbouring country, in the hope 
that his people would also learn from Chauke. Thus, the farmer was able to increase his 
productive capacity towards meeting the local food demand, contribute to local food security 
and the resilience of other farmers, as well as pursue future plans to diversify into bee-keeping, 
mango production and the cultivation of a broader range of vegetables and fruit, both in 
Makuleke and in Mozambique. 
                                                     
143
 See cases of Renias Chauke, Farmer F and Tobias Hlongwane in Sections 6.9.1 and 6.9.4 for details. 
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Generally, the appraisal of commercially-orientated riverside gardeners showed that the more 
affluent and successful a farmer was, the greater the size of his garden and hydraulic 
infrastructure investments. The more affluent and enterprising individuals among riverside 
gardeners had invested in water lifting devices, such as portable petrol and diesel powered 
water pumps, water storage tanks (2500 to 5000 litre jo-jo tanks) and drip irrigation systems. 
However, the high rates of theft of infrastructure, particularly transformers, prevented the 
better-resourced farmers from investing in boreholes. 
6.11.2.3 Informal Subsistence Irrigation in Riverside Gardens 
Findings also showed that riverside gardens were an important source of food and nutrition for 
the poorest of Makuleke households. The gardens provided these households with a critical 
safety net against rising food prices. From 2008 to 2009, the informal subsistence riverside 
gardeners included food plot holders, who had been excluded from the irrigation scheme since 
the start of the RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership in 2007, and other gardeners, who had not 
been allocated plots in the irrigation scheme due to shortage of land but were interested in 
farming. The latter decried the fact that some among commercial plot holders had dual access 
to land in the irrigation scheme144.  
A fair proportion of riverside gardeners were pensioners, who reported that their household 
food security had been severely compromised by food price increases and lack of access to 
their small (0.1 ha) food plots within the irrigation scheme. Others were younger, unemployed 
and landless members of the community, who also cited deepening insecurity due to food price 
increases. While the main gardening objective for the younger unemployed youth was 
purportedly to enhance household food security, these youth also quietly nurtured a sense of 
hope that gardening activity might pave for them opportunities in commercially-orientated 
farming.  
Lack of resources confined the poorest of riverside gardeners to investing in buckets and the 
construction of the most rudimentary of infrastructure, such as furrows to channel water to 
                                                     
144
 One of these three farmers was murdered on 17 October 2008 (See Section. 
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crops and earth platforms from which to safely draw water using buckets and pumps from 
riverine pools. Some of these platforms also doubled up as vantage points for subsistence 
fishing. The better resourced among subsistence gardeners made fewer investments in 
irrigation infrastructure than their commercially-orientated counterparts.  
6.11.2.4 Homestead Gardens 
Following the exclusion of food plot holders from the irrigation scheme in 2007, there was an 
increase in the prevalence of homestead food gardens in Mabiligwe village. The village had an 
exceptionally high assurance of domestic water supply, whereby all of the communal water 
taps provided sufficient water throughout the day every day (see Table 33 in Section 6.3.7; and 
Appendix 1). By contrast, a little more than half (56 per cent) of communal water taps 
functioned in Makahlule and a smaller proportion (13.9 per cent) in Makuleke village, and these 
provided water supply on a rotational basis for a few hours each day. Due to water shortage, 
there were fewer homestead gardens in the two latter villages and those that existed were 
established by the few households with private boreholes. What was notable, though, was that 
in all three villages, there were rules against indiscriminate use of communal water supply 
infrastructure for homestead garden irrigation. Rules restricting users to bucket irrigation 
rather than hopepipes were deliberately disobeyed in Mabiligwe village (Box 15).  
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What emerged was also that Mabiligwe home gardeners were not necessarily food plot 
holders, who were excluded from the irrigation scheme, but included virtually any interested 
individuals or households. Apart from narratives about food price increases and abundance of 
piped water, there was evidence that the proliferation of home gardens in Mabiligwe village 
was linked to political dynamics within the broader Makuleke community as well as 
developments within the irrigation scheme. For example, many among female home gardeners 
expressed their frustration at the exclusion of food plot holders from access to the irrigation 
scheme. They sympathized with the excluded food plot holders. This seemed to be related to 
women’s self-mobilization as a distinct interest group within the broader Makuleke community 
Box 15 Voices on non-compliance with community rules against hose pipe connections to communal 
stand pipes 
 
“The water point committee has rules, but some people flout them and waste water. The Mvula Trust 
project objective [in providing water services infrastructure] was to reduce poverty, not provide luxury. 
The intention was therefore for people to get water from stand pipes, not individual taps….No homestead 
should be more than 200m from a stand pipe. The problem became water wastage. People were watering 
banana trees and so on with hose pipes. Water is not paid for therefore there is wastage.” - Chairman of 
Mabiligwe Village Water Committee in a key respondent interview. 
“We do it for food, not for commercial!” - Several participants of a focus group discussion in Mabiligwe, 
which involved 86 women participants, 8 of whom were food plotholders. 
“I have cattle at home. I am not alone. There are many others [who own livestock]. We have made tanks 
[within homesteads] for watering our livestock. It is not easy to fill these up with buckets!” - Mrs 
Mandeya, in the Mabiligwe women’s focus group discussion. 
“I am within my rights to use water to grow food crops in my ‘yard’. Since there is no source of water 
within this yard I will connect a hose pipe to the communal stand pipe rather than be reduced to watering 
with a bucket.” – A male head of household responding to interview questions.  
“Yes, hosepipes are not allowed, but many connect them nonetheless. We [water point committee 
members] cannot do anything about that. Those breaking the rules say ‘We bought the hose pipes with 
our own money, so we will use them!’” – Member of a water point committee at a women’s focus group 
discussion in Mabiligwe. 
“The [acting] headman is not happy about the breaking of rules, but has not succeeded in stopping it…Part 
of the problem is that people were called by the headman and informed about the rule regarding 
hosepipes. There was no consultation…” – One participant in a women’s focus group discussion.   
“Water point committees are there, but people do not listen to them. The ‘induna’ [acting headman] also 
does not listen and is probably part of the problem.” – Chairman of the over-arching Village Water 
Committee for Mabiligwe. 
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(Box 16). In a focus group discussion involving 86 women participants from Mabiligwe, the 
women insisted that they would continue disobeying water use restrictions that they 
considered to be unnecessarily oppressive. Effectively, therefore, home gardening in this case 
was not only a coping strategy related to agricultural commercialization and contract farming 
arrangements but was also conflated with a multiplicity other issues, including gender relations. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.12 DISCUSSION OF KEY ISSUES 
6.12.1 REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATION: LEGITIMACY ISSUE 
With progression from RESIS to RESIS-Recharge, it became evident that Preliminary Phase 
organizational development had not achieved the required degree of proficiency in governance 
skills among emerging commercial farmers. The hardest test for this related to responsibilities 
delegated by the strategic partnership contract to the farmers’ management committee. Such 
responsibilities included engaging directly with the community regarding issues of labour, 
communication, theft and the distribution of benefits to the community, such as casual 
employment and surplus produce. Capture by some members of the management committee 
of benefits, specifically surplus produce intended for distribution to the broader community 
(Box 14 in Section 6.7.2), indicated the need to strengthen governance skills of emerging 
commercial farmers. Such skills mainly related to the capacity of emerging commercial plot 
holders to root out irregular practices from among representatives within the management 
Box 16 Women’s Voices on Gender Issues in Makuleke Community 
“Women sometimes have potential, but when men are leaders, they act as if they are the sole owners and 
exclude or marginalize women. They keep telling us that we women are uneducated and do not know 
anything. Indeed many women in the community are uneducated…The educated women are working in the 
cities! Yet with basic knowledge or translation, we can be leaders…” 
“Uneducated women work more easily and succeed whenever they get access to opportunities. They do so 
with their own initiative, without the assistance of men. Yet when opportunities arise, educated women are 
called up.” 
Questioned about the Gender Equity principle in the vision for Makuleke community development that was 
drafted in 1998 as part of the Makuleke Conservation and Tourism Programme (MCTP), one woman’s 
response was: “Gender equity has only been in name…. All women in Makuleke suffer from this [i.e. 
discrimination].”  
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committee. Requisite skills also included capacities to hold representatives accountable for 
their decisions and actions.  
Failure by commercial plot holders in the management committee to represent the interests of 
all smallholders in the irrigation scheme, particularly food plot holders, indicated two 
possibilities. Firstly, that within the institutional arrangement for the strategic partnership, 
farmers were the least powerful of the three contracting parties and therefore unable to 
influence decisions that led to the exclusion of food plot holders.  Secondly, that these 
representatives were too preoccupied with their own self-interest as a group to the exclusion of 
interests of subsistence food producers. The two possibilities were not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  
Differences in degrees of power within the strategic partnership, however, did not account for 
failure by the farmers’ management committee to effectively communicate and consult with 
food plot holders and community leadership about challenges experienced and possible ways 
of resolving difficulty. The committee missed an opportunity to mobilize support from a critical 
mass among food plot holders and the broader community. Despite significant degrees of 
freedom to take such action, as provisioned by the contract, the management committee did 
not use this prerogative. Such failures highlighted weaknesses in commercial plot holders’ 
organizational skills and raised the question whether or not the institutional arrangements 
could secure the interests of the poor.  
The above failures led to perceptions among food plot holders and the Makuleke community at 
large that those commercial plot holders who were in the management committee served their 
own selfish interests. From the perspective that community legitimacy derives from the extent 
to which community organizations sustain the functions of articulating and community goals 
(Stewart, 1998) questions regarding legitimacy of the farmers’ management committee were 
perhaps justified. However, what seemed more fundamental was the fact that emerging 
commercial farmers and their management committee were in dire need of organizational 
strengthening, particularly in skills relating to governance, negotiation and stakeholder 
participation. 
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Failure to safeguard and secure the interests of food plot holders by the more powerful actors 
within the institutional arrangement combined with the failure of the more powerful actors 
within Makuleke community leadership to defend and secure interests of the same farmers. 
Voices of food plot holders, who were among the poorest, least influential and vulnerable 
people in the community, were not heard. This brought into question an assumption by the 
developmental logic of decentralization that local representation is most effective since it is 
closest and most aware of issues the grassroots level. The elected Ward Councillor and the 
Chief both did not intervene on behalf of food plotholders, who constituted the majority (85.3 
per cent) of irrigation farmers. Information about the crisis of governance that had developed 
in the irrigation scheme did not timeously filter to other key stakeholders at local, municipal, 
provincial and national levels.  
In a hypothetical scenario, whereby such information did filter, the fact that Vhembe District 
Council was identified as an ISRDP poverty node in September 2003 but never formally gazetted 
effectively meant that there would not have been any dedicated ‘political champion’ to pursue 
the matter further, as was the case with ISRDP nodes such as Greater Sekhukhune. Such an 
ideal scenario, however, would assume that such champion would have been downwardly 
accountable. The problem of institutional failure in this case was largely one of gaps in the 
broader local, provincial and national institutional arrangements for managing power dynamics. 
For example, gaps included weaknesses in institutional coordination, monitoring and 
accountability. Gaps also included lack of an effective stakeholder participation strategy, which 
would have broadened the range of institutions involved in RESIS-Recharge interventions. 
Intermediary institutions, such as NGOs and Civic Society organizations (CSOs), might have 
played monitoring roles to ensure that voices and interests of the less powerful people within 
Makuleke community were taken on board in decision making within the strategic partnership. 
The foregoing gaps presented an opportunity for powerful institutional actors within the 
strategic partnership to take decisions that compromised the democratic rights of the poorest 
and most vulnerable among the rural poor of Makuleke. Institutional failure during the RESIS-
Recharge Phase was therefore less a problem of power dynamics within RESIS, RESIS-Recharge 
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and contract farming institutional arrangements, and even less a problem of poor governance 
skills and limited power of commercial plot holders.  At a more basic level, the governance, 
skills and power issues were about gaps in the South African institutional arrangements for 
cooperative governance and democracy. 
6.12.2 CAPACITY BUILDING  
The targeted beneficiaries of skills development towards IMT and agricultural 
commercialization were commercial plot holders and, to a lesser extent, food plot holders. It 
was reasonable therefore to expect that gains and losses from such interventions would be 
largely felt by these groups of farmers and perhaps their households and workers. However, 
the study identified an instance whereby a joint venture that coincided with the Early RESIS 
Phase and NSK joint venture broadened access to capacity building far beyond confines of the 
irrigation scheme. This was a joint venture by Alcatel-Vodacom-Manobi, which distributed and 
trained farmers in the use of internet-enabled cellular phones to enable access to markets and 
market-related information. Farmers like Mr Phosa (Section 6.9.2), whose private enterprises 
were located outside the irrigation scheme, seemed to have benefited more from access and 
capacity to use such technology than commercial plotholders, who were at the time hemmed in 
by the NSK joint venture contract and afterwards by the AWC strategic partnership. By contrast, 
emerging commercial farmers who diversified from equity labourer roles in the irrigation 
scheme to active pursuit of independent informal irrigation enterprises, like Renias Chauke, 
were similarly able to garner benefits from the cellular phones.  
While the earlier RESIS Phase 1 interventions developed farmers’ organizational and 
administrative skills, the study was not able to identify skills development initiatives that were 
associated with the RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership. What was evident was that skills 
gained by emerging commercial farmers from training in crop production and irrigation 
techniques during the preliminary and early RESIS phase were not required since farmers, as 
equity labourers, had surrendered wholesale their access to land, soil, water and infrastructure.  
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Although the strategic partnership’s failure to use farmers’ crop production and irrigation 
management skills seemed to constitute a waste of many farmers’ human resources, possible 
negative impacts of this were lessened by the fact that a proportion of these farmers 
transferred these skills to their own private market gardening initiatives outside the scheme. To 
a limited extent, organizational skills remained relevant since the partnership contract 
delegated to the management committee responsibilities for dealing with outstanding social 
issues, such as compensation and benefit sharing, as well as the transaction costs of 
communicating and sharing information with the broader community.  
6.12.3 GENDER AND DECISION-MAKING 
Gender and age contributions towards crop production labour varied according to household-
specific factors. In some households, both male and female adult able-bodied members worked 
in the food plots and gardens, irrespective of age. In other households, only the elderly male 
and female pensioners were actively involved in gardening. Within male-owned commercially-
orientated gardens and (prior to revitalization) irrigation scheme plots, women contributed 
their labour while men had the prerogative to make production-related decisions. Some men 
consulted their wives before taking decisions, while others did not.  
Decision making about the use of produce or income generated from produce sales varied. 
While male respondents reported that such decisions were taken either jointly or by their 
female spouses, many women who participated in a community-wide focus group discussion 
strongly voiced their dissatisfaction with the broader gender inequalities within their 
households and within the community. However, among women there were evident 
perceptions that although all women were discriminated against, the more educated among 
them fared better.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SYNTHESIS OF KEY FINDINGS AND ISSUES 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Proponents of agricultural commercialisation have argued that it contributes, through 
multiplier effects, to economic growth (Kirsten et al, 2005; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Eaton & 
Shepherd, 2001) and rural development (Glover & Kusterer, 1990). Furthermore, agricultural 
commercialisation has been said to have a considerable potential to enhance rural 
development, reduce poverty and increase productivity, employment and incomes of small-
scale farmers (Norton 2004). The study sought to determine whether or not agricultural 
commercialization, as articulated mainly through contractual joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships, provided an adequate construct for addressing rural livelihood security within 
selected smallholder irrigation scheme communities in Limpopo Province. In pursuing this aim, 
a key concern was whether or not institutional arrangements reflected interests of the poor 
and vulnerable in such communities. The study made detailed empirical examination of 
interactions between agricultural commercialization interventions and livelihoods in selected 
case study sites. The study also conducted in-depth research and rapid appraisals of 
institutional arrangements, specifically contracts of joint ventures and strategic partnerships 
that emerged during the earlier RESIS phases and latter RESIS-Recharge phase. Specific research 
questions were:  
 Under what institutional and livelihood context has the resurgence of contract farming 
occurred in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province? 
 How have contracts for joint ventures and strategic partnerships been formulated and 
implemented in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province?  
 How have agricultural commercialization initiatives affected livelihoods of petty 
commodity producers, subsistence farmers and other people in smallholder irrigation 
scheme communities? 
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 What are the key policy and institutional issues for government interventions in 
smallholder irrigation schemes? 
On the basis of the results presented in the preceding Chapters Two, Three, Four, Five and Six, 
this chapter (Chapter Seven) discusses key findings and issues that emerged from the study. 
The discussion first gives attention to selected key findings and issues from earlier RESIS phases 
in Hereford, Phetwane and Makuleke. This is followed by a discussion of selected key findings 
and issues from the latter RESIS-Recharge phase in Makuleke, Phetwane, Elandskraal 
(Elandskraal-Balemi/EBIS and Elandskraal-Kgotlelelo), Tswelelopele, Strydkraal A and 
Krokodilheuwel.    
7.2 EARLIER RESIS PHASES: DISCUSSION OF SELECTED KEY FINDINGS FROM 
JOINT VENTURES IN HEREFORD, PHETWANE AND MAKULEKE 
7.2.1 LIVELIHOOD CONTEXTS: OVERVIEW 
In-depth research findings from Hereford, Phetwane and Makuleke suggested that agricultural 
commercialisation in smallholder irrigation schemes of Limpopo Province took place in contexts 
of generally low levels of formal education, employment, income and material asset ownership. 
Consequently, smallholders were often described as ‘resource poor’. The study found that in all 
three schemes, social grants were a critical factor in the survival of many individuals and 
households. Phetwane community had the greatest reliance on state social grants, with 82.6 
per cent of smallholders receiving old age pensions and 64 per cent of all households having no 
other source of monetary income than social grants. Poverty was linked to the fact that the 
majority of the labour force in irrigation scheme communities was unemployed. For example, 
the unemployment rate for Phetwane community was 75.3 per cent. By contrast, in Makuleke 
community the working age population with no paid employment in 2000 was 57.7 per cent 
(Tapela, 2002). Among emerging commercial farmers, the majority in Hereford (66.25 per cent) 
and Makuleke (82.4 per cent) considered themselves to be self-employed. Since inception of 
RESIS-Recharge, many of the latter had become equity labourers, who derived income from 
ceding their allocated plots of land to strategic partnerships, drew monetary incomes from 
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dividends, played little or no active roles in farming and had no alternative income sources 
other than social grants. 
Individuals and households within farmers’ groups and communities relied on a range of 
strategies to cope with problems relating to poverty, unemployment, shocks and vulnerability. 
Social grants and social networks are particularly critical to the survival of many households. 
Coping strategies included reliance on relatives and neighbours for moral and material support. 
Many households depended on loans from other community members, micro-lenders and 
burial societies. Others constantly obtained credit from formal retailers and informal traders. A 
number of households had personal savings accounts and insurance, particularly through 
membership of burial societies and church organizations. Some forms of insurance were less 
tangible. Examples included ownership of items such as catering utensils for use in funerals, 
weddings and similar events. Such events were an important part of social life in communities 
and extended families. Contributions in cash, kind and labour towards such events 
strengthened social relations and, through reciprocation, strengthened relations and ensured a 
broader array of future support for all involved.  
In Phetwane and Makuleke, coping strategies also included symbiotic relationships involving 
shared access to arable land, including irrigated plots. Work and produce were shared through 
informal arrangements based on responsibility for relatives and indigent community members. 
For example, although irrigated plots in Phetwane were formally allocated to 49 farmers, in 
practice at least 56 households were identified by the study as having direct shared access to 
the land prior to RESIS Programme interventions. In Makuleke, although shared access was 
more prevalent in food plots, the study found three examples of shared access in the 
commercial plots. Such sharing, however, involved farmers using both their plots and plots 
registered in the names of relatives rather than shared crop production. Such arrangements 
were widely considered to be irregular and had elicited misgivings from landless people within 
the community. Besides shared access to irrigated land, a number of households in all three 
schemes gained access to irrigation scheme benefits through employment in casual, seasonal 
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and permanent employment in farm work. Such benefits, however, were limited to the 
duration of employment and were therefore often short-lived.    
A peculiar feature of coping strategies in Hereford was 'straddling'. Farmers’ households 
retained use of homestead sites in communal areas of Tafelkop or Motetema, which were 
located some ten to fifteen kilometres away, while occupying small-holdings within Hereford 
Irrigation Scheme. The dual occupation of homesteads was intended to optimize available 
livelihood generation opportunities in Hereford while simultaneously gaining access to social 
services in Tafelkop and Motetema. Such services were absent within the irrigation scheme 
area. The general trend was that many of the married women divided their time between 
working on the scheme and caring for children and elderly relatives in Tafelkop and Motetema. 
The more consistent presence of women on the scheme was often associated with polygamous 
households (6 per cent), in which one wife - often the younger - resided and worked in the 
scheme while the other - often the older - resided in Tafelkop or Motetema caring for younger 
children and elderly relatives. The more consistent presence of women in the scheme was also 
associated with elderly women with grown up children (42 per cent) and with women who 
either held land rights in their own capacity or who were the main breadwinners in their 
households (18 per cent). Such straddling was not observed in Makuleke or Phetwane, since the 
irrigation scheme and rural community were located within the same land space. Instead, the 
commonly observed phenomenon in these communities involved rural-urban linkages, 
whereby some household members migrated to work in urban industrial centres elsewhere and 
remitted incomes to their rural homes. A number of Hereford smallholder households exhibited 
the same phenomenon. 
Evidence showed that there was a degree of socio-economic differentiation within and among 
farmer households in all three irrigation schemes (Figure 45). Such differentiation was evident 
in the diversity of livelihood strategies, aspirations and capabilities, such as production and 
marketing skills and household financial resources. While individual and household incomes 
were a useful measure of socio-economic differentiation, many respondents were unwilling to 
disclose incomes. For ethical reasons the researcher did not insist on income disclosure, but 
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instead used proxy indicators to qualitatively and quantitatively determine socio-economic 
differentiation. Proxy indicators included data on household material asset ownership, monthly 
expenditure and household nutrition. 
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FIGURE 45 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION OF SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES: PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF 
OWNERSHIP OF MATERIAL ASSETS BY HOUSEHOLDS, 2004 TO 2005 
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Some of the findings were that Hereford farmers had the highest proportion of vehicle and 
tractor ownership while Phetwane farmers had the least. Asset material ownership also varied 
between households each scheme. Ownership of assets tended to be concentrated within 
particular households. In Hereford, while a significant proportion (57 per cent) of households 
did not own any gas, electric, coal or primus stoves and rely on wood fuel for cooking, some (15 
per cent) owned two types of stove, sewing machines, tractors and small trucks (bakkies). In the 
case of Phetwane, differences between households that had direct access to irrigated plots and 
those without were less visible, although plotholding households owned significantly more 
livestock, fridges and electric stoves. Non-plotholding households had greater ownership of 
mobile phones and the less expensive primus (or kerosene) stoves. Mobile phone ownership 
was not always an indicator of affluence but of the existence of critical communication links 
with household members who work in more distant urban, industrial or mining areas and those 
domiciled in rural areas. The phones, however, could also double-up as status symbols. In 
Makuleke, the majority of subsistence food producers had much fewer assets than petty-
commodity producers. However, a number of householders among subsistence food producers 
were found to own more of the expensive material assets, such as cars and electrical 
appliances, than petty-commodity producer households. This pointed to the fact that not all 
Makuleke food growers were indigent. The more affluent among food plot holders included 
households whose members were allocated food plots as compensation for displacement from 
rain-fed crop fields when the irrigation scheme was developed in the late 1980s.  
In all the study sites, expenditure on food was relatively low. Average monthly expenditure on 
food by households ranged from R300 to R400. In both Makuleke and Phetwane, a narrow 
range of food items was consumed per household per week. The emphasis was on staple foods, 
such as mealie meal, and cheaper foods, such as cooking oil, bread and vegetables. Most 
households hardly ever consumed protein-rich foods, such as milk, meat, chicken, trotters, 
peanut butter and margarine. Protein-rich food, particularly meat, is relatively more expensive 
and might therefore be beyond the reach of many households in irrigation schemes. The study 
also found, however, that many Phetwane respondents to the questionnaire survey down-
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played their consumption of fresh fish, due to widespread perceptions about the illegality of 
informal fishing activities. Follow-up interviews and field observations revealed that fresh fish 
constituted the main source of protein for most Phetwane households. This was linked to the 
fact that nearly all unemployed and landless Phetwane men and some of the poorest single 
women heads of households practiced informal fishing for livelihoods. There did not seem to be 
any significant difference in food consumption between irrigation plotholding and non-
plotholding households in Phetwane, or between petty-commodity producers and subsistence 
food producers in Makuleke. Although Hereford households spent roughly the same amount 
money on food as those of Phetwane and Makuleke, a greater percentage of Hereford 
households consumed a wider range of vegetables and consumed milk and poultry more 
frequently. This was due to that these foods were produced by many smallholders in the 
scheme and were therefore more readily available and at relatively low prices. Hereford 
smallholders were also located close to commercial farms, from where they cheaply obtained 
additional food supplies.  
7.2.2 OVERVIEW OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SMALLHOLDERS AND JOINT VENTURES 
An overview of earlier RESIS joint ventures showed that smallholders in all three schemes 
received financial, material, technical and managerial support from government, private 
investors and, in the cases of Hereford and Makuleke, NGOs. Smallholders had complemented 
such support with own investments time, labour and other resources. During the earlier phases 
of RESIS, the greatest amount of financial support accrued to Hereford farmers, who received 
over R10 million since their occupation of the irrigation scheme in 1997. However, this was to 
change in the RESIS-Recharge phase, when smallholders in Makuleke, Phetwane and similar 
irrigation schemes received much greater financial investments.  
Support from the various stakeholders enabled smallholders to engage in a series of joint 
ventures. Hereford smallholders engaged in tobacco and vegetable production for local and 
international markets, while Makuleke and Phetwane farmers were largely involved in cotton 
production. Hereford farmers had more freedom than Makuleke and Phetwane farmers to 
make decisions pertaining to choice of joint venture partners and produce. Although both 
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Makuleke and Phetwane farmers’ acquiescence to decisions by government officials and 
private investors, Makuleke farmers were more assertive in negotiating for the kind of support 
they required. Despite that, their interests to produce food crops alongside cotton were 
contested by NSK and LDA, since such practice ran counter to provisions of the joint venture 
contract. Overall, joint ventures in the earlier phases of RESIS did not yield planned outputs, 
particularly incomes for farmers.  
Direct results of joint venture failure in all three schemes included debts, food insecurity, job 
losses and mental stress. Ripple effects of joint venture failure included tensions and conflicts 
among farmers and between farmers and farm workers. In Makuleke and Phetwane, where 
irrigators lived within local communities, tensions and conflicts often spilled over into the 
broader community. This resulted in the escalation of antecedent tensions, social and political 
marginalization and a general reduction in quality of life for individuals and the community in 
general. In all three cases, joint venture failure and its attendant problems led smallholders to 
claim more active roles in production-related decision-making. However, a number of factors 
limited smallholders’ agency to exercise freedoms to choose and/or decide.  
Land tenure insecurity was a limiting factor for smallholders in Makuleke. In Makuleke, 
emerging commercial farmers were more constrained by tenure insecurity than subsistence 
food producers, whose interaction with RESIS joint ventures was minimal. The monthly rent 
that each emerging commercial farmer paid to the chief lacked the guarantees required to 
engage in commercial crop production. Farmers were therefore compelled to abide by 
collective decisions and actions for fear of losing access to land. Despite such limitations, 
Makuleke farmers became more proactive and successful in negotiating for the kind of support 
they required. The aftermath of NSK joint venture failure saw them moving beyond arguments 
for RESIS projects to accommodate both commercial and food security concerns, to include 
demands for farmers to determine the choice of crop and the contents of joint venture 
contracts. This response was driven by entrepreneurial aspirations of individual farmers and a 
shared vision that considered the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme to be part of a twin-engine for 
community development, the other being the 21 887 ha of restituted land in the northern 
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region of KNP. Makuleke farmers’ increasingly proactive stance garnered positive responses 
from stakeholders, such as LDA, Geselschaft Technische Zusammernarbeit (GTZ), local 
supermarkets and tourism operators in the restituted Makuleke Region of KNP. 
In Phetwane, although PTOs gave farmers a greater sense of tenure security, smallholders 
perceived the state and corporate actors to have inordinately greater power than them. Such 
perceptions seemed to be strongly linked to many elderly farmers’ historical experience with 
apartheid oppression, which undermined the farmers’ confidence and limited their freedom to 
assertively voice dissent and negotiate on the same level as other parties to the joint venture 
contract of 2003/2004. Despite their earlier lack of confidence, Phetwane farmers subsequently 
emerged from joint venture failure with a keen awareness that although the irrigation scheme 
was owned by the government, their PTO certificates and their livelihood and food security 
interests entitled them to a stronger stake in production-related decision-making. They 
therefore wanted to see a different approach from RESIS Programme rehashes of pre-1994 
contract farming practices that limited their participation in agricultural production to the 
provision of cheap labour while privileging public institutions and ‘expatriates’ in production-
related decisions and activities. In this endeavour, the elderly smallholders mobilized socio-
political support from their socal networks. On the one hand, they obtained support from their 
own children, who adopted a more militant attitude against top-down impositions of decisions. 
On the other hand, smallholders also garnered support from kgoshi Matlala, who was the 
traditionally responsible for land allocation and social well-being of rural communities under his 
jurisdiction. In light of inter-generational contestations that emerged at the on-set of RESIS 
Programme interventions in Phetwane, such a double-pronged approach was an attempt by 
smallholders to guard against possible capture of land rights by the youth while ensuring a 
more even balance of power between themselves and external agencies of RESIS interventions.    
In the Hereford case, the fact that farmers had yet to acquire ownership rights to individual 
plots did not limit their individual and collective freedoms to make decisions whether or not to 
join joint ventures. Such freedoms appeared to be linked to the individually demarcated and 
fenced smallholdings in Hereford, which were not as amenable to land consolidation as the 
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non-residential plots of Makuleke, Phetwane and similar irrigation schemes. Hereford 
smallholders’ degrees of freedom were not limited by their awareness of the substantial 
support contributed by various stakeholders. Farmers seemed to draw strength from their 
socio-political networks with powerful and influential stakeholders, some of who were not 
clearly visible to the study. The main constraint for Hereford farmers was largely that of lack of 
capacity to make informed choices. Hence, although Hereford farmers generally had greater 
degrees of freedom than Phetwane and Makuleke farmers, their limited business acumen, 
organizational development, managerial expertise, information, technology, technical capacity 
and financial resources often limited their negotiation capacity and application of such strength 
towards making optimal decisions.  
7.2.3 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CAPITAL INTENSIVE FARMING 
Experiences with agricultural commercialisation in the three study sites revealed a pattern 
whereby joint ventures failed to make optimum use of available resources in order to generate 
planned outputs and outcomes for smallholders. The problem seemed to be related to risks 
associated with capital intensive farming.   
Smallholders’ production accounts showed that crops such as tobacco and cotton were capital-
intensive. Production costs for cotton in 2003 accounted for 360 per cent of Makuleke farmers’ 
net receipts after sales. Direct production costs accounted for between 89 and 320 per cent of 
Hereford farmers’ net receipts from tobacco sales in 2004. In 1999, tobacco production costs 
per Hereford farmer ranged from 39 per cent of the receipts from sales for the more successful 
farmers to 128 per cent for the less successful. Insurance costs were relatively high, accounting 
for between 30 and 34 per cent of the total production costs, implying that tobacco is a risky 
crop. As studies by de Klerk (1996) suggest, adequate financial support is central to any 
programme to establish small-scale farmers, and the degree to which farming activities are 
funded by a small-scale farmer’s own funds relative to finance through creditors’ funds is 
critical to the viability of farming activity145. In the case of Hereford, Makuleke and Phetwane, 
production costs often far exceeded 50 per cent of net earnings, with much of the costs 
                                                     
145 See Section 4.10.3, Section 5.8.3 and Section 6.4.3. 
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financed through subsidy grants from private investors and government. In the event that such 
subsidies cease, farmers might resort to credit schemes to finance the production of capital 
intensive crops. With the rising costs of credit, the high ratio between possible debts and net 
earnings will render small-scale tobacco producers particularly vulnerable to downturns in 
market prices. The high risks involved, the requirement for substantial capital outlay and the 
losses experienced in successive joint ventures in Hereford, Makuleke and Phetwane raised 
questions on the ability of smallholders to sustain capital-intensive production without long 
term financial assistance.  
Another source of risk related to decisions to produce capital intensive industrial crops based 
on insufficient analyses of perceived opportunities within regional and global production and 
market trends. For example, the decision by Hereford farmers to grow tobacco, despite that 
production of the crop had historically been unsuccessful in the Hereford area, appeared to 
have been influenced by the decline of tobacco production in Zimbabwe following the 
orchestrated “fast-track” land reform. What farmers did not realise was that Brazil had 
increased its output of prime tobacco, thereby claiming a significant share of the market. 
Farmers were also not aware that BAT–PLC, a major role-player in the world tobacco trade, had 
recently nominated Brazil, the United States and Zimbabwe as major sources of tobacco for the 
future. From the onset, therefore, entry by Hereford farmers into the established tobacco 
sector was not assured. With regard to Phetwane and Makuleke, decisions to grow cotton 
seemed to have been informed more by a convergence of interests of the private investor and 
the LDA than the existence of real opportunities in the world markets. The private investor’s 
needs to increase supplies to a newly-built ginnery and simultaneously demonstrate corporate 
social responsibility resonated strongly with the RESIS programmes objectives, and possible 
downturns in cotton prices were ignored.        
7.2.4 DEBT 
Joint ventures in all three schemes experienced financial losses. Although subsidies cushioned 
Hereford and Makuleke farmers from effects of debt, farmers were increasingly reluctant to 
accept joint venture propositions from stakeholders based outside irrigation schemes. Their 
 
 
 
 
 453 
reluctance emanated from observations that some smallholder households descended into 
livelihood insecurity and vulnerability as a result of debt from earlier contractual arrangements. 
An example identified by the study was that of a Hereford plotholder who lost most of his 
productive assets when the Land Bank repossessed these in lieu of a debt that he incurred with 
respect to a joint production venture. Since 2004 the plotholder had not been able to grow any 
crops as he waited to recover from asset loss. The vulnerability of the household seemed likely 
be of longer term than anticipated, given that the total household income came from 
intermittent casual employment of the smallholder, social grants totalling R340 for two of his 
daughter’s children and informal ‘employment’ of the daughter, who assisted an informal 
trader in exchange for food and soap.  
Subsidies did not sufficiently cushion Phetwane smallholders from the less visible debts that 
remained long after private investors had gone. Such debts emanated from disparities between 
budgeted and actual cotton picking labour costs. The Phetwane joint venture budget allowed 
for cotton picking costs at a rate of R0.40 per kilogram. However, many farmers were 
compelled to pay workers R20 per day. No mechanisms were put in place to ensure that 
workers’ rates of pay did not exceed budgeted labour costs, or to amend the joint venture 
budget to reflect actual labour costs. Although the Phetwane farmers’ management committee 
and the RESIS project implementation agent anticipated problems with labour arrangements 
that farmers were individually entering into, they were unable to intervene effectively. Many 
farmers were not fully aware of the risks involved. Even if they were, they had no choice but to 
accept labour fees determined by workers or face prospects of losing much of their cotton crop. 
Many farmers therefore rejected advice and adopted various strategies to cover costs of hired 
labour. Some attempted to manage risk by working together with their workers on the plots 
and paying them amounts lower than the average daily rate of twenty rand. That way, they 
managed to reduce their labour costs. Others used their entire remuneration for picking cotton 
to pay hired workers the rate of R20 per day, but still owed workers by the end of the cotton 
picking season. Most Phetwane farmers were pensioners, who were thereby forced to use their 
pension pay-outs to pay off labour-related debts. Financial and food security for the elderly 
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farmers became critically low, and insecurity was further exacerbated by debts incurred 
through buying food on credit.  
7.2.5 FARM WORKER WAGES 
Labour-related debt issues of Phetwane, which are described in the foregoing section above, 
showed that wage-setting mechanisms of contract farming arrangements needed to safeguard 
the interests of workers employed within smallholder irrigation schemes. Phetwane’s pre-
project consultations over wages evidently did not sufficiently take into labour requirements of 
the enterprise and, in particular, the interests of farm workers. The crux of the problem was 
that a farm worker wage of R0.40 per kilogram of picked cotton, which the joint venture 
offered to Phetwane labourers, translated to an average total income of R489 per ha for the 
three-month long cotton picking season, which would be shared among two to three labourers. 
Effectively, the mean monthly income per worker for the three months would have ranged 
from R54.33 to R81.50, which was less than 10 per cent of the minimum wage for farm workers 
at the time. It was not surprising therefore workers rejected the wages stipulated by the joint 
venture.  
Joint venture budgets for cotton production labour costs in Makuleke were R300 per worker 
per month. Such wages were not attractive to unemployed Makuleke women, who had 
historically relied on employment within the scheme for relatively low incomes (Tapela & 
Omara-Ojungu, 1999). Since government broadened access to social grants, many Makuleke 
women of working age gained access child grants, which reduced both their dependence on 
irrigation scheme employment and their vulnerability to exploitative wages. Makuleke women 
farm workers had been replaced mostly by male and female refugees from neighbouring 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The illegal status and desperation of such workers made them 
particularly vulnerable to exploitation and compelled them to survive on the margins of society 
and the economy. A number of emerging commercial farmers were observed to retain a part of 
joint venture allowances for labour for household use while employing two to three workers on 
the remaining fraction of the allowance.  
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In Hereford, the tobacco joint venture budget allowed for higher minimum wages of 
approximately R550 per worker per month. The study was not able to find any workers who 
had been paid below the prescribed rate. However, lack of evidence did not necessarily mean 
that all smallholders complied with joint venture labour payment rates. Such employment was 
generally insecure and tended to terminate with the end of each joint venture contract. Only 
one farmer was observed to have retained most of his workers over an entire three year 
period. Hence, it was also possible therefore that lack of evidence of contraventions of labour 
arrangements might have been due to absence from the irrigation scheme of workers who 
were underpaid. 
7.2.6 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT AND MARGINALIZATION 
Joint venture inception and failure in all three schemes had various effects on local social and 
political dynamics. In Makuleke, failure of the cotton joint venture in 2004 led to tensions 
among farmers over differences of opinion regarding continuation or discontinuation of the 
joint venture. Tensions spread into the broader community and cast people into two main 
political camps. Farmers who had voiced dissatisfaction were then marginalized from 
mainstream political life within the community. Among Hereford farmers, joint venture issues 
did not erupt into open conflict but remained as low-key but persistent tensions. While farmers 
were evidently kept in check by fear of their leader, the source of this leader’s power was not 
clear. It seemed possible, though, that the leader was connected to socio-politically powerful 
and influential stakeholders elsewhere. 
In Phetwane, contestation revolved around expectations that the NSK joint venture would 
generate incomes for the largely elderly population of smallholders, thereby by-passing the 
younger, landless and unemployed members of the community. Although smallholders firmly 
believed that their rights to irrigated land were secure, arguments by the landless youth for 
land reallocation remained an ongoing source of tension within the community. Unemployed 
youth, who constituted 57 per cent of the adult population and 59 per cent of the unemployed 
in Phetwane, invoked the Freedom Charter of the African National Congress (ANC) to argue that 
“The Land Shall be Shared Among Those Who Work It!” and called for a reallocation of irrigated 
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land away from elderly plotholders, who constituted 83 per cent of Phetwane smallholders. 
While CLRA provisions for PTOs to be upgraded into ‘new order rights’ seemed to give the 
elderly smallholders security of land rights, which was their main concern, the legislation was 
new and untested such that smallholders opted to invoke traditional land tenure institutions 
and thus fend off calls by the youth for land redistribution. Arguments for land redistribution 
also needed to be balanced against obligations to avoid undermining the livelihood security of 
households presently holding PTOs as well as those with informal and/or shared access to land 
on the scheme.  
A peculiar form of social marginalization emerged in the aftermath of the cotton joint venture 
in Phetwane, which was markedly absent from Hereford and Makuleke. Such marginalization 
related to allegations of witchcraft and became rife as elderly smallholders grappled with 
hardships resulting from income failure in 2004. Vulnerability from witchcraft was best 
understood in the context of Sekhukhuneland’s historical reputation as the 1980s epicentre of 
witch burnings in South Africa, which is documented by Delius (1996). While witch burnings in 
Sekhukhuneland had historically been linked to rural resistance to colonial and apartheid 
repression, the observed wave of allegations seemed to be driven by widespread failure of 
coping strategies following the shocks on livelihood and food security. The fact that such 
allegations tended to single out those elderly women who managed to cope against odds that 
many could not overcome was in itself indicative of problems of class and gender power 
dynamics in smallholder irrigation scheme communities.  
Research on joint venture of the earlier RESIS phase suggested that the challenge for livelihood 
security in smallholder irrigation schemes was not about the presence or absence of political 
and social dynamics within communities, but rather about implications of unequal political 
power relations on the interests of the less powerful people within communities and within 
institutional arrangements for contract farming. There seemed to be a need therefore for 
institutional actors tasked with implementing agricultural commercialization initiatives in 
smallholder irrigation scheme to guard against reinforcing the ‘voicelessness’ of such people. It 
also seemed important for all key stakeholders and, in particular, LDA and local community 
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leadership to ensure that all valid local community interests were fore-grounded in the crafting 
of desired interventions in irrigation schemes.  
7.3 RESIS-RECHARGE PHASE: DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS FROM STRATEGIC 
PARTNERSHIPS IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE 
7.3.1 GENERAL APPROACH 
Implementation of RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships varied from one irrigation scheme to 
another. However, a common approach was to engage with smallholders formally constituted 
as cooperatives or trusts, consolidate smallholders’ small parcels of land, use sophisticated 
technologies of land preparation and irrigation, introduce high levels of mechanization in crop 
production and drastically reduce reliance on human labour. Strategic partnerships had also 
delegated to smallholders’ management committees responsibilities over externalized and 
socially-embedded issues, such as transaction costs of hiring labour, communicating with the 
broader local community, addressing problems of theft and distributing surplus produce. While 
a few of the strategic partnerships had retained the use of conventional sprinkler irrigation 
systems, many had benefited from major financial investments in centre pivots and floppy 
sprinkler irrigation systems. Such infrastructure was shared and therefore required 
consolidation of plots and collective action, which accounted for the grouping of smallholders 
into cooperatives and trusts.  
Implementation of strategic partnerships had also effectively relegated smallholders to roles of 
‘equity labourers’ or “arm-chair farmers”. Smallholders ceded their access to land, water and 
infrastructure within irrigation schemes, played little or no active roles in farming, obtained 
little or no skills in enterprise management, crop production and produce marketing, but drew 
dividends from strategic partnerships. Conversely, roles of private sector partners in overall 
enterprise management had increased so significantly that smallholders had become virtually 
invisible from irrigation schemes except during times for collecting dividends.  
According to business plans of the RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province, the rationale for 
involving private sector institutions in partnerships with smallholders was that such institutions 
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would enable farmers to gain access to finance capital, technology, production skills and 
markets. In return, private sector institutions would gain access to land, water and 
infrastructure within smallholder irrigation schemes in order to generate profits while 
empowering smallholders. Arm-chair farming or equity labour arrangements raised the 
question: What is the rationale for RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships in the context of 
South Africa’s Agricultural Sector Strategy objectives for support to black farmers? 
7.3.2 PROJECT INCEPTION 
The introduction of RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships varied among irrigation schemes. 
Some of the smallholders, such as those of Strydkraal A, welcomed the inception of RESIS-
Recharge strategic partnerships. These smallholders perceived as successful a prevailing cotton 
joint venture between their traditional leader and NSK and were therefore optimistic. However, 
such optimism was not shared by the majority of other smallholders. For smallholders of 
Makuleke, Phetwane, Krokodilheuwel, Elandskraal and Tswelelopele, RESIS-Recharge strategic 
partnerships were preceded by unpopular cotton joint ventures between smallholders and an 
agri-business entity, NSK. Such ventures failed to generate expected incomes between 2002 
and 2005.  
Against this background, smallholders were wary of entering into new contracts with private 
commercial agricultural enterprises. In best case scenarios, such as Makuleke and Tswelelopele, 
officials of the provincial department of agriculture allayed smallholders’ concerns over possible 
debt and encouraged them to place their land, water and infrastructure resources at the 
disposal of AWC. In worst case scenarios, such as Phetwane, officials avoided direct 
engagement with smallholders. Rather, Temong by-passed smallholders and actively engaged 
with the traditional leader, Kgoshi (chief) Matlala, in order to get smallholders to agree to the 
strategic partnership. Since the empowerment partner within Temong formerly worked in 
Upper Arabie as an agricultural extension officer, he was aware of local power dynamics. In 
particular, he was aware that elderly smallholders, who were in the majority, had a stronger 
allegiance to the chief than the younger smallholders, who were fewer but more militant.  
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According to the youth among smallholders, the chairperson of Phetwane Farmers Association 
was compelled to sign the contract before reading it and in the presence of the chief. In the 
chairperson’s words, he literally “signed under the barrel of a gun”, meaning that he had had no 
choice but to obey the chief’s command and also abide by elderly smallholders’ acquiescence. 
While such strong-arm tactics had been a source of grievance for Phetwane youth, it had yet to 
be seen whether objections would persist if dividends began to flow.   
An examination of processes of inception showed that in all cases, government officials either 
did not make a concerted effort to engage with farmers on the exact implications of contracts 
or assumed that smallholders would somehow have the technical savvy to understand the 
import of contract clauses. There was also an assumption among officials that farmers would 
invariably agree with departmental views about the content of contracts and, in particular, 
issues of power and empowerment within institutional arrangements.  
Apart from findings that chairpersons of some of the schemes signed contracts under duress, as 
illustrated by the Phetwane case, most of the smallholders voiced discontent about the RESIS-
Recharge empowerment model and the inordinate degree of power vested in government 
officials relative to the disempowerment of smallholders. In particular, there was unhappiness 
about inequalities fostered by clauses requiring strategic partners to account only to LDA and 
not to smallholders. For example, strategic partners were obliged to send all written 
communication and information to the departmental address, which raised questions about 
secretarial functions within smallholder entities. Such concerns echoed views expressed earlier 
by smallholders of Elandskraal. The foregoing findings indicated that when RESIS-Recharge 
strategic partnerships were established, there was generally a limited degree of shared 
understanding and consensus on the terms of contracts. 
7.3.3 CROP PRODUCTION 
In all cases, strategic partners had assumed full control over crop production, with smallholders 
playing little or no active roles. As equity labourers, smallholders ceded their access to land, 
water and irrigation infrastructure and proceeded to play passive roles until they were called to 
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come and collect dividends. Smallholders also obtained few or no additional skills in 
commercial farming. Despite this, an important positive aspect of contract implementation had 
been consistent crop production. Successive crops of potatoes and maize were harvested in 
two seasons per year. However, smallholders’ satisfaction with the consistency of production 
was closely linked to realization of incomes from strategic partnerships. 
7.3.4 INCOME AND ‘SUCCESS’ 
Compared to many unsuccessful joint ventures of the earlier RESIS era, RESIS-Recharge 
strategic partnerships invariably generated desired incomes for smallholders and avoided 
exposing them to debts. For example, Makuleke smallholders’ earnings per hectare of potatoes 
ranged from R9000 in 2007 to R1400 in 2009, while income per hectare of maize ranged from 
R7000 in 2007 to R2800 in 2009. While the progressive reductions in incomes were ascribed to 
a number of risk factors, the study had no access to financial records to enable a more rigorous 
analysis of how the financial structure of enterprises managed the issue of debt. What was 
apparent was that, in generating desired incomes and avoiding debt for smallholders, RESIS-
Recharge strategic partnerships satisfied contractual obligations to ensure that enterprises 
were profitable and did not get bogged down by debt.  
Incomes contributed to dispelling the despondency that followed RESIS joint ventures and re-
building smallholders’ confidence in RESIS Programme interventions. Optimism was evident in 
the persistence of perceptions of success despite progressive declines in earnings in some of 
the irrigation schemes. The significance of RESIS-Recharge earnings was related to smallholders’ 
prolonged hunger for incomes since the withdrawal of state subsidies after 1994 and since 
termination of earlier RESIS-era joint ventures. On the basis of incomes alone, smallholders 
were unanimously happy about earnings that were significantly higher than their previous 
incomes from a variety of ad hoc farm-based and off-farm livelihood strategies. Although RESIS-
Recharge partnerships succeeded in meeting smallholders’ objectives to earn incomes and 
avoid debts, there was a need to broaden criteria for gauging success beyond income and debt.  
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Perceptions of success were often tempered by dissatisfaction over exclusions of food plot 
holders from irrigation schemes, many of who were among the poorest and most vulnerable 
members of local communities. For example, incomes of forty-three (43) commercial plot 
holders in Makuleke Irrigation Scheme had been gained at the expense of livelihoods and food 
security of two hundred and seventy-three (273) food plot holders, who had been excluded 
from the scheme. A similar trend was observed in Elandskraal Irrigation Scheme. In irrigation 
schemes where smallholders did not have PTOs or formal leases to what were perceived to be 
communal resources, such as Makuleke, there were questions about cost and benefit sharing 
arrangements. Landless community members, particularly the youth, questioned the rationale 
for beneficiation of a few individuals, who did not compensate the broader community for 
foregone use or pay rentals for exclusive benefit from usufruct rights ceded to strategic 
partnerships. Other concerns pertained to issues of power and governance and lack of farmer 
skills development. In light of contextual realities associated with the location of smallholder 
irrigation schemes in impoverished and marginal rural areas, ‘success’ of RESIS-Recharge 
partnerships in enhancing local incomes needed to be measured in terms of a more 
appropriately broader set of criteria. 
In light of the diversity of farming interests and in the absence of a clear alignment between 
interests of individual smallholders and targeting by strategic partnership projects, it was 
difficult to determine to what extent smallholders’ incomes represented actual ‘success’ of 
RESIS-Recharge projects. It was also not easy to determine to what extent the apparent 
‘success’ had or had not been due to grants by LDA and the benevolence of AWC. The latter 
would imply that farmers’ financial gains in the three years of the strategic partnerships had 
been heavily subsidized by the private investor and/or government.  
7.3.5 SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 
Clause 1.2 of the contracts listed the second objective of agreements as being to train “the 
farmers” and transfer the required skills to empower them to be able to operate the irrigation 
scheme themselves, in the long term. Such training covered knowledge of finance, quality 
control, marketing, management, operational, technical and business administration. Clause 
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11.1 placed an obligation upon the strategic partner to provide smallholders with technical 
advice and training in the operation of the business enterprise of the irrigation scheme and 
ensure a transfer of skills in this regard. Despite clear allocation of this responsibility, strategic 
partners had provided very little or no skills development to smallholders. For example, in the 
case of Upper Arabie Balemi Trust area, which included Phetwane and Krokodilheuwel, only 
one training session had been conducted to train five (5) people from each of the four (4) 
constituent irrigation schemes. From each irrigation scheme, two people were trained as pump 
operators, two were trained in health and safety issues and one person got training in 
operating the floppy irrigation system. Although such training imparted important skills to some 
among the local labour force, there remained a need to provide requisite skills to those 
smallholders who aspired to become more actively involved in commercial farming.  
7.3.6 LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
Strategic partnerships had created relatively few full time jobs and many short-term 
employment opportunities for local communities living in the vicinity of smallholder irrigation 
schemes. The former types of jobs related to security services and operation of pumps and 
irrigation systems while the latter included harvesting of potatoes and maize. Although such 
jobs made relatively little net impact on pervasive unemployment within the province, they 
contributed to coping strategies of the rural poor. The degree to which strategic partnerships 
could absorb local labour was limited, however, by heavy reliance on mechanization. 
7.3.7 DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS CROP 
Although contracts were silent on the disposal of surplus and sub-standard produce, decisions 
were taken to distribute such produce freely within local communities. Free access to surplus 
food resources provided brief respite from the constant challenge to ensure household food 
security. While decisions about surplus and sub-standard crops were laudable, there had been 
instances, such as in the case of Makuleke, where such decisions were evidently not shared by 
some among the smallholders’ management committee. While the Makuleke management 
committees was responsible for distributing surplus and sub-standard produce, some of the 
committee members appropriated such produce and sold it for private gain. Effects of such self-
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interest exacerbated community-wide tensions relating to benefits from land reform. There 
seemed to be a need to strengthen accountability of representatives within management 
committees, such as Makuleke’s. 
7.3.8 EXCLUSION OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 
Some of the examined case studies showed that the on-set of RESIS and RESIS-Recharge had 
been accompanied by exclusions of certain individuals and groups among smallholders. Such 
exclusions were linked to local political and power dynamics, and not to the unsuitability of 
plots of land. Indeed, in instances where plots had been excised due to proneness to flooding, 
poor soils or other factors, holders of those plots had often been included in cooperatives and 
trusts and were therefore entitled to shares of dividends from strategic partnerships. 
It was also worth noting that in some instances, such as Makuleke, RESIS and RESIS-Recharge 
era exclusions had been superimposed upon a historical context of losses of land rights to make 
way for the establishment of irrigation schemes. While some of the displaced farmers had been 
compensated, often through allocation of plots in schemes, others had neither received 
compensation nor shared in the benefits from irrigation. Such outstanding social issues 
constituted potential threats, not only to strategic partnerships, but more importantly to 
objectives of the agricultural sector strategy to support black small-scale farmers. There was a 
need therefore for effective monitoring of RESIS Programme institutional arrangements 
regarding issues of exclusion and inclusion.   
7.3.9 GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
Findings showed that there were challenges pertaining to the governance of relationships 
between strategic partners and smallholders, on the one hand, within smallholders’ 
cooperatives and trusts, on the other hand. Such challenges related mainly to issues of power, 
accountability, transparency, equity and sustainability. With the exception of the AWC – EBIS 
Trust partnership, relationships between smallholders and strategic partners were technically 
determined by contracts, which left little space for organic growth of mutual interactions. The 
generic contract model prescribed that AWC and Temong should be accountable to the LDA 
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and made no provisions for accountability to smallholders. This had affected the 
implementation of contracts and reduced relationships between strategic partners and 
smallholders to minimal technical interactions. For example, strategic partners were obliged to 
submit copies of written records to LDA but not to smallholders. Consequently, smallholders 
had often not seen records of financial transactions and were therefore unable to determine 
whether their dividends were fair or not. Similarly, smallholders had had suspicions concerning 
the management by Temong of government grant funding deposited into trust accounts 
opened in the names of cooperatives or trusts. Poor handling of the accountability issue and 
lack of transparency had resulted in a widespread erosion of trust among smallholders.   
Governance problems were partly due to strategic partners’ appointment of ‘middle men’ or 
project managers, who interfaced with smallholder entities. The roles of such agents were not 
stated in contracts and smallholders perceived them to be accountable to strategic partners 
and not to strategic partnerships, which were the contracted business enterprises. Middle men 
conducted their roles without accounting to smallholders, who were dissatisfied with the 
perceived inequalities within institutional arrangements and, in particular, with their own 
limited powers. Some among smallholders felt that some of the inequalities could be resolved 
through the strengthening of management committees’ capacities to negotiate fair contracts 
and to monitor and enforce compliance.   
There were also governance problems within smallholder groups. These were largely due to 
lack of capacity by the management committee to manage common property institutions. The 
consolidation of plots of land, formation of grouped smallholder entities and ceding of land, 
water and irrigation infrastructure to strategic partnerships effectively meant that these 
resources became common property resources (CPR) while smallholder entities became 
common property institutions. Literature (Ostrom, 1990, Oakerson, 1992; Symes, 1997) shows 
that such resources and institutions require collective action and therefore effective co-
management strategies and sound governance principles. For example, basic requirements 
include resources and procedures for sound organizational administration, management of 
multiple interests and power relations, communications and information management, 
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transparency, accountability and equity. Although some of the committees had undergone 
training in the earlier RESIS phase, there was still a significant shortfall in requisite skills.    
7.3.10 EMPOWERMENT FRAMEWORK 
Findings were that RESIS-Recharge provisions for an ‘empowerment partner’ within strategic 
partnerships involving Temong cc had been problematic. Such provisions introduced a 
‘historically disadvantaged individual’ (HDI) from outside the ranks of smallholders, who 
individually commanded a quarter (25 per cent) of proceeds from strategic partnerships. 
Meanwhile, dividends for smallholder entities collectively constituted half (50 per cent) of 
strategic partnership profits, and these translated into smaller individual fractional gains. 
Smallholders in several irrigation schemes questioned the perceived inequalities within the 
empowerment model on the basis that such arrangements privileged elites among HDIs. 
Disparities in economic empowerment were exacerbated by lack of clear provisions within exit 
strategies for the empowerment of smallholders.  
Exit strategies, according to Clause 13 of contracts, envisaged that upon expiry of strategic 
partnership agreements, AWC would relinquish his shares in the partnership, at no cost, in 
favour of smallholders’ cooperatives or such shareholders that may be nominated for this 
purpose by the Limpopo Department of Agriculture. In view of the absence of clearly 
demonstrated – as distinct from rhetorical – commitment to developing capacities of 
smallholders, exit strategies were viewed as providing leeway for the enrichment of an elite of 
more affluent HDIs based outside smallholder irrigation schemes. Clause 13 was therefore a 
major bone of contention for smallholders in Makuleke, Elandskraal, Phetwane and 
Tswelelopele. However, not all groups of smallholders were unhappy with exit strategies. For 
example, smallholders of Strydkraal A, who collectively commanded a relatively small portion (5 
ha) of land, perceived benefits from the contractual arrangement as significantly outweighing 
any potential disadvantages. Krokodilheuwel smallholders, who had recently entered into a 
strategic partnership, were more concerned about breaking the post-NSK joint venture cycle of 
non-productivity and lack of incomes than about empowerment issues. 
 
 
 
 
 466 
To a certain extent, the empowerment problem was about the perceived dual beneficiation of 
the same empowerment individual, Mr Lazarus Mosena. Farmers stated that this 
empowerment partner of AWC in Temong cc was a former employee of LDA and had hitherto 
worked within RESIS Cluster 11 irrigation schemes as an agricultural extension officer. They 
further stated that prior to his involvement with the RESIS Programme the partner had been 
involved with SAFM, which was a discredited empowerment enterprise in land reform projects 
in Limpopo Province. Furthermore, the empowerment partner was a shareholder and director 
of Floppy Sprinkler (Pty) Ltd, which was the company that LDA had awarded multi-million rand 
contracts for developing floppy sprinkler irrigation infrastructure. While a proportion of the 
R248 million allocated towards funding RESIS-Recharge between 2005 and 2007 had gone 
towards installation of centre pivots and various other expenditure items, a significant 
proportion of the funding had also gone towards development of floppy sprinkler irrigation 
systems. The overlap of decisions to commit significant expenditure on floppy sprinkler 
infrastructure development and to select Temong cc as preferred empowerment partner raised 
suspicions about the roles of senior officials of LDA. 
These allegations were due to the fact that LDA officials were responsible for implementing 
RESIS-Recharge and the department’s Empowerment Framework. They were therefore seen to 
have promoted Temong cc as preferred strategic partner and the floppy sprinkler irrigation 
system as the technology of choice in some of the smallholder irrigation schemes. The 
department’s twin preference for Temong cc and Floppy Sprinkler (Pty) Ltd had given rise to 
allegations about possible links between the empowerment partner in Temong cc, who was a 
former employee of LDA, and senior officials then employed by the same department. Many 
smallholders believed that the empowerment framework of the predominant strategic 
partnership model was part of a ploy to siphon off benefits from land and water resources 
ceded by smallholders and to accrue such benefits to external HDI parties through processes 
which lacked transparency. Voiced allegations, however, were not fully substantiated. The 
allegations also persisted despite a general consensus that LDA needed to facilitate a break 
away from failure by many erstwhile earlier RESIS-era joint ventures. There seemed to be an 
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urgent need for such allegations to be addressed in a transparent manner in order to restore 
trust within RESIS Programme interventions. 
7.3.11 MONITORING 
In terms of RESIS-Recharge institutional arrangements, LDA assumed a monitoring role over 
strategic partnerships. However, while LDA seemed to have monitored strategic partners’ 
performance with regard to income generation, productivity, avoidance of debt and compliance 
with the Empowerment Framework, the department did not appear to have monitored 
compliance with developing skills of smallholders.  
LDA had not ensured that the strategic partner complied with contractual obligations to 
develop the skills of smallholders, as required by Clause 1.2 of contracts. Under this clause, the 
strategic partner was required to train smallholders and transfer required skills to empower 
them to be able to operate the irrigation scheme themselves, in the long term. Such skills 
development included training in the areas of finance, quality control, marketing, management, 
operational, technical and business administration. Although smallholders had raised concerns 
over the lack of compliance by the strategic partner, such concerns remained unaddressed.  
While RESIS-Recharge projects were mostly implemented in impoverished and marginalized 
rural communities, the department had not used its oversight role to ensure that interventions 
did not exacerbate the poverty and vulnerability of local people. LDA appeared to sanction 
rather than guard against the exclusion of many smallholders, particularly the poorest and most 
vulnerable, without any compensation for foregone use of plots of land. No efforts were made 
to mitigate hardships due to deepening food insecurity and loss of livelihoods. Such issues 
raised questions about the accountability of LDA. 
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7.4 KEY ISSUES IN INTERACTIONS BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL 
COMMERCIALIZATION AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN SMALLHOLDER 
IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE: DISCUSSION   
This section discusses selected key issues relating to interactions between agricultural 
commercialization and rural livelihoods in smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province. 
Particular attention is given to issues around joint venture and strategic partnership contracts, 
as institutional arrangements governing relationships in RESIS Programme implementation. 
Within such contracts, key issues discussed include power, viability, empowerment, subsidized 
privatisation, co-management and livelihood security.  
7.4.1 ISSUE OF POWER 
Given that strategic partnerships brought together institutions and actors with different 
degrees of power and influence, it was reasonable to expect government-facilitated contracts 
to provide adequate measures for regulating relationships. It was also reasonable to expect 
that institutions vested with oversight responsibilities would safeguard these measures and 
ensure compliance and avoidance of undue harm. However, while contracts played a critical 
role in regulating production relationships among various parties, such institutional 
arrangements also existed within contextual realities of different stakeholder interests, 
capacities, entitlements, endowments, roles and relationships, degrees of power and livelihood 
strategies.  
The effectiveness with which contracts played their regulatory role seemed to be closely 
related to how the interplay of power among different parties was managed. Some of the 
power dynamics were more overtly couched within contract clauses and formal decisions and 
actions. Others often took place ‘off-stage’ in the form of undeclared interests, informal 
arrangements and other ‘hidden transcripts’ (according to Scott, 1995). This thesis suggests 
that the locus for understanding workings of joint ventures and strategic partnerships is not 
restricted to formal contracts, but extends into the off-stage domain of interests and 
interactions among institutional actors.  
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The latter domain was particularly evident in the case of Hereford, where ISRDP, RESIS 
Programme and other processes for support to small-scale black farmers seemed to be 
influenced by off-stage stakeholders and processes. Similarly, resistance by the seemingly 
powerless elderly smallholders of Phetwane to perceived threats from ‘outsiders’ was largely 
mobilized off-stage of formal communications with LDA and involved socio-political networks 
both within Phetwane community and in other Upper Olifants/Lepelle irrigation scheme 
communities. In Makuleke, resistance by excluded subsistence food producers and disgruntled 
emerging commercial farmers drew from both formal and off-stage socio-political networks 
with leadership structures and influential members of the community, some of who were 
dispersed as far afield as Gauteng and elsewhere. Through such hidden transcripts, the less 
powerful smallholders garnered sufficient clout to influence decisions by institutional actors. 
Compared to RESIS Phase joint venture contracts and the RESIS-Recharge pilot phase contract, 
a key instrument that changed the balance of power in the RESIS-Recharge Phase was captured 
in Clause 11 that stated, “Upon establishment and implementation of this agreement, the 
Partnership will form an integral part of the Limpopo Department of Agriculture and will 
interact with other entities of Limpopo Department of Agriculture, especially the farmers”. 
Effectively, the clause removed the separation between the strategic partnership, smallholders 
and LDA. The clause conflated strategic partnerships with the provincial department of 
agriculture and considered smallholders to be entities of the department. Such conflation was 
confusing in that Clause 11 fell within the section that stipulated strategic partners’ rights, 
duties and obligations in respect of smallholders, whereas the clause suggested that the 
department ‘owned’ both the strategic partnership and smallholders. Such conflation also 
assumed that LDA and smallholders shared the same interests and objectives. In the event that 
there was variance of interests and objectives, the conflation significantly reduced 
smallholders’ degrees of freedom to make decisions or play more active roles in management, 
production and marketing.  
The department’s claim to ownership over both strategic partnerships and smallholder entities 
seemed to emanate from perceptions that smallholders were vulnerable in their interactions 
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with the more powerful corporate entities. Such view was borne out by Clause 18 on Notices 
and Domicilium, for example. Clause 18 indicated that smallholder cooperative entities, as co-
signing parties, “choose as their domicilium et executandi” the physical address of the Limpopo 
Department of Agriculture. Effectively therefore, all smallholder cooperatives entering into 
strategic partnerships with either AWC and Temong cc received all written communications, 
including notices and court processes, through LDA. No obligations were placed upon AWC to 
give written communications to smallholders, who were legally constituted as cooperatives and 
parties to partnership contracts. This omission appears to have been a major source of 
grievance for smallholders. All key respondents from smallholder entities expressed concerns 
that AWC was not giving them written records of transactions, such as copies of purchase 
orders and invoices. The only financial records they received pertained to payments of 
dividends and wages for casually and full-time employed labourers. Centralization of power 
within LDA as well as the empowerment frameworks of RESIS-Recharge contracts both meant 
that requirements for smallholders to co-sign strategic partnership contracts constituted a 
semblance of power rather than real empowerment. 
Although an oversight role by the provincial department of agriculture seemed to address the 
need for monitoring, in effect many of the RESIS-Recharge contracts transferred much of the 
decision making power to LDA. Agricultural commercialization of smallholder irrigation schemes 
had thus re-invoked elements of centrally managed project farming approaches that, according 
to Vink et al (1998), characterized agricultural development in homeland areas from the 1970s 
to the late 1980s.  Re-invocation of apartheid era paternalism by RESIS-Recharge practitioners 
was linked to a need to avoid repeating problems of RESIS era joint ventures, which exposed 
smallholders to risks of capital intensive farming and largely resulted in income failure and 
debts. However, in upholding views that LDA, as the institution responsible for the RESIS 
Programme, should retain power and control over strategic partnerships, practitioners failed to 
recognize that unequal power relations within institutional arrangements were among key 
concerns for smallholders.  
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By centralizing power and control within LDA while giving strategic partners a “free hand to 
manage the business” (Clause 9.2), RESIS-Recharge institutional arrangement left smallholders 
with very little power. Although Clause 9.2 required strategic partners to consult smallholder 
entities in their management of enterprises operating within irrigation schemes, the term 
‘consultation’ denoted a relatively low level of participation for farmers. By definition, 
consultation means that although strategic partners might solicit smallholders’ views, the 
former were not obliged to take on board views of the latter.  
By introducing an ‘empowerment partner’ from outside the ranks of smallholders while failing 
to enhance enterprise management skills of interested and potentially capable smallholders, a 
perpetual cycle of disempowerment and dependency was created for smallholders.  In the final 
analysis, the RESIS-Recharge construct for balancing power relations did not resolve power 
issues within institutional arrangements for agricultural commercialization of smallholder 
irrigation schemes.   
Despite significantly reduced powers, management committees of smallholder entities had 
retained a small but critical degree of power to hire local labour, distribute surplus produce to 
local communities, deal with issues of theft in the irrigation scheme and represent the strategic 
partnership in communications with local communities. Delegation of such power, however, 
seemed tantamount to externalization by strategic partners of transaction costs associated 
with ‘outstanding social issues’. Since delegation was often not accompanied by rigorous 
organizational capacity development and monitoring, many committees lacked good 
governance principles, particularly transparency and accountability, and were inadequately 
funded. Where decisions and actions of committees lacked accountability, transparency and 
fairness, such as in the case of Makuleke (Box 17), such structures were regarded with suspicion 
and considered by the majority of community-level stakeholders to be illegitimate. All in all, 
however, the power exercised by management committees seemed miniscule compared to the 
power commanded by strategic partners. While government support to smallholders 
significantly raised their equity relative to that of private investors, the latter wielded more 
decision making power. 
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In light of the different ‘bundles of resources’, ‘bundles of rights’ and ‘bundles of interests’ that 
each party brings into strategic partnerships, it was not feasible that an equitable distribution of 
power could be achieved. It was also not feasible that any one party could command complete 
power and control over any given strategic partnership. An ideal distribution of contractual 
power would ensure that partnerships contributed to access by interested and capable 
smallholders to strategic resources for effective participation in commercial agriculture, 
without undermining opportunities for less commercially-inclined smallholders to sustain 
livelihoods from irrigation farming. Such an ideal, however, was countered by a number of 
factors. Firstly, it was debatable whether smallholders can establish a niche within highly 
competitive and globalized agricultural commodity sectors. Secondly, models of strategic 
partnerships seemed to be geared towards self-perpetuation rather than progression by 
commercially-inclined farmers away from dependent equity labourers into fully-fledged 
commercial farmers. Thirdly, indications were that prevailing approaches to agricultural 
commercialization conceived viability in narrowly economic and technical terms, which 
excluded the non-monetary, aesthetic and cultural values. This added to poor people’s 
livelihoods and food security.   
Box 17 Governance and Local Power Dynamics in Makuleke  
In the case of Makuleke, the management committee’s failure to manage communication and information 
dissemination led to widespread perceptions within the local community that this structure served narrow 
interests of commercial plot holders. The committee was blamed for excluding food plot holders from the 
scheme, misappropriating surplus produce, using discriminatory practices in allocating jobs and abusing elderly 
female food plot holders for ‘stealing’ surplus produce which was earmarked for free access by the community 
at large. The resulting conflicts intersected with pre-existing political power dynamics and further deepened 
cleavages within the community. Members of the management committee bore the costs of socio-political 
conflicts. Some of the problems could have been resolved through accountability, transparency, effective 
communication, consultation and awareness of existing home-grown governance principles underpinning the 
Makuleke vision for community development. A greater proportion of the problems, however, required 
effective responses from LDA. Although both the committee and excluded food plotholders repeatedly voiced 
needs for intervention, LDA’s responses to the increasingly fractious scenario were either unsatisfactory or 
non-existent. 
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7.4.3 ISSUE OF VIABILITY 
Findings suggested that ‘viability’ in the RESIS-Recharge phase was seen principally and 
narrowly in terms of efficiency of the production system and irrigation technology. For 
example, preference for floppy sprinkler irrigation technology was informed by scientific 
observations of relatively higher water use efficiency while the predominant strategic 
partnership model was consistent with a policy of reducing transaction costs and optimizing 
economic returns. A problem with such an approach was that the strategic partner, who aimed 
to optimize profit and avoid debt, was vested with a relatively high degree of power and was 
legally accountable only to the provincial department of agriculture, which in turn was hard-
pressed to justify the massive financial investments in irrigation technology and infrastructure.  
Consequently, when the strategic partner was found to be putting less effort into training 
smallholders than required by contracts, and when LDA was found to be reneging on its 
monitoring responsibility, smallholders had no legal power to insist on compliance. 
The narrow notions of viability, however, resonated with smallholders’ interests in earning 
incomes from agricultural enterprises.  A major dilemma for smallholders was that they were 
caught between a hunger for incomes, on the one hand, and aspirations to become fully-
fledged farmers, on the other hand. Earning dividends from assuming equity labourer roles 
became an easier option for livelihoods generation and many smallholders put aside their 
commercial farming aspirations. Other smallholders, however, appreciated the incomes but 
retained focus on playing more active roles in farming. The divergence of smallholder interests 
militated against efforts to present a unified argument for LDA to ensure strategic partners’ 
compliance with obligations to develop commercial farming skills. While the resonance 
between smallholders’ needs for incomes and emphasis by RESIS-Recharge on profitability of 
enterprises seemed to represent achievement of a common objective, underlying power issues 
had implications that went beyond interests of smallholder entities.  
Prevailing notions of viability pointed to a dominance by certain powerful interests over 
discourses on requisite interventions in smallholder irrigation schemes. Such interests appeared 
to have influenced narratives about viability and, in particular, promoted the dominance of 
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narrow economic and technological criteria for gauging viability. The result was a drive towards 
accelerating agricultural commercialization and irrigation technology developed in the RESIS-
Recharge era. Economic viability criteria seemed to favour the creation of an elite group of 
black equity labourers and agri-business entrepreneurs while ignoring interests of the poorest 
and most vulnerable among socio-economically differentiated smallholders. By contrast, 
irrigation technology development was reminiscent of colonial and apartheid eras of “heroic 
engineering” (Platt 1999 in Turton & Ohlsson, 1999) or the “hydraulic mission” (Reisner 1993 in 
Turton & Ohlsson, 1999) and added pressure for LDA to justify fiscal expenditure. Often 
justification was couched in terms of technological efficiency and economic viability, reinforced 
emphasis on commercial rather than subsistence farming interests.  
7.4.4 DIVERSITY OF SMALLHOLDER INTERESTS 
Perceptions that empowerment within RESIS-Recharge reinforced inequalities between 
included and excluded smallholders, on the one hand, and between equity labourers and 
empowerment partners, on the other hand, pointed to a need for an adaptation of programme 
design. Given that many smallholder irrigation schemes were located in impoverished and 
socio-economically marginal areas, implementation of the RESIS Programme targeting 
approach needed to be simultaneously multi-pronged rather than singularly focused upon 
commercial interests of equity labourers and black economic empowerment (BEE) partners 
from outside the ranks of smallholders.  
Denison & Manona (2007) identified four categories of smallholder namely, the business 
farmer, the equity labourer, the smallholder and the food producer. For commercially-oriented 
smallholders, RESIS-Recharge needed to shift away from a one-size-fits-all equity labourer 
approach to an approach that included empowerment and support for potential business 
farmers among existing equity labourers.  
The RESIS-Recharge phase also needed to bring interests of subsistence food producers to the 
fore, alongside commercial farming interests. For subsistence-oriented smallholders, such as 
‘smallholder farmers’ and ‘food producers’ (according to Denison & Manona), critical decisions 
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needed to be made about subsidizing these farmers’ livelihoods, informal economic activities 
and/or safety nets as a means to achieving macro-economic policy objectives regarding poverty 
and social integration. Such decisions required a broadening of viability criteria beyond narrow 
economic and technical variables. Such decisions also meant that access to government 
subsidies, such as the DWA Policy on the Financial Assistance to Resource Poor Irrigation 
Farmers, needed to be extended to subsistence farmers, thereby removing a major constraint 
to affordability of productive water access and use. Concerns about farmer exclusions and 
inequalities in cost and benefit sharing could be addressed by adjusting mechanisms for 
targeting.  
7.4.5 EMPOWERMENT ISSUES 
A major problem in the RESIS-Recharge phase related to the Empowerment Framework of LDA. 
In its application, empowerment tended to focus on the technicalities of meeting the 
requirements of AgriBEE and, by extension, LDA’s Empowerment Framework. Allegations of 
possible covert relationships between Mr Lazarus Mosena and decision makers within LDA 
could not be substantiated. However, there was a definite pattern of preference by LDA 
officials for procuring services from enterprises linked to Mr Mosena (see Section 7.3.10). While 
LDA was preoccupied with ensuring the empowerment of this particular HDI, who hailed from 
outside the ranks of smallholders, the irony that no similar effort was made to empower HDI 
farmers seemed to have been lost to decision-makers of the RESIS Programme. Issues such as 
this eroded smallholdes’ trust in RESIS-Recharge interventions.  
During the RESIS-Recharge era, contracts effectively usurped whatever vestige of power 
smallholders had during the earlier RESIS phases and centralised it within LDA. Apart from the 
inexplicit exit strategies, it was not clear whether or not such arrangements were permanent 
and, if not, what time frames and capacity building strategies were envisaged towards the 
empowerment of smallholders. This lack of clarity created uncertainty and dissatisfaction 
among the more enterprising smallholders. As Laker (2004) had earlier observed, the lack of 
production capital and agribusiness management skills among many emerging farmers 
necessitated the decision to employ joint venture and strategic partnership strategies. 
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However, in implementation, RESIS contractual arrangements ran counter to views by scholars 
such as Laker (Ibid.), who stated that project facilitation should ensure that such arrangements 
were not perpetuated ad infinitum but that ‘human capital’ building was promoted so as to 
ensure that within reasonable time a lot of land will not only be in the hands of Blacks, but that 
there will actually be Black commercial farmers managing that land. 
Coupled with lack of demonstrated commitment by LDA and private investors to the 
development of commercial farming skills for interested smallholders and the ambivalence of 
exit strategies, the issue of the empowerment partner posed a threat to the legitimacy and 
acceptance of the RESIS-Recharge phase of the RESIS Programme. Although the intention of 
centralizing decision-making in LDA was purportedly to protect smallholders in transactions 
with powerful corporate institutions, the effect was an institutionalized disempowerment of 
smallholders without guarantees of LDA’s oversight role and without adequate provisions 
alternative recourse. Even if such guarantees might have been given, the capacity of LDA to 
play an effective monitoring role remained subject to question.  
A number of factors suggest that the LDA Empowerment Framework might have been too 
hastily drafted. Firstly, LDA was under pressure to ensure that the significant financial 
investments that went into the RESIS Programme were worthwhile expenditure. Secondly, the 
department was pressurized to demonstrate that RESIS-Recharge constituted a better construct 
than earlier RESIS joint ventures in increasing productivity, generating incomes, avoiding debt 
and meeting empowerment objectives of promoting equity and participation by HDIs in 
commercial agricultural enterprises. Thirdly, pressure also emanated from expectations that 
RESIS Programme interventions would contribute to reducing poverty, unemployment and 
livelihood insecurity that characterized localities of most of the smallholder irrigation schemes.  
Against the backdrop of such demands, it is possible that institutional actors within LDA acted 
under duress to demonstrate success of the RESIS Programme at all costs. One such cost was 
the exclusion of many subsistence food producers, who had their land rights alienated without 
adequate compensation or benefit sharing. These farmers were among the poorest and most 
vulnerable people within local communities.  
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Institutional arrangements that placed LDA in both implementation and monitoring roles 
created an ethical dilemma whereby same institutional actors who were expected to serve the 
interests of prioritized farmers might have been responsible for creating the governance 
problems. Absence of alternative mechanisms for recourse within institutional arrangements 
created ‘safe’ spaces within which problems of non-compliance, corruption or other 
derelictions of responsibility remained cocooned and therefore unaddressed.  
The diversity of interests surrounding RESIS-Recharge interventions meant that the locus of 
oversight roles needed to be dispersed rather than centralized within LDA. Such 
decentralization would need to take into account the diverse interests of multiple stakeholders 
including RESIS-Recharge equity labourers, smallholders in general, private sector partners, 
municipalities, sector departments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society 
organizations (CSOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Faith Based Organizations 
(FBOs), and traditional and elected leadership at grassroots levels. What seemed requisite were 
oversight roles at a higher level than LDA, such as provided by the national Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Coordination Committees for Agricultural Water Use 
(CCAWS) and multi-stakeholder platforms and/or governance forums. There was a need to 
identify requisite institutional structures, roles, responsibilities, resources and interfaces, and 
the means to ensure effective monitoring while reducing transaction costs associated with such 
rationalization.    
7.4.6 CHALLENGES OF CO-MANAGEMENT  
To an extent, the RESIS Programme drew from international best practice in IMT, which 
involved the decentralization of management responsibilities within smallholder irrigation 
schemes to include contractual arrangements between private investors and farmers, as well as 
the devolution of day-to-day operational responsibilities to smallholders constituted as 
cooperatives, WUAs and other farmer organizations. In many ways, therefore, the problem of 
RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships was about co-management challenges.  
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These challenges were not likely to be resolved by simply enabling projects to ‘efficiently’ use 
water to generate incomes and agri-business skills for smallholders while contributing 
somehow to food security and economic growth and development. Such an approach narrowly 
viewed viability in economic and technical terms and thus overlooked and/or unde-rated the 
embedded values that people attach to agricultural resources like land and water. From this 
perspective, therefore, RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership contracts discounted the 
complexity, diversity, dynamics and resilience of the social, economic, political, cultural and 
ecological ‘systems-to-be-governed’146, which traversed the boundaries of the contracting 
entities and smallholder irrigation schemes.  
A consequence of this misalignment was that LDA efforts to dispense with the conventional 
one-size-fits-all approach and, instead, appropriately target specific categories of farmers147 
resulted in a singular focus on the equity labourer type of smallholder, to the exclusion of all 
other categories. Another consequence was that efforts to improve irrigation technology and 
technical efficiency of water use inadvertently led to prolonged non-productivity without 
concomitant efforts to help mitigate the hardships experienced by smallholders and other 
members of local communities.   
Although pre-requisite factors for RESIS Programme implementation were earlier identified to 
include an enabling policy and institutional environment, the identification of innovative best 
practice in IMT and the learning of lessons from the past (Shaker, 2005), the RESIS Phase (i.e. 
Phase 2 from 2001 to 2004) did not assimilate as much of the critical lessons as intended by 
implementing agencies (De Lange, 2006: 21, 22)148. Despite an attempt in this phase to shift 
away from the Pilot Phase emphasis on infrastructure rehabilitation towards a more balanced 
emphasis on preparatory planning, farmer training, organizational development and the 
establishment of institutions (Shaker, 2005: 20), the contract farming arrangements remained 
basically re-hashes of pre-1994 models.  
                                                     
146 According to Kooiman (2008). See Figure 3 in Section 1.4.7. 
147 Refer to Table 7 in Section 3.7 for the Typology put forward by Denison & Manona (2007). 
148 See Section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. 
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In examining possible reasons for the continuation of apartheid era models, it is perhaps not 
sufficient to ascribe this particular phenomenon solely to the rise of neo-liberalism and the 
attendant agri-food systems and global value chains, or “new agricultures” (according to Little 
& Watts, 1994)149. The continuance of pre-1994 formulations might be linked to the conflation 
of at least two overlaid factors. Firstly, the persistence of the social, economic and political 
structures created during the period of white supremacy (e.g. Terreblanche, 1998; Du Toit, 
2005), whose ‘extreme nature’ resulted in a legacy that tenaciously continues to underpin post-
1994 transformation efforts and impede the achievement of post-apartheid macro-economic 
policy objectives. The second factor, which builds upon this background, relates to post-
apartheid institutional inertia whereby post-1994 institutional structures, systems and actors 
lacked sufficient capacity to effectively redress the results of racial capitalism within the realm 
of resource-poor smallholder irrigation schemes of Limpopo Province. These two related factors 
seem to explain why the RESIS Programme lacked robust institutional arrangements, despite 
the semblance of an enabling policy and institutional environment, and efforts by senior LDA 
officials’ to ensure that the programme drew from international best practice, past experiences 
with LDA programmes, such as LADEP and PEA) (De Lange, 2004) as well as lessons from the 
pilot phase and Phase 1 or Watercare Programme (Shaker, 2005)150.  
The need for robust institutional arrangements for the governance of RESIS-Recharge strategic 
partnerships partly emanated from the fact that the significant capital investments in shared 
irrigation infrastructure, such as floppy sprinkler systems and centre pivots, within smallholder 
schemes characterized by relatively small parcels of land inevitably compelled many farmers to 
consolidate land and work together to achieve economies of scale. This modification of pre-
existing CPR scenarios required sound co-management institutions (according to Ostrom, 1992) 
and an effectively facilitated participatory process to ensure that all stakeholder interests, 
particularly those of resource-poor and vulnerable smallholders, were taken into account and 
well-articulated in all aspects of agricultural commercialization. Also requisite was a more 
balanced emphasis on the diverse interests of all the resource-poor irrigation farmers, who 
                                                     
149 See Section 8.2. 
150
 See Section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 480 
included (according to Denison & Manona, 2007) ‘The Business Farmer’, ‘The Equity Labourer’, 
‘The Smallholder’ and ‘The Food Producer’ types of farmer. Drawing from Cousins’s (2010) 
class-analytic typology, which identifies six categories of small-scale producers in South 
Africa151, a greater degree of flexibility in accommodating the more nuanced diversity of needs 
could have led to better programme instruments and project results.  
In the absence of robust institutional arrangements for co-management within RESIS-Recharge 
programme implementation, there emerged the risks associated with unequal power relations 
and self-interested behaviour. The livelihood impacts of these factors varied according to 
farmer type and context. For example, the more enterprising among Makuleke equity labourers 
demonstrated a remarkable degree of agency in pursuing alternative strategies to diversify 
their livelihoods and thereby take advantage of opportunities created by the RESIS-Recharge 
interventions within local food markets. No similar agency was shown by Phetwane equity 
labourers. Furthermore, while the Makuleke traditional leadership supported or did not object 
to riverside gardening within pastoral land, Phetwane leadership forbade the use of rangelands 
for crop production because of possible conflicts between livestock and crop farmers152. 
Another example is that subsistence food producers in the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme suffered 
a greater degree of hardship than equity labourers, owing to their exclusion from access to land 
in the scheme and their antecedent condition of poverty and vulnerability. The poorest and 
most vulnerable among smallholders were most severely affected by the marginalization and 
hardships, which further deepened their vulnerability to the livelihood shocks instigated by the 
strategic partnerships. The lack of a clearly articulated monitoring role for the RESIS Programme 
further entrenched the voicelessness of these people.     
                                                     
151 See the last paragraph of Section 3.7. 
152 PROLOGUE: Ultimately, in the post-study phase (2010), many Makuleke riverside gardeners were compelled to 
discontinue their rangeland farming activities owing to conflicts with livestock farmers. They were allocated 0.1 ha 
food plots in an extension of the irrigation scheme. Among these farmers were young people who had nurtured 
the hope of entry into the irrigation scheme. Farmers like Chauke (Section 6.9.3), whose land was formally 
allocated by the traditional leadership, continued to ply their commercially-orientated enterprises undisturbed, as 
did similar farmers practising on land formally designated as rain-fed cropland. 
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Hereford farmers, who individually occupied sub-divided allotments of land with homesteads 
within each plot, were not affected by the RESIS-Recharge land consolidation and the attendant 
development of shared infrastructure. Nonetheless, in their own context, these farmers shared 
their water allocation and irrigation infrastructure, and they recognized that they needed to 
work together in achieving equitable sharing of water and economies of scale in crop 
production and marketing. Many of the RESIS era co-management problems that emerged in 
Hereford were similar to those of Phetwane and Makuleke. Such problems included poor 
governance of farmers’ organizations, free-riding within group settings, unequal power 
relations among smallholders and between these and private investors, among others. The 
management of these problems required clearly articulated co-management frameworks and 
well-funded extension, mentoring and monitoring roles, to bolster the capacity of existing 
agricultural extension services.  
The case of Hereford demonstrated that municipalities were not necessarily the most 
appropriate locus for articulating co-management, mentoring and monitoring of RESIS 
Programme interventions in Limpopo Province. Various scholars (Bene et al, 2009; Pomeroy, 
1995; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1989) have pointed out that while participation is requisite, 
accountability is perhaps more important in co-management scenarios, such as irrigation 
schemes (Ostrom, 1992). The Hereford case study indeed showed that, without clearly defined 
and allocated roles and responsibilities for participatory decision-making, the involvement of 
municipal actors could result in unintended negative impacts on the livelihoods of farmers and 
the productivity of smallholder irrigation schemes. Although municipal actors could have 
contributed, under different circumstances, to enhancing accountability within RESIS 
Programme initiatives, the involvement of some of these actors resulted in a perversion of 
farming issues to serve political self-interest, and unequal power relations resulted in sub-
optimal decisions. Ultimately, governability problems arose as Hereford smallholders refused to 
be governed by municipal stakeholder platforms. Governability problems also emerged in the 
cases of Phetwane and Makuleke, but without the involvement of municipalities. Inattention to 
the embedded political context, among other embedded social, cultural, economic and 
ecological systems among smallholders and within local communities associated with 
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smallholder irrigation schemes also contributed to the reduced governability of strategic 
partnerships and joint ventures in Phetwane, Makuleke and Hereford. 
Drawing from CPR theory, it would seem that the involvement of smallholders, as the end-users 
of smallholder irrigation scheme development, in decision-making is critical. Such involvement 
could possibly increase the smallholders’ sense of responsibility and ownership, and with 
appropriate support from the state, civil society organisations and markets, thereby facilitate 
the self-enforcement of the management system within contract farming arrangements and, in 
principle, the ‘sustainability’ and equity of production systems in smallholder irrigation 
schemes.    
Given the complexity of livelihood and institutional contexts associated with smallholder 
irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province, as well as the broader global agri-food systems and 
value chains, it is reasonable to say that civil society could have played useful roles in mediating 
relationships within RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships in Limpopo Province and ensuring 
that ‘participation’ did not impact negatively on local people’s livelihoods. By foregrounding the 
roles of the state and markets as ‘governance institutions’ while largely ignoring civil society, 
RESIS and RESIS-Recharge institutional arrangements remained sub-optimal in governing 
interactions between smallholders, private firms and other stakeholders. Meanwhile, the 
requisite policies, strategies and funding were in place to ensure greater participation by black 
smallholders in commercial agriculture.  
The foregoing discussion highlights the need for RESIS Programme implementation and joint 
venture and strategic partnership facilitators in particular, such as LDA, to recognize the 
political economy of co-management reforms in the smallholder irrigation sector in Limpopo 
Province. In recognizing this fact, institutional actors would perhaps strive towards putting in 
place institutional arrangements that ensure that governance systems and governing 
interactions achieve the intended governability of systems-to-be-governed (according to 
Kooiman, 2008)153.  This thesis surmises that governability becomes possible when institutional 
                                                     
153 See Section 1.4.7. 
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arrangements meaningfully contribute to enhancing livelihoods and livelihood systems 
associated with smallholder irrigation schemes. As Bene et al’s (2009) succinctly observes:  
“It is crucial to recognize that decentralization is never introduced in a ‘power vacuum at 
a local level’ (Nijenhuis, 2003, p. 88). The socio-institutional landscape where governance 
reforms in general and co-management in particular are implemented is in fact the result 
of a constantly evolving political game which reflects the current distribution of power 
between different local actors and their struggle to control the natural, institutional, 
financial, and political resources. In this context the introduction of co-management more 
often than not turns out to be a catalyst for political conflict and frequently turned out to 
intensify the battle for power among local people. In this continuous (open or more 
subtle) battle, the poorest and most marginalized of the [farming] community have 
generally been the losers.” 
7.4.7 ISSUE OF SUBSIDIZED PRIVATIZATION  
RESIS-Recharge partnerships raised questions around the privatization of extension services. 
Privatization of agricultural commercialization in smallholder irrigation schemes also seemed to 
by subsidized by the state. By vesting private sector strategic partners with contractual 
obligations to train smallholders, the RESIS-Recharge strategic partnership model effectively 
privatizes the provision of extension services without explicitly defining how this will be done 
and how it will be monitored. A question that must be asked is: What is the long term vision for 
sustainable extension services provision for South African smallholders? 
The strategic partnership model has many of the attributes of subsidized privatization with 
minimal return for the public sector. Government-owned irrigation infrastructure, public water 
resources and state or community land, the last of which is either allocated through PTOs or 
formal and informal lease arrangements, are effectively handed over to the private sector on 
short-term contracts of mostly three years. None of the contracts examined required strategic 
partnerships to provide for re-capitalization of major investments by the state in irrigation 
infrastructure. Since the life span of such infrastructure is typically ten to fifteen years, 
government would need to infuse further funding to replace or refurbish infrastructure to 
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levels of functionality that would be attractive to subsequent strategic partners (Denison & 
Tapela, 2009). Institutional arrangements that focus on benefit accrual within enterprises to the 
exclusion of re-capitalization from financial models create untenable conditions for state 
subsidization of private enterprise. This is irrespective of whether the private actors are 
strategic partners, empowerment partners or equity labourers. Such arrangements raise 
questions on the justification for subsidizing privatization while withholding government 
subsidies from subsistence producers, who are often the poorest and most vulnerable among 
smallholders.    
A second form of subsidized privatization pertains to the lack of contractual provisions for 
strategic partnerships to ensure that the integrity of the natural resource base is maintained 
and negative impacts are avoided or mitigated. Environmental legislation, such as the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA) of 1998 and the Conservation of Agricultural 
Resources Act (CARA) of 1983, imposes such duties on owners, people in control and people 
who have rights to use land, thus uncoupling such responsibility from ownership of land. There 
are however, problems with the enforcement of environmental law, particularly in former 
homeland areas where most smallholder irrigation schemes are located. Lack of capacity in 
responsible departments and local institutions means that unless RESIS-Recharge institutional 
arrangements clearly specify obligations for conservation and rehabilitation of agricultural 
resources, the price of environmental degradation will be paid either by smallholders and local 
communities or by government long after strategic partnerships have ended. 
The combined effect of aging infrastructure, declining soil potential and disease prevalence 
suggest that the end of strategic partnership contracts will leave behind legacies in which 
smallholder irrigation schemes collapse and become less viable or attractive for possible future 
commercial agricultural ventures. In such event, government might be compelled to use tax 
payers’ contributions to public revenues to subsidize private investors and equity labourers, bail 
out stakeholder rural communities and rescusitate productivity. From a developmental 
perspective, such issues raise fundamental questions about the sustainability, efficiency and 
equity of RESIS Programme interventions and contract farming arrangements. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALIZATION AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN 
SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN LIMPOPO: DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents concluding remarks on agricultural commercialization under the RESIS 
Programme in Limpopo Province. Particular attention is given to joint venture and strategic 
partnership contracts, and how these intersected with livelihoods of smallholders and other 
members of smallholder irrigation scheme communities in Limpopo Province. Ultimately, a key 
question addressed by the chapter is whether or not agricultural commercialization, as 
articulated mainly through contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships, provided an 
adequate construct for achieving rural livelihood security within impoverished smallholder 
irrigation scheme communities in Limpopo Province.  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The adoption by government of contractual arrangements for linking smallholders in irrigation 
schemes to mainstream commercial agriculture was informed by “evidence that some sub-
sectors of agriculture and value-adding activities are uncompetitive in the local and 
international markets” (South Africa, 2001). Hence, the South Africa’s Agricultural Sector 
Strategy listed core objectives for support to emerging farmers as being to enhance equitable 
access and participation in the agricultural sector, improve global competitiveness and 
profitability, ensure sustainable resource management and ensure food security. The merits of 
agricultural commercialization and contract farming for smallholders and other members of 
impoverished rural communities, however, have remained subject to debate.  
A key question for this thesis is whether or not agricultural commercialization by the RESIS 
Programme, which was articulated mainly through contractual joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships, provided an adequate construct for achieving rural livelihood security within 
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impoverished smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province. Subsumed within this 
overarching question are four broad sets of questions relating to institutional and livelihood 
contexts; institutional arrangements; livelihood assets, strategies, impact factors, outcomes and 
vulnerability to shocks and trends; and policy and institutional issues. Specific questions are:  
 Under what institutional and livelihood context has the resurgence of contract farming 
occurred in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province? 
 How have contracts for joint ventures and strategic partnerships been formulated and 
implemented in selected smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province?  
 How have agricultural commercialization initiatives affected livelihoods of petty 
commodity producers, subsistence farmers and other people in smallholder irrigation 
scheme communities? 
 What are the key policy and institutional issues for government interventions in 
smallholder irrigation schemes? 
The above research questions have been addressed in the preceding chapters. This chapter 
summarizes selected research findings and draws overarching conclusions on key issues, 
challenges and options for nurturing rural livelihood security within a hybrid neo-liberal and 
social development policy context. The chapter concludes by addressing the key question for 
the thesis, which is whether or not agricultural commercialization by the RESIS Programme, 
through contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships, provided an adequate construct 
for achieving rural livelihood security within impoverished smallholder irrigation schemes in 
Limpopo Province. 
8.2 INSTITUTIONAL AND LIVELIHOOD CONTEXTS FOR RESURGENCE OF 
CONTRACT FARMING IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE: SUMMARY 
Study findings suggest that the livelihood contexts within which RESIS Programme interventions 
were implemented in Limpopo Province were generally characterized by pervasive poverty and 
low levels of formal education, employment, income, material asset ownership, social services 
and infrastructure. While the apartheid-era interventions in smallholder irrigation schemes had 
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not been economically viable, they provided a social safety net that was severely affected by 
the sudden withdrawal of state subsidies after 1994, which halted productivity and exacerbated 
livelihood and food insecurity as well as the marginalization of many smallholder irrigation 
scheme communities. With the inception of moves to revitalize productivity of such schemes, 
smallholders became commonly described as ‘resource poor’. Their broader local geographical 
contexts were identified to be ‘poverty nodes’. The RESIS Programme at national, provincial and 
local level necessarily had to contend with the gap between livelihood conditions prevailing in 
such contexts and trends in the broader regional and global arena. 
While the sustainable development paradigm brought MDGs to the fore, agricultural 
commercialization in smallholder irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province was also 
foreshadowed by emergence since the 1980s of “new agricultures” (according to Little & Watts, 
1994). These were geared towards high-value crops, an increasing involvement of small-scale 
farmers in contract farming in developing countries and a reduction of state roles in farmer 
support as private sector roles increased (Da Silva, 2005:4). Among regional institutional 
frameworks, NEPAD’s CAADP provided an important framework for promoting black small-scale 
farmers’ entry into mainstream commercial agriculture. International institutions that 
supported the integration of small-scale farmers into mainstream commercial agriculture 
included, among others, the UN’s FAO, World Bank Group’s IFC, CGIAR and FANRPAN. From 
such perspective, the RESIS Programme was a response to an international drive to reduce 
transaction costs of operating state-sponsored irrigation schemes and enhance efficiency in 
agricultural water use, productivity and marketing. Global and regional influences were 
complemented by national institutional imperatives. 
A pertinent aspect of national imperatives, such as the Agricultural Sector Strategy, was that 
the RESIS Programme emerged against a milieu of national macro-economic policy shifts away 
from the focused anti-poverty strategies of the RDP towards a dual emphasis on both poverty 
reduction and national economic goals espoused by the GEAR Strategy. The RESIS Programme 
also emerged in tandem with the erstwhile government-led ISRDP, which similarly blended 
social and economic objectives, as well as environmental goals. While objectives of the 
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Agricultural Sector Strategy resonated, in rhetoric, with the hybrid macro-economic objectives 
espoused in GEAR and the ISRDP, articulation of AgriBEE particularly in the RESIS-Recharge 
phase was accompanied by an abrupt shift away from such blended emphasis towards a 
brazenly neo-liberal pursuit of economic objectives. Such shift was couched in narratives about 
economic viability and technical efficiency of agricultural water use. Such narratives not only 
echoed neo-liberal arguments for global economic restructuring but were also used to justify 
significant fiscal expenditure on hydraulic infrastructure and technology development in 
smallholder irrigation schemes.  
When the ISRDP was launched in 2000, it embodied much of core-periphery development 
thinking. For example, smallholder irrigation schemes were included among ‘anchor’ projects 
from which rural LED was envisaged to spread. Similarly, the RESIS Programme viewed 
smallholder irrigation schemes to be ‘nodes’ from which economic growth would spread 
outwards to uplift rural communities and contribute to social integration. The discordant 
reality, however, was that smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa and former homelands 
of Limpopo Province, in particular, had historically functioned as a social safety nets or labour 
buffers, which served to absorb rural surplus labour during colonial and apartheid eras rather 
than generate resource rents. After 1994, this orientation prevailed until irrigation 
infrastructure broke down following the withdrawal of subsidies. By introducing drastically 
replacing production systems that smallholders and local communities were familiar with with 
aggressively market-orientated approaches therefore, agricultural commercialization in the 
RESIS-Recharge phase brutally disturbed antecedent livelihood functions of smallholder 
irrigation schemes. This deepened hardship and insecurity for many vulnerable and poor rural 
people.  
In 2009 when the CRDP replaced the ISRDP as a ‘comprehensive’ approach to effectively 
resolve the persisting challenge of rural poverty and inequality, there were shifts towards 
engendering a broad-ranging approach to addressing needs of the majority of landless rural 
people and targeting vulnerable groups. In the agricultural sector, these shifts were evident in 
the re-focusing of government policy towards, for example, exploration of options to to 
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enhance rural livelihoods. Within the broader South African national context and in 
impoverished rural and urban localities in particular, the emergence of the CRDP was preceded 
by a general sense of disillusionment about the prospects for amelioration of deprivation. 
While such disillusionment pervaded much of the ‘silent rural backdrops’ of South African 
society, grievances were largely amplified in urban centres (Tapela et al, 2011a). Pressure on 
government seems to have come partly from the widespread contestations and national waves 
of violent social protests that gripped mostly urban informal settlements since 2004154 and 
exponentially increased in frequency since 2009155. The increasing ungovernability of 
impoverished and marginalized contexts seems to have contributed, in the run up to 2009, to 
influencing the tempering of a brazenly neo-liberal RESIS-Recharge phase with efforts to 
accommodate the livelihood interests of resource-poor irrigation farmers156.  
It seems possible therefore that with the crystallization in 2009 of the urgent need to 
effectively and comprehensively address rural poverty and inequality, interest by agricultural 
scholars in small-scale farmers and the ‘smallholder’ model continued to influence the way 
resource-poor black farmers were perceived in relation to rural development programmes, but 
there was an emerging shift towards enhancing the formulation and articulation rural 
development interventions and the RESIS Programme.  
8.3 CONTRACT FARMING AND RURAL LIVELIHOOD SECURITY  
Research findings showed that agricultural commercialization during the earlier phases of the 
RESIS Programme had varying effects in different contexts. With the exception of Makuleke, 
interventions did not take into account the socio-economic differentiation of farmers, but 
tended to replicate many features of the pre-1994 models of agricultural commercialization. A 
                                                     
154 See Atkinson 2007, Johnston & Bernstein 2007, Botes et al 2007a; b; Bond & Dugard, 2008; Allen & Heese, 
2009 and Heese & Allen, 2009. 
155 See Allan & Heese, 2009; Gouws et al, 2009; Sinwell et al, 2009; Tapela et al, 2011a, Nleya et al, 2011 and 
Nleya, 2011. 
156  PROLOGUE: For example, the displaced subsistence food producers of Makuleke were reinstated, while 
the landless riverside gardeners were removed from the rangelands and allocated food plots within a new 
extension of the irrigation scheme. In Phetwane, LDA embarked on efforts to support livelihood diversification by 
promoting aquaculture projects for smallholders and the landless.   
 
 
 
 
 490 
“one-size-fits-all” approach also characterized ways in which joint venture projects involved 
farmers. Concerns voiced by less influential stakeholders, such as the elderly and illiterate 
farmers of Phetwane and Makuleke, particularly the women and vulnerable men among these, 
were not readily accommodated in decision-making. This raised questions about the integrity of 
decision-making processes within RESIS interventions and associated joint ventures. 
In Makuleke, earlier RESIS phase interventions and the joint cotton production venture 
enhanced access to water for both subsistence food producers and emerging commercial 
farmers. Many subsistence food producers increased their productivity. By contrast, monetary 
incomes from the cotton production joint venture fell short of expectations and exacerbated 
insecurity for many within the latter group of farmers, who did not produce food crops 
alongside cotton.  
In Phetwane, implementation of a similar joint cotton production venture made no attempt to 
distinguish between different types of smallholders. Hence, enhanced water access not only 
failed to yield expected monetary incomes but also eroded the meagre livelihood assets that 
smallholders possessed, with critical outcomes on their livelihood and food security. Prior to 
that, inception of the joint venture was accompanied by physical exclusion from the irrigation 
scheme of informal subsistence farmers, who maintained informal food gardens in open spaces 
alongside the mail irrigation canal. This contrasted with the absence of such exclusions from 
Krokodilheuwel, where local traditional leadership defended the right of informal gardeners to 
utilize surplus space and water within the irrigation scheme. 
Although Hereford smallholders had greater degrees of freedom to choose their pathways to 
market entry, their experiences with joint ventures since the pilot phase of the national RESIS 
Programme invariably failed to yield expected monetary incomes and, in a few cases, 
exacerbated vulnerability. However, the provision of extension and other support services by 
DALA, NGOs and private investors left Hereford farmers with relatively greater albeit 
insufficient capacity to engage in specific commodity sectors.  
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While the earlier phase of RESIS sought to “train and capacitate the smallholder farmers to run 
their scheme profitably and sustainably” (De Lange, 2004: 107; Shaker, 2005: 19), the RESIS-
Recharge phase saw a relegation of many smallholders to equity labourer status.  While such an 
intervention enhanced livelihood assets, strategies and outcomes for a relatively small 
proportion of smallholders, such as Renias Chauke of Makuleke (Section 6.9.1), the majority of 
subsistence food producers were marginalized and excluded from the scheme without 
compensation. By contrast, undifferentiated smallholders in other contexts, such as Phetwane 
and Krokodilheuwel, were compelled to wait for several years while floppy sprinkler irrigation 
infrastructure and technology was developed, and no effort was made mitigate the negative 
effects of displacement. Consequently, many smallholder households in Phetwane became 
more vulnerable and insecure, and coping strategies broadened to include rampant informal 
fishing activities.  
It seems likely that, when the NDA and LDA took the decision to concede to requirements by 
trade liberalization policies for governments to increase private sector roles while rolling back 
state support services, institutional actors were aware of the constraints to effective 
participation by black farmers in the globalised commodity sectors (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; 
Madonsela 2001 in Jacobs, 2001; Jacobs, 2001)157. It was too early, however, for the study to 
determine the impacts of smallholder involvement in value chains as equity labourers. A 
shadow-side that loomed though was that while trade liberalization policies, such as the World 
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture, compelled developing countries to phase out 
subsidies, exchange controls and trade barriers, they did not impose the same conditions in 
countries in the north (Jacobs, 2001). Effectively, the global market arena remained an uneven 
playing field for smallholders. Assumptions that contractual joint ventures and strategic 
partnerships would contribute to enabling black small-scale irrigation farmers to participate 
effectively in the highly competitive and globalised commodity sectors therefore needed to be 
tempered with realization of possible risks associated with capital intensive farming. 
                                                     
157 See Section 2.3.3. 
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8.4 JOINT VENTURE AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS  
Watts (1994:25) states that the notion of ‘contract’ is central to any understanding of the social 
integration of peasants into corporate relations of production. Contracts were used in the RESIS 
Programme to reduce ‘transaction costs’, coordinate links between farmers and agribusiness 
firms and integrate small-scale farmers into mainstream agricultural market chains. Effectively, 
they were the institutional mechanisms for minimizing the costs of market exchange and 
ensuring compliance, thus reducing supply-side uncertainty that is detrimental to the workings 
of industrialized agricultural market chains (according to Da Silva, 2005; Glover & Kusterer, 
1996; Little & Watts, 1994). Within the RESIS-Recharge phase in Limpopo Province, integration 
of smallholders into mainstream commercial farming entailed land consolidation, infrastructure 
development and formation of cooperatives and trusts that contract with private investors in 
multi-partite strategic partnerships.  
Findings from in-depth research in Hereford, Phetwane and Makuleke showed that in the 
earlier RESIS phases, smallholders in all three schemes received financial, material, technical 
and managerial support from government, private investors and, in the cases of Hereford and 
Makuleke, NGOs. Smallholder complemented such support with own investments time, labour 
and other resources. Findings also showed that these case studies were characterized by 
variations in the manner in which contracts were formulated and implemented. To an extent, 
variations were due to the positioning of contracts within different programmatic phases and 
geographical contexts.  
Hereford fell under auspices of the national pilot phase of the RESIS Programme, a cross-border 
district municipality designated an ISRDP poverty node, the LRAD Programme, Africare’s REAP 
Programme and an activist CSO for landless black farmers. Consequently, Hereford farmers 
enjoyed both broad-ranging support from a diversity of stakeholders and relatively high 
degrees of freedom regarding entry into joint venture contracts. Such freedom, in the absence 
of robust negotiation capacity and against a background of multi-stakeholder power dynamics, 
led to sub-optimal decisions and choices. Some of the contracts were unwritten, while others 
were predicated upon grossly distorted business plan projections. While all joint ventures 
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showed tangible increases in agricultural productivity, income failure became a persistent 
refrain in all but one instance. As problems of poor governance unfolded in project 
implementation, smallholders realized that it was not easy to sanction non-compliance and lack 
of accountability on the basis of unwritten contracts or verbal ‘understandings’.  
By contrast, Makuleke and Phetwane had similar contracts for joint cotton production with 
NSK, which were facilitated by project implementation agents acting on behalf of LDA under 
auspices of the Limpopo Provincial RESIS Programme. Makuleke’s joint venture fell under the 
the RESIS Phase 1 or ‘Water Care Programme’ and Phetwane’s was under the early RESIS Phase 
2. Both study sites were located in rural poverty nodes in impoverished former homeland areas, 
whereas Hereford was located in a former white commercial farming area within a district 
broadly designated a poverty node. Such context accounted for the variations between 
institutional arrangements for Makuleke and Phetwane, on the one hand, and arrangements 
for Hereford.  
Despite greater common background between Makuleke and Phetwane, there were some 
nuanced differences. Makuleke had stronger leadership and a greater degree of social 
organization and cohesion than Phetwane. These affected patterns of engagements with 
outsiders and private investors. Makuleke leadership managed to broker what seemed to be a 
more favourable three-year contract that accommodated subsistence food producers while 
targeting emerging commercial farmers (or petty commodity producers). Phetwane leadership 
did not veto the exclusion of similar informal farmers, and LDA allowed the private investor to 
use a one-size-fits-all approach. However, the elderly smallholders insisted on a precautionary 
approach and entered into a one-year renewable contract that was subject to successful 
financial performance in the first year. Consequently, when cotton joint ventures in both cases 
failed to yield expected incomes and petty commodity producers in both irrigation schemes 
became more vulnerable, Phetwane smallholders ‘walked away’ from the joint venture while 
Makuleke petty commodity producers remained hamstrung until the contract had run its 
course. Despite their greater degree of freedom, Phetwane smallholders subsequently became 
hamstrung for five years by LDA’s decision to halt production while development of floppy 
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irrigation infrastructure under RESIS-Recharge took place on all irrigation schemes in the Upper 
Arabie Balemi Trust area.  
With the emergence of RESIS-Recharge, LDA adopted a generic ‘strategic’ partnership contract 
that engaged petty commodity producers mostly to private investor AWC and/or AWC’s 
‘empowerment’ company, Temong cc. Makuleke, Phetwane and other appraised case studies 
were subject to similar contractual arrangements, while Hereford had come under jurisdiction 
of LDA but had not been included in such arrangements. The generic contracts invariably 
reinforced petty commodity producers’ equity labourer status and excluded subsistence 
farmers with no compensation for displacement as means to reduce transaction costs and 
maximize productivity. Transaction costs were also reduced through externalization of 
outstanding social and environmental issues. Although equity labourers’ management 
committees were delegated the task of dealing with social issues, such as theft and distribution 
of surplus produce, environmental issues, such as water pollution, were ignored. Benefit 
sharing schemes were inadequate and suggestions to prioritize displaced farmers went 
unheeded. Although the state-funded irrigation schemes were regarded to be community 
resources, of which a minority of petty commodity producers were allocated use rights, 
contracts made no provisions for compensatory benefit sharing for foregone resource use by 
communities.  
While financial performance largely met expectations, problems of non-compliance were not 
monitored and sanctioned. Problems of governance went unattended, leading to dissatisfaction 
and conflicts. RESIS-Recharge contracts did not address sustainability issues. Contracts showed 
that the strategic partnership model, like the earlier joint venture model, effectively privatized 
extension services. However, contractual provisions for exit strategies were not matched with 
implementation of provisions to train and capacitate farmers to enable them to eventually run 
their commercial enterprises. Contracts also made no provisions for post-project rehabilitation 
of the agricultural resource base and recapitalization of infrastructure.  
Although private investors committed their own resources to joint ventures and partnerships 
these were far lower than the significant state funding that went into irrigation scheme 
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development. In light of lack of provisions for rehabilitation and recapitalization, private 
investor contributions might ultimately be further exceeded by future state expenditure 
towards restoring and enabling irrigation schemes to maintain productivity and perhaps attract 
other investors. Effectively, what emerged from the study was that RESIS Programme contracts 
embodied a form of subsidized privatization. 
8.5 NURTURING RURAL LIVELIHOOD SECURITY WITHIN A HYBRID NEO-
LIBERAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY CONTEXT: DISCUSSION  
Alongside rural development and poverty focused programmes such as the ISRDP, adoption of 
RESIS Programme interventions was greeted with optimism in certain circles. Among 
agricultural economics scholars, contract farming was viewed as “a tool for empowering 
smallholder farmers in Southern Africa” (Kirsten et al, 2005). Contract farming was also seen as 
having a “considerable potential to integrate small-scale farmers in developing countries into 
export and processing markets and into the modern economy” (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). The 
study found, however, that contract farming arrangements, as formulated and implemented 
under auspices of the RESIS Programme in Limpopo Province, were limited in the extent to 
which they could enhance rural livelihoods.  
Study findings showed that the resurgence of contract farming in smallholder irrigation 
schemes in Limpopo Province created an elite group of black equity labourers and 
entrepreneurs while mostly ignoring livelihood interests of the poorest and most vulnerable 
among socio-economically differentiated smallholders. This confirmed Cousins’s (2003) 
perspective that ‘integrated rural development’, as conceived by neo-liberal economists, 
emphasizes the inclusion of petty commodity producers into the mainstream capitalist 
economy as a means of achieving ‘equity’ and ‘empowerment’ of HDIs, but in the process 
creates an elite class of petty commodity producers from among the ranks of the impoverished. 
The study found that such inequalities and marginalization were linked to predication of 
institutional arrangements upon a viewpoint by agricultural economics scholarls (e.g. Kirsten & 
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Sartorius, 2002) that it is often only the well-endowed and skilled who have the ability to be 
part of the coordinated chains and alliances.  
A survey of literature on the South African institutional context within which the RESIS 
Programme emerged (Chapter Two) showed that a diversity of agricultural economists, such as 
Van Zyl (1996), Terreblanche (1998) and Kirsten et al (1998) among others, were instrumental 
in shaping the agenda of transforming and integrating South African agriculture into rural 
development planning and, in particular, promoting black farmers’ empowerment and 
participation in commercial agriculture. Social science and political economy scholars strongly 
argued for a comprehensive poverty relief programme (e.g. Levin & Weiner, 1996; Delius, 1996; 
May et al, 1998). However, in the absence of practicable poverty-focused options (according to 
Terreblanche, 1998:49), the argument of the wealthy middle class that the only way to solve 
the poverty problem was to maintain a high economic growth rate prevailed. Terreblanche 
(Ibid.) ascribes the hegemonic influence of neo-liberals to fiscal constraints and lack of 
organizational capacity, which prevented the new ANC-led government from implementing a 
comprehensive poverty relief programme.  
8.6 TOWARD ENHANCED DECISION MAKING IN SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION 
SCHEME INTERVENTIONS: EXPLORATORY POLICY OPTIONS 
Revitalization of small-scale irrigation schemes in Limpopo Province has left a chequered trail of 
livelihood outcomes and strategies. Without detracting from achievements by RESIS-Recharge 
strategic partnerships in generating desired incomes for equity labourers, the RESIS Programme 
had yet to become robust in overcoming the preponderance of neo-liberal criteria for gauging 
‘viability’ and ‘efficiency’ of agricultural water use. There was a need for agricultural 
interventions to respond positively not only to broader national, regional and international 
trade liberalization policies and market-orientated approaches to productivity but also to the 
diversity and dynamism of local context-specific on-farm and off-farm livelihood interests and 
strategies.  
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It is easier perhaps to suggest in retrospect that the RESIS Programme interventions should 
have adopted more innovative ways of defining viability to include a broader set of criteria to 
ensure livelihood security. On the one hand, institutional actors had to grapple with an 
institutional context was in a state of flux and beset with political and ideological power 
dynamics among stakeholders involved in defining options for post-apartheid policy and 
practice. On the other hand, institutional actors had to re-orient their practice from top-down 
centre-driven approaches to participatory approaches that placed rural people’s diverse, 
complex and dynamic livelihood interests at par with economic growth objectives. Within such 
milieu, scholarly debates revolved around whether ‘rural development’ or ‘agrarian reform’ 
constituted a more effective approach to resolving challenges of rural porvety and inequality 
(Cousins, 2003). Furthermore, national, provincial and local imperatives for RESIS interventions 
had to intersect with a diversity of global and regional influences. Grappling with such 
complexity to formulate adequate constructs for interventions in smallholder irrigation 
schemes was therefore a daunting task for institutional actors tasked with ensuring 
effectiveness of interventions to support black farmers in smallholder irrigation schemes.  
By stating the above, however, this thesis does not seek to make an apology for shortcomings 
in the manner in which institutional actors handled revitalization interventions in smallholder 
irrigation schemes. Rather, the point put forward here is that, amid such contextual difficulties, 
institutional actors at policy and decision making levels should have considered certain 
fundamental factors, which would have provided guidance and principles.   
Firstly, the historical background of losses of livelihoods due to forced removals and the 
dispossession of land and other resources, which Platzky & Walker (1985) describe, placed an 
ethical imperative upon government and other intermediaries to ensure that agrarian reforms 
and rural development interventions did not lead to further erosion of livelihood assets for the 
historically disadvantaged and resource-poor in rural communities. Secondly, observations 
were that more than a decade since the advent of majority rule, South Africa retained the 
historical legacy of a highly polarized space economy. The spectre of poverty, inequality and 
uncertainty therefore persisted in contemporary South African rural settings (van Rooyen et al, 
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2001; May, 2000; May et al, 1998) as sector reforms, development interventions and poverty 
reduction strategies continued to fall short of resolving rural macro-economic policy challenges 
(DBSA 1999 in Everatt, 2004: 9; Goldman et al, 2002; Cousins, 2003; IDT, 2000).  
The second fundamental factor related to the National Constitution, which provides an 
overarching institutional framework and a common point of reference over meanings of what 
‘stability’ entails and therefore defines the social contract between government and citizenry. 
Section 25: 8 of the National Constitution’s Bill of Rights expresses a commitment by the state 
to take legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reforms in order to 
“redress the results of past racial discrimination” (South Africa, 1996). Implicitly, therefore, 
institutional actors were obliged to strike a balance between pursuit of economic growth and 
development objectives and securing rural livelihoods in smallholder irrigation schemes.  
In the drive to liberalize the economy and integrate smallholders into globalized agri-food 
systems while simultaneously addressing challenges of rural poverty and inequality, however, 
institutional actors adopted core-periphery models for economic growth and development. 
RESIS Programme practitioners sought to provide incentives to persuade the private sector to 
locate productive enterprises in marginal rural areas in the hope that multiplier effects would 
spread to rural hinterlands. A crucial point missed was that optimism about the “efficacy of 
spread effects from a planned growth centre to override backwash effects and promote 
meaningful development in the periphery” (according to Tapela, 1985) had long since been 
countered by evidence pointing to the existence of structural limitations inherent in Third 
World economies.     
On the basis of core-periphery conceptualizations for integrated rural development, the RESIS 
Programme emerged in tandem with ISRDP and, among others, smallholder irrigation schemes 
were identified to be ‘anchor’ projects for LED within rural poverty nodes. While government 
made significant investment towards rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure in the earlier phases 
of RESIS, the latter RESIS-Recharge phase saw a massive up-scaling of fiscal expenditure on 
developing floppy sprinkler and centre pivot irrigation infrastructure and technology. Such 
investments were intended to make smallholder irrigation schemes more attractive to private 
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investors and consequently more productive. The corollary, however, was that LDA became 
hard-pressed to justify the huge financial investments. As von Braun et al (1989) observes, 
technological change rarely occurs without commercialization. Infrastructure and technology 
development increasingly became drivers of agricultural commercialization. Realizing that black 
farmers faced significant constraints to effective participation in highly competitive global 
commodity markets, institutional actors chose contract farming to be a vehicle towards 
achieving both successful market-entry by smallholders and productivity-induced growth in 
rural areas.  
As joint ventures and strategic partnerships mushroomed in various smallholder irrigation 
schemes, the downside of neo-liberal approaches to reducing transaction costs and increasing 
productivity came to the fore. Both in infrastructure and technology development projects as 
well as joint ventures and strategic partnerships, institutional actors and private investors 
divested themselves of responsibilities to deal with social and environmental costs of 
infrastructure projects and commercially-orientated cropping regimes. Subsistence food 
producers were displaced and excluded without compensation from various irrigation schemes. 
Development of floppy sprinkler and centre pivot irrigation infrastructure and technology 
halted smallholder productivity for periods ranging from a few months to several years, without 
any mitigation of hardships or compensation to smallholders and local communities for 
foregone use of resources. Water pollution in at least one case resulted in fish deaths and 
destruction of food crops in riverside gardens downstream but contract farming enterprises 
failed to take ownership of the problem. 
Research findings suggested that RESIS Programme institutional actors did not acknowledge an 
internationally recognized need to institute and implement support measures for 
compensation, benefit sharing, resettlement and development of local and regional 
communities that are negatively affected by hydraulic infrastructure development and use (Van 
Wiclin & Warren, 1999; WCD, 2000; Cernea & Kanbur, 2002; Koenig, 2002; UNEP, 2007, 2006; 
World Bank, 2004, 1998,; World Bank Group, 2007). International best practice in hydraulic 
infrastructure development, which includes smallholder irrigation schemes, considers such 
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measures to be fundamental commitments and responsibilities of the state and investor 
towards affected people. Implementation of such measures is considered to be important in 
gaining public acceptance and ensuring that rights and risks of affected people and 
communities were appropriately recognized. Affected rural communities and displaced people 
therefore needed to be compensated for foregone use of agricultural resources. Contract 
farming enterprises should have contributed towards fair and equitable benefit sharing and 
post-contract rehabilitation of agricultural land and water resources and the recapitalization of 
infrastructure. Such measures could have contributed to eliminating state-subsidized 
privatization and reducing livelihood insecurity.  
8.7 CONCLUSION 
The study showed that agricultural commercialization, which was articulated mainly through 
contractual joint ventures and strategic partnerships, did not provide an adequate construct for 
addressing rural livelihood security within selected smallholder irrigation scheme communities 
in Limpopo Province. Given the pervasive poverty and vulnerability of people living in 
smallholder irrigation scheme contexts and macro-economic policy imperatives for addressing 
poverty and inequality, institutional arrangements for infrastructure and contract farming 
projects did not sufficiently reflect interests of poor and vulnerable people in such 
communities.  
Evidence from inception of joint ventures showed that risk was often downplayed as 
government officials and private investors selected crops and production arrangements that 
justified the high levels of fiscal investment in infrastructure and technology. Such decisions 
converged with farmers’ anticipation of high incomes, and any voices of caution were silenced. 
Gaps in institutional arrangements for project monitoring and accountability meant that 
problems were often detected too late, and mechanisms to avert similar pitfalls in future 
projects were either ineffective or non-existent. A robust framework for monitoring decision-
making processes was clearly requisite, both within site-specific joint venture projects and 
wider-ranging agricultural commercialization programmes. 
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Insights from project implementation revealed a general pattern whereby incomes from earlier 
RESIS joint ventures fell far short of expectations and institutional arrangements were not 
sufficiently structured to include social, environmental and recapitalization costs and benefits 
to local communities. With subsequent restructuring of latter RESIS-Recharge partnerships, 
most smallholders - except those of Hereford - were relegated to equity labourer status, in 
which they played little or no active roles in farming but drew significantly higher incomes from 
dividend shares in strategic partnerships.  However, such gains were achieved at the expense of 
livelihood security for the majority of subsistence-orientated farmers and local community 
members at large. In Makuleke, for example, many (273) subsistence food producers were 
displaced and excluded from smallholder irrigation schemes without compensation158.  
Although joint ventures and strategic partnerships were considered to be mechanisms by which 
smallholders would be assisted to enter mainstream commodity markets, constraints to 
effective participation by smallholders in highly competitive and globalized agri-food systems 
did not seem likely to be resolved by contract farming arrangements. Non-compliance by 
private investors with contractual provisions for smallholder capacity building and relegation of 
emerging commercial farmers to equity labourer status, in particular, seemed to reinforce and 
perpetuate dependency, with the possible result that such farmers would not be likely to 
establish their own niches within mainstream commodity markets.  
A number of commercially-orientated smallholders seemed to have realized this and therefore 
adopted livelihood diversification strategies, whereby they established their own market 
gardening enterprises outside the irrigation scheme and targeted local informal markets. Some 
of these farmers had successfully established niches within such markets, and were linking up 
with similarly orientated farmers, forming cooperatives and sharing information and strategies. 
Such strategies yielded desired incomes for the farmers concerned. Beyond RESIS-Recharge 
strategic partnerships, therefore, enhanced incomes also accrued directly and indirectly to 
                                                     
158 Epilogue: In the aftermath of the study in 2010, demands by displaced Makuleke subsistence food producers to 
be allowed access to land within the irrigation scheme were heeded. These farmers and other landless people who 
had established informal riverside gardens were re-allocated 0.1 ha plots in the irrigation scheme. For the latter 
group, such a move sought both to resolve conflicts that had erupted between riverside gardeners and livestock 
owners and to recognize these farmers need for livelihood and food security.      
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minorities of commercially-orientated smallholders with access to land within and/or outside 
state-funded irrigation schemes. The majority of equity labourers, however, were either 
constrained by landlessness or content with playing ‘arm-chair’ farming roles while earning 
dividends from yielding their land allocations to strategic partnerships.  
The significance of constraints that smallholders face in trying to enter and establish niches in 
global commodity production sectors seem to leave very little scope for black small-scale 
farmers but to resort to orienting their activities towards local informal markets. However, the 
survival of these farmers within the margins of mainstream economy is not assured. Economies 
of scale are in favour of supermarket chains, which are already making rapid in-roads into 
places and markets that have historically been domains of local petty-commodity producers, 
informal traders and formal retailers. 
Agricultural commercialization interventions will need to guard against marginalizing the 
majority of black farmers, who are less commercially-orientated than neo-liberal rent-seeking 
interventions would want them to be. For subsistence-orientated and survivalist farmers in 
smallholder irrigation schemes, access to agricultural resources within the schemes remains a 
critical safety net and component of a diverse and dynamic basket of farm-based and off-farm 
livelihoods. It seems possible that, under optimal RESIS Programme institutional arrangements, 
smallholder irrigation schemes can critically function as assets for rural livelihoods generation, 
diversification, adaptation, coping and survival and thereby enable enhancement of livelihood 
security for a broader set of farm-based and off-farm livelihoods than those of the narrow 
group of equity labourrs so far targeted.  
With respect to the issue of livelihood sustanibility, it is requisite that RESIS Programme 
practitioners should review the prevailing structure of institutional arrangements in order to 
take into account recent developments in international best practice for operationalizing 
sustainable MWID, which includes infrastructure development associated with smallholder 
irrigation schemes. ‘State-of-the-art’ in operational policy frameworks for dealing with macro-
economic aspects of MWID provides useful insights for the RESIS Programme. Such frameworks 
should be assessed for compatibility with South African constitutional imperatives and macro-
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economic policy frameworks, and innovative adaptations developed in alignment to local 
context-specific requirements for livelihood security. 
In the face of constraints that militate against black small-scale farmers’ entry into the highly 
competitive and globalised commodity sectors, it is perhaps worth re-thinking the prevailing 
preoccupation with economic viability in agricultural commercialization. Negative effects of 
joint venture failure on livelihoods of people residing in small-scale irrigation schemes point to 
a need for alternative approaches to addressing South Africa’s challenges of rural poverty and 
inequality. Cousins (2003) observes that, although it is clear that the deep poverty in rural areas 
requires radical measures, not least a redistribution of resources including land, a sustainable 
livelihoods approach that builds on the land-based livelihoods which rural people currently 
practice and enhances their economic value might be more appropriate than attempting to 
replace these livelihoods with fully market-orientated or commercialised approaches.  
Stephen Friedman's observation that attempts to deal with poverty are ineffective because 
they do not reflect what the poor want (Friedman 2005) suggests a need for greater  and more 
effective participation by the poor in shaping decisions that affect their lives. However, there 
are no guarantees that such measures will result in farmers taking decisions most appropriate 
to their interest. The reason is that, although farmers have limited powers to determine 
decisions pertaining to commercialization approaches, they nonetheless possess degrees of 
freedom to make choices. Such freedoms can unwittingly be used to make sub-optimal 
decisions, to the farmers’ own detriment. A case in point is that of farmers’ own preoccupations 
with earning incomes, demonstrated in all examined irrigations schemes. Farmers’ hunger for 
incomes has resonated with arguments by government officials and private investors to 
produce capital intensive high value crops, thus contributing to farmers’ exposure to risks 
associated with capital intensive farming. A possible way forward could therefore be for various 
stakeholders, particularly locally-based CSOs, to engage with farmers in defining the most 
appropriate approaches to enhancing livelihoods and well-being.  
Research findings showed that although the inception of RESIS joint ventures was greeted with 
optimism and renewed hope in certain circles within government, non-governmental 
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organizations (NGOs), the private sector and smallholder irrigation scheme communities, the 
performance of joint ventures and strategic partnerships largely fell short of expectations. The 
promise of higher incomes and improved livelihoods often remained elusive, while debts and 
potential losses of meagre household assets often loomed large, threatening to erode existing 
livelihoods and undermine government interventions. This was mainly because ‘viability’ in 
both the RESIS and RESIS-Recharge phases was narrowly seen in economic and technical terms. 
The need to justify fiscal expenditure progressively led to the replacement of subsistence 
production with commercially-orientated farming, and the replacement of affordable irrigation 
technologies with high-tech hydraulic infrastructure. Weaknesses in the monitoring of contract 
formulation and implementation meant that voices of the marginalized, poor and vulnerable, 
particularly the women and the elderly, were not heard.  
Research findings further revealed that RESIS-Recharge strategic partnerships did not 
meaningfully enhance the productive, managerial and marketing capacities of smallholders to 
ensure their effective participation in agriculture and the sustainability of local livelihoods. This 
thesis surmises that the emergence of the RESIS Programme amid neo-liberal macro-economic 
policy shifts meant that agricultural commercialization, as articulated through contractual joint 
ventures and strategic partnerships, created a small class of black ‘arm-chair’ farmers, who 
played little or no active roles and obtained few or no skills in commercial farming but 
perpetually depended upon and drew incomes from agri-business initiatives run by externally-
based agents. The thesis therefore raises the question: What was the rationale for joint 
ventures and strategic partnerships in the context of South Africa’s Agricultural Sector Strategy 
objectives for support to black farmers?  
Beyond livelihoods, the sustainability of RESIS interventions was precarious, given that 
contracts lacked provisions for the recapitalization of infrastructure and the rehabilitation of 
degraded land. Contracts also lacked mechanisms for equitable distribution of costs and 
benefits between direct beneficiaries namely, the contracted private partners and targeted 
smallholders, and indirect beneficiaries, who included the rest of members of local 
communities. Many of the smallholder irrigation schemes were located in communal lands 
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characterized by outstanding social issues associated with historical displacements of people 
and alienation of land, often with inadequate or no compensation and little or no access to 
benefits from infrastructure development. There was a need for RESIS Programme contracts to 
give attention to distributional issues, which posed a possible threat to the sustainability of LDA 
interventions.  
The conclusion is that the challenge of reducing rural poverty and inequality might not be 
resolved through existing institutional approaches to agricultural commercialization.  These 
facilitate an integration of resource poor irrigation farmers into the globalized mainstream 
commercial production sector, but this might reinforce socio-economic disparities and 
undermine the livelihoods of the poorest and most vulnerable members of the irrigation 
schemes. The thesis proposes a re-examination of the current conceptualisation, 
implementation and monitoring of joint venture and strategic partnership contracts. Context-
sensitive approaches are needed to avert possible losses of livelihoods and assets by resource 
poor smallholders and non-smallholding members of irrigation scheme communities. An 
improvement in the administration of joint venture contracts is particularly important. 
Although rural people in poverty nodes of Limpopo Province generally have yet to realize their 
capacity to hold local political representatives accountable, a more proactive and robust role by 
municipalities is required in order to ensure that local people’s interests are not subdued by the 
interests of private capital.  
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APPENDIX 1 MAP SHOWING MAKULEKE WATER SOURCES AND 
USES, 2009 
Source: Fieldwork, 2008 to 2009. 
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